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ABSTRACT 
 
This work deals with the strategies and processes of agrarian transformation currently unfolding in 
Ethiopia. In the last 25 years, Ethiopia has achieved one of the most impressive records of economic 
growth, through a strategy of agricultural-development-led industrialization. The strategy is expected 
mainly to help the country to achieve a middle-income country status in the near future, to bring about 
a structural transformation of the economy, to eradicate poverty and food insecurity. A major process 
of social and economic transformation is indeed pursued of the country’s agrarian base, which is still 
mainly made up by the smallholding peasantry. Therefore, the analysis of the current agrarian 
transformation process at issue here, deals primarily with the process of social and economic change 
envisaged by the developmental state for the peasantry. 
The analysis fits into a longstanding theoretical debate on the role of small-scale farming production in 
development and agrarian transition. Lately, the debate has focused on the combined leverage of a 
multidimensional range of global and local factors, which is fostering a rapid change in social and 
economic production, reproduction and exchange relations among the peasantry of developing 
countries. In this context, the mainstream approach to rural and agricultural development widely adopted 
by developing countries has sought to integrate small-scale farmers in outward-oriented and inter-
sectoral value chains. 
Along the same line, lately the Government of Ethiopia has started to implement a cluster-based 
approach to agricultural development, which holds an impressive potential for transformation. This 
work proposes an empirical-based study of the implementation process of agricultural clusters in South 
Wollo, a zone in the country’s central highlands. By providing an innovative contribution to the 
definition of the Ethiopian way to agrarian transformation, the analysis of the cluster-based initiatives 
provides insights into: the peasantry’s changing role in fostering development and structural 
transformation, the leverage of historical legacies and international influences on the adoption and 
implementation of the strategy, the developmental state’s practice and state-peasant relation. 
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KEY ACRONYMS 
 
ACC  Agricultural Commercialization Cluster 
ADLI  Agricultural-Development-Led Industrialization 
AGP  Agricultural Growth Project 
AISE  Agricultural Inputs Supply Enterprise 
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DA  Development Agent 
ECX  Ethiopian Commodity Exchange 
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EPRDF  Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
ESE  Ethiopian Seed Enterprise 
EPTP  Ethiopia’s Economic Policy During the Transitional Period 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
FCA  Federal Cooperative Agency 
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WB  World Bank 
WDR  World Development Report 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The peasantry of developing countries is currently undertaking an intense change process, shaped by the 
combined interaction of a multidimensional range of global and local factors. These changes have been 
analyzed from different perspectives and with different approaches that overwhelmingly share a 
common interpretation of the current period as having a heavy impact on the peasantry. This phase 
places peasantry and the governments of agrarian-based developing countries, before a set of challenges 
and opportunities to be faced and seized. On the success or failure of the strategy created to adapt to 
these changes, lays the foundation of the future of peasantry, and the state itself. 
By selecting the case of Ethiopia, the objective of this study is to explore the major dynamics of agrarian 
change that have been unfolding lately, and to outline the fundamental elements of its strategy for 
agrarian transformation. Since the establishment of the current form of state and government, Ethiopia 
has outperformed its neighboring countries in terms of economic growth and development. Even though 
the country started from a very negative situation, the trajectory undertaken by the Ethiopian 
Government has exceeded expectations and attracted the interest of a sound group of economists and 
development study scholars. In keeping with a mainstream approach to agrarian transition, since its 
inception the trajectory attributed considerable political and economic importance to the agricultural 
sector transformation project, which was to be achieved mainly through a rapid development brought 
about first and foremost by the smallholding peasantry. In spite of the progress achieved, the small-scale 
farming community still holds a fundamental role in the current industrialization and economic 
structural transformation process being performed by the country. Thus the definition of the Ethiopian 
strategy fundamentals is expected to provide useful insights for the investigation of the major dynamics 
of the present day agrarian transformation, with a particular focus on: impact on, and changing role of, 
smallholding peasantry; and the interaction of international influences, and local and political 
determiners. 
The study of African peasantries and agrarian capitalism development often encompasses the 
understanding of social and political contradictions that have ensued from colonial and post-
independence disputed land reforms, and state- and nation-building processes. Concerning the Ethiopian 
case, the absence of a colonial domination period has not prevented historical legacies from influencing 
and shaping contemporary socio-economic, as well as political relations, in the rural contexts. In fact, 
the access to, and control of land has constituted a defining factor of agrarian relations among peasants, 
communities and state actors in modern Ethiopian history. Many authors and scholars indeed, gather on 
the assumption that the ability of both the Imperial and the Derg regimes to assume and hold power has 
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been strongly affected by their capacity to control the land.1 (Chinigò 2015; Clapham 1988; Dessalegn 
2008b; Markakis 2011). 
«Land hunger» was the main driver of the territorial expansion realized by the late 19th century northern 
kingdom, which led to the creation of the Ethiopian Empire (Markakis 2011: 27). In collaboration with 
local chieftains, northern settlers evicted southern populations from their land and imposed a land-tenure 
system that ensured the central government surplus extraction from, and political control of, the country 
peripheries. At the same time, the «fluid land-tenure system» that ruled the central-northern rural space 
was mainly characterized by a combination of land-use and fief-holding rights that demarcated social 
differentiation lines and secured the ruling elite’s political and economic primacy (Hoben 1973: 13). 
The processes of state bureaucratization and modernization implemented in the second period of Haile 
Selassie’s reign established private property rights, and improved state administration capacity to collect 
taxes and to grant and withdraw land rights (Crewett et al. 2008). Ultimately, during the Imperial period, 
access to land was strongly influenced by political power imbalances; overall, peasants did not hold 
enough power to effectively claim land rights and, especially in southern territories, they were subject 
to growing exploitation and arbitrary power from northern settlers.2 
The unbalanced distribution of powers - deeply rooted in agrarian relations and institutionalized in the 
land-tenure system - and its negative effects on the agrarian economy, were among the most pressing 
claims of the 1974 revolution that brought to the consolidation of the Derg regime. Thereafter, the 1975 
land reform constituted the first step toward the implementation of agrarian socialism: it abolished 
landlordism and dismantled the local gentry in view of the replacement of the exploitative imperial 
agrarian relations with equal access to cultivation land (Dessalegn 2008b). According to the new 
agrarian system, every peasant was legitimated to claim land for cultivation, and decentralized structures 
of administration established at community level were expected to ensure the effective implementation 
of the principle of egalitarianism (Clapham 1988). Notwithstanding, the new setting did not change the 
uneven distribution of powers but, conversely, it deepened peasants’ subjugation to the state authority. 
As chapters 2 and 4 will describe in a more detailed form, the revolutionary system of tenure 
complemented other institutional reforms that expanded the mechanisms of economic exploitation and 
socio-political control of the agrarian society. Ultimately, in spite of the radical change generated, the 
new institutional setting perpetuated mechanisms of peasants’ domination, which again constituted a 
core revendication topic in the events that led to the establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia by the early 1990s. 
                                                     
1 - See Clapham (1988); Dessalegn (2008b); Markakis (2011); Chinigò D., Governance of the Land and 
Decentralisation in Ethiopia: Case Studies from Siraro and Deguna Fanigo, PhD thesis in International 
Cooperation and Sustainable Development Policies, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna, 2011. 
2 - Chinigò op.cit. 
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Therefore, despite this work embarks on an analysis of present day directions and mechanisms of 
agrarian transformation, in order to inform a comprehensive description and a complex interpretation of 
the topic, in the concluding sections of chapter 4 prominently the subject is approached from a long-
term perspective. It is indeed worth acknowledging here that the configuration of agrarian relations, the 
economic performance of the agricultural sector, the smallholding peasantry involvement in the agrarian 
transition process, and the question of land access and use have always been determinants in modern 
Ethiopian history. These evidences validate the objectives of this study and emphasizes its significance, 
for it proposes a delineation and interpretation of present day mechanisms of agrarian transformation as 
core determinants of the political-economic trajectory of the current government. 
The study is divided into four chapters. The first chapter aims to provide a useful theoretical framework 
to understand the major dynamics involved. The first part analyses the relevant literature from the studies 
on peasants and agrarian change, it explores the classic and contemporary definition of peasantry, it 
analyses the origin of the agrarian question debate, and provides a brief presentation of the main 
strategies for agrarian change. The second part of the first chapter analyzes the debate on the changing 
role of peasantry in developing countries in the past few decades. The third part explores some of the 
fundamentals of the mainstream strategy for agrarian transformation in developing countries, associated 
with the creation of spatial development initiatives and clusters to foster farming value chains. 
The second and third chapters retrace the trajectory of economic, rural and agricultural development 
policies undertaken by the government of Ethiopia since its establishment in 1991. The chapters are 
intended to explore the multidimensional and changing roles assigned to agriculture and smallholding 
peasantry through the decades, its partial alignment with the mainstream agrarian transformation model, 
and the international and domestic influences affecting its establishment process. The presentation 
follows a combined thematic-chronological order, to provide a relatively complete analysis of the most 
relevant policies, events and transformation that have taken place in rural areas. In particular, the second 
chapter analyses the first decade of transition from the Derg regime to the current forms of government 
and state, and the second decade of consolidation of the developmental state. The third chapter analyses 
the most recent period that is being shaped by the planned structural transformation of the economy, and 
the major evolutionary trends that are influencing agriculture and peasantry. As part of this trajectory, 
the cluster approach appears to be the leading strategy for agricultural and agrarian transformation with 
an impressive potential for change. 
The fourth chapter offers a groundbreaking empirical analysis of the process of implementation of 
agricultural clusters in Ethiopia. The fieldwork, carried out in 2016 in South Wollo, a zone in the central 
highlands, provides innovative evidence on the most recent evolution of the Ethiopian agrarian 
transformation strategy. Following an explanation of the setting of the study and of the main evidence 
gathered case by case, the aggregated data is discussed in light of the core fundamentals of the Ethiopian 
developmental state project and interpreted from a long-term perspective. The South Wollo cluster 
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analysis reveals elements of both continuity and rupture with the government of Ethiopia’s trajectory, 
and indicates the reappearance of historically embedded strategies for agrarian transformation and state-
peasant relations. Hence, the study provides unique and up to date evidence that provides useful 
empirical data on the role and implementation process of agro-based clusters in developing countries, 
and provides useful findings for the international debate on the changing role of peasants in these same 
countries. 
This work concludes the 3-year research carried out at the University of Bologna to attain the PhD in 
Global and International Studies conducted under the supervision of Prof. Mario Zamponi. The research 
has benefited from the special contribution by the Department of Social Anthropology of the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology, Trondheim; where I had daily exchanges with scholars with 
long-standing research experience on issues of agrarian change in South Wollo. Their amazing 
knowledge on the selected context has been vital towards developing an effective research methodology, 
and to understand the fundamental elements at stake. During the fieldwork that was conducted in 
Ethiopia in 2016, primary and secondary data were gathered from various governmental offices: the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Agricultural Transformation Agency, the Federal 
Cooperative Agency, the South Wollo Office of Agriculture, and other woreda and kebele level offices. 
The fieldwork was performed with the precious support of the College of Agriculture of the Wollo 
University, and more detailed methodological remarks can be found in chapter 4. Relevant contributions 
were also provided by representatives of the Ethiopian desks of FAO, UNIDO and Agenzia Italiana per 
la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo; and through personal communication with international experts and 
scholars that has taken place during the three-year period. 
I am very grateful to Prof. Mario Zamponi for his continued support and mentoring; to Profs. Svein Ege 
and Harald Aspen for their enlightening recommendations; to Drs. Teferi Abate and Davide Chinigò for 
their precious contributions. I am also thankful to the academic and administrative staff of the Wollo 
University with whom I had the opportunity to collaborate during a very intense period. 
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CHAPTER ONE – PEASANTRY IN THE XXI CENTURY 
 
Peasant is not a univocal term. The first appearance of the English word “peasant” occurred in late 
Medieval times, when a ruling elite settled in developing urban areas expressed the need to differentiate 
itself from the majority of people living in the countryside. At the time, the term referred to a diversified 
group of people living off the land, rural residents, rural poor people, agricultural workers, but also serfs 
and “simple” people with no specific connection to land and agricultural activities. While differentiation 
was the main purpose for which the term was coined, subjugation was the main aspect which defined 
that differentiation. Actually, the verb “to peasant” was used to describe an unequal power ratio between 
men or women, where one dominated over the other. Its derogatory nature was not an exclusive feature 
of the English language: very early on the French term “paysan” and other similar Latinate and Anglo-
Saxon forms of the term were used to connote rustic, ignorant, criminal, stupid, villain and other similar 
negative meanings (Edelman 2013). 
That implication lasted through the centuries and influenced both the origin and the subsequent 
development of studies on peasantry and peasants. In modern times, the distinction between “traditional” 
and “modern” has influenced a broad set of social, political, economic, anthropological analysis of rural 
populations and areas. Betrayed by their legacy, peasants - the poorest, most backward and most 
numerous portion of the nations - were considered as a hindrance for the cultural and economic 
development of society. Most of the intelligentsia of the industrialized, growth-oriented and urban-
centered Central and Western Europe - who were the first to address a systematic study of peasantry - 
was consequently shaped by that conceptual dualism. This entanglement was also easily noticeable in 
most of the ideologies and political doctrines which arose between the XIX and the XX centuries. The 
flourish of populism, socialism, nationalism and modernization theories both engendered and was the 
consequence of the claim for reversal of the unequal power ratio endured for centuries in Europe. The 
Western social researchers who first addressed the issue in sociological, anthropological, economic or 
political terms, «found themselves conceptually handicapped by the prevailing dualism of ‘pre-
industrial’ or ‘primitive’ versus ‘industrial’ or ‘modern’ societies» (Shanin, 1971: 289). The conceptual 
framework at their disposal was, indeed, markedly conveyed by the mainstream narrative of 
development based on the values of Western industrialized and democratic countries. 
In this chapter I will outline the theoretical debate encompassing this work. I will first address the origins 
of the studies on peasants, the theoretical framework of the classic agrarian question, and the main 
theoretical issues that arise from the debate on the agrarian transformation process. In the second part, I 
will outline the main elements of change for the peasantry nowadays, the most relevant global trends, 
and the theoretical debate that arises from the analysis of these factors. In the third and last part, I will 
outline the cluster theory, an agricultural transformation strategy that aims to adapt and integrate the 
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peasantry in these global dynamics of change. As I pointed out in the introduction, in view of the 
definition of the ongoing agrarian transformation process, the creation of agricultural clusters in Ethiopia 
constitutes the focus of the empirical-based analysis presented in this work; the third part of this chapter 
will provide useful insights into the cluster theory, its rationale, its success determiners, and the 
implications for public policy. 
 
1. Peasant Studies and Agrarian Transformation 
 
The first studies related to peasantry and peasants to be published in English were not able to transcend 
the narrative of the “primitive societies”. Nonetheless, the increase in interest in developing societies 
that marked the post-World War II period, promoted a conceptual rethinking of the terms of analysis. 
This was brought on by the need to better understand the development problems and prospects of the 
poor and newly decolonized countries, where peasants were the undisputed protagonists of the social, 
economic and political scenarios. The first studies on classic agrarian political economy represented 
important theoretical frameworks for the investigation of these issues, and for the definition of 
determinist theories and models of development. The affinity with Marxist studies turned out to be 
conceptually relevant mainly because of the similarities between the pre-capitalist agrarian systems 
studied by Marx, Lenin, Engels, Kautsky, Preobrazhensky, and those found in developing countries 
immediately following decolonization. The successful resurgence of theories and models of classic 
agrarian political economy among the rising studies on peasant and agrarian change was also fueled by 
the loud international echoes of numerous experiences around the world, where peasants played the 
main role in the struggle against Western capitalist imperialism.3 
While Marxists provided the ground-breaking analytical suggestions and insights for the development 
of studies on agrarian societies in the 1960s, the role played by peasants in worldwide experiences of 
national liberation and the constraints to the industrialization of poor and mainly rural-based countries, 
revealed the quest to overcome classic Marxism. In this regard, Moyo recently pointed out the relevance 
of the national quest for sovereignty in the analysis of the classics, discussing the Eurocentrism and 
industrial-biased focus of the mainstream debate in peasant studies (Moyo et al. 2013). Peasants needed 
to be at the center of attention not only within European borders, for their position in the transition to 
capitalism, in socialist primitive accumulation and in the class struggle with an emerging bourgeois 
democracy. Rather, as it became obvious from the Maoist experience, a new version of peasant studies 
was needed, that could engage effectively with the evolution process that was taking place in developing 
                                                     
3 - Bernstein (2009) reminds revolts in Mexico, Russia, Eastern and Southern Europe, China Bolivia in the 1950s, 
Vietnam and Algeria between the 1950s and the 1960s, Peru in the 1960s, Mozambique in the 1970s and Nicaragua 
in the 1980s. 
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countries: new forms of agrarian transformation, new models of development and new claims for 
democracy and independence coming from the countryside (Bernstein, Byres 2001). 
Hence from the 1960s, peasants started to be considered as one of the main structural reasons for the 
underdevelopment of those countries. New analytical terms were thus needed in order to approach the 
complexities of unexplored contexts. Contributions gathered from multidisciplinary researches, with a 
focus on sociology, anthropology and politics. In 1972, the spreading academic interest led to the 
organization of a Peasant Seminar at the University of London. The seminar was held in order to provide 
a stimulus for those major agrarian change issues that were attracting increasing interest, after being 
largely neglected and inadequately researched for so long; «[t]hose issues concerned peasantries and 
their social structures; the nature and logic of peasant agriculture; peasantries and their moral 
communities; and peasants and politics» (Bernstein, Byres 2001: 2). The seminar also gave birth to the 
Journal of Peasant Studies, a periodical that for decades has contributed greatly to the theoretical 
enrichment, and academic institutionalization of the studies on social and political structures and 
transformation process of peasants and agrarian societies in the developing countries. 
What the flood of new monographies and publications in the Journal and beyond preeminently revealed, 
was a widespread disagreement on the very core of the topic: what is a peasant and what are peasants. 
Different analytical purposes, ideological traditions and practical consequences were at the base of these 
divergences. At that time, one of the most interesting attempts to retrace the leading traditions of studies 
which analyzed peasantry as a specific type of social structure was provided by Shanin in the early 
1970s. Within this conceptual framework Shanin pointed out four major lines of thought: «the Marxist 
class theory, the ‘specific economy’ classification, the ethnographic cultural tradition, and the 
Durkheimian tradition» (Shanin, 1971: 291). According to the British sociologist, scholars who followed 
the Marxist tradition tended to study the peasantry in terms of power relationship, within a two-class 
model of society. Peasants were considered the leftovers of suppressed and exploited producers from 
pre-capitalist societies, with the agricultural surplus expropriation imposed by a powerful minority being 
their recurrent and distinctive feature. Within the specific economy classification, Shanin included all 
those scholars – mainly economic anthropologists like Polanyi and Dalton, reminiscent of Chayanov’s 
earlier work (Bryceson 2000a) – who viewed peasant social structure as being characterized by a specific 
type of economy. The distinctive feature of that type of economy was the consumption-based family-
farm, able to provide its components with a self-sufficient means of subsistence. The third tradition is 
linked to the literature of Eastern European ethnography and traditional Western anthropology. It makes 
reference to the literature which tended to envision peasants as representatives of an earlier national 
culture which lagged behind the rest of contemporary society. Lastly, the Durkheimian tradition - which 
includes most American anthropologists including Kroeber and Redfield - tended to see peasants in an 
intermediate position between the closed and self-sufficient sections of “traditional” societies, and the 
organic and functional sections of “modern” societies. 
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There are two main reasons whereby the proposed classification provides a useful framework to help 
understand the conceptual context which characterized the birth and growth of social studies on 
peasantry and peasants. First, Shanin demonstrated how pervasive and influencing primitive/modern 
dualism was in its approach to those research topics. Second, he pointed out both the divergences and 
the shared features among different lines of thought developed so far. As reported, each approach tended 
to associate different meanings to the peasant concept, but all of them generalized certain facts or 
characteristics in order to define peasantry as a social type. 
Obviously, the kind of generalization which appears here may lead to simplified interpretations. As a 
matter of fact, it is worth acknowledging that the concept of peasantry has not constituted a 
homogeneous axiom, not even in the first social studies of Marxist tradition. Recalling Lenin’s 
differentiations within the toiling peasantry - the small-peasantry, the semi-proletarian or parcelised 
peasant and the agricultural proletariat with a wage - Mintz (1974) underlined the heterogeneity of the 
term peasantry, claiming that nowhere do peasants form a homogeneous mass or agglomerate, but are 
always distinguished by multiple forms of internal differentiation. Furthermore, Eric Wolf claimed that 
peasants were typically divided into three types of domain (patrimonial, prebendal and mercantile) who 
could have coexisted in the same social order (Wolf 1966). 
Therefore, internal differentiations have not been overlooked in defining the essence of the peasantry as 
a social type. In the cases reported here, differentiations were pointed out as a sign of the changing stages 
of industrialization in the first example, as the result of political pressures and the historical context in 
Mintz’s case, and as shaped by relations of economic ownership by Wolf. De facto, homogeneity was 
seldom claimed, even in the first studies on peasants, demonstrating the complexity and 
multidimensionality of the concept. Thus, rather than aiming to give a picture of a homogeneous social 
group, the call for “peasantness” (Hobsbawm 1995) - quite widespread among the first studies on 
peasantry and peasants - was mostly intended to create sociological generalizations to be used as a 
paradigm for the analysis. After all, «a sociological generalization does not imply a claim of 
homogeneity, or an attempt at uniformity» (Shanin, 1971: 291). 
 
1.1. Peasants and Peasant Studies 
One of the main contributions to the theoretical and methodological debate that fuelled the beginning of 
the new peasant studies, was the first English translation of Chayanov’s book The Theory of Peasant 
Economy in 1966. The revival of the book which was written in the 1920s has to be placed within a 
process of conceptual rethinking which sought to deviate from mainstream thought. Hence, at the time 
of its first publication, Chayanov’s “peasant economy” represented one of the first and most debated 
cases of detachment from mainstream Marxist thought that was shaping the studies (and politics) of 
Russian agrarian society in the first decades of the 20th century. 
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Chayanov was among the first to claim that peasant societies and economies were not to be observed 
through the lens of classical economics based on capitalist production relations. Chayanov’s study 
focused on the description of the nature and logic of peasant agriculture according to new analytical 
terms, and the explanation of the essence of peasant farm organization as something able to subordinate 
the whole system of capitalist economy. As a consequence of his empirical studies of peasant farms 
carried out mainly in Russia, he remarked that peasant economies were composed of family economic 
units unaffected by the dynamics of hired labour. According to him, «the family labor product was the 
only possible category of income for a peasant or artisan labor family unit» (Chayanov, 1966a: 5). 
Therefore, rather than being studied in capitalist-related terms of wage, interest, rent and profit, the 
peasant farm had to be considered as a special organizational form where the amount of labor product 
is mainly affected by the size and composition of the working family, the ratio of working members, the 
productivity of the labor unit and the degree of self-exploitation of the workers (expressed in terms of 
labor-consumer balance, the balance between the satisfaction of family needs and the drudgery of labor) 
(Thorner 1966). Consequently, he reflected upon the relationship between family size and “sown area” 
in the search for the “optimum size” (Kerblay 1966), initiating the rise of an intense theoretical debate 
between neo-classical and structural approaches, with widespread practical evolutions of various 
development theories, some decades later. 
Another important intellectual stimulus to the emerging peasant studies came from the publication of 
Eric Wolf’s studies on Peasants (1966) and Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (1969). As claimed 
by Bernstein and Byres, together with Barrington Moore Jr.’s work on The Social Origins of the 
Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (1966), Wolf’s 
writings constituted and inspired major forms of critical dissent from the mainstream American academy 
of that period, whose main commitment was to highlight gaps in the habits of classic Marxism. Indeed, 
they embarked on historical and comparative studies of non-traditional geographical areas through a 
Marxist type lens, challenging the classic focus on Europe (Bernstein, Byres 2001). 
In Peasants, Wolf’s main focus was on the analysis of peasant social structure and dynamics. By using 
an anthropological approach that encompassed studies in Latin America and the Caribbean (mainly 
Mexico, Peru and Puerto Rico), he sought to describe the nature of «the majority of mankind» among 
different kinds of production, historical eras and social orders (Wolf 1966: vii). Indeed, he affirmed the 
existence of some defining common features among peasants, that is to say among rural cultivators who 
have lost the control over the means of production, in favour of «groups that do not carry on the 
productive process themselves, but assume instead special executive and administrative functions» 
(Wolf 1966: 3). According to his statements, the process of functional division of labour between 
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farmers and rulers, which he names «civilization», distinguishes the «peasants from the primitives».4 
The passage from rural farmers to peasants is closely connected to the creation of a surplus value system. 
In peasant societies, the surplus production goes beyond the replacement and ceremonial funds, the 
former intended to ensure production and reproduction for the household, and the latter to fulfil social 
responsibilities connected to living in the community. Peasants are distinguished from primitive farmers 
by the production of a «fund of rent», namely a fund that in various forms is transferred from the «source 
of labour and goods» to «someone [who] exercises an effective superior power, or domain» (Wolf 1966: 
10). Addressing the peasant as an economic agent and at the same time as the head of a household – 
with particular reference to Chayanov’s concepts and works5 – Wolf approached the study of peasants 
in different forms of domain, forms of trade, social orders and relationships. 
Barrington Moore Jr embarked on a study about the different roles played by classes of rural dwellers 
in the process of state formation in modern times (Moore 1966). His analysis was intended to 
demonstrate, within this process, the importance of the struggles between agrarian power- and land-
holder classes and the subordinated peasantry. Going beyond the classic European focus, Barrington 
Moore Jr concentrated on the experiences of the UK, France and Germany, as well as Japan, US, China 
and Russia, and produced an historical and comparative study of the industrialization process in these 
countries. His work demonstrated that the structure and nature of the agrarian societies had an influence 
on the outcome of the transition to modern and industrial states. Particularly, from his historical analysis 
peasantry (as a class) proved to have played a leading role in the development of industrialized societies 
in the case of Russia, China and (marginally) France. Thereafter, pointing out the close relationship 
between the industrialization process and the transition to democracy, Barrington Moore Jr claimed the 
need to envision peasantry as a decisive force in both an economic and a political sense. 
Another important contribution to the theoretical debate that characterized the birth and origins of the 
studies on peasants came from Teodor Shanin (Shanin 1971). Aiming to transcend the classic 
primitive/modern dualism and in order to formulate a sociologically comprehensive and generalizable 
definition of peasantry, Shanin defined peasant society as a specific type of social structure composed 
by four essential inter-linked facets. First, the peasant family as the basic unit of a multi-dimensional 
social organization; second, land husbandry as the main means of livelihood for the consumption-based 
peasant family; third, a specific traditional culture related to the way of life of small village communities 
characterized by regular personal contact, lack of anonymity, high level of homogeneity, mutual 
identification, ideological solidarity and egalitarianism; fourth, the «underdog» position, that is to say, 
                                                     
4 - He does not accept the narrative of “tradition against modernity”, notwithstanding he includes in his analysis 
both the social and «ideological» orders to which peasants partake, the latter being conceived as an order of 
symbolic understandings consisting of acts and ideas, of ceremonial and beliefs with expressive and coping 
functions for the peasant and its community (Wolf 1966: 96). 
5 - He also identified «the perennial problem of the peasantry» as the search for the balancing of the multifaceted 
«demands of the external world against the peasants’ need to provision their households» (Wolf 1966: 15). 
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the subjugation to powerful outsiders. Subsequently, he also claimed that, since the peasant economy is 
characterized by a low level of institutional specialization that differentiates it from the free-market 
economy - that is to say that social units coincide with economic units –, «the specific modus operandi 
of the peasant family farm places in doubt the usefulness of economic models rooted in the reality or 
the assumptions of a free market» (Shanin 1973: 72). Therefore, according to Shanin, non-economic 
factors had to be included in the study of the peasant economy. 
The abovementioned scholars and their works should be here considered for their extremely innovative 
propositions, and for the contribution they brought to the definition of a conceptual framework for the 
emerging peasant studies, responding to the quest for new terms of analysis in the study of new issues 
and patterns of agrarian transformation. Their main innovation partakes to the fact that they considered 
the peasantry as a «closed» social group (Wolf 1986) in which members share some common and 
defining characters. These characters constitute the core of peasant essence that express a distinctive 
internal logic, no matter whether cultural, sociological, economic or in some combination. The forms of 
interaction and exchange that such a powerless social group have with other actors, cannot but reflect 
its subjugated position and result in various forms of oppression and appropriation external to the inner 
essence (Bernstein, Byres 2001). 
The acknowledgement of the existence of some kind of peasantness was afterwards defined as peasant 
essentialism. As noticed, most of the aforementioned definitions were influenced by methodological 
essentialism, for they tended to define the concept of peasantry through the indication of some distinctive 
characters. In the highly-politicized context that characterized the period of origin of the peasant studies 
(mainly associated to the latest interest on developing countries), methodological essentialism was 
sometimes associated to varieties of populism that resulted in the celebration of the resistance of 
peasants and peasantness from the modern legacies of its traditional subjugation and from tendencies of 
disappearance engendered by different external pressures (Alavi 1973; Meillassoux 1973; Mintz 1973; 
Hobsbawm 1973). With specific reference to developing countries, the influences of populist ideological 
stances inspired the formulation of theories of development focused on the support of agriculture, and 
in particular of peasant economy, for the overall economic growth. 
At the dawning of the studies on peasants, essentialism was challenged by alternative approaches 
inspired by, and aspiring to a materialist political economy of agrarian structure and change, basically 
resurged in the 1960s.6 These latter approaches tended to analyze peasantries through their locations in 
different historical and economic contexts, as shaped by different modes of production and embedded 
in different social formations. Instead of focusing on distinctive and common traits of peasantries in 
different historical, cultural and economic environments, these approaches considered the peasantries 
                                                     
6 - For a presentation of the most appreciated applications of the materialist approach to issues of agrarian change, 
in the Journal of Peasant Studies, see Bernstein, Byres (2001). 
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as constituted through their relations with other classes and entities. In opposition to the external 
oppressions that put a challenge on the core of the (essentialist) peasantry, these alternative approaches 
looked at the processes of internalization of such entities in diverse social and economic arrangements 
of peasant life, as constitutive dynamics of the peasantry. These materialist approaches mainly observed 
agrarian structures and society as featured and challenged by power relationships between classes and 
different modes of production. It is through this critical study method that some of the most enlightening 
interpretations of patterns and trends of agrarian change have been drafted, among both the classic and 
the contemporary scholars. The synthesis of the classic theoretical debate on the agrarian political 
economy is now presented, in order to uncover the historical and conceptual underpinnings behind some 
of the most successful critical perspectives of contemporary agrarian change. 
 
1.2. The Classic Agrarian Question 
The theoretical debate on classic agrarian political economy focused on the definition and overcoming 
of the obstacles posed by the agrarian societies and economies to the «overall development of either 
capitalism or socialism […] in a particular national social formation» (Byres 1991: 10). The «continuing 
existence in the countryside of a poor country of substantive obstacles to an unleashing of the forces 
capable of generating economic development, both inside and outside agriculture» has been traditionally 
defined as the agrarian question (Byres 1991: 9). In the following sections, a short review of the origins 
and development of the debate on the agrarian question is now presented, as interpreted by some of the 
main representatives of the agrarian political economy school. The chronicle of the agrarian question is 
a useful instrument for introducing the study of the Ethiopian pathway to development and change. From 
a historical perspective, the quasi-feudal administrative system under the Imperial regime had started 
some forms of capital accumulation and differentiation among peasants. During the Derg period, the 
transformation of the backward peasants into waged agricultural workers was driven by the classical 
mechanism of surplus extraction from agriculture, in view of the creation of an industrialized society. 
In the Ethiopian ruling coalition’s project, the small-scale farmers are the protagonists of the envisaged 
structural transformation of the economy, where industrialization is expected to originate from the 
development of the agricultural sector and the commercialization of subsistence farming. 
The agrarian question arose over a century ago, in close connection with Marx’s and Marxists’ studies 
on the genesis of capitalism. As we all know, Marx focused on the social, political and economic 
dynamics of development of a capitalist system of production, with the purpose of defeating and 
subverting it in order to create a more prosperous and equal society. Defining capitalism as a production 
method where capital is the principal means of production, Marx described the emergence of capitalism 
as an exploitative and inhumane process that changes social property relations and creates contrasting 
material interests between capital and labour (Preobrazensky 1965). In Marx’s thought, the emergence 
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of capitalism was conductive of its transcending mechanisms through the creation of a working class 
freed from the ownership of the means of production, free to sell its labour-power, and thus able to 
overcome capitalism itself. In the countryside, these dynamics were hampered by the unproductive 
structure of the small-scale peasant producers, who combined elements of being petty capitalists and 
labour, thus hindering the development of a capitalist system of production, and the forces able to 
overturn it (Akram-Lodhi, Kay 2010). 
As brilliantly presented by Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristobal Kay in a recent essay, in The Capital 
(1867) Marx analyzed the English enclosure model in order to explain the concepts of primitive 
accumulation and emergence of capital in agriculture (Akram-Lodhi, Kay 2010). In the “classic” case, 
described also by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, as capitalism advanced, the expropriation of land from 
the small-scale agricultural producers created a class of landless agricultural waged workers who faced 
a class of capitalist tenant-farmers (beneath the dominant landlord class) (Bucharin, Preobraschensky 
1921). The logic of primitive accumulation encloses the establishment process of social capitalist 
relations in agriculture (Wood 2009), which is gradual and can take differentiated and hybrid forms in 
different countries and eras. It is a complex process that encounters a large number and wide range of 
obstacles for its complete fulfillment: for these reasons, throughout the different historical eras and 
societies only partial and limited versions of it have been reached. Indeed, from the interaction between 
expropriation dynamics and the coping mechanisms of the small-scale peasant producers, the latter often 
ends up as a hybrid class still tied to the control of the means of production but not free to sell its labour-
power. According to recent literature, this constitutes Marx’s main issue for the agrarian question: that 
is to say, the main obstacle for the creation of capitalist social relations in agriculture, and in turn, for 
the creation of the necessary pre-conditions for their subversion. 
As Marx acknowledged the existence of different paths towards dispossession and primitive 
accumulation in different countries and eras, he also admitted the existence of multiple solutions for the 
agrarian question. By contrast, Frederich Engels analyzed the agrarian question embedded in the 
contemporary historical and political context he was living in. While Marx presented a (mainly) 
economic analysis of general patterns of emergence of agrarian capital and of rural capital accumulation, 
Engels focused his study on the contemporary political implications of the agrarian question, 
emphasizing the only viable solution to it: the alliance between the urban proletariat and the peasantry 
(Akram-Lodhi, Kay 2010). He focused his analysis on the major political effects caused by the opening 
of the European food markets to American, Australian and South African agricultural frontiers, as a 
result of imperialism. In The Peasant Question in France and Germany (1894) indeed, Engels argued 
that, due to the prevalence of small-scale peasant producers, the European food production structure was 
not able to compete with the cheap grain produced outside of Europe. Therefore, the internationalization 
of the food markets was forcing peasants to leave their land to larger-scale capitalist production (Araghi 
2009). 
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Thus Engels interpreted the agrarian question of his time as an agrarian question for and about labour, 
embedded in the collapse of peasant livelihoods (the so-called “peasant question”), to be solved by the 
political alliance of the peasantry with the more self-conscious urban working class. The “peasant 
question” and the matter of the disappearance of the peasantry were reframed a few decades later within 
the methodological essentialism discussed above, and still constitutes one of the most discussed issues 
in contemporary peasant studies and studies of agrarian change concerning globalization trends. 
While Engels deviated partly from Marx’s original understanding of the agrarian question, later on - in 
the same last decade of the 19th century - Karl Kautsky and Vladimir Lenin readdressed the problem 
within the classic, general and structural concern: in terms of the appearance of capital in agrarian 
societies, dynamics of rural capital accumulation and transformation of social property relations. As 
noted by Byres, with Kautsky and Lenin «the concern becomes the extent to which capitalism has 
developed in the countryside, the forms that it takes and the barriers which may impede it» (Byres 1991: 
10). In one of his most quoted sentences, Kautsky defined the agrarian question as «whether and how 
capital is seizing hold of agriculture, revolutionizing it, making old forms of production and property 
untenable and creating the necessity for new ones» (Kautsky 1988: 12). Kautsky and Lenin shared an 
interpretation of the agrarian question embedded in the concept and dynamics of commoditisation of the 
agricultural production. According to the authors, the growth of the industrialized form of production in 
the countryside is responsible for the appearance of capital in agriculture through the increase of 
commerce and the expansion of productive relations based on market forces. The increased 
pervasiveness of capital- and market-led relations in agricultural production and trade entails a 
transformation of the peasantry into different classes. Following Marx’s thought, the petty commodity 
producing peasantry transforms materially and socially into a class of waged agricultural labourers, free 
to sell their labour-power to a capital-accumulating class (Araghi 2009; Bryceson 2000a). 
The differentiation process within the peasantry is largely discussed by Lenin, whose works on 
socioeconomics and political sociology point out that the appearance of capital in agriculture entails the 
breakdown of the petty commodity producing peasantry into big landowners, big peasants, middle-
peasants, small peasantry, semi-proletarians, and agricultural proletariat. As noticed by Bernstein 
(2010), the distinctive character of each class identified by Lenin is constituted by the degree of 
exploitation they are able to carry out over the others; the exploitation occurs through the expropriation 
in capital of the surplus value produced by the waged labourers. The appearance of agrarian capital is 
thus engendered – as Marx argued – by the transformation (or liberation) of the labour power of a waged 
class into surplus value, to be expropriated and accumulated in capital by an exploitative class (Akram-
Lodhi, Kay 2010). It is worth noting that both Kautsky and Lenin admitted that these mechanisms are 
not structurally replicable in every country or era, and that there is not a univocal pathway for the 
transformation of the petty commodity agricultural producers. However, they assessed – particularly 
Lenin – the importance of the study of these dynamics of differentiation and change of social relations 
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in agricultural production as the core processes of agrarian transformation suttending the agrarian 
question. 
 
1.3. The Agrarian Question and Agrarian Transition 
The essays and contributions summarized briefly so far, basically shared a common practical and 
political aim represented by the subversion of capitalism in European countries, in the pre- First World 
War period. As pointed out by Byres (1991), the experience of the Russian Revolution contributed to a 
progression of the meaning and conceptual framework classically associated to the agrarian question. 
With the birth of the Soviet Union, a revolutionary party acquired the rule of a largely rural and agrarian 
country, with the purpose of subverting its ongoing transition to capitalism. The success of the revolution 
in Russia raised new questions and issues, which the classic debate on the appearance of agrarian capital 
and agrarian waged labour had no answer for. The conceptual framework within which the agrarian 
question was configured until then, evolved into historical materialism and sought to provide useful 
schemes and practices of agrarian transformation (Akram-Lodhi, Kay 2010). Mostly, it included issues 
related to the ways agriculture and the petty commodity production peasantry promoted or hindered 
capital accumulation within or without agriculture itself, during the structural transformation process of 
the economy. 
This main change occurred with the so-called Soviet industrialization debate, which took place in the 
newborn Soviet Union between 1924 and 1928. At the time, agriculture represented the major (even 
though not exclusive) source of income and surplus for the national economy, and was therefore 
considered essential to finance the transition to socialism. Thus the debate concerned the definition of 
those agricultural and peasant-related policies that would have been better to promote the structural 
transition of the national economy to socialism: in other words, how to boost the economy, through 
agriculture.7 The debate developed around two main approaches: the first was supported by Nikolai 
Bukharin and endorsed by Chayanov. Bukharin’s main argument was that the economic growth of the 
Soviet Union was to be achieved through a rapid improvement of peasants’ livelihoods, by creating the 
commercial circumstances necessary for the better-off peasants to increase their food and non-food 
agricultural production (Kay 2010). According to this approach, by following this pathway, the peasant 
economy would have been able to create the surplus product and value needed for the cities and the 
industry to develop; in other words, the stimulus for industrialization would only come with the 
enrichment of the peasantry. The idea of enriching peasants has been contested by a second line of 
thought, pioneered by Preobrazhensky (1965), who viewed peasant farming and their poor productivity 
                                                     
7 - In Byres’ words: «The agrarian question became, in part, a question of the degree to which agriculture could 
supply that surplus, the means by which the fledgling socialist state might appropriate such surplus, and the speed 
and smoothness of transfer» (Byres 1991: 10). 
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as obstacles to socialist transition. Preobrazhensky envisaged the transition to a socialist economy 
through the conversion of peasant agriculture into large-scale cooperatives and collective communities 
owned by the state where mechanization permitted higher production, and the manipulation of the terms 
of trade against agriculture and in favour of industry. The nationalization of the productive sectors and 
of all the sources lying outside the state economy represented the precondition for the actualization of 
the accumulation of all material resources in the hands of the state: the primitive socialist accumulation. 
Only in these conditions, the proletariat was considered able to seize hold of power and to create a 
socialist economy (Preobrazhensky 1965; Kay 2010; Akram-Lodhi, Kay 2010). According to 
Preobrazhensky and his supporters, this production system would have allowed the expropriation of all 
agricultural surplus to then use it to finance the socialist industrial sector. 
Preobrazhensky contested the opponents, whose intentions were to replicate capitalist-like dynamics of 
surplus generation and accumulation, and to create a proto-capitalist class of peasants (kulaks) that 
would have acted for its own purposes, against the socialist transition. While Chayanov’s model of 
peasant economy excluded this possibility by affirming that the logic of the family-farm was 
reproduction, not accumulation for its own sake (Bernstein 2010; Chayanov 1966b); Bukharin resolved 
this risk through the proposition of an alliance between the peasants and the urban working class. 
Nevertheless, the debate was won by Preobrazhensky and resulted in the transfer of increasing 
agricultural commodities and financial resources to the urban areas, at the expense of the peasantry (Kay 
2010). 
As observed by Byres (1991), the Soviet experience engendered an expansion of the conceptual 
framework that previously characterized the agrarian question. In the second half of the 20th century, the 
agrarian question has been revisited, broadened and re-conceptualized in different forms, as well as 
applied to various contexts. It was particularly revitalized for (and thanks to) the new academic and 
political interests in the developing countries that marked the post-WWII period. Within colonial or 
post-colonial rules, those almost-entirely pre-capitalist agrarian societies were to begin processes of 
structural transformation of their economies that represented an unmissable opportunity to understand 
the trends and patterns of agrarian transformation. Therefore, the studies of the classical agrarian 
question represented the basic conceptual framework over which new areas for development theories, 
as well as theories of agrarian transition were developed. 
In this regard, the exchange that took place between Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy in the 1950s dealing 
with the process of transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, contributed meaningfully to a 
revival of the debate.8 Subsequently Hilton and Brenner endorsed the two contrasting positions, 
                                                     
8 - The controversy dealt with a classic theme in Marxist-analysis, represented by the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism in Europe. With reference to the English case, Sweezy supported the thesis according to which the end 
of feudalism was connected to the expansion of trade, on the contrary Dobb argued that the prime mover was the 
transformation of the relations between lords and peasants (Wood 2009). 
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providing a significant contribution to the study of the dynamics of property relations, class structures, 
relationships and struggle, in agrarian transition processes (Brenner 1976). The relationship between 
classes became a crucial theme in the studies of peasants and agrarian change in the second half of the 
20th century. Henry Bernstein readdressed the issue by stating that in capitalist economies, production 
and reproduction are structured universally (but not exclusively) by class relations (Bernstein 2010). In 
this regard, he proposed a successful reconceptualization of the classic agrarian question through an 
analytical deconstruction of class relations and dynamics into three problems. The first regarded the 
structure and dynamics of the rural production process, classically related to the analysis of the changing 
relations of property and labour; the second problem dealt with the ability of agriculture to supply 
surplus for industrialization and structural transformation; the third problem concerned rural politics, 
namely the ways in which variations in the production or accumulation patterns were causing a political 
response by the rural dwellers. 
Since its resurgence in the 1960s, the agrarian political economy dealt with three broad themes: 
transitions to capitalism in their original European and Russian versions; the histories of agrarian 
systems in colonial Africa, Asia and Latin America; the relevance of the former to the prospects and 
problems of industrial and national development in now politically independent countries. All these 
historical and contemporary concerns have been involved in (and connected by) the construction and 
interpretations of the agrarian question in both socioeconomic and political terms (Bernstein 2016). 
 
1.4. Strategies of Agrarian Change 
The historical-structural approaches to agrarian political economy were by far the most actives and 
influential in the early development of the peasant studies, and before (Harriss 1982). As the 
implementation of the collectivization programs in the Soviet Union demonstrates, their influence went 
beyond the pure academic and theoretical debate, envisaging models and practices of development and 
agrarian change. Thereafter, the conceptualization of the agrarian question in economic and 
developmental terms, affected the evolution of the principles of development during the second half of 
the 20th century, especially in those countries that chose to embark on a transition to socialism.  
Unquestionably, the development course expressed by Marxist’ insights was linked to the shift from 
agrarian to industrial-based national economies (Bryceson 2000a), and the emergence of development 
economics as a distinctive area of study in the 1950s reflected such conceptual underpinnings. In that 
period, a model of economic development that provided an economic basis for development policies in 
the developing countries made its appearance: integrated with an industrialization-biased interpretation 
of Lewis’ dual-economy model, the so-called modernization theory sought to analyze the developmental 
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pathway as a linear transition from a traditional economy to a modern one.9 In this regard, the 
agricultural production systems in the developing countries were described as backward sectors, and 
considered to have negligible prospects for an increase in productivity or growth. Since the agricultural 
(subsistence) sector was characterized by low productivity, its role in economic development was meant 
to provide manpower for the industrial (capitalist) sector. This approach gathered some insights from 
the classic debate on the agrarian transition, and reframed it through the primitive/modern dual 
conceptualization of the peasantry. 
However, starting from the 1960s, a vast quantity of essays and researches were published by various 
social science branches, sharing the same awareness that the economic growth of an agrarian-based 
country could depend solely on the production and accumulation capacity of the agricultural sector, thus 
focusing all the attention on the latter. Of utmost importance for the success of those ideas, in 1961 
Johnston and Mellor discussed Lewis’ theory calling for an appropriate “balance” of resource allocation 
between agriculture and industry, for the development of economically poor countries. Drawing 
historical confirmation from the Japanese and Taiwanese experiences, they claimed that agricultural 
development was necessary for overall economic growth for food provision, export expansion, the 
transfer of manpower from agriculture to non-farming sectors, capital formation and growth of rural 
incomes (Johnston, Mellor 1961). Their essay initiated and fostered the birth and successful diffusion 
of new theories and strategies of development concerned with the role of agriculture in transforming 
economies, in Cold War world times and thereafter. 
The proposition and application of these principles represented the space in which the classic agrarian 
political economy recovered, setting off a period of intense production of studies of peasantries and 
agrarian change in both historical and comparative perspectives. This resurgence is to be considered in 
dual relationship with the increase in new studies on peasants and peasants’ societies, discussed above. 
The Marxist theory gave rise to a vast literature focused on the position of peasantries vis-à-vis the 
capitalist world market and post-colonial nation-states that covered the developing countries in the 
1960s and 1970s: it is sufficient here to mention the cutting edge Banaji, Kay and Meillassoux (Bryceson 
2000a). This is not to say that Marxist and neo-Marxist social scientists, among whom the debate on the 
agrarian question lived on for decades, basically endorsed the policies of rural development carried out 
through the decades in the developing countries, mainly with the support of Western donors. On the 
contrary, their main contributions were related to agricultural and rural development practices, which 
tended to be critical of those interventions, emphasizing often neglected patterns of agrarian change as 
an expression of unequal power relationships, class struggles, differentiation within the peasantry, 
labour exploitation, expropriation and dispossessions. However, there is no doubt that the 
                                                     
9 - Particularly evident in Rostow’s book The Stages of Economic Growth: a non-Communist Manifesto (1960). 
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implementation of such mainstream theories of development represented an essential space for debate, 
that basically permitted the agrarian question narrative to survive. 
In post-World War II, the political economic directions that undeveloped and developing countries 
undertook, were influenced heavily by the worldwide competition between two ideologies rooted in the 
United States of America and the Soviet Union. In mostly-agrarian societies, the competition concerned 
mainly the ways the economic growth had to be supported and achieved, and the main subjects of 
discussion concerned land tenure systems, agrarian reforms, property rights, the optimal farm size, and 
the role played by the state in regulating the markets. Very briefly, the mainstream theories and practices 
of agrarian change adopted in the post-WWII period, evolved as follows: in those countries that were in 
the early stages of capitalist development between 1950s and 1960s (Byres 1982), a “bimodal strategy 
of agrarian change” focused on the crash modernization of the agricultural sector through the 
concentration of resources in a highly commercialized subsector of capitalist farming (Johnston, Kilby 
1982) was widely pursued, in accordance with the classic conceptualization of the agrarian transition 
which sought to extract surplus value from agriculture in order to feed industrialization. In the following 
decades, gathering evidence from the successful green revolution carried out in East and South Asia, 
among the studies of agrarian change many authors contested this mainstream strategy and contributed 
to a paradigm shift toward the neo-classical model, according to which peasant farmers are rational 
economic agents making efficient decisions (Schultz 1964; Williams 1982), and toward policies for 
agricultural transformation associated mainly with the diffusion of improved farming technologies 
(Timmer 1988). These neo-populist approaches argued against the “urban bias” of the most diffuse 
approaches to agrarian change (Lipton 1982), supported the existence of an inverse relationship between 
farm size and productivity, and informed the emphasis on land reform and distribution (Harriss 1982). 
Subsequently, the focus was on increasing yields on efficient small farms connected to integrated 
projects of rural development, for poverty alleviation (Chambers 1983) and empowerment (on the 
legacies of Sen’s “capabilities”) that afterwards encompassed bottom-up, grassroots and participatory 
methods. The implementation of rural development policies was then connected to Washington and 
post-Washington consensus principles, environmental sustainability and gender-related inequalities. 
From an historical perspective, agrarian transformations have emerged as the processes of change of 
prevalent agrarian patterns, in turn grounded on property relations, division of labour, land tenure, power 
relations, peasants’ mobility, class structures, farm size, farming practices and market relations. With 
regard to these factors, the complex and rapid evolution that the global peasantry and agrarian systems 
were subjected to in the second half of the past century, has been studied from several prospects and 
different views. The historical-structural approach to agrarian transformation inspired by Marxists and 
neo-Marxists constitutes just one of the lines of thought through which the issues have been studied; 
undoubtedly it has been, and still is, the most complex, active and critical in terms of its theory, but also 
of great inspiration for alternative experiences of rural development. For these reasons, the contribution 
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of this doctrine to the birth and success of the peasant studies and studies of agrarian change has been 
acknowledged and explained in the short resume of the classics proposed in the previous paragraphs. Of 
utmost relevance to this study, the classic agrarian question sought to identify the major obstacles to the 
development of mostly-rural societies and economies, and it constitutes a useful tool of analysis of the 
major changing trends currently faced by the peasantries of the developing countries. As the following 
sections will explain, it is indeed within this tradition that some of the most reliable studies on the 
transformation of the global peasantries have appeared lately, and have proposed thoughtful 
interpretations of the most relevant current trends. Nevertheless, as issues and researches broaden, and 
subjects of analysis become more complex, the historical-structural approach appears to be limited in 
getting the broad picture. Therefore, the analysis will not abandon the analytical and methodological 
tradition by which the peasant studies have emerged, but will overcome its limits by covering different 
themes and methods and encompassing more recent evolutions. 
 
2. The Peasantry Today 
 
Peasants and peasantries are today at the centre of a multidimensional global transformation process. 
Some of the most pressing challenges are to be attributed to rapid demographic changes, among which 
population growth is a main factor, and is particularly relevant in developing countries. According to 
World Bank (WB) data,10 since 1960 low- and middle- income countries have almost tripled their 
population from 2.27 to 6.31 billion (2017), currently experiencing a 1.24% of annual growth. 
Significantly lower growth rates have occurred in the high-income countries that have shifted from 758 
million in 1960 to 1.19 billion in 2017, and that are currently experiencing a 0.44% growth rate. Again, 
growth rates increase among the poorest of the poor: with a total population of 673 million, low-income 
countries experiencing the current highest population growth rate are scoring 2.67%. Despite the highly 
questionable composition of these categories, data show clearly that population growth is progressing 
rapidly, especially in those countries that have lower economic performances. Projections for the future 
are in line with these trends and, for 2050, the projection is for a total world population of 9.7 billion, 
again unevenly divided between low- and middle-income, and high-income countries, respectively 8.4 
and 1.2 billion. 
The relationship between population growth and agriculture constituted the worthy argument of 
discussion between Ester Boserup (and her followers) and neo-Malthussian scholars. The core of the 
debate centered on the direction of the causal relationship between the two variables (Boserup 1965). 
                                                     
10 - Data and projections from: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Health%20Nutrition%20 
and%20Population%20Statistics:%20Population%20estimates%20and%20projections# 
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Indeed, the Danish economist and her followers interpreted population growth as the independent 
variable, responsible for the intensification of farming practices, the spread of new technologies, and the 
development of the agricultural sector in general (Tiffen, Mortimore 1994). By supporting this thesis, 
she was arguing against Malthus and neo-Malthussian authors who tended conversely to interpret 
population pressure as the result of changes in agricultural productivity, in turn determined by unrelated 
factors. Boserup promoted a positive approach to population growth which supported the optimistic 
view of technological change in agrarian societies, and which supported the project of the Green 
Revolution. 
Lately, peasant studies and studies of agrarian change have questioned these optimistic interpretations 
of population growth by denouncing the negative effects of its growth rate, with regard to the 
unsustainable increased global demands for food, water, energy and (obviously) welfare services. As 
far as this study is concerned, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is among the leading areas of the world, in 
terms of population growth. Its population is currently increasing at a 2.67% rate: in 1960, its total 
population was 228 million, it has now reached 1 billion (2017) and it is expected to double in the next 
30 years, to 2.2 billion in 2050.11 
The need to respond to expanded and diversified demands are rapidly transforming the forces and 
relations of production and trade of African countries, engendering structural transformations of 
economies and societies. High rates of population growth are particularly relevant in the rural areas of 
the continent for two main reasons: first, increasing demands for food and agriculture-related 
commodities require greater efforts by the rural producers to be fulfilled; second, since the majority of 
SSA people still live in rural areas (646.5 million people, 61.2% of the total),12 population growth raises 
the competition for natural resource accessibility and utilization, in turn causing a transformation of the 
related political, economic and social relations. 
It is just worth mentioning here one of the most striking problems brought on by population growth: the 
land question. In SSA, population pressure over land generates deep changes in peasantry production, 
distribution and consumption relation. Some of these consequences are already observable in the 
ongoing shrinking size of many farms, land degradation and diffusion of unsustainable forms of 
agricultural intensification, the rise of land markets, rapid changes in farm structure, increasing 
difficulties in achieving broad-based and inclusive forms of agricultural growth (Jayne et al. 2014). It is 
also worth remembering that land in SSA is not just about production and reproduction. Land in SSA is 
a multidimensional mix of relations with power, identity, interests, custom and value, «(l)and issues are 
often not about land only» (Lund, Boone 2013: 1). The study of the Ethiopian case will demonstrate the 
                                                     
11 - http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Health%20Nutrition%20and%20Population%20 
Statistics:%20Population%20estimates%20and%20projections# 
12 -  Ibid. 
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ways peasant societies are connected to land, how land is embedded in the political course of the country 
and how its importance transcends its productive and reproductive role. These factors must be taken into 
consideration in order to understand the change processes generated by population growth so far, and in 
looking ahead to the implications of population growth over land in SSA in the future. As pointed out, 
population growth represents one of the most striking factors of global change nowadays: land, as well 
as other aspects of rural landscapes of developing countries are being greatly affected. 
Another present day demographic change with wide scale tangible relevance for rural SSA and 
developing countries is urbanization. This longstanding global process that characterizes largely a vast 
part of the developing countries is remarked once again by WB data and projections.13 In 1960, world 
urban population consisted of 33.6% of the total, today this share amounts to 54.7% and projections 
foresee a 66% share for 2050. As for population growth, the transformative effects of urbanization are 
more relevant in low-income countries than in high-income ones (Cohen 2004), because of less 
industrialized initial scenarios and higher rates of growth of the former. Starting from a 24.1% baseline 
in 1960, urban population in low- and middle-income countries is now growing at a 2.3% yearly rate, it 
is expected to exceed the rural one for the first time in history in 2018, and forecasts expect a 63% rate 
for 2050. Higher urbanization rates are found in high-income countries, now scoring a 0.7% annual 
growth: in 1960 urban population was 63.8% of the total, it has now reached 84.5% and estimates foresee 
a small increase in the following decades, up to 87% in 2050. 
As far as SSA is concerned, urbanization is a particularly relevant phenomenon, undoubtedly boosted 
by the detrimental effects of climate change (Barrios et al. 2006): urban population is currently growing 
at 4% per annum, in 1960 urban dwellers constituted the 14.6% of the total population, it is now 
estimated at 38.7% and it is expected to reach 54.6% in 2050. The migration process of people from 
rural to urban areas represents an important opportunity for social and economic development in SSA 
countries. It is indeed assumed that, if well managed, high population densities in urban areas allow for 
lower per capita costs of providing infrastructures and basic services like transportation, education, 
health, sanitation and electricity (Cohen 2006). Urban centers allow for better management of social 
services and integration, crime control, political participation and labour specialization. However, as the 
reality of many SSA cities demonstrates, unsustainable and unequal management of urban development 
is very likely to produce social marginalization and economic poverty, where even food security is 
hampered by the lack of available means of subsistence and can be aggravated by ineffective 
connections to the agricultural markets. 
For the above reasons, urbanization needs a comprehensive understanding and efficient management in 
order to keep negative effects under control. Moreover, it is worth acknowledging that urbanization 
constitutes just one side of a wider process of inner migration that concerns contemporary SSA 
                                                     
13 - Ibid. 
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economies and societies, which is multidirectional and responsible for numerous multidimensional 
effects. Again, evidence shows that urbanization concerns mainly small and medium size towns, 
therefore producing a widespread convergence between rural and urban spaces, economies and lifestyles 
as well (Cohen 2004). In the fields of peasant studies and studies of agrarian change, the mutable and 
intersectoral nature of this conjunction have been studied and approached with regard to the global 
economy. A significant amount of literature, approaches this convergence as a result of the creation and 
diffusion of new relations of production, distribution and consumption on a global scale, while at the 
same time seeking to understand the main consequences for the agrarian societies in developing 
countries. 
The global economy concept stems from the expansion of markets and trades on a global scale that has 
drastically increased in the second half of the 20th century and has entailed a significant change in 
production, distribution and consumption relations on a global scale. With regard to SSA, the 
foundations of global economy lay most probably in the institutional settings created by colonial direct 
and indirect rulers, intended to expand export-led and surplus-extraction systems of production and 
commerce in rural colonies. The required increase in production was designed mainly to exploit the 
comparative advantage represented by the natural and labour endowments of the colonies, through 
massive technology and capital transfers. Modernization theories influenced the development policies 
in colonial and post-colonial periods in SSA, engendering different institutional transformations, 
embedded in nation-building processes. At that time, the state was at the center of both the nationalists’ 
claims and the development issue, and reached its apogee in the socialist experiences of Ethiopian land 
reform and Tanzanian ujamaa (Bryceson 2000b). At the end of the 1970s, domestic bourgeoisies – 
embarked in processes of state-building (Beckman 2004; Forrest 2004) – retained a monopolistic control 
of agrarian economies and agricultural markets through government-owned and/or parastatal 
corporations or boards, state-regulated co-operatives having to do with grants, subsidies and input 
distribution and extension (Raikes 2000). The resulting state indebtedness mixed with the difficult 
scenario created by the oil crisis. The state’s failure at “capturing” the peasants shifted the focus of the 
international community to the market (Hyden 2006), resulting in a resurgence of the laissez-faire 
doctrine of economic development among scholars, governmental agencies and international financial 
institutions. Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and conditionality came to the fore of the economic 
and political scenario in the 1980s, causing a drastic withdrawal of the state from the development 
process. Devaluation, cuts in state spending and dismissal of parastatal employees preceded 
privatization, deregulation and closures of public institutions, with the intention to create an enabling 
environment for the development of private enterprise in agriculture as well as in other sectors (Raikes 
2000). 
The economic environment created by these reforms – applied throughout the SSA, despite relevant 
contextual peculiarities such as the Ethiopian refusal to privatize the land in the early 1990s – effectively 
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expanded the exchange of tradable goods between countries in a more globalized economy (Raikes, 
Gibbon 2000), exposing SSA peasantries to unprecedented opportunities and challenges. The 
application of neo-utilitarian theories for minimalist state (Baylies 1995) has been blamed for having 
caused inequalities in the access to natural resources and incomes (Bangura 1987), increased land 
conflicts and informalization of labour (Oya 2010), replicated the “urban bias” (Bezemer, Headey 2008), 
reinforced structural processes of rural differentiation and de-agrarianization (Akram-Lodhi et al. 2009; 
Meagher 2000), and eventually represented a step back to “modernization” by replacing parastatal 
agencies with the private sector (Raikes 2000). SAPs raised controversies also for having linked 
international aid to an unrealistic blueprint set of political conditionalities, aimed to universalize 
pluralistic politics and improve governance capabilities, within a more rhetorical than concrete process 
of democratization (Haynes 2002). Democracy represented a vehicle for institutional stability, civic 
mobilization and growth of potential for investment and exchange; conversely poor economic 
performances were responsible for raising social conflicts and thus delegitimizing multiparty political 
systems and democracy (Lewis 2010). 
The mainstream model of bilateral and multilateral cooperation for development implemented by 
Western countries and financial institutions has thus promoted the creation of a uniform platform for 
development characterized by the internationalization of capital and trade between multiparty 
democracies, which is commonly referred to as «neoliberal globalization» (Akram-Lodhi et al. 2009). 
The ways the integration of rural households in the global economy is implemented as a condition for 
both peasants’ enrichment and national development (Popkin 1980; Hyden 1983), as well as the various 
ways these attempts have been refused and resisted, constitute a relevant part of the contemporary 
studies on peasants and agrarian change, and represent the conceptual framework of this work. 
 
2.1. Disappearing Peasantries? 
The most effective support to the transformation of the forces and relations of production on a worldwide 
scale has come from the implementation of a series of economic reforms promoted by Bretton Woods 
institutions and connected intergovernmental organizations like the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The resulting process of 
neoliberal globalization entails the involvement of increasing shares of labour-force and 
multidimensional capital into global commodity chains. As capital influxes increase and part of the 
population becomes wealthier, economies redirect toward the service sector and industrial production. 
As a matter of fact, agriculture is still the leading sector for the majority of SSA countries and the rural 
population still constitutes the greater part of the total population. However, as a consequence of 
differentiating and multiplying demands generated by demographic pressure and the global economy, 
at present the agricultural sector of developing countries is experiencing a period of radical 
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transformation toward agro-industrial international markets for agribusiness and value-chain 
production. 
According to many agrarian scholars, these dynamics force peasantries in developing countries to deal 
with new production relations characterized by an international division of labour, technological change 
and capital-intense production. Given the close connection between production relations and of 
subsistence mechanisms, the effects of these globalization processes on peasants and peasantries in SSA 
are very conspicuous. Indeed, as their dependence from (and competition with) the international markets 
increases, economic redirection toward urban or rural non-agricultural employment becomes more and 
more important for peasants’ livelihoods (Bryceson, Howe 1997). 
Deborah Fahy Bryceson described this scenario as «the convergence of de-peasantization and de-
agrarianization» (Bryceson 2000a: 5). Drawing insight from Lenin’s findings on the «depeasanting» of 
Russian peasantry as a consequence of the differentiation in peasantry caused by the commodity 
economy and the capitalist production, and Araghi and Harriss’ (1982) further discussions on the topic, 
Bryceson defines peasantization and de-peasantization as the processes of fluctuation of the population 
of rural producers involved in the peasant labour process denoted by the cohesion of Shanin’s defining 
characters of farms, family, class and community (Bryceson 2000a). On the other hand, agrarianization 
and de-agrarianization constitute the economic sectoral change arising from expansion and contraction 
of rural populations that obtain their livelihoods from agriculture; and more specifically, de-
agrarianization is a threefold process of economic activity reorientation, occupational adjustment and 
spatial realignment of human settlement away from agriculture, responsible for mutating three crucial 
aspects of peasants’ nature: their livelihoods, work activity and residence (Bryceson 1996). The loss of 
these attributes, that the author observes in current times, increases the vulnerability of peasantries and 
leads her to state that «(p)easantries are disappearing, more rapidly than before» (Bryceson 2000c: 323). 
The reference to the past envelops the longstanding presence of «dissolving» forces faced by peasantries 
vis-à-vis progressively more sophisticated and insidious structures of domination over their labour 
(Bryceson 2000a: 29): the colonial state and local rural elites, followed by the post-colonial centralized 
state, and by the international financial institutions and the global market in current times (Bryceson 
2000c). 
In SSA as well, peasantries are disappearing as the result of an historical process of economic 
reorientation, occupational adjustment and spatial realignment. SAPs and reforms for economic 
liberalization implemented from the 1980s have reduced public interventions in agriculture: subsidies 
for production and price control policies established in the previous years constituted important 
guarantees for farmers’ production and incomes. As a consequence of this reduction, small- and 
medium-scale farmers in developing countries experienced a dramatic decline in accessibility to 
productive resources and greater vulnerability to fluctuating global markets (Bryceson 2002). According 
to the author, their vulnerability is aggravated moreover by the current worldwide uneven agricultural 
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restructuring brought on by the expansion of international corporations for agri-food and supermarket 
chains for the subsidized and protected markets of the global North. Bryceson observes that vis-à-vis 
the unsustainable competition of highly productive agro-industrial schemes, family farms in developing 
countries «are being sidelined rather than incorporated» (Bryceson 2000c: 309). Peasant agrarian labour 
displacement integrates with centrifugal forces of economic polarization and class differentiation, often 
leading to peasants’ income diversification through self-employment in non-farming activities; only 
large-scale farmers are able to compete and resist. Due to missing intra-sectoral specialization, African 
de-agrarianization is not taking the form of industrialization, but rather of expansion of the service sector 
(Bryceson 1996); the study of the ongoing structural transformation of Ethiopian economy will confirm 
and deepen some aspects of this trend (Seid et al. 2016). Looking for new income opportunities, peasants 
flow to the urban areas but keep a «subsistence fallback» in the countryside: «(t)oday’s “vestige 
peasants” often live in an urban-rural continuum with an indeterminate residential and occupational 
feature, or are part of “multispatial households”» (Bryceson 2000c: 310). The author argues that circular 
migrations from rural to urban areas are contributing to the «blurring of social constructs surrounding 
African peasant life» (Bryceson 2000b: 55), together with: expanded spatial separation between working 
activities and home life, transformation of gender relations within the households, increased infleunce 
of Western values and lifestyles on young generations and political relations. 
While Bryceson interprets the incomplete transformation of peasants into urban dwellers as a factor of 
disintegration of the rural-urban divide, responsible for the ultimate disappearance of the peasantry, 
Heather Johnson observes the same process from a different perspective. Gathering insights from 
Bernstein’s and Chayanov’s understandings of the peasant economy, Johnson asserts that peasant 
production is defined by the «driving logic of subsistence and the maintenance of some control over the 
means of production» (Johnson 2004: 56). As pointed out also by Bryceson, the difficulties experienced 
by peasantries in diversifying their incomes towards non-farming activities, drives them to remain 
connected to the land and their communities as an expedient. According to Johnson, it is indeed by 
maintaining this link that peasants remain subsistent and keep control over the means of production, 
thus fulfilling both the conditions for their persistence. 
Jan Douwe van der Ploeg (2010) apparently reaches a different conclusion, by interpreting the current 
agrarian and financial crisis as vehicles for the re-emergence of the peasantry. The author states that 
decades of initiatives to boost development in order to modernize the agricultural sector have turned out 
to be detrimental for peasant farming, mainly because of the commoditization of the means of 
production. In a reversed trend, today’s agricultural sector is reshaped as peasant agriculture in both 
developed and developing countries. This trend is demonstrated by various comebacks: to the definition 
of land as an ecological capital after the period of commoditization; from the penetration into 
reproduction of commodity relations (in Friedmann’s terms), to self-provisioning agriculture through 
cost cuts and employment in the part-time labour market; from attempted integration in the markets to 
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an actively pursued departure from unfair food empires; the return to a synergy between the farmer and 
nature through agro-ecology and co-production, after fixed farming methods and routines and economic 
strategies; from subordination to multiple resistance; the return to community markets through extended 
connections between rural and urban areas, after the monopoly of food regimes. According to van der 
Ploeg (2010), these forms of resistance to subordination, dependency and deprivation, are the ways in 
which peasants are adapting to global transformation and reappearing as a sustainable development 
model. 
The debate between disappearance and persistence (or re-emergence) theories reflects two distinct 
perceptions and approaches to the analysis of peasant economy and societies, which have already been 
mentioned: the former derives from the Marxist and Marxists’ definition of peasants as obstacles to the 
development of capitalism, within the conceptual framework of the classic agrarian question. The latter 
shares Chayanov’s methodological essentialism in the study of peasants, it resurged in the 1990s 
associated with neo-populism and inspired various forms of re-essentialization of peasants culturally 
speaking (Brass 2010). These conceptual underpinnings have framed the rural development strategies 
carried out in the developing countries in the last century, by supporting rural or urban bias theories, and 
thus rooting industrial-led or agriculture-first strategies. In order to overcome the everlasting struggle 
between these dualistic and exclusive perspectives, Cristobal Kay interprets the current decrease in the 
rural-urban gap occurring in developing countries, as an opportunity for development and poverty 
reduction. «In the era of neoliberal globalisation an escalating interaction and fluidity between the rural 
and urban sectors in terms of capital, commodities and labour can be observed. (…) The increasing 
dependence on inputs purchased from industry, the continuing industrialisation of agriculture through 
agro-processing plants, the spread of rural industries, the expanding integration of agricultural producers 
into global commodity chains, the growing intrusion of agro-food corporations and supermarkets into 
the countryside are tying the urban and rural sectors more closely together than ever» (Kay 2009: 122) 
In order for developing countries to benefit from the opportunities created by these new production and 
trade relations, the author calls for a more comprehensive understanding of the new rurality: the 
connections, interactions and synergies between the sectors. 
The concept of new rurality is interpreted here as a synthesis of the debate between disappearing or 
surviving peasantries. It is indeed beyond the purpose of this study to endorse either one of the two 
sides. Rather, it is preferrable to carry out a more neutral and objective analysis of the implications of 
international evolution dynamics on the peasantry, as mediated by domestic policies. Similarly, Kay 
(2010) underlines the importance of avoiding a dichotomic and “context-free” analysis of the current 
evolution trends that the changing global peasantry is subjected to. By sharing the same approach, this 
work’s purpose is to observe context-specific change dynamics and understand them in connection to 
both international influences and historical legacies. However, the brief presentation of these themes is 
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useful to depict the conceptual underpinnings and political frameworks that characterize current studies 
on peasants and agrarian change.  
 
2.2. Contemporary Agrarian Questions 
The “disappearing peasantries” debate demonstrates the influence of a changing economy and 
demography on the definition of peasants’ social and economic environment, where production and 
reproduction relations unfold. In the elaboration of the disappearing and surviving theories, the classic 
themes of the agrarian question are ultimately reconstructed and revitalized from a peasants’ point of 
view and tied to deterministic interpretations of global phenomena. The debate proves the «continuing 
salience of the agrarian question» by exploring the processes of de-peasantization, re-peasantization and 
semi-proletarianization (Akram-Lodhi, Kay 2010: 280), and the role of the peasantry in agrarian 
economies in transition (Mueller 2011). 
The creation of new capitalist classes, the transformation of property rights and production relations are 
ongoing processes in the world economy. Historically, the core of the classic agrarian question has been 
the primitive accumulation through “enclosure of the commons”. Since then, the situation in developing 
countries has radically changed: there is an overlapping between communal rights and private property, 
the state has been delegitimated as primitive accumulation agent thanks to four decades of neoliberal 
thought, capital-intensive production systems integrate with traditional and pre-capitalist ones, formal 
and informal laws coexist and constitute the social background for rural and agricultural development 
programs (Zamponi 2012). Many agrarian scholars have investigated these issues in classic terms, as a 
result of incomplete transitions to capitalism. Mindful adaptations of traditional themes of analysis to 
new situations have been addressed, attempting to overcome traditional primitive accumulation 
narrative and giving birth to several agrarian questions for this day and age. 
In agrarian political economy, neoliberal globalization is commonly analyzed as the ultimate and most 
sophisticated process by which «capital is seizing hold of agriculture» - in Kautsky’s terms (Kautsky 
1988: 12; Fairbairn et al. 2014). Neoliberal globalization has changed agrarian production systems, 
reshaped rural production processes and promoted the expansion of commodification of rural economic 
activity. The entrance of agro-food-based profit seeking transnational corporations in the global South 
has brought about transformations in accumulation patterns, rural politics and social structures, poverty 
reduction and structural change (Akram-Lodhi, Kay 2009b). «As global capitalism penetrates agrarian 
formations and commons in new ways, agrarian scholars continue to reconstruct the theoretical heritage 
of the classic ‘agrarian question’, producing fresh insights on trajectories of agrarian change and 
politics» (Fairbairn et al. 2014: 656). Again, most of these studies tend to be critical of these 
transformations, by denouncing global inequalities, injustices and other detrimental effects of capitalist 
relations, as generated by the agency of neoliberal institutions and policies. 
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A significant number of contemporary studies on peasants and agrarian change address the current 
agrarian question in terms of a global spatial dimension. Land is one of the defining factors of peasants’ 
production and reproduction relations in SSA. Since the early 1990s, market-led agrarian reforms have 
gained prominence, as an alternative to previous state-led approaches to rural development, for the 
removal of several distortions from agricultural markets, and were expected to promote economic 
growth and poverty reduction. According to many, market-led agrarian reforms and other neoliberal 
economic tools for rural development and agricultural market internationalization have downplayed land 
as a source of power and transformed it into a means of accumulation (Lahiff et al. 2007). Land 
commoditization has been associated with an increase in land deals and new forms of accumulation that 
have ultimately hampered weaker peasants’ access to land and other means of production and 
reproduction, while benefiting the development of national and international private agribusiness 
companies. According to this view, SSA’s integration into the unequal food system has separated 
peasants from land while favoring transnational agribusiness (Moyo et al. 2013; Moyo 2011). For their 
implication in terms of labour processes and accumulation systems, the concept of “new enclosures” 
has been developed recently with regard to SSA and bearing in mind the English experience during the 
18th century (White et al. 2012). The new enclosures are explained as the convergence of a set of global 
transformations that include the prompted widespread corporate investments in food-crops as an 
anticipation of food insecurity, new forms of resource extraction for energy purposes, the establishment 
of special economic zones for trade, the emergence of new financial tools and agents involved in 
worldwide land investment. SSA has been «integrated into global networks of accumulation, violently 
and unevenly, through the brutality of slave trade, resource extraction, and financial dependency» (Ince 
2014: 24). On the same line, Araghi explores the new forms of accumulation and production through 
the concept of enclosure food regime: a global food regime of capital that deepens value relations 
worldwide and produces uneven geographies of consumption (Araghi 2009). 
Within the studies that approach the contemporary agrarian question in terms of global spatial 
dimension, the most relevant issue concerns peasants’ displacement through dispossession, and 
subsequent forms of depeasantization (Ince 2014; Araghi 2009). The loss or reduction of entitlement 
and resources generated by the commodification of production and reproduction means (first and 
foremost, land), offsets differentiation mechanisms within the peasantry that are in turn responsible for 
dispossession and in situ displacement. Displacement is very common among those peasants in SSA 
who cannot compete with large-scale production schemes or who are not suitable for integration into 
agricultural value-chains; depeasantization and deproletarianization are the direct consequences of this 
displacement, and constitute the core of the global spatial dimension of the agrarian question. 
The emergence of new forms of accumulation through encroachment and displacement (Patnaik 2011) 
has brought on resistance (Moyo 2013). According to Bernstein, the forms of resistance observable 
today concern southern «classes of labour with a rural base» vis-à-vis centralized international capital 
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(Bernstein 2014: S103). The increasing involvement of macro-enterprises and large investment funds in 
food and agricultural sectors in the global South implies, according to Bernstein, that capital has already 
permeated rural areas and “seized hold of agriculture” globally. As a consequence, southern rural labour 
has broken into classes, distinguishing a minority of successful farmers from a majority that strives to 
pursue reproduction through insecure, oppressive and increasingly informal wage employments, 
including farming (Bernstein 2010). His approach entails the study of the existence and reproduction 
conditions of peasants in the different categories of the capitalist production system: social relations, 
accumulation methods and labour division in capitalism/imperialism. Due to the international division 
of labour created by global capital, he points out that poor peasants and landless rural proletariat have 
become part of an expanding reserve labour army. However, he is skeptical of various intepretations of 
depeasantization and re-peasantization (or re-emergence), that are deemed as anachronistic for 
contemporary forms of capitalism, and to present a naive and unreal definition of peasants. He also 
rejects neopopulist instances and various forms of “peasant way” solution, since he sees no inevitable 
destiny for peasants. Uneven and diverse forms of globalisation have a different impact on differentiated 
peasant classes, destroying existing spaces for agricultural petty commodity production, as well as 
creating new ones (Bernstein 2003, 2011). The only factor he admits as a constant in history is class 
struggle: as present day globalization shows, the capitalist production mode determines the international 
differentiation into rural labour classes, forced to struggle for reproduction. Therefore, according to 
Bernstein neoliberal globalization is not affected by an agrarian question of capital, but rather it is 
characterized by an international agrarian question of labour, that is to say, how rural labour is 
transforming under the forces of international capital (Bernstein 2009). 
The present day claim for a sole agrarian question of labour has been met with interest and criticism. 
Bernstein is certainly innovative and quite radical in excluding the capital-factor from the analysis of 
contemporary agrarian transformation. His approach clearly denounces the pervasiveness of 
international capital in developing countries, but it avoids any simplistic causal effects by assuming no 
path-dependency for peasants’ demise or resurgence. However, according to Carlos Oya, it does 
underestimate the implications of current globalization for national capital, which is now expanding 
both in joint ventures with international large-scale investments, and independently (Oya 2013b). Others 
have shared Bernstein’s interest on current transformations in global agrarian labour observing that, 
particularly in developing countries, it is becoming progressively more wage oriented and at the same 
time more insufficient and precarious for the larger portion of the population (Akram-Lodhi et al. 2009). 
In the global South the convergence of these tendencies is leading to the expansion of a semi-
proletarianization process, challenging peasants’ access to means of production and reproduction. Semi-
proletarianization is aggravated by the differentiation within the peasantry associated with increasing 
market control in agrarian social relations, and expanding natural resource commodification. The 
differentiation is proven by the increase in the share of farmers who are unable to fulfill their basic needs 
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by working on their lands, and are thus forced to sell their manpower to capitalist/rich farmers or non-
farming capitalists. Since income opportunities created by capitalist production systems are not 
sufficient to cover all of the rural labour supply, most peasants are trapped in a semi-proletariat scenario 
that challenges their and overall social mobility (Akram-Lodhi, Kay 2009a). 
Beyond the focus on global spatial dimensions, and the analysis of global agrarian labour and its 
transformations, the present day agrarian question is also considered as a question of cultural, food, 
environmental and political sovereignty. Nowadays’ scenario is described by Philip McMichael’s 
corporate food regime: an economic and political order that enables a politically unaccountable 
economic elite to drive and control the global production system through the agency of transnational 
food corporations (McMichael 2010). Private industries and efficiency have replaced the state and 
justice. Free markets and the free trade environment created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and WTO have compromised national and local sovereignty. The agricultural surplus taken from 
the South has been accumulated in the North, legitimized by selective trade barriers that brought about 
the development of uneven global markets. According to recent estimates, 70% of the gains from the 
Uruguay Round are channelled to developed countries, while the remaining 30% are shared by a few 
large export-oriented developing countries (UNECA 2013). Food has lost its original meaning as the 
connection between human beings and nature, becoming a mere source of income and capital, as proven 
by the diffusion of biofuels. In this scenario, McMichael endorses the claims of food sovereignty 
movements aiming to hand back to the global peasantry the lost sovereignty over food, environment, 
culture and politics. The call for food security and sovereignty expressed by organizations like La Via 
Campesina and Movimiento Sin Tierra represents in the first place a condemnation of the negative 
consequences of current dispossession processes on peasants food security; secondly, and more broadly, 
by the association of food sovereignty with a political identity and significant rights, they advocate a 
viable political alternative to the current depeasantization trend (McMichael 2009). Freeing farmers 
from the value-chain approach to agricultural development - currently spreading in the global South as 
a mixed philanthropic entrepreneurship – is the purpose of local and transnational movements that 
promote agroecological solutions, against deskilling, financial speculation, intellectual property 
commodification, vulnerability and inequality (McMichael 2013). The struggle for environmental 
sustainability, biodiversity, local sovereignty, gender and human rights is these movements’ major 
challenge. By rekindling class struggle, they have been able to challenge the disappearing peasantry 
narrative, to create an international peasant issue and identity, and to bring forth an alternative view of 
the agrarian question (Morton 2007; Martinez-Torres, Rosset 2010). Rethinking globalization is the 
solution proposed for the contemporary agrarian question: achievable through a reformulation of the 
global politics of agriculture, conceived in order to solve the opposition between corporate and rural 
sustainability (McMichael 1997). 
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2.3. Peasants and Agriculture Beyond the Agrarian Question 
The narrative of the agrarian question has accompanied - in its various facets - the birth and evolution 
of peasant studies. The agrarian question has constituted a conceptual and methodological framework 
for the analysis of the role of agriculture in development and the role of peasants in agriculture. Because 
of the internationalization of production, distribution and consumption relations, the agrarian question 
has been adopted from national to global spaces in order to capture the essentials of changing rural 
landscapes. The coexistence of pre-capitalist and capitalist production relations has been analyzed 
through the conceptual framework of transition to capitalism and industrial economy. 
However, despite providing several mindful insights and a very interesting perspective, the narrative of 
transition to capitalism is not able to encompass the complexity of contemporary transformations that 
agrarian societies are going through. First of all, agriculture is currently undergoing a transformation of 
its structural production relations that does not necessarily imply a transition to industrial economy. 
Industry and agriculture are merging into progressively expanding and diffused production systems of 
both staple and cash crops, in order to respond to a growing and increasingly diversified demand of 
agricultural commodities. Moreover, as the Ethiopian case demonstrates, in several countries the 
ongoing transition is not driven by the manufacturing sector, but rather by the growth of the service 
sector. Furthermore, radical transformations are happening in agrarian societies and particularly in 
developing countries, involving a wide range of national and international interests and power relations. 
It is maybe constraining to argue that developing countries are passively subjected to a neoliberal 
discourse by the influence of international capital and enterprises; postulating an all but simple definition 
of international vs national capital, in the era of blurring financial boundaries. It is also restrictive to 
consider that the only alternative to a “standardized” development pathway toward capitalism is 
represented by peasant movements. The neoliberal discourse is definitely essential in setting up a global 
development model based on a convergence between free-market doctrine and liberal political 
philosophy. However, things are never just black or white: developing countries are selectively adopting 
neoliberal type policies of rural and agricultural development, based on national and international power 
relations held by the ruling class, as a result of the expression of both domestic and foreign interests. 
Understanding this complex and non-standard situation obviously involves a historical and country-
specific perspective that transcends the conceptual restrictions and political perspective of the agrarian 
question. Hence, analyzing the agrarian transition process experienced by a developing country in SSA 
means exploring the long-term evolutionary course undertaken by its peasants, in relation to agriculture 
and state-building processes. The development of agriculture in SSA has not been framed only by the 
narrative of transition toward capitalism and industry. Instead, given its primacy in poor and rural-based 
economies of SSA, it has been approached frequently with different development purposes, sometimes 
even beyond its ability to respond. The idea of a balanced economic growth between agricultural and 
industrial sectors beyond primitive accumulation was explored by the avant-garde contributions of 
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Johnston and Mellor in the early 1960s. Contemporaneously, the small-farm-first narrative came to the 
fore of the development debate, influencing successive evolutions and application of rural development 
strategies (Schultz 1964; Ellis, Biggs 2001). Since the early 1970s, a growing consensus gathered around 
the market orientation and the use of private enterprise to achieve agricultural development and 
economic growth (Timmer 1988), nevertheless, protectionism in agriculture and an intensive 
intervention on export-led and import-substitution industrialization prevailed in SSA during that time, 
generating a general fall in both agricultural and food production indexes (Clute 1982). 
The call for an agricultural-demand-led industrialization was raised in the early 1980s by Singer and 
Adelman and developed in the following years with a shift in agricultural policies from surplus 
extraction to surplus creation (Adelman 1984). The performance of the agricultural sectors in South-
Eastern Asia demonstrated the benefit associated with rising agricultural productivity for the internal 
markets, within a subsidized economic system. «(B)ecause of agriculture’s productive and institutional 
links with the rest of the economy, stimulating agriculture produces strong demand incentives (increased 
rural household consumer demand) and supply incentives (increased food supply without rising prices) 
fostering industrial expansion» (Vogel 1994: 137). Since the mid-1980s, the application of SAPs sought 
to reduce the restrictive policies on agriculture and trade (Dethier, Effenberger 2012), and agricultural 
and rural development strategies became part of inclusive development projects for small-scale farmers 
with the intention to involve them in commercial production, through participatory and grass-roots 
methods (Popkin 1980; Ellis, Biggs 2001). During the 1990s, poverty-reduction objectives were 
increasingly associated to agricultural development strategies and supported by the international 
financial institutions and its operational agencies (Christiansen et al. 2011; Townsend 2006), through 
an agenda of market-led reforms and “good governance” conditionalities. Following privatization, 
liberalization and deregulation, SAPs were expected to create an enabling environment for development; 
their application in SSA entailed a significant cut in governments spending in agriculture. In order to 
correct some structural deficits of the SAPs, since the early 2000s the International Monetary Fund 
called for the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: an agenda of country-driven 
and partnership-oriented international assistance for the realization of comprehensive, sustainable, equal 
and result-oriented initiatives of development.14 Since poverty was still concentrated in rural- and 
agriculture-based countries, the call for poverty reduction could not but generate an immediate call to 
strengthen agriculture. 
Thereafter, in 2008 the World Development Report (WDR) on Agriculture for Development addressed, 
25 years after the last WDR on agriculture, the question of the role of agriculture in development (WB 
2007). The Report reasserted the importance of transforming small-scale farming into income-
                                                     
14 - IMF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Factsheet International Monetary Fund, Communication 
Department, Washington, 2013. 
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generating activities to be integrated into value chains, in order to achieve economic sustainability and 
food security. Calling for a growth in government investments for infrastructure, sustainable natural 
resource management and to connect small-scale farmers to the markets, the Report re-attributed to the 
state a central role in coordinating, controlling and facilitating development, in partnership with the 
private sector. 
The call came during one of the most dramatic world food price crises ever experienced by the global 
economy, which brought on a global land race intended to tackle food insecurity. SSA countries strived 
to cope with this massive influx of international capital and to benefit from the opportunities that came 
with it, as much as possible. The resulting chaotic and rapid transformation of the rural landscapes, 
makes any attempt to define a univocal development course for peasants, quite irresponsible. After the 
global food price crisis in 2007/08, most developing countries have implemented policies and programs 
designed to strengthen support for domestic producers (especially small farmers), to improve access to 
food and its utilization, and to modify prices in favor of producers or consumers (FAO 2014). At the 
same time, the rapid increase in land deals between small-scale farmers and national, foreign, or 
transnational enterprises roves the openness of the countries themselves to these new opportunities. 
Increasing reliance is associated to large-scale investments in agriculture, GMO production, industrial 
clusters and global value chains, as the only viable strategy for economic growth and poverty reduction, 
in stark contrast with the peasant economic organization system (Collier 2009; Collier, Dercon 2014; 
Dercon 2009, 2013). At the same time, others support the re-emergence of peasants as the only 
sustainable and environment-friendly pathway toward development (van der Ploeg 2010). The 
international financial institutions envisage growth with equity as a pathway out of poverty through new 
forms of peasant integration into value chains, diversification into rural non-farm incomes and 
development of rural-urban connections through public-private partnerships (WB 2013). 
In conclusion, the ways that peasant farming can participate and integrate in the transformation of 
agrarian-based countries is still at the center of studies and debates on peasants and agrarian change, as 
it was in the classic definition of the agrarian question. However, both the transition process and the 
strategies have now taken on a different meaning and involve different components. Instead of reflecting 
old ideologies, the goal of the transition is motivated globally by poverty reduction purposes and 
economic growth associated with expanding markets among liberal economies. It does lead to the 
articulation of capitalism with other modes of production (Harriss 1982), but it is also framed by new 
state and nation building mechanisms, under the influence of Western concern for human rights, gender 
equality, democracy, environmental sustainability and fair growth. For these reasons, the old paradigm 
of the agrarian question at this point is acknowledged and transcended. Taking the cue from Oya’s 
condemnation of economic preconceptions, and Akram-Lodhi and Kay’s call for context-specific 
understandings of agrarian change, this work aims to explore current policies and paths of agrarian 
transition in Ethiopia, by gathering conceptual insights from the materialist approach, but not preventing 
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the research from including other elements to understand the process (Oya 2013b; Akram-Lodhi, Kay 
2009a). 
 
3. Clustering in Agriculture: A Strategy for Transformation in SSA 
 
As discussed earlier, the ongoing globalization of trade and production relations is causing a major 
impact on global peasantries. On the one side, the convergence of rural and urban worlds stemming from 
these global processes is clearly noticeable in the emergence of agro-industrial schemes. On the other, 
trade liberalization has also enhanced the creation of global value chains in the agri-food sector, with 
major implications for agrarian structures in developing countries. The agglomerations of agro-based 
industries and producers into clusters, agricultural growth corridors and special economic zones, have 
recently resurfaced in response to these changes, and as a means to transform agriculture. Major impacts 
have been observed on smallholding farmers in developing countries, whose integration into global and 
regional value chains, shapes the contemporary agrarian question. The current process of agricultural 
transformation in Ethiopia is deeply embedded in these global trends: the government-led process is 
mainly outward-oriented and aimed at integrating agro-industrial value chains to spur the conversion of 
the country into a global leader in manufacturing goods by 2025. One of the most significant strategies 
designed to achieve this goal is the agglomeration of agricultural and industrial producers into poles, 
hubs, or clusters, in order to benefit from the service-delivery concentration. 
As the last sections of this chapter will highlight, this strategy is embedded in the renovated interest in 
agriculture as a means to set off a structural transformation of weak African economies, which arose 
from the recent evolutions in development studies. Rather than attempting to present a complete view 
of the methods and approaches to the cluster study, the purpose of the discussion is to emphasize some 
of the most debated issues related to clusters, to present the rationale behind the recent resurgence of 
agro-based clusters in developed and developing countries, and to explore the functions attributed to the 
governments in developing countries by mainstream literature. This work is not aimed at assessing the 
performance of the agricultural clusters per se, nor to evaluate the output of the related policy. Rather, 
agricultural clusters are being considered here as a useful tool to understand the evolution of political 
economy, rural politics, and agrarian transformation in contemporary Ethiopia. The following sections 
will therefore provide a useful theoretical framework for the study of the agricultural clusters currently 
implemented in Ethiopia, which will in turn offer evidence-based contributions to the studies of agrarian 
change and peasant studies aimed at exploring the contemporary transformation process of agriculture 
and peasants in developing economies. 
 
3.1. The Need for a Transformation of Agriculture in SSA  
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In the rapid transformation of labour, production relations, trades, technologies, capital formation and 
space, observed globally over the last decades in the agri-food sector, farming still remains a problem 
in many developing countries, particularly in Africa. Despite significant changes, it is still mostly 
dominated by smallholder farmers (80% according to recent estimates) cultivating small plots with low 
productivity, high post-harvest loss rates and very low added value generation; nevertheless, agriculture 
remains an essential sector of the African economy because it employs 50% of the labour force and it 
constitutes the main source of income for over 60% of the total population, who still lives in rural areas 
(Moyo et al. 2015). 
The effects of trade liberalization reforms implemented during the 1980s and 1990s - with the support 
of international financial institutions - to reduce the distortions created by the state-led policies of the 
previous decades, thus expanding national and international private trading, and enhancing market 
efficiency in SSA, did not bring about the expected results. Private trade in agriculture has expanded, 
but at the turn of the millennium it was still constrained by a lack of credit and governments’ minimal 
commitment to reform (Kherallah et al. 2000). Regional and national markets have improved their 
efficiency and integration despite the presence of market information systems which are still ineffective. 
The liberalization of input-supply systems has led to a general increase in input prices and a decrease in 
credit access due to a tiny contribution by the private sector, which performed below expectations. 
Positive effects were observed in the decline in rural poverty rates, associated to lower food prices for 
consumers, and higher market efficiency; but because of the elimination of government financing and 
credit subsidies, the overall per capita food production has stagnated (Kherallah et al. 2000). 
Regional and multilateral trade agreements were signed at the same time, but their impact was 
contradictory. A study conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa assessed the 
impact of trade liberalization reforms in Eastern Africa (UNECA 2013): it observed that weighted 
applied tariffs (an index of import tariffs adjusted according to the relevance of the goods for the whole 
basket of imported goods) in the area decreased from 27.8% in 1986 to 11.7 percent in 2010,15 and trade 
openness – measured as a trade share of the GDP - increased from 43.8% to 69.7% in 2010.16 Increased 
regional and inter-regional integrations expanded the countries’ trading power, with a positive effect on 
trade volume and export structure. Trade liberalization did in fact lead to higher imports and exports, 
and most of the countries increased their export productivity level and diversified toward non-traditional 
product export. However, since exports increased more slowly than imports, in most of the region, 
countries’ trade balances stagnated or even worsened. Accordingly, there was no noticeable variation in 
                                                     
15 - Ethiopia’s weighted applied tariffs diminished from 24.3% in 1997 to 18.2 in 2007, and were not reduced 
further until 2010 (UNECA 2013: 5). 
16 - Starting from the lower performance rates in the early 1990s, Ethiopia’s share of trade in GDP mounted from 
14.4% in 1990 to 32.2% in 2010, and increased further to 54.1% in 2010 (UNECA 2013: 6). 
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the production structure due to trade liberalizations, and ultimately the region’s comparative advantage 
has not changed (UNECA 2013). 
However, the expansion of international trade has transformed production relations locally and globally, 
generating new market opportunities and posing new challenges for the sectors’ sustainability in the 
African context. Competitiveness has spurred a global economic race driven by the pursuit of scale 
economies and efficiency maximization. The combination of new communication systems, new trade 
rules, reduced transportation costs, new technologies and increased international competitiveness has 
been the basis for the expansion of multinational and international businesses throughout the global 
value chains: «the distribution of activities in an industry through buyer-supplier relations across 
different geographical locations» (Fetels, Memedovic 2008). Starting from 1995, most African countries 
have increased their integration into global value chains, both as input suppliers for other countries’ 
export production, and as foreign input acquirers for export production (Conde et al. 2015). Most of the 
agencies for international cooperation and development have noticed that the participation in global 
value chains has increased foreign capital investments and entailed a growth in productivity and 
domestic added value in exports for most African countries (AfDB et al. 2014). 
In dealing with these transformations, in the last 25 years, the approach of many development studies 
was to bypass the narrow focus on agriculture and smallholder farmers, and focus instead on 
complementary or substitute activities aimed at rural income diversification, expansion of large and 
commercial farms, looking at market opportunities and massive industrialization (Ellis, Biggs 2001; 
Collier 2009; Diao et al. 2007; Dercon 2013). Conversely, others recognized the remarkable impact of 
agriculture on poverty reduction and economic growth and therefore attempted to reconfigure the role 
of agriculture for development in Africa and to adapt it to changing production and trade relations,17 by 
promoting farmer integration and strategies for their support, into value-added activities through inter-
sectoral and international connections, public-private ventures, agricultural value chains and spatial 
development initiatives. 
Despite some scepticism, agriculture remained at the centre of African strategies for economic growth 
and poverty reduction, as stated and promoted by major international organizations for development.18 
                                                     
17 - See Byerlee et al. 2005; Diao et al. 2010; WB 2007; Thirtle C., X. Irz, L. Lin, V. McKenzie-Hill, S. Wiggins, 
Relationship Between Changes in Agricultural Productivity and the Incidence of Poverty in Developing Countries, 
Department for International Development, Report N. 7946, 27/02/2001 
18 - With the agreement of the NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
in 2003, major international stakeholders and African governments’ leaders committed to an agenda for 
agricultural development intended to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty and hunger 
by half by 2015. The agreement envisaged for agriculture to attain food security, to achieve an average annual 
growth rate of 6%, to integrate farmers into an agricultural dynamic market and to deliver a broadly based 
economic advancement of 7% GDP growth per year (NEPAD 2003). Eleven years later, in the 2014 AU assembly 
in Malabo, the African governments reaffirmed the principles and values of CAADP, and recommitted themselves 
to allocate at least 10% of national budgetary resources to agriculture to ensure its efficiency and effectiveness, to 
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The greater integration of the continent into global production and trade relations was considered by 
some to have been responsible for the creation of the urgent need and opportunity for African farmers 
and governments to take advantage of the new technologies and market opening to boost the 
transformation of the sector, thus replicating the green revolution experienced by South and East Asian 
countries during the 1960-90 period (Moyo et al. 2015). From an aggregated point of view, compared 
to other regions, agriculture in Africa achieved very low levels of productivity and competitiveness both 
in terms of yields and net added value (Webber, Labaste 2010), and the progressive decrease in the 
incidence of agriculture on the economies was counterbalanced mainly by the increase in the trade 
service sectors, which showed the lowest labour productivity of the entire economy (Bah et al. 2015). 
Accordingly, many strategies were designed in order to adjust to the changing scenarios, to increase 
productivity, spur competitiveness and generate positive impacts on economic development and poverty 
reduction. 
Since the beginning of the new millennium, in many African countries the agricultural value chains 
approach gained renewed interest from governments and donors to upgrade the performance of the 
agricultural sector, increasing the success of African rural economies and the incomes of rural 
populations. The value chains approach is aimed at analysing and intervening on all the vertically linked 
processes that add value for the consumer, including supply logistics, production patterns, value 
addition, transactions and market connections (Webber, Labaste 2010). The model was considered 
useful in raising competitiveness, achieving self-sufficiency in key staples, supporting African farmers 
to gain a “fair share” of export-oriented commodity value-chains, creating capability to fulfill consumer 
demands and nutrition needs, unlocking the potentials of growth of under-developed regions (Johm et 
al. 2016). The value chain approach responded to the need to create market connections for farmers and 
generate opportunities for value addition in low producing agricultural chains. The value chain approach 
promoted the expansion of agribusiness and agro-industries in Africa and in other developing countries 
(Conde et al. 2015). The agro-industrial sector in Africa was structurally reformed, expanded and 
privatized since the 1990s as a consequence of liberalization, technological advancement, organizational 
and institutional changes (Reardon, Barrett 2000). The production shifted toward those subsectors and 
commodities where the country enjoyed a relative advantage and higher income returns, such as 
oilseeds, fresh fruits and vegetables; foreign enterprises filled the gaps left by lack of capital, and input-
supply systems were taken over by multinational corporations. Capital intensity in production and 
processing activities grew, entailing a higher capital-labour ratio and increased added value share within 
the agri-food chain (Reardon, Barrett 2000). Technological innovations lead to improved transportation 
and storage services. Wholesaling, processing and retailing activities imposed specialization and were 
influenced by the expansion of multinational corporations: many SSA’s markets shifted from being 
                                                     
end hunger and halve poverty by 2025, to boost intra-African trade and to enhance resilience in livelihoods and 
production systems (AUC 2014). 
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dominated by traditional wholesale relations to the use of vertical coordination mechanisms, going from 
local procurement by each individual store to centralized procurement through distribution centres 
(Reardon et al. 2009). In addition, contractual exchanges replaced spot markets, and consequently 
fostered the enhancement of property rights and private standard quality systems (Reardon, Barrett 
2000). 
If on the one side, production and communication system globalization actually promoted the creation 
of vertical connections between companies and the scattering of activities worldwide, on the other, 
innovation boomed in highly concentrated areas with favourable conditions creating horizontal 
connections between value chains that provided intermediate goods and services (Fetels, Memedovic 
2008; Webber, Labaste 2010). Hence, in order to reduce transaction costs and further improve the 
integration of the value chain system, joint actions and physical agglomeration of related companies 
were promoted and expanded lately, as a consequence and cause of global changes in agri-food economy 
(Krugman 1991). These solutions came in the form of spatial development initiatives: efforts made by 
governments and international cooperation agencies to develop dynamic areas of sub- and supra-
regional or global economic integration in delimited geographic areas; through these initiatives the idea 
was to physically organize the area in a given location by planning the distribution of activities, 
manpower, infrastructures and trade promotion policies. As many have noticed, these initiatives are 
regaining notoriety in emerging countries, especially in SSA, where the need to enhance competitiveness 
and social cohesion, have been strongly emphasized by their appearance on the global competition scene 
(ISPC 2016; Gálvez-Nogales 2014). 
These initiatives may take different forms depending on the overall purpose, the economic sector 
involved and the implementation practice. The establishment of special economic zones is included in 
these spatial development strategies. These are circumscribed geographic areas in states where trade 
rules, investment conditions, fiscal policy and legislative environment are more liberal and 
administratively effective than those of the national territory; the purpose is mainly to attract direct 
foreign investment, to diminish unemployment, to support a wider economic reform strategy, and to 
operate as experimental laboratories for the application of new policies (Farole 2011). Spatial economic 
zones have been created since the early decades of the 20th century in Europe and Asia, but a big thrust 
for their expansion took place from the mid-1960s in Asian and Latin American countries to accelerate 
their export-led industrialization; since then, expansion was very fast: from 79 zones existing in 1975, 
to 3,500 in 2005 (Farole 2011). For many reasons that had to do with poor timing, lack of physical or 
social infrastructures, political instability, poor institutional coordination, weak implementation 
capacity, poorly designed legal frameworks and distorted incentives, most African zones have failed 
(Farole, Moberg 2017); except for Mauritius, Kenya, Madagascar and Lesotho, most of the attempts 
have failed to attract significant investments, promote exports or create sustainable growth (Farole, 
Moberg 2014). Accordingly, at the end of the last decade only 4% of the worldwide special economic 
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zones were located in Africa. Nevertheless, a rapid increase in the number of countries adopting this 
framework could be seen starting from the 1990s onwards (Farole 2011). 
Similarly to special economic zones, industrial and agro-industrial parks are another kind of spatial 
development initiative, currently reappearing for growth and innovation purposes in developed and 
developing countries. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) defines 
industrial parks as «a tract of land developed and subdivided into plots according to a comprehensive 
plan with or without built-up factories, sometimes with common facilities for the use of a group of 
industries» (UNIDO 2012). These parks usually provide an institutional framework, modern services 
and infrastructures that may not be present in the rest of the country. They develop along value chains 
where buyers, producers and suppliers are interlinked and operate in the same location in order to reduce 
transaction costs; this may in turn attract investors, accelerate innovation, expand knowledge, and 
generate externalities on local companies (UNIDO 2012). Industrial and agro-industrial parks were 
popular in developed countries until the late 1950s, but most of the newly established ones are located 
in Asia and Africa, and in the latter case are mainly conducted by foreign direct investments; according 
to recent estimations there are around 15,000 industrial parks around the world (UNIDO 2015). 
Another form of spatial development initiative deals with the creation of corridors, which have been 
defined as the agglomeration of economic activities and people in an area with logistic connectedness 
(Gálvez-Nogales 2014). Corridor approaches range in objective from the transport and logistic corridors 
envisaged to link landlocked areas to ports, to the growth and development corridors including economic 
and non-economic initiatives that are taken for development objectives (ISPC 2016). Corridors may be 
designed for trade transport, connectivity and logistics facilitation in order to attract investment and 
generate economic activities (Gálvez-Nogales 2014). A recent research conducted by FAO found 14 
corridors in SSA, designed for very different purposes: enhancing physical connectivity, ensuring food 
security, supporting regional trade integration, boosting agricultural growth and absorbing the expansion 
of metropoles. Two of them were launched to foster agricultural growth specifically: the Beira 
Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC) in Mozambique launched in 2010 to promote commercial 
agriculture on an area of 22.7 million ha, and developed in public-private partnership along the transport 
route which links the port of Beira to various Mozambican provinces and parts of Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe; and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of the United Republic of Tanzania 
(SAGCOT), developed in partnership with the government, multinational companies, development 
partners, and the domestic private sector, and envisaged to triple the agricultural output of 350,000 ha 
by 2030 (Gálvez-Nogales 2014). 
As relevant literature reveals, peculiar elements of these and other forms of spatial development 
initiatives have been combined together to create organizational structures with the highest economic 
performance. These initiatives constitute the general direction taken by spatial planning approach in 
Africa, but do not include one-size-fits-all models: for instance, in some cases special economic zones 
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have been associated with industrial agglomeration (Farole 2011), industrial parks have been granted 
special trade rules and fiscal policies (UNIDO 2015), and corridors have enjoyed both the benefits of 
special economic zones and agro-industrial parks (Gálvez-Nogales 2014). In addition, as these studies 
reveal, all of them use a value chain approach to design the interventions, and most are associated to - 
or may take advantage of - the agglomeration of complementary or structural companies in delimited 
areas, called clusters. For instance, as the SAGCOT and BAGC cases inform, the agricultural activities 
along the hinterland corridor are worth organizing into clusters where nuclei consisting of farms, 
processors, integrated service providers, storage facilities, research institutes, infrastructures and 
institutions are interconnected to enable specialized production (Gálvez-Nogales 2014; ISPC 2016). 
Similarly, spatial economic zones and industrial and agro-industrial parks may benefit from the 
integration with industry clusters or associated policies and projects (UNIDO 2015; Farole 2011). 
As this section has demonstrated, one of the current directions taken by governments and donors 
committed to fostering the competitiveness of African agriculture to tackle global transformations in the 
agri-food system, deals with initiatives aimed at spatially defined areas, for the promotion of vertical 
and horizontal connections between the agro-industrial value chains. These envisage in several ways the 
agglomeration of activities into clusters, following a method that has been successful in developed 
countries, and that according to some observers, is expanding rapidly in emerging economies (Gálvez-
Nogales 2010). Most of the relevant literature on clusters has focused on the industrial sector, rather 
than on agriculture, since most of the externalities of clusters deal with knowledge overflow, and 
technological innovation which is usually not associated to agriculture. At the same time, most of the 
researches on agro-industrial value chains and spatial development initiatives related to agriculture have 
focused on the process of value addition created within these organizational structures, the benefit share 
along the chain, the effects created in terms of broad development, poverty reduction, or environmental 
change. From the perspective of peasant studies and studies of agrarian change, very few studies have 
analysed the mechanisms and processes of implementation of agro-based clusters in emerging countries. 
It is obvious that the cluster creation process is fundamental to yield a positive output, and generate a 
fair and significant result and impact. For this reason, in addition to providing experience-based proof 
of the impact of contemporary global transformations of the agri-food systems on peasantries in SSA, 
the purpose of this study is to provide an innovative approach to the study of agro-based clusters by 
analysing the implementation method followed in Ethiopia. 
Furthermore, the Ethiopian case is particularly interesting for two main reasons. On the one side, agro-
based clusters are under implementation in Ethiopia even in areas where the agrarian transition is still 
in its initial phases. These areas are in fact characterized by very limited surplus accumulation systems, 
locked land markets, a very limited presence of agricultural workers and post-harvest transformations, 
and a strongly hampered private enterprise; therefore, the value addition chain needs to be created from 
scratch. On the other side, the creation of agro-based clusters is a major part of the economic project of 
47 
 
the developmental state, which draws its political success and legitimation from an authoritarian 
relationship with its poor agrarian base. Therefore, in the Ethiopian context the cluster-based approach 
assumes an additional function which ranges from controlling the factors of production, leading agrarian 
change, monitoring development patterns and controlling the rural area in terms of politics. In order to 
approach the study of agro-based clusters, the following sections will briefly present: the theoretical 
framework underpinning clusters’ models, comparative advantage and success determinants; the most 
debated issues regarding the integration of smallholder farmers into agro-based clusters in developing 
countries; and the role assigned to governments by mainstream literature concerning cluster creation. 
 
3.2. Clustering: Models, Comparative Advantage and Success Determinants 
The integration between different economic sectors represented by agro-industrial ventures, the focus 
on global value chains, the shift in political economy orientation, and the technological and 
organizational changes which characterized the early 1990s, created a fertile context for the re-
emergence of the agglomeration approach in economic theory, and for its application to development 
theory. In fact, Porter (1998: 22) remarked that, in spite of increasingly faster communication, lower 
transportation costs and global accessibility to markets, within the global economy, proximity still 
constituted a crucial variable in the creation of competitive advantage and achieving economic success, 
especially in a developing country. 
The “cluster” term usually refers to agglomerations of companies engaged in similar and/or related 
activities. Since clusters can vary greatly depending on a number of variables (shape, organizational 
form, location, objectives, components, complexity, productive sector, raison d’être, etc.), 
contemporary business literature has formulated different models in order to approach their analysis. 
One of the most influential works, in The Second Industrial Divide Piore and Sabel (1984) defined 
clusters as districts of small companies able to compete with Fordist mass production, thanks to the 
efficient combination of flexibility and specialization. The peculiarity of clusters is represented by the 
fact that, thanks to a correct mix of cooperation and competition, cluster companies are able to retain 
the productive flexibility that is typical of craftsmen and necessary on one hand to respond to the variable 
demand of a large consumer base, and on the other to attain the specialization and organizational 
capacities of larger companies. 
A second very influential piece of literature on clusters is based on the concept of external economies 
originally presented by Alfred Marshall in Principles of Economics in 1890, and adopted by Paul 
Krugman (1991) in the early 1990s. Marshall identified three ranges of localized external economies 
that lowered costs for clustered producers, that is to say, three reasons for the concentration of industrial 
production: the creation of a pool of specialized workers in the district, an enhanced accessibility to 
specialized non-tradable inputs and services, informational spillovers (Krugman 1991; Schmitz, Nadvi 
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1999). Based on these assumptions, Krugman pointed out that companies tend to concentrate where 
demand for manufactured and agricultural products is larger, in order to reduce transportation costs and 
achieve scale economies. According to this perspective, external economies, generated by the 
concentration of competitors and related companies in a specific location, in turn create a self-feeding 
process which promotes industrial growth (Krugman 1991). 
In addressing clusters according to their location, Krugman brought back economic geography into 
mainstream economics (Schmitz 1999). In the overt attempt to bridge mainstream economics and 
industrial district literature, Schmitz proposes a different explanation for clusters, based on the concept 
of collective efficiency (Schmitz 1999; Schmitz, Nadvi 1999). With this approach, external economies 
are considered as incidental effects generated by aggregated companies. These incidental and passive 
factors are deemed insufficient by Schmitz and his followers to explain the comparative advantage 
enjoyed by individual firms in clusters. Other deliberate forces are indeed included among these 
advantages: the joint actions of constituents, that is to say, their purposely pursued cooperation. Different 
forms of cooperation may be present in clusters: vertical cooperation which connects the actors along 
the value chain is differentiated from horizontal cooperation which may occur among competitors; 
otherwise, cooperation may be bilateral and involve individual firms, or multilateral among groups of 
firms or consortia. Hence, according to this perspective, understanding the clustering processes involves 
focusing on collective efficiency, which «is the competitive advantage derived from local external 
economies and joint action» (Schmitz 1999: 470). 
Along with the diffusion of cluster-like initiatives in both developed and developing countries, since the 
early 1990s numerous dissertations have appeared, to define the comparative advantage that clustering 
has to offer. To explore this issue from within or without the lens of the three approaches mentioned 
here, means to investigate the rationale behind clusters. Michael J. Porter (1990, 1998) has provided 
significative contributions on the topic: his main point is that through the promotion of cooperation and 
competition among participants, clusters enhance innovation and allow firms to upgrade. Hence, three 
concepts are relevant in Porter’s analysis, and will be referred to again in later studies. First, cooperation: 
the author observed that the proximity of competitors, related companies and institutions (involved in 
providing services for the whole value chain), fosters coordination and trust which mitigate the rigidity 
of the chain’s vertical organization. With regard to competition, the author remarked that clusters allow 
companies to have easier access to labour markets, input suppliers, information, technology, institutions 
and public goods, which ultimately increase productivity in the area. Moreover, the organizational 
structure and productive processes increase competition by stimulating the creation of new businesses 
and leading the direction and pace of innovation. Innovation is the link with the third concept underlined 
by Porter in his assessment of the comparative advantage offered by clusters. The enhancement of 
cooperation and competition conditions indeed make opportunities for innovation more visible and 
suitable for companies. 
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Innovations enhance cluster companies’ ability to supply high quality products, to respond to an 
increasing demand by customers and therefore expand trade. These factors are called knowledge 
externalities and are considered, by some, as the basic advantage of the clustering system (McCormick, 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2007). Innovation comes mainly from the spread of ideas, knowledge-based 
practices and information (for instance on finance, technologies and markets) which in turn arises from 
the combination of rivalry and collaboration between companies. Evidence shows that collaboration (or 
cooperation) improves company performance (Schmitz, Nadvi 1999), and competition generates 
important local externalities such as a skilled labour pool and specialized physical, technical and legal 
inputs (Gálvez-Nogales 2010). In the wake of expanding industrial and agro-industrial clusters, seen 
lately in developed and developing countries as a response to global evolution in the agri-food system 
(Zeng 2008; WB 2012), a study commissioned by FAO has labelled this balance between competition 
and cooperation, «co-opetition» (Gálvez-Nogales 2010: 3). Hence – as highlighted by Porter’s studies 
– when integrated with local institutions, competition, cooperation and innovation constitute the essence 
of clusters, the rationale behind their formation; in other words, the competitive advantage offered to 
their constituents, which distinguishes clusters from simple producer concentrations (Gálvez-Nogales 
2010). 
Along with the study of the competitive advantage of clusters a seen from different perspectives, 
scholars have also questioned the factors which favour the success of these particular forms of 
aggregation. As a matter of fact many elements have been defined in terms of local conditions and 
specific contexts, while others have been mentioned for their generalizability and broad application. As 
Porter (1998), pointed out the study of clusters reveals that the analysis of the business environment 
surrounding the company is as important as the study of the productive processes within it. By recalling 
– in a certain way – Krugman’s emphasis on localization, Porter observed that the performance and 
sophistication of individual companies are greatly influenced by context factors such as transportation 
systems, infrastructures, labour market, court and taxation systems, and so on and so forth. Furthermore, 
by analysing the cases of Italian and Japanese industrial clusters, he also noticed that the presence of 
strong local rivals is crucial to promoting competitiveness and fostering innovation: «[t]he more 
localized the rivalry, the more intense. And the more intense, the better» (Porter 1990: 25). Other key 
elements include the conditions of the related factors of production, and the type of national demand for 
that good. A four-facet diamond model summarized the elements for the cluster’s regional advantage 
and success: firm strategy, structure and rivalry; related and supporting industries; factor conditions; 
demand conditions. Each component of the diamond – and the diamond as a system – has an influence 
on the national environment in which the cluster operates, and affects its competitiveness on a global 
scale. Furthermore, in order to benefit from the competitive advantage offered by the cluster, a company 
must take on a global approach, making its existing advantage obsolete in order to innovate further and 
upgrade, work collectively, choose a location and engage locally (Porter 1990). 
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From a collective efficiency perspective, the cluster’s performance is closely linked to the level of 
cooperation achieved by the companies and, consequently, to the presence of joint actions and collective 
institutions. These may come in the form of local business associations, producer or service 
organizations and others, and can usually perform a wide range of functions that foster integration: 
vertical and horizontal coordination; regulation; representation of the cluster’s interests vis-à-vis 
government and state institutions; provision of technical and benchmarking services, information and 
managerial advice to meet quality and safety standards, and assistance to reach global markets (Nadvi 
1999). Cooperation is mentioned, although with much less emphasis, also from the of flexible 
specialization perspective issued by Pior and Sabel (1984), who attribute cluster success mainly to 
company relation with the market. The flexible application of increasingly productive technology and 
the creation of regional institutions to strengthen the connection between trades are indeed considered 
vital for success. Therefore, the impact that governments and policy support may bring has been widely 
accepted as a crucial issue. Particular attention also to the government’s role towards implementing 
cluster development will be given in the analysis of the Ethiopian case. For these reasons, one of the 
following subchapters will be entirely dedicated to the examination of the most pertinent literature and 
contributions. 
 
3.3. Clustering in Developing Countries: Integrating Smallholding Farmers into Agro-Based 
Clusters 
Most of the studies on clustering models and rationales presented in the previous chapter, were based 
on, and fostered by, the successful industrial clusters that appeared in the second half of the 20th century 
in Northern Italy, Western USA and Eastern Asia. Nevertheless, agro-based clusters have been seen in 
Eastern Asian countries since the 18th century: in Japan, Vietnam, China and Thailand, different forms 
of agglomerations were established between small businesses, craft villages and local producers, 
surrounding larger enterprises or in view of the creation of specialized production nuclei. Thereafter, 
industrial clustering continued during the 20th century in more developed economic systems and in spot 
areas in less developed countries, to spread innovation and competitiveness in order to reach global 
markets (Ganne, Lecler 2009). During the second half of the last century, in SSA some industrial clusters 
appeared spontaneously or were promoted by public policy, often in combination with the establishment 
of special economic zones: among the most relevant cases Zeng (2008) identified the Suame 
manufacturing cluster in Ghana, the Kamukunji metalwork cluster and the Lake Naivasha cut flower 
cluster in Kenya, the Nnewi automotive components cluster and the Otigba computer village cluster in 
Nigeria, the handicraft and furniture clusters in Tanzania, the Lake Victoria fishing cluster in Uganda, 
the textile and clothing sector in Mauritius, the wine cluster and the Western Cape textile and clothing 
cluster in South Africa. 
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Agro-based (or agribusiness) clusters may be defined as: the concentration, specialization and 
interconnection of producers, agro-industries, traders, service providers, institutions and other private 
and public actors engaged in a particular field (sometimes including universities, research institutes, 
associations and customers), linked by externalities and complementarities within a value-enhancing 
production chain, to address common challenges, increase cooperation, innovation and competitiveness 
(Gálvez-Nogales 2010; Zeng 2008; WB 2012). Since the 1990s, industrial and agro-industrial cluster-
based projects diffusion has increased rapidly in developing countries, in response to changing 
production and trade relations: as pointed out by Clark et al. (2015) and Gálvez-Nogales (2010), this 
emergence has affected particularly SSA, as a way to promote innovation and enhance regional 
development. Indeed, although trade liberalization opened up new market and business opportunities, 
global economy and international competition forced local firms in developing countries to perform by 
global standards in terms of costs, quality, response speed and flexibility. Value chain integrations, 
specialized firm agglomeration, the creation of growth corridors and poles of competitiveness were 
some of the strategies pursued by enterprises and governments in developing countries, in order to cope 
with these new challenges. 
Besides those specific challenges and opportunities created by the globalization processe, the rationale 
for clustering in developing countries did not differ significantly from the one found in more developed 
economies: to generate externalities, to increase productivity, to enhance mutual cooperation, to foster 
innovation, to reduce costs, to lobby policy reforms, to attract investors and to improve accessibility to 
inputs (WB 2012). In addition, given the particular conditions of less developed economies, merging 
similar industries can also help small-scale firms to upgrade, it can generate agrarian transition 
mechanisms, it can foster mobilization, break down investments into less risky steps, it can entail higher 
wages for rural workers and give a greater contribution to regional economic growth (Schmitz, Nadvi 
1999; Schmitz 1999; WB 2012). 
Underdeveloped economies are indeed characterized by limited critical masses, weak infrastructures, 
limited factor conditions, dominance of informal relations and very small-scale firms and farms, poor 
capacity building and institutional support. For these reasons, trade relationships between developed and 
developing countries, as shaped by the neoliberal-framed global agri-food system, have been defined 
unequal and unbalanced: with the former playing a decisive role in innovation, product design and 
standard definitions, and the latter group struggling to adapt to specifications and standards set elsewhere 
(McCormick, Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2007). In global value chains, these trade relationships shape 
production patterns in both groups of countries, and tend to concentrate value-adding activities in richer 
and more favourable settings. Accordingly, since the 1990s the cluster approach has been promoted by 
the international donor community and many developing countries’ governments, in order to replicate 
in disadvantaged settings, the conditions that promote a more equal distribution of value-adding 
activities along the global value chain. 
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The agricultural sectors were the ones to be more heavily affected by the evolution in trade patterns and 
production relations associated with global economy. In addition, given the weak manufacturing 
development and the mainstream focus on rural development and poverty reduction strategies which 
characterized the 1990s and 2000s, the new interest toward agglomeration and value chain schemes 
pervaded donor and government policy agendas regarding agriculture (Clark et al. 2015). Clustering in 
agriculture was expected to stimulate value-adding activities in the agricultural value chain: to promote 
cultivation pattern aggregation, to foster post-harvest and processing activities, and to improve 
producer-consumer connections. These changes were in turn expected to boost agrarian transition, rural 
development and economic growth. 
Agro-based clusters existed already in the 1960s and 1970s, when the production of export commodities 
was concentrated in spot areas led by large-scale farms and a highly interventionist state, within a 
traditional model of agrarian transition based on agricultural surplus extraction (Gálvez-Nogales 2010). 
Thereafter, some clusters for non-traditional agricultural export commodities were established during 
the 1980s and associated with rural development goals. But a rapid hike in the expansion of agro-based 
clusters was seen in developing countries since the 1990s and throughout the last decades, as a 
consequence of the aforementioned transformation in the agri-food global system. From focusing 
initially on traditional and non-traditional export commodities, since the 2000s clusters have shifted to 
include staple crops for both national and international markets (Clark et al. 2015). 
International donor commitment to agro-industrial cluster development has been remarkable: 60 million 
dollars were invested by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2003, by 
the International Development Bank reached 380 million by 2010, in 2001 UNIDO’s launched the 
Development of Clusters and Networks of SMEs Program and the International Trade Centre 
UNCTAD/WTO has implemented export-led poverty reduction projects focused on clusters (Gálvez-
Nogales 2010). Between 1998 and 2014, the WB invested roughly 1.5 billion dollars in various 
agglomeration-focused projects; 17 out of 20 of these projects have been implemented in SSA with the 
purpose to: stimulate growth and economic activity, promote an inclusive development focusing on rural 
areas or small- and medium-scale enterprises, create jobs and employment, increase productivity and 
competitiveness (Gelb et al. 2015). Furthermore, promoting agro-based clusters is also one of the 
strategies pursued by FAO to support agribusiness and agro-industrial development (Gálvez-Nogales 
2010), and it is the main objective of the Strategic Alliance for Agricultural Development in Africa 
program, implemented since 2006 by the International Fertilizer Development Centre - in partnership 
with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several development partners in the targeted countries – 
in Burkina Faso, Benin, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo (Alidou et al. 2010). 
As pointed out by recent studies on the topic, agriculture clustering in developing countries is challenged 
by a number of factors: smaller firm/farm size, lack of a critical mass of firms/farms available for 
aggregation, informal relationships and organization, weak internal connections, lower-value product 
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and service predominance, and poor market connections (Gálvez-Nogales 2010). With regard to SSA, 
underdeveloped trade networks, abundance of labour with a negative influence on market pooling 
effects, scarce contribution by higher education institutions for, unsubstantial political support, weak 
service providing institutions, large-scale industries in disarray due to rapid liberalizations, low-
performing SMEs offering low-quality products, and natural resource mismanagement, further 
complicate the development and upgrading of clusters, and their competitiveness in global markets 
(Gálvez-Nogales 2010; Zeng 2008). Given these premises, the success of agro-based clusters in 
developing countries is most likely profiting from a significant support by public policies aimed at 
setting the appropriate context where those involved can cooperate, compete and innovate (Gálvez-
Nogales 2010). 
From a different point of view, in terms of a collective efficiency perspective, contributors underline 
that clusters benefit from joint local action by local firms, which is possible only under two conditions: 
the existence of trade networks to connect them to sizeable distant markets, and the presence of trust 
and effective sanctioning systems (Schmitz, Nadvi 1999; Schmitz 1999). Joint enterprise organizations 
and collective actions are deemed also by others as necessary for success, underlying the importance of 
cooperation in generating multidimensional externalities (Zeng 2008; Gálvez-Nogales 2010). Indeed, 
an effective mix of horizontal cooperation and competition between producers enables stronger market 
connections and managerial competence and flexibility, which are in turn necessary to cope with 
evolving circumstances, consumer preferences and trade opportunities (Clark et al. 2015). Dealing with 
complexity requires also vertical integration throughout the value chains, to be supported by a positive 
political context, institutional support for the private sector, infrastructural appropriateness and direct 
foreign investment participation (WB 2012; Gálvez-Nogales 2010; Gelb et al. 2015). As the analysis of 
SSA successful cases has revealed, clustering in agriculture should also include building knowledge 
networks with local and foreign universities and research centres, conducting learning and training 
activities to prepare and aggregate skilled workers (Zeng 2008). 
Regarding the commodities needed to build a cluster, evidence shows that high-value and export-
oriented products usually generate higher wages, productivity and innovation, and promote cooperation 
among constituents for two main reasons: they address a large-scale market for which they do not 
compete directly, and they need to collaborate to achieve standard quality levels (WB 2012; Gálvez-
Nogales 2010). Conversely, agricultural clusters aimed at local markets where the number of consumers 
is limited, where the demand curve is less flexible, and that large firms with solid financial situations 
are not interested in joining, usually show lower cooperation levels and lower producer benefits. The 
analysis of the agricultural clusters established in South Wollo confirms that market connections are 
crucial in order to allow cluster constituents to benefit from increased cooperation and to avoid the 
negative impacts caused by the generation of surplus production. 
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As already remarked, the establishment of agro-based clusters in less favoured economies may have a 
relevant impact on local firms and farms thanks to the generation of multidimensional externalities. In 
other words, when cluster value chains integrate local small-scale producers into wider knowledge, 
production and market networks, and when this is associated with a fair income distribution, it can lead 
to positive outcomes. Evidence has demonstrated that when connected to modern food industry channels 
smallholding farmers may benefit from greater net earnings per hectare (or per ton) for various reasons: 
the farmer may increase his productivity thanks to the application of improved inputs and technologies; 
costs to access inputs, credit, training, certification and new technology become lower; farmers may 
reduce insecurity connected to markets through contract agreements with intermediate companies; the 
intermediate contractor may be willing to pay a higher price for the raw product in order to lock in the 
farmer and secure the supply of that commodity; the farmer may be able to produce higher quality 
products and to sell on markets that would not be accessible without intermediate company involvement 
(Reardon et al. 2009; Clark et al. 2015; Porter 1998; Gálvez-Nogales 2010). Furthermore, in accordance 
with cluster economic theory, the successful implementation of the cluster-based approach in SSA has 
indeed demonstrated that strengthening horizontal links between producers, vertical links within the 
value-chain, and other connections with public institutions and education institutions have improved 
smallholding farmer competitiveness, and contributed to reduce regional poverty (Alidou et al. 2010; 
Zeng 2008; Gálvez-Nogales 2010).  
In spite of their potential, the achievement of these positive effects in terms of pro-poor development 
depends on the effective integration of smallholding farmers, which does not always happen. For 
instance, the Evans School Policy Analysis and Research recently published an assessment of 90 
agricultural clusters in developing countries, from 1944 to 2015, and observed a positive trend in terms 
of economic outcomes, including increases in the value of exports, changes in employment and 
productivity (Clark et al. 2015). However, only half of the analyzed cases had an impact on smallholders, 
or smallholder participation. Three observations need to be made about this: first, that agro-based 
clusters in developing countries are often oriented toward objectives that do not include pro-poor 
development; second, that integrating smallholding farmers into cluster value chains is not an easy task; 
third, that private sector enterprises usually prefer partnerships with large producers. 
There are many ways in which the cluster value chain interacts with smallholding farmers: differences 
may depend on the number of associated producers, their entitlement, their accessibility to inputs and 
information, their connection with markets and, in general, their horizontal and vertical connections 
within the value chain. As observed by Reardon et al. (2009), smallholding farmers’ participation in 
modern agri-food chains (such as supermarkets and fast-food chains, processing and/or export-oriented 
chains) is usually hampered by the presence of a larger competitor, even though smallholders tend to be 
more flexible to highly labor-intensive field management practices, they can reduce transaction cost by 
creating marketing cooperatives, and they may be more easily included by stipulating resource-
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providing contract schemes (Reardon et al. 2009). Research confirms that the presence of a supportive 
government and the presence of cooperatives is often associated with positive impacts (Clark et al. 2015; 
Gálvez-Nogales 2010; Alidou et al. 2010). 
On the other side, many obstacles may hamper the generation of positive cluster impacts in terms of 
pro-poor development: lack of infrastructures, over-domination of small-scale firms, weak connections 
and informal organization within clusters, specialization in low-value niche commodities, excessive 
concentration on primary goods, excessive or missing government involvement (Clark et al. 2015). 
Indeed, although the creation of agricultural clusters has usually been associated with positive economic 
outcomes, when conditions are inadequate, clusters may fail or even cause negative consequences. The 
first concern regards the cluster’s market orientation: as already mentioned, when agricultural clusters 
do not cater to the exterior, companies compete for the same limited pool of consumers and this may 
lead to excessive competition and a decrease in producer income (Gálvez-Nogales 2010). The second 
issue is linked to the choice of commodities: if only one or two crops are produced, farmers and the 
whole cluster chain may suffer severe losses from price drops or crop diseases. During the 1980s and 
1990s, WB supported clusters have experienced these problems, and lately there is a common tendency 
to focus on a more diversified set of crops and to create mixed cropping systems (Clark et al. 2015). The 
third problem concerns smallholding farmer integration into the cluster value chain (Gálvez-Nogales 
2010; Clark et al. 2015; Reardon et al. 2009): in many cases small-scale producers have a very marginal 
role in decision-making processes and have the smallest share of economic benefit; they may suffer 
from the competition with larger-farms whose investment capacity is greater and production costs are 
lower; where agrarian transition systems are more advanced, peasant farmers may lose their ties to land 
and become waged workers with poor labour standards, as sustained by the proponents of the 
disappearing peasantry thesis. Lastly, the creation of agricultural clusters may cause an antagonism 
between local communities and the commercial interests of non-local actors, including environmental-
related damages (WB 2012). 
 
3.4. Implications for Public Policy 
Since this work is focused mainly on analysing the implementation process of agricultural clusters in a 
specific area of Ethiopia, as a tool to understand the political course followed by the government of 
Ethiopia (GoE) in terms of agrarian transformation, the previous chapters gave a brief overview of the 
major issues at stake in the cluster creation process, focusing particularly on clustering in agriculture 
and agro-industrial sectors, in less developed countries. As the brief presentation has demonstrated, 
clustering in developing countries is influenced by a broad set of variables that concern the political, 
economic, institutional, organizational and structural environment surrounding the project. The cluster 
can therefore be analysed from different points of view and with different approaches that may take into 
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consideration production factors, trade relations, the value chain organization, power distribution among 
those involved, multidimensional cooperation, communication networks, and so on and so forth. Up 
until now, the reviewed literature has identified some elements which will guide the understanding of 
Ethiopian policy on clustering in agriculture in terms of rationale, competitive advantage, success 
factors, impact and smallholder integration. But, one more point needs to be looked at in greater depth 
in order to assess the Ethiopian clustering experience from a political approach: this regards the role that 
governments are expected to play in cluster development. 
Clusters have been implemented in developing countries using different political economy approaches. 
Big push theories, backed by a highly interventionist state, were applied to rural economies and 
influenced cluster formation in Asia, Latin America and Africa in the 1960s to 1980s period. With the 
resurgence of market role in development encouraged by the neo-liberal turn, government role in 
clustering has been reconsidered and sensibly reduced in view of the promotion of scale economies for 
development (Gelb et al. 2015). As envisaged by the 2008 World Development Report, since the late 
2000s the mainstream trend associated with development policies promoted a mixed private and public 
effort participation to boost market-led development, bearing in mind the negative impacts linked to 
excessive state reductionism or interventionism in the economy (WB 2007). 
In the scarce literature on agricultural clusters in developing countries, the role attributed to governments 
reflects and conditions the definition process of moderate interventions in the economy, intended to 
avoid market distortions and allow private companies to develop. The mainstream approach actually 
rejects the kind of interventionism that took place in previous decades, when governments invested 
directly public capital and resources to create clusters of competitive companies (Porter 1990), and 
assumes instead that market failures can be solved better by joint private action rather than by public 
intervention (Schmitz 1999). Accordingly, governments should: avoid restrictions and subsidies that 
distort or hamper the process (Porter 1998), encourage the creation of competitive private companies, 
boost the competitive advantage of clusters by promoting domestic rivalry and stimulating innovation 
(Porter 1990), and avoid interference in trade and markets (Schmitz 1999). Collaboration with the 
private sector is a crucial activity required of public institutions and governments to prepare the 
environment for cluster development and upgrading (Porter 1998; Gálvez-Nogales 2010). Current 
literature wants public institutions to work with the private sector to create an efficient input supply 
system, invest on hard and soft infrastructures for doing business (Porter 1998; WB 2012), provide high-
quality public goods (Zeng 2008), ensure access to finance (INNO 2010) and establish connections with 
research institutes. Therefore clusters are not expected to emerge from public institutions’ unilateral 
decision, but from the combined efforts of public and private subjects (Gálvez-Nogales 2010). As 
remarked by Zeng (2008), clusters can be formed in two ways: spontaneously or when induced by public 
policy. Most of the successful clusters in Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, as well as 
the experiences in West Africa, emerged from the spontaneous agglomeration of enterprises and other 
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related subjects, but there have been varying degrees of government intervention throughout the 
decades, to support and promote their expansion (Zeng 2008; Alidou et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, observers state that rather than replicating successful experiences from other countries, 
governments should reinforce existing contexts with potential, by pursuing competitive advantage and 
specialization, consistently with local conditions (Porter 1998). Lately cluster planning policy has 
indeed been tied to the identification, mapping and assessment of existing or emerging clusters, rather 
than to the downright creation of new clusters (WB 2012; INNO 2010). Accordingly, recent studies 
recommend the following measures in order for clusters to generate positive outcomes: to take into 
account context-based characteristics of commodities, markets and institutions, to avoid one-size-fits-
all interventions, and to involve decentralized government agencies (Gálvez-Nogales 2010). As the 
Ethiopian case will show, despite its worthiness, it is very difficult both to achieve and assess the 
inclusion of peasants and grass-roots level institutions in decision-making processes. The Ethiopian case 
will also prove that the actual degree of participation of the people involved in the planning and 
implementation processes of agricultural clusters, may differ a lot from official claims. Furthermore, 
besides low participation, the decision-making process regarding clusters in Ethiopia, appears to have 
been influence much more by international recommendations and preceding successful foreign 
experiences, rather than by context-based conditions. 
Despite shared consensus on the rejection of state interference in economy, a broad set of tasks are 
planned for public institutions, in order to create an enabling environment where private companies 
involved in the same value chains may strengthen cooperation and agglomerate in a specific location. 
One of the issues that most of the literature stresses concerns the pooling of specialized workers, which 
is, as seen previously, one of the key factors needed for competitive advantage and to ensure success. 
Public intervention is indeed expected to have a direct influence on worker education levels (Porter 
1998; Gálvez-Nogales 2010), to improve healthcare services, and to encourage private companies to 
invest in human skills (Porter 1990). 
Likewise, public institutions are also required to create a favourable policy environment for cluster 
development and improvement. In this respect, attention is focused on three ranges of elements: 
macroeconomic stability, regulatory functions and incentive-based policies (Zeng 2008). The first 
component is linked to a very broad set of macroeconomic policies concerning mainly the control of 
inflation, external debt and government expenditures, not really addressed by cluster-focused literature. 
The second element refers to the need to implement clear trade rules, to ensure sustainable use of natural 
resources, secure social and environmental regulations (Gálvez-Nogales 2010), to enforce standard 
quality and safety regulations, to issue a consistent antitrust policy (Porter 1990), to protect intellectual 
property (Porter 1998), to develop a sound property rights regime, to issue a regulatory framework for 
investments, facilitate the establishment of contracts and agreements among constituents (WB 2012). 
The third category concerns the stimulation of private initiative to participate in cluster activities 
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through: the promotion of a proactive foreign investment strategy, the promotion of public-private 
partnership, the issue of a cluster export strategy, ensuring access to financing at competitive interest 
rates (Gálvez-Nogales 2010), deregulating competition, opening market access and rejecting managed 
trade (Porter 1990), deregulating domestic market, removing trade barriers, ending distortions in 
exchange rates and taxation (WB 2012). The indications above clearly show that the promotion of 
agricultural clusters in developing economies has been boosted mainly by a neo-liberal type discipline. 
Formal and informal institutions created with synergic efforts by public and private initiatives are also 
expected to play a major role in: technology transfer (WB 2012), providing training and technical 
assistance to facilitate innovation and technology and knowledge acquisition (Gálvez-Nogales 2010; 
Zeng 2008), promoting collective and joint actions (WB 2012), boosting access to markets and other 
business support services (INNO 2010). 
Even in the case of SSA countries, governments play a fundamental role in planning and implementing 
value-chain networks for industrialization. As observed by Monga, special economic zones and clusters 
are being created in SSA since the 1970s, but many of these have failed to deliver their promises due to 
«poor design, ineffective management and misguided policies» (Monga 2011: 10). As already observed 
earlier vis-à-vis other spatial development initiatives, sometimes industrial agglomerations and zones 
have been created without taking into consideration the country’s asset structure and without developing 
a consistent policy framework. Many governments operated directly, generating conflict of interest 
situations, hampering the development of the private sector, and often resulting in low performance due 
to lack of expertise and ability. The location choice has sometimes been inappropriate and has lacked 
transparency, resulting in isolated geographic enclaves without positive spillovers and externalities in 
the area. The tools implemented for trade promotion have often failed to produce a positive benefit-cost 
ratio, and have represented instead substantial and unsustainable costs for governments. Due to these 
main issues, in SSA governments have often been unable to determine direct and indirect benefits (such 
as export development and diversification, job creation, technology transfer, knowledge spillovers, 
income generation) through these arrangements (Farole 2011), once again demonstrating that, especially 
in developing countries, government role is crucial. 
To conclude this chapter, government interventions are required to be customer-oriented (Schmitz-
Nadvi 1999), to be inclusive, transparent and have a strategic dimension (Gálvez-Nogales 2010), to 
consider power imbalances, inter-sectoral and inter-cluster connections when implementing cluster 
policies (WB 2012), to avoid top-down policies and to promote informal connections among cluster 
constituents. Government role should therefore be limited to promoting factor conditions, political 
support and economic environment in which cluster dynamics find it easier to emerge and thrive. In 
following through the evolution of the cluster, governments should: first, create the environment with 
institutions and regulations; second, assist and promote the emergence of new firms and investments; 
third, boost the establishment of contract agreements between the parties involved; fourth, foster 
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cooperation and synergic activities; fifth, develop ability through technical assistance; and last, monitor 
and evaluate (WB 2012). 
After having neglected the role of public institutions in agricultural development for many years, and 
having consequently promoted the dismantlement of measures protecting the vulnerable smallholding 
farmers, lately the mainstream model for development is encouraging governments of developing 
countries to regulate and facilitate the integration of peasants into global value chain networks. Despite 
general acceptance of the issues, criticism has also arisen regarding developing country governments’ 
ability to negotiate working rules, financial agreements and benefit shares, with companies or 
corporations whose revenues are higher than the whole national GDP of the national contractor. Other 
key issues concern the establishment of fair benefit shares throughout the value chain, the contrast 
between private interests and social and environmental issues, the longstanding problems caused by 
corruption, and the instability of political as well as economic settings. As long as governments continue 
to act under these circumstances, agricultural transformation strategies may not fulfill expectations, or 
may not lead to fair and social benefits. 
The study of the agricultural cluster implementation process in Ethiopia gathers relevant contributions 
from the findings that have been summarized briefly here on the theory and practice of clustering in 
industry and agro-industry, in developed and developing countries, concerning the main reasons for 
adopting this approach, the key factors for success, and the implications for public policy. As noticed 
so far, the cluster approach is generally adopted to strengthen the integration of processes and 
transactions vertically within a value-chain, or horizontally among different value-chains, as a strategy 
to cope with (and take advantage of) the global transformation of production and trade relations. The 
cluster approach is part of a broad range of spatial development initiatives that nowadays require 
fundamental support from state institutions in order to be implemented. The current implementation of 
clusters in Ethiopia draws inspiration from the development theory briefly presented here, and is 
embedded in the evolution process that has been affecting peasantries and agri-food systems worldwide. 
However, as the following chapters will reveal, current cluster projects in Ethiopia are shaped by a 
strong commitment by the federal or regional governments, which is frequently implemented on the 
basis of central planning, rather than in support of existing ventures. Although clustering in Ethiopia has 
definitely emerged as a consequence of an international pressure to integrate national production in agro-
industrial ventures and transnational value chains, in order to be internationally competitive, the 
rationale behind its implementation can be better explained through the study of peasant-state relations 
within a long-term perspective. Therefore, the study recommends paying the utmost attention to the 
dimension of internal politics in the analysis of agro-based clusters in developing economies. 
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CHAPTER TWO – BUILDING THE ETHIOPIAN WAY: FROM 
TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATION 
 
Ethiopia is often considered as one of the most interesting and successful countries in present day Africa, 
because of its sensational economic performance and rapid improvement in various human development 
indicators. After the overturn of the Marxist-Leninist military dictatorship in the early 1990s, a coalition 
of parties differentiated along ethnic lines has established a federal democratic republic, delivered a 
constitution inspired by liberal and democratic principles (Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003) and initiated a 
project of «national economic reconstruction» (TGE 1993: 1). The “long-term development strategy” 
of the GoE has been successful in obtaining an over 7% average annual growth in the country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) between 1992 and 2015 according to World Bank (WB) data.19 The economic 
performance has contributed to reduce national economic poverty: poverty headcount ratio below 1.90 
US dollars per day has dropped from 66.4% of the total population in 1995, to 33.5% in 2010.20 
Economic growth has been achieved together with a good performance by many other interventions on 
welfare: overall enrollment ratio in primary school has increased from 25% in 1992 to 100 percent in 
2014, reaching SSA’s average;21 under-five mortality rate has been reduced by two thirds between 1990 
and 2015;22 stunting and underweight prevalence of under-five year-old children have diminished 
between 1992 and 2015 from 67 to 40 and from 42 to 25 percent respectively.23 Thanks to a period of 
unprecedented peace and political stability, as recorded by The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the total population has more than doubled from 48.1 million in 1990 to 99.4 in 
201524 and life expectancy at birth has extended from 47.9 years in 1992 to 64.6 in 2015, surpassing the 
59% SSA average.25 It is important to notice that these economic, health and demographic records have 
been achieved after the detrimental period under the rule of the military dictatorship, that left its 
successors with an almost-collapsing economy and a population that was worn out by civil war and 
                                                     
19 - Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?year_high_desc=false 
20 - Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 a day at 
2011 international prices: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?year_high_desc=false 
21 - Total enrollment in primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official 
primary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because 
of early or late school entrance and grade repetition: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR?locations=ET&year_high_desc=false 
22 - From 205 to 59 deaths per thousand (UNICEF 2016: 118). 
23 - Data for 1992 are from https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/country_profiles/Ethiopia/Nutrition_ 
ETH.pdf and differ slightly from Solomon Bellete (2005: 16) who recorded 64% of stunting and 46.9% of 
underweight under-five children. Recent data are from UNICEF (2016: 122). 
24 - De facto population in a country, area or region as of 1 July: http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/44206 
25 - Number of years a newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at 
the time of birth stay the same throughout the infant’s life: http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/69206 
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droughts. However, the positive results obtained under the aegis of the Federal Democratic Republic are 
evident and these make Ethiopia one of the most fascinating economic successes in contemporary SSA. 
The expected transformation of the economy - and of the country overall – was supposed to involve first 
and foremost the agricultural sector and the rural society. At the time of establishment of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), the country was mainly rural-based: rural population 
represented the highest share of national population, agriculture represented the main source of income 
for the vast majority of the population. The rural area was the scenario where the armed struggle for 
independence and liberation movements had taken place in the previous decades. Land represented the 
defining factor of peasant social and economic life: the most economically and politically relevant and 
dramatic struggles of the past had been motivated by the administration of and access to land. Almost 
all Ethiopians still lived in rural areas or still had close connections with peasants and peasant life. For 
all these reasons, the agrarian part of the society constituted the first and most pressing one to be 
addressed and involved in the developmental pathway for both economic and political purposes. The 
following chapters will thus show how the agrarian question proved to be a fundamental issue in the 
restructuring process of the FDRE. 
The undisputed protagonist in the FDRE’s project is the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF), the multi-ethnic party that, since the first national polls in 1995, has held its power 
through five multiparty elections to five-year terms. According to EPRDF’s – and composing regional 
parties – ruling elite and leaders’ intention, the structural transformation of the economy was expected 
to be achieved through an active role of the state. The state was attributed a main role in coordinating 
and regulating the re-introduction of «an economic system driven by market forces» (TGE 1993: 4), and 
focused on boosting an export-led agriculture. The process of breaking away from the «command 
economy» of the Marxist-Leninist inspired regime entailed a selective withdrawal of the state from the 
economy, intended to stimulate market expansion. However, in order to prevent «rent-seeking 
activities» from implementing an unequal redistribution of wealth and value that characterizes the 
«neoliberal paradigm» (Meles 2012: 4), the GoE was supposed to create the necessary conditions for its 
developmental role to be fulfilled without obstacles. Since the EPRDF has been able to hold the rule of 
the country for the whole period of the FDRE’s existence (until today), the destiny of the developmental 
pathway undertaken is closely connected to the evolution of its ruling party. As a consequence, the study 
of the agrarian question in contemporary Ethiopia cannot but be embedded in an in depth understanding 
of the historical, political and ideological characters of the FDRE and the EPRDF. The study will then 
proceed with a more specific exploration of the most relevant economic initiatives in rural and 
agricultural development, within a more agrarian-based narrative. 
The presentation of the EPRDF’s political trajectory has been divided, for analytical purposes, into a 
first founding period, and a following consolidation phase, associated respectively to the first and second 
decade of the EPRDF’s rule. Indeed, the former includes the period between the subversion of the 
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military regime in 1991 and the end of the Ethio-Eritrean war in 2000, which corresponds to the 
transition from the Marxist-Leninist oriented military regime to the federal democratic republic state, 
and the initial post-transitional phase. The reason for the choice of the starting point is easily 
understandable because it represents the beginning of the EPRDF’s experience as a ruling party. On the 
other hand, the end of the war corresponds to the beginning of a new political phase in the Ethiopian 
development path, starting with a redefinition of the party’s leading elite, and continuing with the 
consolidation of its ruling role, conducted in the national ballots and in the decentralized power 
structures. The end of the first analytical decade also corresponds to the end of the macroeconomic and 
structural adjustment reforms implemented throughout the 1990s in order to bring financial and 
economic stability to the country, and to redefine its identity and position in international relations. 
During the second analytical decade, the economic direction set up in the previous decade was continued 
and, indeed consolidated through the performance in economic growth and poverty reduction policies. 
 
1. The First Decade: Transition 
 
The transition process undertaken by the country in the early 1990s was characterized by a certain 
number of elements: the transition from civil war to peace, a particularly pressing issue in the Northern 
part of the country; an ethnic-based liberation movement’s attempt to acquire popular legitimacy 
nationwide; the shift from a command economy toward a mixed and market-oriented one, by means of 
structural adjustment reforms and liberalisations; the transformation of the administrative structure from 
an historically-embedded political and economic centralisation toward a decentralized one; the 
comprehensive transition to democracy (Verlaeten 1992a). From both economic and political points of 
view, the transition represented the founding period of the current FDRE and its government. It consisted 
in the process through which a coalition of ethnic-based armed movements born within the context of 
the socialist revolution, emerged as an innovative, trustworthy and reformist force, and acquired 
international credibility and popular support. The ratio for the study of this multidimensional process is 
twofold: in a retrospective approach, it highlights continuities and breaks with the previous regime; in a 
long-term perspective, it provides the framework to understand successive evolutions. 
The study will proceed with an analysis of the birth and first steps of the FDRE and the EPRDF, from a 
perspective intended to explore the historical and ideological origins of the political project. The second 
subchapter will look briefly at some of the most important economic programmes issued and carried out 
by the governments of the first decade, in order to understand their economic orientation, their continuity 
with the past and their innovative reformist plan. The third and final subchapter will analyse the main 
interventions in agricultural and rural development, and the ways in which the peasantry and the agrarian 
change process have been part of the political setting. 
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1.1. The 1990s: The Transitional Period, the EPRDF and the Constitution of the FDRE 
During the whole period ruled by the regime guided by the military committee named Derg, many rebel 
groups in different areas of the country sought to challenge its power with a more or less coordinated 
rural guerrilla. The most efficient opposition to the Derg came from one of the northern provinces of the 
country, the Tigray province, where the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) was able to put together 
an organized opposition campaign. As noticed by Markakis (2011) Tigray represented the most 
neglected and poor province of the country: its agricultural production was seriously hit by ecological 
degradation, drought and famines, its economy suffered from the absence of manufactured production 
or economic development projects conducted by the central government; moreover, Tigrayans kept an 
intense historic grievance against the central Amhara rule. 
 
1.1.1. The Tigray Peoples Liberation Front 
TPLF grew out of the Student Movement, the radical group who «drew inspiration from the extreme 
left of the Marxist ideological spectrum» (Markakis 2011: 162), in the early 1970s, within the 
movements that challenged Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule, and that led to his deposition on the 12th 
September 1974. The TPLF was founded by intellectuals, bureaucrats of the former regime (neftegna) 
and local notables (balabbat) who lived in towns and had received an exceptional education compared 
to the rest of the population. The front originally fought for the liberation of Tigray from the 
authoritarian, centralised and ethnocratic regime located in Addis Ababa. Notwithstanding its mostly 
urban core, the front rejected the proletarian revolution as the driving force for change, preferring a 
grassroots guerrilla arising from peasant mobilisation (Medhane, Young 2003). By establishing an 
internal structure similar to other Marxist-Leninist fronts, the TPLF was able to create a widespread 
presence in the countryside through hierarchical structures and mass associations, that were in turn 
responsible for spreading the grounding ideology of the grassroots struggle, recruiting activists and 
soldiers, and gathering strategical information (Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003). 
In order to provide the Front with an efficient government structure, the Marxist-Leninist League of 
Tigray (MLLT) was established in July 1985 (Bach 2011). It soon became the ideological organ of the 
TPLF, whose efforts were driven by nationalist and ethnic-based claims, against the oppressive control 
exerted by the Derg over national groups (Markakis 2011; Aalen 2011). The creation of the MLLT 
represented an important moment in the history of the TPLF because it shifted the struggle’s orientation 
from Tigray to Ethiopia and from a Maoist political struggle model to the Albanian model considered 
to be less revisionist (Bach 2011); in addition, the establishment of the MLLT increased the project’s 
military and organizational effectiveness (Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003; Medhane, Young 2003). 
In coalition with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the TPLF conducted a grassroots 
guerrilla that allowed it to seize control of Tigray in 1989 (Aalen 2011). Consistently with its intention 
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to spread the revolution throughout the whole country, the TPLF launched the EPRDF in coalition with 
other liberation movements willing to create a common front. The First National Congress of the EPRDF 
was held in January 1991: the TPLF’s revolutionary struggle for democracy and self-determination was 
adopted unchallenged by the national Front as the ideological core (Medhane 2015). Its first partner in 
the project was the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), an expression of Amharan 
grievances against the Derg regime (Milkias 2001). Where liberation movements committed to share 
the TPLF and the EPDM’s cause were missing, the People’s Democratic Organization (PDO) was 
created jointly by the two, with the intention to expand the revolution in the rest of the country. This 
was the case of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopia 
People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF): which were created on purpose to be part of the EPRDF and carry 
forward its national project, since the existing Oromia Liberation Front (OLF) and Southern Ethiopian 
People’s Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) had refused to participate (Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003). These 
new organizations were composed by former Derg soldiers imprisoned by the insurgents and educated 
with the EPRDF’s principles and goals (Markakis 2011). 
The core of the EPRDF’s struggle and national project was the peaceful cohabitation of all the nations, 
nationalities and peoples of the country, in a federal republic respectful of every existing ethnic claim 
and guided by the principle of self-determination. The TPLF was the leading front within the EPRDF 
and played a crucial role in the liberation of the whole country both ideologically and practically. As a 
matter of fact, when the EPRDF marched on Addis Ababa backed by US support, in May 1991, and 
officially overturned the military regime, the MLLT conserved its leading role and the Tirgrayan front 
was providing two thirds of the soldiers to the armed force of the national front (Aalen 2011). In the 
post-liberation period, the TPLF played once again a prominent and strategic role in handling the 
transition to the new Ethiopian state. As the following chapters will highlight, many ideological aspects 
and practical forms of conduct of the party were transposed to the formal structure of the state and 
shaped in various ways in what Kerkvliet defines “everyday politics” (Kerkvliet 2010). 
 
1.1.2. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
As for the historical period being described, in the aftermath of Mengistu’s collapse, the TPLF called 
for the participation of various political forces – as representatives of different ethnic interests – to a 
national conference held in Addis Ababa between 1 and 5 July. The decision to hold a conference came 
after the failure of negotiations between government representatives and Tigrayan and Eritrean rebel 
leaders, mediated by the United States Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Herman J. Cohen 
(Markakis 2011). The fact that Cohen cautioned that aid would be delivered only if the new rulers had 
met international democratic standards was particularly emblematic of the political conditionality 
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associated with foreign aid by Western agencies: «No democracy, no cooperation».26 As the chairman 
of the supreme council of the EPRDF, Meles Zenawi promised his group would cooperate for the 
creation of a broad coalition government in order to meet the required democratic standards, and to 
enable international aid to reach the Ethiopian population. Ottaway observes that, since the TPLF 
represented a very minor ethnic group within the country and therefore lacked the popular support 
required for its national project, its turn to democratic initiatives can be interpreted as an attempt to find 
external legitimacy and support by the U.S. government (Ottaway 1995). The United States’ 
participation in the transitional process definitely reflects the global reframing of political alliances and 
allegiances that characterized the last years of the Cold War period (Haynes 2002). 
Over 27 delegations from political parties were «selectively invited to attend» the Peaceful and 
Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia, while others were excluded because of their political 
opposition to the democratic and pan-Ethiopian project, and to the EPRDF’s leading role within the 
transitional process (Markakis 2011; Merera 2011: 5). The EPRDF had 32 delegates out of a total of 87, 
the second most represented party was the OLF with 12, while the remaining seats were divided among 
more than 20 small parties; this composition allowed the EPRDF to control the conference (Ottaway 
1995). Moreover, since most of the attending parties had little popular legitimacy nor a clear agenda 
because they were so new, the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia adopted on 22nd July, reflected 
almost completely the EPRDF’s project to build a democratic and united Ethiopia. The Charter, 
approved by «the peace loving and democratic forces present in the Ethiopian society», appointed a 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) to «exercise all legal and political responsibility for the 
governance of Ethiopia until it hands over power to a government popularly elected on the basis of a 
new Constitution».27 
The shift in political orientation from the previous Soviet-backed regime is evident in the Charter, which 
is explicitly «[b]ased on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations» and 
repeatedly commits its subscribers to build a «democratic order» through participative processes; 
individual rights are indeed expressed at the base of the Charter and guaranteed full respect. In addition, 
collective rights are listed at “Part One. Democratic Rights”, in the form of «[t]he right of nations, 
nationalities and peoples to self-determination (…) [which consists of] the right to: a/ Preserve its 
identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history and use and develop its language; b/ 
Administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central 
government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation; c/ Exercise its right to self-
                                                     
26 - C.G. Whitney, Ethiopian Seeks to Form Temporary Government, in «The New York Times» (on-line), 29 May 
1991: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/29/world/ethiopian-seeks-to-form-temporary-government.html 
27 - Peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia, Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, 
«Negarit Gazeta», 50th year, n. 1, 22 July 1991, Addis Ababa. 
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determination of independence, when the concerned, nation/nationality and people is convinced that the 
above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated».28 
The country was divided into regions, on the basis of (presumed) ethnic identities. Due to the complexity 
of the process and the vagueness of the criteria used, many disputes arose within and across boundaries 
(Markakis 2011). In the formalization of the right to self-determination until independence - which 
eventually led to Eritrean secession in 1993 - lays the foundation of the new Ethiopian state, based on 
the opposition to previous attempts to build centralized and homogeneous nations, as happened in both 
Imperial and Derg periods. In this sense, the Charter constitutes the institutionalisation of the EPRDF’s 
vision of a united Ethiopia and represents a crucial step in the state-restructuring and nation-building 
processes of under analysis. 
By announcing a «politics of plurality», the Transitional Charter signed a «decisive break with the 
country’s past authoritarian culture» (Tronvoll, Hagmann 2012: 14). Nevertheless, as the creation of 
People’s Democratic Organizations demonstrated, the EPRDF did not actually create the grounds for 
the opposition parties to really challenge its leadership and guidance in the transitional period. Instead 
of representing a sound coalition for Ethiopia, the TGE and the Council of Representatives were 
composed of «antagonistic blocs»: on one side there was the EPRDF and its allied parties and 
organizations, while on the other side there were some incompatible ethnically-based political 
movements among which the OLF and the All-Amhara People’s Organizations (AAPO) (Ottaway 
1995). Even though 7 different political groups were expecting to be represented in the TGE, the EPRDF 
managed to fill the President and Prime Minister positions and take over the Ministries of Defence, 
Interior and Foreign Affairs. Because of its popular legitimacy and longstanding tradition, the OLF was 
among the best organized and strongest movements that managed to challenge the EPRDF during the 
transitional period and thus attained relevant leading positions within the TGE, by taking over 4 
Ministries. As set forth by the Charter, the Conference transformed itself into a transitional Council of 
Representatives and regional and local administrative elections took place in the following months 
(Markakis 2011). However, as soon as the TGE was created, many among the opposition movements 
started denouncing the EPRDF of using force and military power to gain control over Oromo and other 
Southern areas through its party cadres and structures. The OLF sided with the opposing parties, it left 
the TGE shortly after its establishment and boycotted the local administrative elections conducted in 
1992 (Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003). The elections took place in the absence of a real electoral competition 
(Tronvoll, Hagmann 2012) and the EPRDF’s primacy became uncontested in June 1992, when its former 
guerrilla army was named national defence force (Markakis 2011). 
 
                                                     
28 - Ibid. 
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1.1.3. The EPRDF’s Constitution 
The EPRDF played a main role also in drafting the Constitution. Following the Charter’s mandate, a 
Constituent Commission was created by the Council of Representatives’ and outsiders to be accepted 
by the Council itself. Since the Council was largely dominated by EPRDF’s members, this mechanism 
did not further political pluralism and led to the unanimous approval of EPRDF’s program (Merera 
2011). Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in June 1994, in a climate of growing distrust, 
extreme polarization and opponent repression. Similar conditions were created during the consultation 
(among a small part of the population) on the issues of secession and land ownership to be ratified in 
the Constitution, and during the 1995 federal and regional elections when the EPRDF gained over 90% 
of the seats in the newly established House of Representatives (Tronvoll, Hagmann 2012; Merera 2011). 
The opposition withdrew from the polls after being intimidated, harassed and threatened in various ways. 
The Constitution of the FDRE was issued in December 1994 and finally adopted in August 1995 
(Markakis 2011). 
The Constitution reflects an overall continuity with the Transitional Charter and with the EPRDF’s 
project of an Ethiopian united and democratic state, respectful of the right to self-determination for all 
«Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia» (Preamble), defined as «a group of people who have 
or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief 
in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, 
predominantly contiguous territory» (art. 39/5). In order for this to happen, the Constitution established 
a federal republic composed by 9 States (kilil), «delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, 
language, identity and consent of the peoples concerned» (art. 46/2). At a federal level, the Constitution 
established a parliamentarian form of government composed of a House of People’s Representatives 
and a House of Federations. The former is elected by direct universal suffrage every five years and is 
invested with «the power of legislation in all matters assigned by the Constitution to Federal 
jurisdiction» (art. 55/1). The latter represents the nations, nationalities and peoples and is in charge of 
interpreting the Constitution and dealing with issues related to the right to self-determination; it is 
composed by one representative for each officially recognised ethnic group, regardless of size, and an 
additional one per million inhabitants. By attributing to the States «[a]ll powers not given expressly to 
the Federal Government alone, or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States» (art. 52/1) 
the Constitution furthered federalism beyond the traditional schemes (FDRE 1995). The underlying 
rationale was to give all the nations, nationalities and peoples «an unconditional right to self-
determination», to be advocated up to «secession», as stated in art. 39. 
The self-determination principle was implemented in the federal state. However, the institutional 
framework provided for a strong federal government vis-à-vis financially dependent regions, and 
consisted in a power deconcentration, rather than delegation (Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003). As the 
following chapters will highlight, in spite of all the mechanisms designed for self-determination, all the 
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claims for democratic participation and all the formal distributions of power, the institutional structure 
of the FDRE fosters a concentration of powers in the central executive. From then on, EPRDF’s political 
practice in the following years will reveal the intrinsic political and ideological contradictions of its rule 
and its ad hoc-designed FDRE. Consistently, despite an apparent orientation toward Western aid 
agencies and coherent liberal principles, beyond the façade of legal and institutional procedures, the first 
decade of the FDRE showed very few elements comparable to other liberal democracies. Ottaway’s 
description of the Ethiopian experience of transition to democracy is particularly trenchant: 
«[d]emocratization in Ethiopia was started from the end point, with the formal steps that crown the 
process being carried out before any social or political transformation had taken place» (Ottaway 1995: 
75). Indeed, liberal democracy was considered to be a «sham under conditions in Ethiopia», an 
instrument in the hands of a very limited minority; in opposition, the EPRDF envisaged a «popular 
democracy (…) based on communal collective participation, and representation based on consensus» 
(Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003: 117). A contradictory dialectic began to shape the political narrative of the 
GoE: on one side, concepts such as “good governance” and “economic liberalism” entered EPRDF’s 
discourse and replaced the admiration for the Albanian development model; on the other, old legacies 
of the Marxist-Leninist ideological roots survived in the practices of the “democratic centralism” – 
ruling the party and state structures – and “collective mobilisation” of peasants (Aalen 2011; Merera 
2011). 
 
1.2. New Economic Policy and Structural Adjustment Reforms 
As already mentioned, the new political phase corresponded to a shift in national economic orientation. 
The EPRDF blamed the Marxist-Leninst military regime for the dramatic economic and political errors 
which led the country on the verge of collapse. Proof of this is the WB calculation of an average per 
capita GDP annual growth around -2.7% between 1982 and 1992, a result that could have been 
significantly worse if the post-famine recovery years in 1985 and 1986 had not been included.29 Other 
economic indicators confirm the negative trend performed by the country in the whole Derg period. For 
instance, between 1974 and 1990, commodity producing sectors grew at the very low rate of 1.2%, while 
the service sector performed slightly better with a 3.5% growth rate (Eshetu, Makonnen 1992). 
Government spending grew steadily from 17% of the GDP in 1974/75 to 47% in 1988/89, most of it 
went into the military and administrative bureaucracy (IDS 1994).30 As a consequence, domestic savings 
declined from 13% of GDP before 1974 to 4% in the late 1980s (Eshetu, Makonnen 1992), and tumbled 
to 0.2% in 1990/91 (IDS 1994), becoming one of the lowest savings rates in the world (Eshetu, 
                                                     
29 - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ET 
30 - Military spending rose from 3.3% share of GDP in 1974-75 to 11.4% in 1987-88 (Eshetu, Makonnen 1992); 
in 1990, more than 50% of the recurrent budget was used to finance military and civil war (IDS 1994). 
69 
 
Makonnen 1992). Despite an impressive growth in total government revenue (from 717.3 million to 
3,115.2 million Birr), the budget deficit grew six-fold during that time; and due to a drastic rise in 
imports31 and a slow growth in exports,32 the trade payment balance had a negative increase up to 1.5 
billion Birr in 1987-88 (Eshetu, Makonnen 1992), and 1.8 billion Birr in 1991/92 (IDS 1994).33 As a 
consequence, the country’s external debt deteriorated to a critical level: excluding military aid, the 
state’s foreign indebtedness raised to 1.5 billion Birr in 1980, 3.3 in 1984/85 and 7.2 in 1989/90, 
respectively accounting for 18, 34 and 58 percent of the GDP; the state’s incapacity to meet loan 
obligations generated arrears that reached 1 billion Birr in 1992 (IDS 1994). Where not covered by 
external loans, budget deficit recovery measures were taken by the domestic banking system, that 
increased the money supply which in turn led to inflation (Verlaeten 1991; IDS 1994). This had a 
negative consequence on the peoples’ purchasing power, leading to a general rise in the prices of basic 
commodities and services (IDS 1994), which were aggravated further by a wage stagnation in large 
sectors of the economy (Eshetu, Makonnen 1992). 
 
1.2.1. Structural Adjustment Programs and New Economic Policy toward a mixed economy 
The downfall of the Ethiopian economy was definitely worsened by the effects of unpredictable or 
deeply challenging events such as particularly acute droughts (in 1984-85 probably as many as 1 million 
people perished), rapid demographic growth, environmental degradation and external economic 
shocks34 (Eshetu, Makonnen 1992). However, quite a lot of literature explores the reasons behind the 
economic failure of the Derg regime and it shares in various ways and from different perspectives, a 
common blame for the failed attempt to manage the economy (Hansson 1995; Pausewang et al. 1990; 
Eshetu, Makonnen 1992; Naudé 1998). Hence, several reasons justified the TGE for claiming the 
reversal of the «misguided policies» of the former government, intended to deal with the structural 
problems engendered by the command economy and to resolve the social crisis which left millions of 
people in need of urgent help: around 9 million, according to UN (Verlaeten 1991) between displaced 
people, refugees, post-war invalids, unemployed, former soldiers, widows, orphans and people suffering 
with chronic food insecurity (Naudé 1998). 
                                                     
31 - Rising imports of food, raw materials, fuel and capital goods constituted the bulk of imports growth (IDS 
1994). 
32 - «Export earnings declined from Birr 942 million in 1985/86 (about $450 million) to Birr 756 million in 1989/90 
and further to Birr 389 million in 1991/92; while imports increased from Birr 2,018 million in 1984/85 to Birr 
2,274 million in 1988/89» (IDS 1994: 68). 
33 - The decline in the price of coffee and the fall in volume of coffee export were major causes for trade deficit 
growth. The trade deficit was 10% of GDP in 1988/89 and 9.3% in 1989/90 (IDS 1994). 
34 - Associated to instability of primary commodity prices, these are particularly severe in countries that rely on a 
single crop for export incomes, as was the case of coffee in Ethiopia, that accounted for 60% of total export value 
in 1990 (IDS 1994). 
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The very first step away from the socialist pathway had actually been taken by the newly-established 
People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in the late 1980s, when the pressing economic 
problems added on to changing international relations and the intensification of the civil war. The first 
overture to economic reformism came following the resolutions of the 9th Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia in November 1988, where, in spite of continued support 
for the socialist cause, the Committee called for the creation of legal conditions to enhance private 
investments in the production and service sectors. In 1989, legislation was implemented to remove the 
limits imposed on private participation in small-scale industries, hotels and joint ventures. But only in 
the aftermath of the 11th Plenum held in March 1990, was a New Economic Reform Programme (NERP) 
issued, promoting an overall reversal of the original transition to socialism project. The NERP promoted 
the creation of a mixed and market-oriented economy, where the competition between all the forms of 
enterprise and investment - state, private and cooperative – was promoted (Eshetu, Makonnen 1992). 
The programme aimed to boost real GDP growth, increase food production and food security, increase 
exports, promote a balanced development between urban and rural areas, enhance welfare service 
delivery and create economic stability. Macroeconomic reforms and structural adjustment measures 
were designed to reach these goals, mainly by removing price distortions and restrictions on trade and 
exchange rates, cutting budget deficit and price inflation (Verlaeten 1991: annex 3). The new Investment 
Policy and the Special Decree on investments, practically removed all the restrictions for the private 
sector and created incentives for foreign and domestic investments. However, the full implementation 
of the programme was interrupted by the famous historical events. 
 Following the Soviet bloc’s withdrawal from the international scenario of financial aid and 
development assistance, the reformist environment of the late 1980s can also be explained as an attempt 
to attract resources form Western agencies, who did participate in the draft of the measures to be taken, 
but ultimately did not deliver any. This perspective seems to be extremely relevant when linked to the 
transitional and post-transitional period ruled by the GoE: the TGE resolutely committed itself to 
democratic values and Western-minded economic policies, which were implemented with the 
collaboration of the WB and the International Monetary Fund. 
Hence, in the immediate aftermath of its establishment, the TGE inaugurated a period of macroeconomic 
and institutional reforms intended to reverse the negative trends of the economy and to begin a 
democratic pathway: the reforms were to be part of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Even though the 
TGE was very determined to dissociate itself from the previous regime and to highlight the different 
nature of its democratic project vis-à-vis the «anti-democratic nature» of the previous one (Naudé 1998: 
124), the late period of market-oriented reforms announced by the PDRE made its successors’ call for 
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discontinuity less radical.35 The first economic document issued by the TGE was the Ethiopia’s 
Economic Policy During the Transitional Period (EPTP), on 21 November 1991. The paper formally 
accepted the fact that, in order to pull the country out of the social and economic crisis, a market-driven 
political economy was needed: «[i]t is evident that in the past state control over the entire economy was 
the major cause of economic decline».36 Consistently with the transitional pathway traced by the NERP, 
the EPTP aimed to create a mixed economy with less state involvement and greater opportunities for 
the private sector, to recognize market rights, to restructure state farms and enterprises on standard 
market-based principles, to favour domestic private capital and to increase popular participation in the 
economy; measures to be taken included reforms of the fiscal and military systems intended to reduce 
budget deficit, regulate inflation and reduce price control (Verlaeten 1991). In spite of the enhancement 
of market-orientation, the mixed economy was not expected to entail a total withdrawal of the state from 
the economy. Instead, state ownership in the industry was kept «in a selected number of key 
establishments that are essential for the development of the economy»; indeed, «major financial 
institutions that provide services to different sectors of the economy such as banks, insurance companies 
and other major financial institutions will be under state ownership in order to ensure that they will play 
their proper role in the process of economic development». The state kept the possibility to «engage 
itself in the wholesale trade of basic goods of mass consumption» in order to guarantee stabilised prices. 
Foreign investment was promoted (and allowed) «to engage (…) in those activities in which the state or 
domestic investors are (…) unable to invest[.] (…) [S]tate capital should be given priority over foreign 
capital». State ownership of land was to remain temporarily unchanged, until the sentence of a popular 
consultation to be held in following months.37 It is obvious that the EPTP was the expression of a 
political compromise, reached between different currents of thought represented in the TGE (Verlaeten 
1992a), and characterized by the urgent need for external support and financial resources to resuscitate 
the economy.38 
In view of the economic national emergency, in 1992 the TGE launched an Emergency Recovery and 
Reconstruction Program (PROGRAM) which lasted until 1998 with the financial assistance of the WB 
                                                     
35 - In the Discussion on the Draft Economic Policy of the Transitional Government, Eshetu Chole – Department 
of Economics, Addis Ababa University - confirms the presence of continuities, as well as differences, between 
NERP and the forthcoming policy paper presented by the TGE (Tekie 1992: 383-387). 
36 - Quotation from Ethiopia’s Economic Policy During the Transitional Period, The Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, November 1991, in Naudé (1998: 132, 133) 
37 - Ibid. 
38 - The influence of the national emergency in the process of negotiation characterizing the EPTP is clearly 
expressed in the words of Makonnen Abraham, from the Ministry of Panning, in the Discussion on the Draft 
Economic Policy of the Transitional Government with other senior officials of the TGE: «As far as currency 
adjustment is concerned, the Draft Economic Policy has clearly indicated its intention to devalue the highly 
overvalued Birr. I do not think there is any other alternative, and I do not understand why people are skeptical. 
Now if someone is really skeptical, then he has to come up with the alternative. The World Bank together with the 
EEC and other donors are already here to embark upon emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes 
on the assumption that Ethiopia will undertake SAP [structure adjustment programme] starting next June» (Tekie 
1992: 390). 
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and other bilateral and multilateral donors.39 The PROGRAM allocated 657.4 million USD «to assist 
Ethiopia to embark quickly on a process of economic and social recovery and to lay the basis for the 
follow-up adjustment program» (WB 1998: 1). The program had three parts: a production part aimed at 
supporting public and private agricultural and manufacturing sectors, which accounted for 45% of the 
budgeting; an infrastructural one dedicated mainly to roads and telecommunications, water supply and 
power facilities, that received 35% of the total financial assistance; the third part regarded health and 
basic welfare services, to which was allocated the remaining 20% of the total (Milkias 2011). 
Alongside the ERRP and in line with the NEP, the Ethiopian government embarked on a period of 
macroeconomic reforms and structural adjustment programmes, with a strong commitment by external 
financial partners. In September 1992, in collaboration with the WB and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the TGE issued a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) that constituted the political framework 
for the realization of economic reforms during the 1992/93 – 1994/95 period. The paper envisaged a 
first phase of economic stabilisation, a following structural reform phase, and a final period for the 
consolidation of the measures (Naudé 1998). The PFP clarified the objectives and strategies expressed 
in the EPTP, providing a more precise implementation time frame consistent with the objective of 
dismantling the command economy in a less controversial way. Some of the most outstanding reforms 
envisaged: privatizations in all sectors of the economy with very limited exceptions; market 
liberalizations consisting of price liberalization and trade deregulation; public enterprise reforms 
intended to rationalize and monitor their activities; incentives to private enterprises; institutional 
changes affecting market functioning; monetary, fiscal, and external trade policies associated to the 
stimulation of the private sector and the reduction of the budget deficit; sectoral policies intended to 
stimulate economic growth, and social policies to improve human development conditions; a national 
disaster prevention and preparedness strategy including a food security strategy (Bulti 2008; Verlaeten 
1992b). In addition, the PFP envisaged more consistent measures to achieve decentralization vis-à-vis 
the EPTP, including delegating to regional administrations the legislative power concerning tax 
collection (Verlaeten 1992b). 
The PFP constituted the ground for the implementation of structural adjustment programs supported by 
the IMF, the WB and other multilateral and bilateral financing. Although the PFP had been created by 
a transitional government, given the long-term objectives that were in the plan, the document was 
expected to serve more than the sole transitional period, and to represent an economic framework for 
future reforms. In November 1992, the TGE concluded an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) agreement with the IMF for the 1993-95 period. The agreement followed-up the liberalization 
                                                     
39 - PROGRAM was «co-financed by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, African Development Fund, 
European Economic Commission, European Investment Bank, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, United 
States Agency for International Development, United Nations Development Program, and reallocation from IDA's 
existing credits» (WB 1998: 3). 
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reforms and was expected to generate economic growth, reduce inflation, correct the balance of 
payments and create foreign exchange reserves: import duties were reduced, initial steps were taken in 
order to open the financial system to the participation of private domestic banks, an Ethiopian 
Privatization Agency was established with the goal of privatizing state-owned enterprises (IMF 1999). 
Subsequently, in May 1993 a Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC1) of about 250 million USD was 
granted by the WB and its financial partners for the 1993-95 period,40 to contribute specifically to the 
TGE’s efforts in boosting economic growth, create employment and ultimately reduce extreme 
poverty.41 In line with the PFP and the ESAF, actions to be carried out within the SAC1 regarded 
macroeconomic stabilization and support for the private sector. Economic conditionality was associated 
to the follow-up of the SAC1 and to other complementary projects agreed on (or renewed) by the Bank, 
in support of the overall development of the Ethiopian economy (WB 1993a).42 The borrower’s 
performance was declared «satisfactory» by one of the partners who financially supported the 
programme, the African Development Bank (ADF 1997: ix). 
As expected, in the aftermath of its first election, in 1995 the GoE expressed its intention to continue 
the reformist program initiated by the TGE and prepared a new medium-term adjustment program for 
the 1996-99 period. A remarkable difference vis-à-vis previous policy papers consisted in the new 
emphasis on poverty reduction as the final goal of the whole economic reformism: «[t]he Government 
is committed to reducing poverty by achieving a broad-based economic growth, in a stable 
macroeconomic environment» (GoE 1996: 3). The new element can be interpreted as a consequence of 
the political legitimacy expressed by the 1995 polls to the Government; or as the result of the 
consolidation of the dialogue of EPRDF’s officials with Western donors, and therefore as an anticipation 
of the future redirection toward poverty alleviation strategies. 
Acknowledging the positive results obtained during the first period of the SAPs, for the period between 
1996-99, the GoE envisaged the continuation of fiscal, monetary and credit policies intended to reduce 
budget deficit, stabilize the economy and enhance private participation in the economy. Also new 
structural and institutional policies aimed at liberalizing commodity prices, privatizing public 
enterprises and boosting private sector development were issued. Sectoral policies, human resource 
development, population policy, environmental protection and food security strategy completed the set 
of actions the new policy framework envisaged for the period. The GoE’s request for financial assistance 
                                                     
40 - Extended for one additional year to allow the implementation of the policies (ADBG 2000). 
41 - Several external donors contributed to the SAC1 through external and parallel financing. The contribution of 
the African Development Bank and three European Governments (The Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden) 
resulted in a total of 360 million USD (ADF 1997). 
42 - Some of them are recalled in SAC1 such as: such as the National Seeds Project, the Fertilizer Project, the Road 
Rehabilitation Project, the Public Works Project, the Family Health Project, the Seventh Education Project and the 
Calub Gas Project (WB 1993a). 
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was supported by a three-year arrangement under the IMF’s ESAF43 (which eventually expired after the 
first year), the WB’s sector investment programs (SIPs) and other multilateral and bilateral donors.44 
Many actions and reforms have been performed between 1996 and 1999 to follow-up the transition 
toward a market-oriented economy, among which: import licensing simplification, import duty cuts, 
commercial bank lending rate liberalization, simplification of export regulation, export tax elimination 
except on coffee, liberalization of all retail prices except petrol, agricultural price liberalization, 
investment regulation reform to enhance private-public participation, tax system reform, privatization 
of 175 enterprises, fertilizer subsidy abolishment and legalization of the private trade of fertilizers, civil 
service reform, introduction of a labour code, and many others (Bulti 2008; IMF 1999; Berhanu 1999). 
A new policy framework paper was issued again, in September 1998, calling for a structural reform 
intensification in the following 1998-2001 three-year adjustment program; it was the fifth PFP, since 
1991. Similar measures were envisaged in order to «attain relatively fast, broad-based, and more 
equitable economic growth with macroeconomic stability», and to integrate Ethiopia into the global 
economy.45 The new framework proposed once again measures to «remove exchange and trade 
restrictions, increase export promotion, expand opportunities for foreign investors, intensify agricultural 
and rural development, and strengthen public expenditure management, including improvements to 
budget planning and monitoring and acceleration of civil service reform» (IMF 1999: 20, 22). In 
November, the Executive Boards of International Development Association (IDA) and the IMF declared 
Ethiopia eligible for assistance under the enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC 
Initiative). Despite the break out of the war with Eritrea, structural reform implementation continued in 
the 1998/99 fiscal year, with particular emphasis on privatizations and exchange and trade liberalizations 
(IMF, IDA 2001a). 
 
1.2.2. A Partial Transition 
Some major observations can be made following the brief review of some of the most relevant economic 
reforms adopted since the establishment of the TGE up to the turn of the millennium. First of all, the 
impressive set of reforms was overtly influenced by the opening of the TGE and EPRDF’s leaders to 
Western donors. As mentioned, the orientation shift from the Soviet bloc toward the Western 
international donors community had already been started by the previous regime towards the end of its 
                                                     
43 - The three-year ESAF loan was approved on 11 October 1996 (IMF, Press Release: IMF Approves New Three-
Year ESAF Loan for Ethiopia, International Monetary Fund, Press Release n. 96/51, 11 October 1996) but after 
the first year it was allowed to expire since «the mid-term review under that arrangement could not be completed»; 
a second annual ESAF loan was approved on 23 October 1998 (IMF, Press Release: IMF Approves Second Annual 
ESAF Loan for Ethiopia, International Monetary Fund, Press Release n. 98/51, 23 October 1998). 
44 - See IMF, Ethiopia - Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Medium-Term Economic and Financial Policy 
Framework Paper, 1998/99-2000/01, International Monetary Fund. 
45 - Ibid. 
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period. However, the TGE and the following GoE were able to attract increasing amounts of financial 
assistance for the first phase of economic stabilization, recovery and basic liberalization, and for the 
second generation of macroeconomic reforms in the late 1990s. Much of the confidence and trust 
acquired was thanks to the political ability of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi,46 who brought the reformist 
project of the EPRDF to the attention of the donors, thus receiving their appreciation: «[t]he commitment 
of the Government to an economic agenda is reflected in an exceptionally strong sense of "ownership" 
of economic policies and to probity in their implementation» (WB 1997: 2). Post-socialist Ethiopia 
increased significantly the amount of financial and development assistance attracted, under different 
forms: technical assistance, food aid, loans, grants and foreign direct investments. International financial 
assistance47 flows were equal to 12 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in the 1980s and reached 
an average of 23% in the 1990s (until 1997); in per capita terms, flows rose from 23 USD in the former 
decade, to 30 USD in the latter. When compared to other similar size SSA countries, these figures reveal 
a low aid flow on per capita basis, but one of the highest percentages of the GNP. To get an idea of the 
significance of these flows in terms of development, it is worth observing that in 1996 the official 
development assistance was equal to 90% of total government expenditure (Berhanu 1999). If 
considered together with the different economic approaches observed between the EPTP and the fifth 
PFP, and with the repeated revision of specific measures through the years (since its inception in the 
early 1990s, the investment regulation was revised four times), these data suggest that the influence of 
loans and grants on the definition of the country’s economic trajectory was remarkable (Berhanu 1999). 
Furthermore, it is worth acknowledging that in spite of the numerous market-oriented reforms, the 
government maintained a strategical presence in the economy, and was definitely not subjected to a 
passive acceptance of foreign strategies. This is particularly evident in the governance sector, which 
conserved many of the traditional traits revealed in the previous chapter, and that will appear with even 
more emphasis in the rest of the study. In the agricultural sector as well, upholding the public ownership 
of land – formalized in the Constitution – caused disagreements with the market-oriented donors, but 
allowed the government to keep a fundamental tool of political control and economic drive. But also 
with regard to finance and economics, the transition to a competitive banking system was hampered by 
the supremacy of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia on deposits, and by the National Bank of Ethiopia’s 
lack of autonomy. Moreover, despite significant privatizations, large-scale State-owned enterprises, 
party-owned businesses, party-affiliated NGOs and the state telecommunication monopoly hindered the 
development of the private sector and constituted a relevant presence in the Ethiopian economy of the 
late 1990s (Dereje 2011; Berhanu 1999; Hagmann, Abbink 2011; Plaut 2012; Milkias 2001). Further 
                                                     
46 - As regards to Meles’ relationship with Western donors, Ottaway (1995) reveals that contacts between him and 
the U.S. government date back to the late 1980s. 
47 - Calculated as the sum of Net Official Development Assistance Loans, grants, technical assistance and food aid 
(Berhanu 1999). 
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evidence of the EPRDF’s active control of foreign assistance, concerned the controversy with the IMF 
in 1997 which led to the suspension of the agreement; plus, Ethiopia embarked on the war against Eritrea 
(1998-2000) despite the international pressure against the war, which led to a reduction in donors 
assistance (Dereje 2011). Notwithstanding these elements, the African Development Group declared the 
Ethiopian structural adjustment programme experience, a winning case (ADB, ADF 2001). 
Finally, the Ethiopian experience of transition from a socialist economy toward a mixed and market-
oriented one was, characterized ever since its early stages by a very politicized environment. The 
stabilisation of the economy constituted a crucial step within the Ethiopian political transition 
experience, yet at the same time, the TGE envisaged the economic transformation of the country as part 
of the political project. Coherently with the argument that the main reason for the economic destitution 
inherited from the previous regime, was the non-democratic nature of the regime itself, the new political 
order was expected to stimulate economic growth. At the same time, economy reform was considered a 
necessary step in order to make the transition to a democratic order. Henceforth, the unification of 
economics and politics will characterize the EPRDF’s narrative of development, as a means to acquire 
legitimacy within its own society and among the international donor community. Within this framework, 
economic and institutional reforms constitute the core of the development project around which the 
EPRDF will aim to create popular consensus and international support. 
 
1.3. Reforming Agriculture: ADLI, Extension System and the Issue of Land 
The legacies of the peasant-based struggle that the TPLF had fought from its origin against the quasi-
feudal system of land administration and ideals of the Emperor and the Orthodox Church (Medhane, 
Young 2003), encouraged the EPRDF to maintain a strong connection with the rural base. This close 
connection framed the economic plan created by the government since the early 90s, and still constitutes 
a key tool of analysis for the change and development trajectory of the country as a whole. Beyond the 
ideological character, the choice for a rural-centred and agricultural-based pathway of development 
responded to an economic rationale based on the material conditions inherited by the Derg. In 1992, the 
rural population constituted 87% of the 50 million national population,48 agriculture accounted for over 
40% of GDP49 and generated around 90% of total export earnings (Befekadu, Tesfaye 1990). Peasant 
                                                     
48 - http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Health%20Nutrition%20and%20Population%20 
Statistics:%20Population%20estimates%20and%20projections# 
49 - There is strong disagreement around this data, probably attributable to different measurement systems: 
according to Naudé (1998: 129) by 1991/92 agriculture accounted for 40% of GDP, while the industrial sector 
11%; according to WB database, in 1991/92 agriculture composed 61-66 percent of GDP 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=ET) while industry accounted for 7-6 percent 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS?locations=ET). According to WB, this two-year period is 
characterized by the highest peak of agricultural share of GDP, while the same indicator in immediately preceding 
and following years scored around 50%. Other sources are more in line with this estimation: Eshetu, Makonnen 
(1992: 16) reported 43.4% in 1989/90, IDS (1994: 67) rounded off to 40% in the early 1990s. The vagueness of 
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farming constituted the bulk of the sector, and therefore of the whole national economy: according to 
estimates, in the early 1990s, the average holding size was 0.73 ha, and around 6 million smallholders 
produced 96% of the total agricultural output (WB 1995b). Despite this demographic and economic 
predominance, the agricultural sector was almost stagnant as a consequence of recurring droughts, 
environmental degradation, increasing population pressure in the highlands, low yields, scarce 
technological assets, very limited utilization of improved inputs, and many other concurring factors such 
as unfavourable economic policies and political instability. Habtemariam (2008) reports that agricultural 
production increased to a 0.6% annual rate between 1973 and 1980, and to 2.1% in the following 7 
years. Other sources confirm the sector’s poor performance during the 1980s, estimating an annual 
agricultural output growth of around 0.7% between 1974 and 1990, which meant 2% less than the 
population growth rate, and represented the lowest growth rate in all the economic sectors, except for 
construction (Verlaeten 1991). As a consequence, per capita food availability declined from 82% in 
1979/80 to 75% in 1986-87 (Eshetu, Makonnen 1992), worsening food shortages and transforming the 
country into a net food grains importer.50 
 
1.3.1. Agricultural-Development-Led Industrialization 
The dramatic effects of this stagnation were strongly denounced by the newly established Ethiopian 
government, in order to legitimate its subsequent initiatives in favour of agricultural support: «as 
population has grown from 15 million in 1951 to 55 million today, the production of cereals has dropped, 
on a per capita basis, by more than 25 percent» (GoE 1996: 4). In line with the EPTP, the strategy of 
economic development envisaged by the TGE, indeed, overtly addressed «as its focus, the bulk of the 
population», and aimed to generate «economic development and structural transformation», in turn 
conducive to «sustainable economic growth; equity (…), and self reliance» (TGE 1993: 15-18). The 
economic transformation involved an administrative reorganization embedded in ethnic and self-
determination issues, and therefore committed to provide «national regional administration with full 
autonomous power to manage regional economies» (TGE 1993: 1). The structural transformation goal 
was conceived as the transition from an agricultural-based economy dependent on external resources, 
to an industrialized and self-sufficient economy. The strategy gained knowledge from previous 
experiences of «export-led development» in post-World War II and the successive switch to «import-
substitution strategy», both accused of having «made no meaningful contribution to the country’s 
economic development» (TGE 1993: 8-10). 
                                                     
the expression used in the text is explained by the fact that the estimation is here needed only to get an idea of the 
high contribution of agriculture in the economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There seems not to be any reason 
for further investigation in this case. 
50 - In 1981 the country imported 3% of total grain consumption requirements, in 1990 this data rose to 10% (WB 
1995b). In 1984-85, external food aid constituted 26% of total food availability in the country (GoE 2002: 5). 
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Consistent with the «existing conditions» of the country (TGE 1993: 17), the strategy recognized the 
impossibility to engage in radical projects of industrial-led or export-led or import-substitution 
industrialization, and instead focused on an «Agricultural-development-led Industrialization (ADLI)» 
(TGE 1993: 16), that is to say: a parallel and coordinated development of agriculture and industry, in 
which the former was supposed to play a crucial role in offsetting the structural transformation of the 
economy toward industrialization. Since agriculture constituted «a source of employment for the bulk 
of the population (…) [and] the foundation of the national economy» (TGE 1993: 4), it was accorded 
strategic priority in the development narrative to raise «the living standards of the population (…), for 
attaining food self-sufficiency, for employment creation, for providing market for domestically-
produced goods, for generating foreign exchange, for the availability of raw materials, etc» (TGE 1993: 
5). 
The ADLI model embraced the theory of agrarian change promoted by Singer and Adelman, which 
focused on surplus creation, rather than surplus extraction, for the transition to an industrial and 
developed economy, inspired by the successful experiences of South-Eastern Asian countries. Most of 
the agricultural policies conducted by the protagonists of the Asian Economic Miracle were indeed 
aimed at increasing the productivity of the agricultural sector to boost the shift of capital and labour 
surplus towards industrialization: rather than squeezing resources out of agriculture (for instance 
through high taxation or by reducing relative revenue), this model attempted to transfer them into 
manufacturing by rising wages and returns (WB 1993b). The ADLI strategy was based on this successful 
approach and envisioned for agriculture a three-phase development process: major improvements in 
traditional agricultural practices, infrastructure and modern agricultural input expansion, increase of 
rural labour opportunities in non-farming activities (TGE 1993). 
The ADLI strategy also gathered insights from the small-farm first issue based on the assumption that 
smallholder farmers are rational economic agents, and reframed it within its national building processes 
embedded in a political alliance with the peasants (Kassahun 2016), against the urban bias as opposed 
to the collectivization practice implemented during the previous regime. The success of the strategy 
depended primarily on its capacity to improve the productivity of «peasant farmers and pastoralists 
[who] constitute the cornerstone for launching the strategy» (TGE 1993: 5). Increased yields were 
expected to strengthen economic growth by generating export products, and by providing raw materials 
and market opportunities for domestic industrial expansion. However, the links between agriculture and 
the other sectors of the economy were expected to produce significant transformations only in the long-
term, and only after decades of rural and agricultural development support. 
  
1.3.2. Agricultural Intensification: The Extension System and the Food Security Strategy 
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The rapid transformation of the agricultural sector envisaged by the ADLI was primarily based on 
boosting production and achieving higher levels of productivity. The leading strategy consisted of a 
rapid modernization of smallholder farmer production systems, associated to both the agricultural 
practices and inputs used. Accordingly, between 1993 and 1999, the EPRDF led governments 
implemented the Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES), a 
development program which promoted the distribution and application of improved seed-fertilizer-
credit packages through a training and visit approach, to increase cereal production (Byerlee et al. 2007). 
The PADETES was a scale-up of the Sasakawa-Global 2000 project, a piloted program of extension, 
seed, fertilizer and credit created by Sasakawa Africa Association and the Carter Center’s Global 2000. 
The purpose of agricultural intensification was not new in Ethiopian history, since previous regimes 
yearned for similar objectives, although by means of different input dissemination systems and usually 
associated to commercial farming schemes. That was the purpose of the Comprehensive Integrated 
Package Project (1968-73) and Minimum Package Program (1971-79) implemented during the Imperial 
period, and of the foundation of the Agricultural Input Supply Corporation (1984) and the Peasant 
Agricultural Development Program (PADEP) (1986-1995) during the Derg regime (Habtemariam 
2008). The PADEP’s objectives, under which the Derg provided inputs, credit and extension services 
using a training and visit approach, to peasants grouped into service cooperatives were particularly 
ambitious (Spielman et al. 2011). Despite the efforts, many of these past projects lacked an integrated 
vision, financial support, infrastructural background and organizational efficiency, and they did not yield 
the required results in terms of agricultural production and agrarian change; rather, they often generated 
very isolated excellencies, or even a total waste of resources. Conversely, the PADETES demonstrated 
higher levels of efficiency on a small-medium scale, and was therefore scaled up to a country-wide level, 
under the National Agricultural Extension Intervention Program. Although some argue that the positive 
trend that the agricultural sector experienced during the 1990s in terms of output, was mainly due to the 
expansion of the cultivated land, rather than as an effect of improved yields (Byerlee et al. 2007; Belay 
2003), it is estimated that the PADETES achieved an unprecedented expansion level, reaching around 
40% of the overall10 million farmer households in almost 10 years (Spielman et al. 2011). 
As already mentioned, the founding objective of the PADETES was agricultural intensification, 
intended to increase the smallholding sector’s production and productivity. In turn agricultural 
intensification represented the ADLI’s main strategy to achieve economic development and food self-
sufficiency: on one side, the strategy was indeed expected to increase the production of raw goods and 
resources required to stimulate the economic growth and stabilization of the country; on the other, it 
envisaged an ultimate solution to the longstanding food deficit situation of the country which resulted 
in both transitory and chronic food insecurity. Concerning the latter, the EPRDF led government 
acknowledged the relevance of the problem, blamed the preceding regimes for their responsibility and 
reinforced its commitment to the solution of the problem. As a matter of fact, during the three major 
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droughts that hit the country in 1984, 1987 and 1989, Derg’s response was unable to provide the 
assistance required by large portions of the population, worsening the depth and structure of the food 
deficit that came as a consequence of the stagnant agricultural sector. The national Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) - founded by the Derg in 1974 after the severe drought that 
contributed to Emperor Haile Selassie’s deposal - proved to be a political instrument, with which the 
regime sought to dismantle the rising opposition rebels by condemning hundreds of thousands of 
civilians to starvation. In addition, the consistent international assistance received by the TPLF during 
the last years of the Derg regime - in support of Tigrayans’ people and ultimately of its subversive final 
goal - made the TPLF aware of the fact that food security should be considered a political priority to 
prevent any future rebel group from benefiting – as it did - from the support of foreign aid (Graham et 
al. 2013). 
Accordingly, when it came into power the EPRDF promoted the creation of an emergency preparedness 
and response system under the control of the Federal government, aimed at the alleviation of food 
insecurity and the avoidance of catastrophic disasters. The National Policy on Disaster Prevention and 
Management was issued in 1993, according to which an early warning system that linked relief to 
employment generation schemes was adopted, and the RRC was replaced by the Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Commission (Graham et al. 2013; Pankhurst, Dessalegn 2013). The establishment of 
efficient early warning and emergency preparedness and response systems represented one of the pillars 
of the Food Security Strategy (FSS) issued in 1996. The strategy was consistent with the “self-
sufficiency” objective determined by the ADLI, as one of the priority objectives for the agricultural 
sector, and for the overall economy. With the FSS, achieving this objective would lead to «narrowing 
substantially the ‘food gap’» which struck «four million people in the rural sector», and «52% of the 
country’s population» each year (GoE 1996: 1, 2). Accordingly, the FSS envisaged interventions for the 
enhancement of food crop production and marketing, the creation of employment possibilities through 
the growth of small business enterprises and the diversification of agricultural production and exports. 
Beyond these actions taken for the creation of economic growth and macroeconomic stability, in context 
setting of comparative advantage in food crop international trade of, the FSS also planned additional 
programs tailored for the most vulnerable areas and targeted to create both availability and accessibility 
to food security (GoE 1996). 
 
1.3.3. Land and Agriculture, Liberalizations and the State 
The ADLI, PADETES and the FSS proved the political and economic commitment that the EPRDF led 
governments granted to the agricultural sector and to the rural people. This commitment can be seen in 
the share of public spending that the governments accorded to the sector during the 1990s, which stayed 
above 11% for almost the entire decade, and even increased in the following years (Tewodaj et al. 2008). 
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However, public support was created within the above political economic framework, which blamed the 
command economy for having caused instability and stagnation, and consequently relied on market 
forces and decentralization. Therefore, it is within the “mixed economy” project that the liberalization 
reforms carried out in the agricultural sector in the 1990s should be observed and analysed. As happened 
with the monetary, fiscal and trade sectors, a comprehensive reform project of the agricultural sector 
was issued already in the late 1980s. In 1990 the NERP abolished the fixed prices and quota system 
created alongside the state-owned Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) – the largest agrarian 
economy command tool created by the Derg -, and created a more competitive environment for the 
private sector involved in grain marketing; furthermore, it envisaged a more secure land tenure 
compared to the past, and it affirmed the voluntary nature of cooperative formation and dissolution 
(Eshetu, Makonnen 1992; Alemayehu 1992). As soon as the TGE was established, many actions were 
taken in order to dismantle the command economy. In 1992, the AMC was restructured in the Ethiopian 
Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE), a public enterprise that kept the AMC’s mission to stabilise prices, 
export grains and stock food reserves, but within an open market environment, and in competition with 
the private sector (Rashid, Asfaw 2013). 
Furthermore, the National Seed Industry Policy and the National Fertilizer Policy were issued in 1992 
and 1993 respectively, for the partial liberalization of their respective markets and to boost therefore the 
application of agricultural inputs. The seeds policy sought to encourage the development of domestic 
private enterprises involved in improved seed production and marketing, to compete with the state-
owned Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) regarding production, and with the public extension structure 
system regarding the distribution process (Spielman et al. 2010). The WB supported the transition with 
the Seed Systems Development Project, intended to boost the development of the formal and informal 
seed supply chain to alleviate the structural inefficiencies (WB 1995b). A very similar pathway was 
designed for the fertilizer supply sector: the 1993 policy abolished the monopoly on fertilizer 
importation and distribution held by the Agricultural Inputs Supply Corporation (AISCO, founded in 
1984), and sought to promote the entry of private enterprises on the fertilizer market of. The reform was 
supported by a 171 million USD WB credit under the National Fertilizer Sector Project (1996), intended 
to promote fertilizer use, develop their supply chain and strengthen capacity building as well as soil 
fertility management and environmental conservation practices. As required by the agreement, the GoE 
reformed the AISCO into the Agricultural Inputs Supply Enterprise, deregulated retail, wholesale and 
distributor prices, limited price subsidies and ensured equal engagement of private and public enterprises 
in import and marketing (WB 1995a). 
Initially the reforms brought a positive response from the private sector, especially in the fertilizer sector: 
by 1996 33% of fertilizer imports were conducted by private firms, while 67 private wholesalers and 
2300 retailers were involved with fertilizer marketing. But due to restrictive practices and incomplete 
liberalizations, shortly afterwards the private enterprises totally withdrew from the fertilizer sector 
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(reaching a 0% import share by 1999) and kept a very marginal role in the seeds sector (by 2004 only 8 
firms were active in seed production, and 70% of maize seeds was still being produced by the ESE) 
(Spielman et al. 2010; Byerlee et al. 2007). One of the main reasons for the failure of the reforms had 
to do with the package distribution system boosted in the early 1990s by the regional governments. The 
system was conceived to facilitate the inputs package dissemination: a 100% credit guarantee scheme 
backed by the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia allowed credit to be distributed by cooperatives and local 
government offices at interest rates below market levels. Being linked to credit rather than cash, the 
input distribution system did not favour the growth of a dynamic and entrepreneurial private sector. 
Moreover, since debts were covered by the regional governments, the system limited also the 
development of private involvement by microfinance institutions or independent financial cooperatives 
in the rural finance sector (Spielman et al. 2010). Hence, in order to boost agricultural production, food 
security and economic growth, the EPRDF led governments reorganized the agricultural production and 
marketing systems in order to enhance the private sector’s participation and thus benefit from the 
positive effects of the market economy. But, as evidenced, the state’s withdrawal from the agrarian 
economy was limited, and reflected the political commitment to drive the transition and hold a strong 
presence in rural areas.  
The leading role appointed to the state in terms of economic development and agrarian transformation, 
was even more evident in the resolution with which the government closed the debate concerning land 
ownership, which arose in the aftermath of Derg’s destitution. The debate developed between two 
opposing factions: on one side, many representatives of the international donor community of and 
foreign and Ethiopian academies, supported the privatization of state-owned land for the promotion of 
a market-driven agrarian economy; on the other side, the EPRDF and its allies defended public 
ownership as a way to prevent the resurgence of inequalities among the agrarian society (Crewett, Korf 
2008). The debate was closed by article 40 of the 1995 Constitution, which affirmed public ownership 
of land, prohibited any private form of sale or exchange, accorded to every farmer and pastoralist the 
right to obtain land without payment and to not be evicted from their land except for public purposes 
(FDRE 1995). The legislation concerning land administration was delegated to each Regional State by 
article 52, and confirmed by the Proclamation n. 89/1997, Rural Land Administration Proclamation of 
the Federal Government of Ethiopia, which also introduced the right to lease or bequeath land, labour 
and capital (FDRE 1997). Therefore, at the end of the 1990s, the transition process toward a mixed 
economy reached a full legal protection of farmers’ use rights, in partial accordance with the suggestions 
of the international donor community and international economists. The new Ethiopian government of 
stepped completely away from the previous land administration system by delegating powers to the 
Regional States (FDRE 1997). Notwithstanding, in the name of equity and fairness, the Federal 
Government conserved public land ownership and therefore a strong tool of political and economic 
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control over rural space, which was then exploited without hesitation in the following phases of agrarian 
transformation (Crewett, Korf 2008). 
Bringing the analysis of what has been defined here as the founding period to an end, and closing the 
analytical circle composed of politics, economics and agriculture, it is possible to draft some major 
impressions and first insights concerning the FDRE’s trajectory. The strategy adopted by the EPRDF 
led governments, gathered insights from various “agrarianist” authors and development paradigms that 
backed the successful experiences of South and East Asian countries, and supported the development of 
the agricultural sector with the economy’s structural transformation in mind (Johnston, Mellor 1961; 
Adelman 1984; Vogel 1994). Compared to the previous regime, the TGE took a significant step aside 
regarding the conceptualization of the Ethiopian agrarian question, switching from an approach based 
on the surplus extraction capacity of the command economy, to a strategy of surplus creation in peasant 
agriculture, for a gradual structural transformation of the economy. Indeed, in line with the ADLI, 
agricultural development became the leading strategy to achieve food self-sufficiency and to stimulate 
economic growth. 
A second important shift was made concerning the size of the farming economy to be supported: from 
the Soviet-like collectivization model of the Derg period, to the “small-farm first” approach, as 
influenced by integrated rural development approaches, and participatory and grass-roots paradigms of 
rural development (Schultz 1964; Chambers 1983; Ellis, Biggs 2001; Dessalegn 2008a). The new 
approach came also as a result of the discontent the old model of development had generated among a 
large number of peasants, who suffered from the dispossession of rural livelihoods caused by the 
enforced resettlement into village schemes. By conserving public land ownership in name of equity, and 
by creating a large-scale and multidimensional support system for the peasant farming sector, the GoE 
took on a paternalist approach toward the rural base of the country, that definitely conveys the peasant 
roots of the past armed struggle. 
Being part of the comprehensive transition project of toward a mixed economy, the ADLI was 
coherently oriented to rely on market forces for the creation of a sustainable and efficient agricultural 
sector. The liberalizations adopted were in line with macroeconomic and structural adjustment reforms 
briefly presented in the previous subchapter, and were oriented to promote the emergence of the private 
sector in farming and non-farming activities, as well as to modernize the traditional patterns of 
production. At the same time however, in line with the aforementioned selective withdrawal from the 
economy, «support from the state in terms of policy intervention and resource allocation» was 
considered unavoidable for the realization of the economic structural transformation (TGE 1993: 20). 
As evidenced by the input distribution structure, and by the nature of land tenure, the EPRDF led 
governments showed some reticence in completing the transformation toward a completely market-
driven economy. Hence, the first decade of the FDRE can be figuratively observed as the first signals 
of the political economic seesaw which will characterize the whole political trajectory of the EPRDF 
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led governments: a constant shift back and forth between market at one end and state at the other end, 
between internationally-sponsored neoliberal reforms and historically embedded socialist-influenced 
legacies. 
 
2. The Second Decade: Consolidation 
 
The second decade of the FDRE and the EPRDF’s rule is defined here as the consolidation decade. It is 
indeed the decade when a major turmoil among the TPLF and the EPRDF’s officials brought about a 
strengthening of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi leadership. It is the decade when the transitional phase 
reforms were replaced by a mix of market-led and state-owned economic reforms created once again 
with the cooperation of international donors, and when the developmental state project built according 
to the model of the successful South-Eastern Asian countries was created based on the concepts of 
poverty reduction, the fight against rent-seeking activities and food insecurity. It is also the decade of 
consolidation of the positive trends achieved in the agricultural sector, the confirmation of the ADLI 
and the opening to international trades and private capital. At the same time, peasant-state relations are 
strengthened by a massive diffusion of state/party institutions in rural areas for developmental and 
political purposes, and by the inclusion of the alliance with the peasantry within the revolutionary 
democratic project. 
 
2.1. The 2000s: Tehadso, the Developmental Project and the National Elections 
In order to present the EPRDF’s political course at the turn of the millennium, namely at what has been 
named here as its consolidation phase, it is worth taking a step back to the late 1990s, and more precisely 
to the war Ethiopia conducted against Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. The conflict was the result of 
unresolved problems regarding disputed borders and is often remembered as a brothers’ war since 
enrolled soldiers were sent to war against former fellow countrymen and neighbours. Notwithstanding 
the impact the war generated in the field of political consensus and legitimacy, the event produced a 
harsh confrontation within the TPLF for the definition of power relationship, which caused major 
consequences in the organization and structures of the regional and federal Fronts, as well as in the 
country’s development agenda. 
 
2.1.1. Renewal and the Developmental Project 
The dispute took place within the TPLF Central Committee, as a further confirmation of the main role 
played by the Tigrayan Front within EPRDF, and the federal government. The object of the controversy 
was the strategy to be implemented in the war operations against Eritrea: on one side, the Tigray 
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nationalists led by the Tewolde-Siye duo who supported a full war against Eritrea, and on the other the 
group led by Meles who aimed for a rapid end to the armed conflict. As reported by Milkias (2001), the 
seeds of the internal division were sown already in 1994, when at the time of the Eritrean invasion of 
Yemen’s Hanish Islands, Meles and his supporters sided with the Eritrean cause, while a group led by 
Tewolde, Siye and General Hayelom opposed the intervention and sustained a redefinition of the 
agreement pact signed with Eritrea. The debate reflected a different position vis-à-vis Eritrea, since 
Meles and part of the Committees sought to establish friendly relationships with the country – as was 
also expected by the US and some European donor governments – whereas other nationalists envisaged 
harsher relations. Furthermore, the dispute reflected a more rooted antagonism within the TPLF’s ruling 
class, mainly due to Meles’ intention to dismantle the TPLF to end the influence of its Politburo and 
Central Committee on the decisions of the Federal Government that he chaired (Milkias 2001). 
In the occasion of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, in the spring of 2000 Meles’ motion was defeated by 13 
votes against 17 in the TPLF Central Committee, causing further resentment; in fact, at the end of the 
war in May 2000, the internal debate continued in spite of Ethiopia’s victory. The battleground then 
turned to the discussion of a Gemgema Report,51 with which Meles accused many TPLF leaders of anti-
democratic behaviours and corruption and denounced the risk of Bonapartist decay.52 With the 
Bonapartist motion, Meles intended to oust many of his dissidents within the Central Committee, among 
which Tewolde and Siye. His motion was rejected at the end of 2000, but in February 2001 he was able 
to reverse the situation, to win the majority in the Committee and to expel his opponents after they 
abandoned the Committee in sign of protest. Having obtained the support of the Central Committee’s 
majority, Meles began a period of purges against his former comrades and their relatives and friends, 
who were accused of corruption and financial embezzlement, and sentenced to jail. The purges were not 
limited to the TPLF’s dissidents, they were extended to many other organizations and institutions, whose 
members were accused of having betrayed the country and its people with their behaviours. Many 
EPRDF officials were persecuted, part of the army was arrested, as well as some PDO leaders, including 
even the President of Ethiopia Negasso Gidada, who was once an executive member of the OPDO and 
of the council of the EPRDF (Milkias 2001; Arriola, Lyons 2016; Medhane, Young 2003). 
The events had a major impact on the future of the EPRDF and the Ethiopian government. By claiming 
the need for a “renewal” (tehadso) of the ruling class because of its political and moral decay, Meles 
                                                     
51 - It is an evaluation technique traditionally adopted by the TPLF, and further extended to EPRDF, civil service 
and federal government, consisting of criticism and self-criticism components, and intended to preserve the Front’s 
ideological unity and efficient performance. As reported by Medhane, Young (2003), gemgema was often used for 
individual or group punishment, rather than as a real tool of evaluation. It was interrupted during the war against 
Eritrea, and afterwards resumed with insistence by Meles (Milkias 2001; Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003). 
52 - Meles adopted Marx and Engels’ concept of Bonapartism, used to refer to a situation in which an individual 
achieves despotic power over the state and society, since neither the bourgeoisie, nor the working class have 
consolidated their power enough to rule a country. In Marxist terms, the Bonapartist state serves the interests of 
capital and its own (Milkias 2001). 
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actually removed all forms of dissent within his parties (the EPRDF and its affiliated), the government, 
and the state. Incidentally, Milkias observes some sort of continuity with the bloody purges conducted 
by Mengistu Haile Mariam during the Derg regime, for which he cruelly admitted that he wanted «to 
have for breakfast those who wanted to have him for lunch!» (Milkias 2001: 3). Moreover, the events 
had various effects on the internal balance of power of the EPRDF: they limited the political interference 
of the TPLF Politburo on governmental affairs, they limited the collective character of the TPLF by 
making Meles emerge as the indisputable leader, they improved the position of the ANDM within the 
EPRDF’s because of its declared support of Meles’ motion, and on the same time distanced the OPDO 
and the SEPDF from central decision-making processes. This split demonstrated how weak the 
foundations of the ethnic-federalism project were.53 
In the immediate aftermath of tehadso, some commentators interpreted the process as an opening to the 
global economy, an estrangement from the radical idea of a working-class revolution and a shift towards 
liberal democracy (Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003; Medhane, Young 2003). In both political and economic 
terms, tehadso was interpreted as a detachment from the popular base, toward the inclusion of national 
and foreign bourgeoisie and capital, in the country’s political project. It is interesting to observe now – 
about 15 years after those events and those comments - that although the “bourgeoisification” of the 
party and of its ideological stance did happen and caused major transformations (for instance in the 
agricultural sector, as will be presented later on), this did not bring about a serious conversion to liberal 
democracy, nor an actual withdrawal of the state from the economy, nor even a disengagement from the 
coalition with the peasantry. Conversely, tehadso and the preceding events constituted the background 
on which the EPRDF legitimated its developmental state project: a «grand project» for a struggle against 
poverty, inequalities and underdevelopment (Fana 2014: S66), to which each sector of the economy and 
each group of society, was expected to contribute, and in order for it to be implemented there could be 
no deviations or factionalisms. For this purpose, along with the renewal process, since the early 2000s 
the government followed up the decentralization of administrative functions and development 
initiatives, to increase popular participation and engagement in the national developmental project. 
Gathering inspiration from the economic successes achieved by the South-Eastern Asian countries, the 
project envisaged a market-oriented development strategy and at the same time a strong presence of the 
state. The strategy was embedded in the ideology of revolutionary democracy, according to which a 
widespread participation of the masses and the protection of a leading party were considered crucial 
pillars (Hagmann, Abbink 2011). Revolutionary democracy provided a fundamental ideological support 
for the realization of the developmental state project, since it brought to the state (and the party) the 
political legitimacy required to play its leading role in pursuing rapid development and poverty 
                                                     
53 - The recent escalation of ethnic-based claims for further representation within the government – especially from 
Oromo and Amhara groups – is further proof of the problems which the ambitious project of ethnic-federalism has 
not been able to solve. 
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reduction. At the same time, under the wing of a project of economic and social development which 
assumed the connotation of a hegemonic ideology, the leading role the party advocated and struggled 
for, allowed it to restrict dissenters and opposition movements. 
 
2.1.2. The 2005 Elections 
The occasion to exert this authoritarian repression appeared at the national ballots in 2005, when after 
one of the most democratic pre-election campaigns in Ethiopian history, the EPRDF reported an 
unexpected defeat. At the national election in 2005, the Front was opposed, for the first time in its 
history, by two coordinated and well-structured national parties: the United Ethiopian Democratic 
Forces (UEDF) and the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) (Tronvoll, Hagmann 2012; Markakis 
2011). Among the most pressing issues at stake during the campaign period were the ones of ethnicity 
and self-determination, over which the EPRDF had built a large part of its political legitimacy: while 
the CUD was for a federal system but rejected the federation on ethnic grounds created by the EPRDF 
and the 1995 Constitution, the UEDF supported a political system based on ethnic distinctions but 
opposed the right to secession conceded by art. 39 (Aalen 2011). Given the the EPRDF’s attachment to 
the issues, the pre-election campaigns were characterized by a harsh debate, with strong reciprocal 
accusations.54 In spite of that, for the first time, oppositions were able to campaign through state-owned 
media and public campaign rallies, and EU observers were allowed to monitor the elections, creating an 
«unprecedented level of openness» (Tronvoll, Hagmann 2012; Aalen, Tronvoll 2009: 195). 
One of the possible interpretations for the EPRDF’s choice to open the electoral competition up, is the 
fact that tehadso and the decentralization of party and state structures down to village-levels, had made 
the Front believe it had rooted consensus among the masses. The shady border created between state 
administration structures and party-headed groups for mobilization and developmental purposes, 
ensured the Front an outstanding presence in Ethiopians’ lives, especially in the rural areas (Tronvoll, 
Hagmann 2012; Segers et al. 2008); and as reported by the Human Rights Watch (HRW), during the 
elections heavy pressures were indeed exerted by a «new set of quasi-governmental institutions» on the 
rural communities (HRW 2005: 2; Aalen, Tronvoll 2009; Lefort 2007). However, election results were 
unexpectedly different: the CUD and the UEDF increased their seats in the parliament, the CUD won in 
Addis Ababa and in most urban constituencies, and it gained a third of the votes in the Amhara Region 
(Aalen 2011). The results were immediately contested by the government in charge, who instructed the 
National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) to review the election-day process. The government and 
the NEBE were accused of vote rigging, mass protests were set up in the country’s main cities and the 
                                                     
54 - The EPRDF inflamed its constituency by accusing the CUD of showing political allegiance with previous 
regimes, of being willing to replicate an Amhara-domination on the country, and of pursuing genocidal policies 
against ethnic minorities (Aalen 2011). 
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opposition declared their intention to boycott the parliament (Tronvoll, Hagmann 2012). The 
government responded by declaring a state of emergency, banning protests, arresting opposition leaders 
charging them with violence instigation, killing dozens of citizens and detaining thousands. Many were 
arrested without any charges and put in detention camps: around 20,000 were reported to have been 
detained in Dedesa camp in Oromia, many others were detained in Denkorachaka camp in North Wollo 
and in others (Brigaldino 2011; Aalen 2011; Aalen, Tronvoll 2009). The European Union Election 
Observation Mission (EU EOM) expressed concern about the deterioration of «[t]he human rights 
situation (…) in the post-election day period» (EU EOM 2005: 1). Accordingly, the flow of international 
aid from EU, and the UK and German governments, was interrupted for several months (Brigaldino 
2011). 
In spite of the declarations, 90% of the overall 173 members of the opposition parties who gained a seat 
in parliament, did not leave. However, their freedom to operate was severely curtailed by a new set of 
laws implemented by the EPRDF’s government, such as, for example, the requirement of a minimum 
of 183 parliamentary members in order to place an agenda item on the debate table (Merera 2011). From 
here on, the consolidation of the hegemonic project was pursued on a double level: through the politics 
of domination implemented at a grassroots level, and through the imposition of institutional obstacles 
to the political participation of non-aligned organizations. Accordingly, in the following years a new set 
of repressive laws was passed, providing the government with an institutional tool that guaranteed legal 
and political legitimacy to its oppressive rule. Particularly restrictive were the Freedom of the Mass 
Media and Access to Information Proclamation (590/2008), the Registration and Regulation of Charities 
and Societies Proclamation (621/2009) and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (652/2009): the first 
allowed the persecution of independent newspapers and mass media on charges of attacks to national 
security and public order; the second basically excluded foreign funded charities and societies from 
operating in the fields of human and democratic rights, advocacy and peacebuilding; by providing a very 
broad definition of terrorism, the third Proclamation granted authorities to persecute independent 
journalists, activists, politicians or any individuals who supported protests and opposition movements, 
to conduct surveillance over the Internet, mobile phones, and all communication lines (Merera 2011; 
Arriola, Lyons 2016; Brechenmacher 2017). Furthermore, the Amended Electoral Law Proclamation 
(532/2007), the Political Parties Registration Proclamation (573/2008), and the Electoral Code of 
Conduct for Political Parties (662/2009) were used to prevent any repetition of the 2005 post-election 
scenario. 
 
2.1.3. “Securitising” Development 
The consolidation of the developmental state project conducted during the 2000s, is brilliantly described 
by Fana as a process of «securitisation of development»: a rationalization of the «drive to aggressively 
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extract and mobilise resources as well as increasing the power and stature of the ruling coalition» (Fana 
2014: S65). Fana makes a comparison between Ethiopia and its manifest models, South Korea and 
Taiwan: the author observes that like these South-Eastern Asian countries who created a political 
allegiance against an external threat (their northern neighbours Northern Korea and China) and took 
advantage of this opposition for their economic progress, the Ethiopian government has likewise 
attempted to create popular awareness and political commitment against common threats: rent-seekers 
and poverty (Fana 2014). Evidence of the scheming of a widespread thought against these «parasitic 
elements» are observable in the EPRDF’s 2005 political program, where revolutionary-like commitment 
to fight rent-seeking actors (following-up the pathway initiated by tehadso) and poverty are mentioned 
repeatedly, as being considered the most dangerous obstacles to revolutionary democracy and enemies 
of the Ethiopian people.55 Any expression of anti-conformism was, accordingly, accused of acting 
against development and Ethiopians’ interests. For this reason, the laws issued between 2005 and 2010 
intentionally limited the freedom of speech, opinion, expression and association of the independent civil 
society: many NGOs fled the country or were forced to modify their focus, newspapers and other 
channels of independent voices were strictly controlled and often shut down, violations of human rights 
exerted by governmental representatives escalated and did not even receive judicial protection or 
international audit (Brechenmacher 2017; HRW 2010). For that period, in fact, Freedom House reports 
a declining score of its democratic index (Arriola, Lyons 2016). 
Making use of a widespread presence in the countryside - ensured by a massive recruitment policy which 
increased party members from 760,000 units in 2005 to 6 million by 2010 (Arriola, Lyons 2016) - and 
benefiting from the political advantage created through the legislative tool, the EPRDF won the local 
elections held in 2008, and regional and national elections held on 23 March 2010, «by a landslide» 
(Tronvoll, Hagmann 2012: 19). Hence, at the closing of the second half of the decade of consolidation 
– as it has been defined here – the EPRDF had created a strong control network, which was especially 
active in the countryside, that demonstrated its effectiveness in the two voting rounds, and guaranteed 
the party an unchallenged domination of the entire administrative structure, from federal to village level. 
3 million woreda (districts) and kebele (wards) council members were voted in 2008, without any 
independent observers involved, which led to 99% of the local seats being won by the EPRDF and allied 
parties’ members (Aalen 2011; Tronvoll, Hagmann 2012). Similarly, in 2010 the EPRDF won 544 out 
of the overall 547 seats at the House of Peoples’ Representatives, corresponding to 99.6% of the votes, 
and 1900 out of 1904 seats in the State Councils (Aalen 2011). On that occasion, the EU EOM was 
allowed to supervise the procedures and affirmed that the election campaigns were conducted in a 
«relatively quiet» environment, and that «the electoral process fell short of international commitments 
for elections, notably regarding the transparency of the process and the lack of a level playing field for 
                                                     
55 - EPRDF, EPRDF Program, 2005: 7. 
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all contesting parties» (EU EOM 2010: 1). The calm that characterized the pre- and post-election 
periods, the results themselves, and the goodwill with which Meles was welcomed at the 2010 G20 
Toronto Summit, were indelible signs of the political maturity and stability reached by the Ethiopian 
developmental project, on both the internal and external sides (EU EOM 2010; Brigaldino 2011). 
Finally, the second decade of the EPRDF rule started with an initial shock within its political leadership, 
which enabled Meles Zenawi to replace party officials and to strengthen his position as Prime Minister 
and the EPRDF’s unchallenged leader. The renewal process took place simultaneously with the 
definition of the developmental state project, aimed to revise and update the political trajectory initiated 
during the 1990s and directed towards a mixed economy. In order for a developmental state to be 
established, it was necessary to create political homogeneity and allegiance around the project. For this 
reason, political reforms and procedures during the decade produced an ad hoc institutional/legal 
framework and a decentralized administration shaped by the collision of state and party structures, which 
brought about the hegemonic project foundation. The following chapters will give a more detailed 
description of this structure of control and how it had a major influence in shaping the process of 
Ethiopia’s agrarian change. But before going in depth on these dynamics, economics and agricultural-
related patterns of the 2000s need to be explored, in order to complete the analysis of the political 
trajectory undertaken by the country, which in turn is necessary to understand the major transformations 
currently occurring in the agrarian structure and society. 
 
2.2. Pro-Poor Growth and Accelerated Development 
In line with many other developing countries, at the turn of the millennium, the GoE has prepared an 
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) in cooperation with the IDA, the IMF, the European 
Commission, the African Development Bank and the broad group of UN agencies.56 The I-PRSPs were 
in line with the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), initiated by the IMF and the WB in 1999 within the 
HIPC Initiative: countries were expected to prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a 
basis for debt reduction and (subsequently) for the implementation of IMF-supported programs for 
poverty reduction and growth.57 
 
2.2.1. The Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
                                                     
56 - According to IMF’s definition, «Interim PRSPs (I-PRSPs) summarize the current knowledge and analysis of 
a country's poverty situation, describe the existing poverty reduction strategy, and lay out the process to produce 
a fully developed PRSP in a participatory fashion»: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.aspx 
57 -  «Updated every three years with annual progress reports, PRSPs describe the country's macroeconomic, 
structural and social policies and programs over a three year or longer horizon to promote broad-based growth and 
reduce poverty, as well as associated financing needs and major sources of financing»: ibid. 
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The I-PRSP prepared by Ethiopian authorities is a clear declaration of the GoE’s commitment to poverty 
reduction as a main development goal, made with the explicit aim to increase the flow of international 
development assistance to the country. More than formal commitments of intent, the I-PRSP and 
following PRSPs constituted the guidelines for the strategy of development pursued by the government 
since the early 2000s, and are therefore worth analysing in order to understand its approach to economic 
development. 
The I-PRSP was issued in November 2000. It is a broad outline for the reduction of poverty, based on 
four pillars: the ADLI, civil service and judicial reforms, decentralization and capacity building. The 
ADLI is reconfirmed as the driving strategy for economic development: agriculture is considered the 
vehicle for industrialization and food security, and for these reasons it is expected to become 
internationally competitive through progress in terms of farming practices and commercialization. 
Alternatively, the strategy for the industrial sector does not receive comparable attention and is limited 
to the promotion of private-public partnerships and the solution of bureaucratic obstacles. For civil 
service and justice, the I-PRSP envisaged the realization of the «second generation reforms», to continue 
«the political transformation [undertook] under the process of democratization initiated in the 1990s».58 
In accordance with the reforms issued in the 1990s for the devolution of power from federal to regional 
governments, the I-PRSP envisaged a further step and established fiscal decentralization at district level, 
with two declared objectives: bringing decision-making closer to the people, and merging political 
empowerment and economic development at grassroot level. In the last pillar public and private sector 
capacity building issues are addressed, for the reduction of resource losses in view of a more efficient 
public administration and a more competitive private initiative. 
Within these four pillars, a strategy of macroeconomic stability, economic growth and increased social 
expenditures was planned in order to achieve the poverty reduction goal. Accordingly, defence spending 
was expected to undergo a substantial initial cut and progressive decline, in order to be able to improve 
the provision of services on health, education, infrastructure, agriculture and other poverty-reducing 
sectors. Other financial sources were expected to come from an improved tax administration and revenue 
collection efficiency, the introduction of value added tax, as well as from debt reliefs from the enhanced 
HIPC Initiative. Stock-of-debit reduction operations were agreed upon on the basis of the important 
track record of economic growth and macroeconomic stability obtained through reforms during the 
1990s, and in view of the government’s commitment linked with the I-PRSP and PRSP (IMF, IDA 
2001a). Consistent revenues were further expected to come from a greater capacity to increase the 
aggregate output level of both industrial and agricultural sectors, and as a consequence of several sector 
                                                     
58 - WB, Ethiopia. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2000/01 – 2002/03, World Bank, Addis Ababa, 
November 2000. 
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development programmes launched during the 1990s, among which the last part of the policy paper 
mentions education, health, HIV/AIDS, infrastructure, and social rehabilitation and protection. 
 
2.2.2. Pro-Poor Growth and the Resurgence of the State: The Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Program 
Being the result of a coordinated job with Bretton Wood Institutions, I-PRSP received many comments 
from the European Commission and Development Assistance Group who asked for a more explicit and 
detailed description of the poverty reduction and food security strategy, and of the ADLI’s role in it 
(IMF, IDA 2001b). The suggestions were taken into consideration for the definition of the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), issued in July 2002, in which the government 
outlined a more detailed strategy for economic development and poverty reduction for the 2002/03 – 
2004/05 period. The SDPRP did not deviate from the pathway introduced by the I-PRSP, as shown by 
the presence of the same four mainstays (or building blocks); but greater emphasis was put on the 
integration of food security and the ADLI to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Accordingly, the concept of poverty was associated to a multidimensional vulnerability, to be measured 
not only with economic consumption indexes, but also in terms of food-intake and nutritional status 
(MoFED 2002). 
In line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the government placed in the SDPRP its 
objective to halve poverty by 2015: according to the program, by the end of the SDPRP period, poverty 
head count ratio was projected to decline by 10%, diminishing on a national scale from 44% in 1999/00, 
to 40%. Poverty reduction was one of the objectives for the economic development strategy announced 
by the TGE in 1993 (TGE 1993), along with growth, macroeconomic stability, liberalization reforms, 
inflation containment, and others. But embedded in the new national project, and under the influence of 
a modified international approach to development associated to the post-Washington Consensus (Stiglitz 
1998), in the SDPRP poverty appeared as the most pressing issue, and its reduction as the government’s 
primary objective. Hence, in the initial pages the SDPRP states: «[f]or some countries, economic growth 
is the primary policy goal, and poverty reduction would be achieved through measures complementary 
to growth. This is not the approach of the Ethiopian government. Poverty reduction is the core objective 
of the Ethiopian government. Economic growth is the principal, but not only means to this objective» 
(MoFED 2002: 20). Accordingly, overall expenditures for poverty-oriented sectors (capital and 
recurrent expenditures) are projected to increase from 9.1% of the GDP in 1999/00, to 15.6% in 2001/02, 
18.4% in 2002/03 and 19.9% in 2004/05 (MoFED 2002: 199). 
The connection between poverty reduction and economic growth is outlined and supported: in order for 
the goal of halving poverty by 2015 to be achieved, the government estimated that a 5.7% GDP annual 
growth rate would be necessary. Accordingly, during the SDPRP, the aggregated growth of the economy 
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was expected to reach an average 7% annual rate, to be achieved through a 7.5% annual growth rate in 
the agricultural sector, 7.8% in industry, 8% in the distribution services and 5.4% among other services 
(MoFED 2002: 42). However, economic growth was deemed to be the sole solution for the creation of 
income inequality; therefore, the SDPRP envisaged a «pro-poor growth strategy», wherein the 
enhancement of accumulation and productivity was combined with a more equitable distribution of 
gains and more efficient regulatory mechanisms (MoFED 2002: 26). At the beginning of the new 
decade, the alleged transition toward the market-economy of the previous decade, is reframed and 
explicitly submitted to the federal government and its decentralized representatives control and 
regulation. Thus, the paper underlines that the strategy is conceived on the concept of «ownership», 
meaning that the designation, implementation and monitoring processes are nationally owned (MoFED 
2002: 28). As Dereje underlines (2011), national ownership of development programmes is a common 
trait in worldwide PRSPs, which is in contrast with the SAPs top-down approach, and is proof of how 
donors are obligated to work within government systems; however, the special information given by the 
paper can also be interpreted as the expression of governments’ sense of belonging and attachment to 
the objectives and the strategy. It is therefore evident that the political events of the early decade have 
fuelled a debate within the EPRDF on the economic approach conceived by the developmental state 
project, which had a major influence on the definition of the strategy for equitable growth. 
Regulation and ownership ran along side with investments and support to key development sectors 
among which priority is given to: agriculture and rural development, food security, pastoral 
development, roads, water and sanitation, education and health services. Since Ethiopia was still an 
agrarian-based country where the largest portion of the national economy and poverty were 
concentrated, the ADLI was confirmed as the leading strategy. The strategy called for an enhancement 
of the real sector of the economy with particular emphasis on agriculture, to be achieved through 
decentralization, private sector investments and public support. Interventions in the rural economy 
through support of farming and non-farming activities were indeed scheduled, in view of export growth, 
the strengthening of agro-industrial linkages, and solving food insecurity. Pro-poor development 
policies were integrated with support strategies to agricultural and non-agricultural production and 
service provision, which were complemented by the continuation of macroeconomic policies started in 
the first decade, for the promotion of a more suitable environment for private initiative. 
Macroeconomic policies were explicitly based on the stability and performance achieved in the previous 
decade, and on the continued support of multilateral and bilateral development partners: these were 
aimed to maintain real GDP growth and macroeconomic stability, increase government revenue and 
improve international reserves. On the fiscal side, the strategy aimed to promote and diversify exports 
through an ongoing trade regime liberalization and simplification, to reduce the budget deficit and 
redirect current spending in the above mentioned key sectors that are strategic for development. In line 
with the I-PRSP, the fiscal strategy called for a cut in defence spending, a more conservative spending 
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policy focused on poverty reduction and development purposes, a significant tax burden reduction, and 
a tax administration system improvement. Further, monetary and financial policies intended to contain 
inflation through the central role of the National Bank of Ethiopia, to create an efficient and competitive 
financial sector on a global scale and to reduce external debt. 
As already mentioned, an enhanced role of the private sector was envisaged and promoted for 
employment generation, sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. In Chapter VIII, the strategy 
for private sector and export development focuses on the creation of a «good balance between the 
complementary functions of the state and the private sector», and to underscore a «judicious refocusing 
of the role of the state», which «is not about indiscriminate privatization but about sound government 
policies that provide room for private initiative and that set a regulatory framework which channels 
private initiatives in ways that benefit society as a whole» (MoFED 2002: 107). The private sector’s 
contribution is also expected to play a major role in boosting the country’s integration in the global 
market, through an enhanced competitiveness of the productive sectors, agriculture first and foremost. 
Accordingly, the government has planned interventions to create a favourable investment climate, to 
improve the finance system, infrastructures and institutional settings for public-private dialogues and 
cooperation, and to promote the export sector’s development.59 
Lastly, it is apparent that the SDPRP represents a partial shift from a simple liberalization reforms 
program as envisaged in the EPRDF’s first decade, toward a poverty-oriented development program, 
thus closer and more supportive of the grass-roots levels of society. Although in terms of both 
macroeconomic reforms and development policies the SDPRP did not stray very much from the pathway 
toward a market-oriented economy that was started during the transitional period, however a partial but 
significant adjustment of the developmental narrative is easy to see. Indeed, compared to the economic 
policy papers drawn up during the 1990s, in this phase less emphasis was put on promoting opportunities 
in terms of structural change and macroeconomic stability, created by a reform program fostering 
liberalization and privatization. Instead a lot more attention was dedicated to defining the state’s role as 
a leading driver for development, obviously within a partially-liberalized framework, but with a more 
specific focus on social and economic equity. As already mentioned, this partial shift should be analysed 
in view of the internal turmoil faced by the EPRDF in the early 2000s, and of the broader change in the 
approach to development assistance, commonly referred to as the post-Washington Consensus. 
 
                                                     
59 - On the fiscal side, for instance, this corresponded to a sustained individual income tax reduction from 40 to 35 
percent (following the decrease from 89% obtained thanks to previous reforms), and from 35 to 30 percent for 
businesses (MoFED 2002: 109). At the same time, the government simplified and streamlined export regulations, 
abolished export duty on all commodities except for coffee, devaluated the exchange rate, and promoted private-
public partnerships in order to promote export (MoFED 2002: 114). 
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2.2.3. State and Development, the Consolidation of the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty 
The SDPRP was implemented and achieved reasonably positive results in terms of economic growth 
and poverty reduction,60 even though spending and GDP growth did not achieve the expected results 
and despite significant inter-regional variations. To continue on its positive track, in September 2006 
the government issued the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), 
giving the guidelines for economic development in the 2005/06 – 2009/10 period. From the introductory 
pages, the continuity with the economic strategy pursued in the previous period is highlighted and taken 
further: higher rates of economic growth and poverty reduction were expected to be achieved through 
interventions in key strategic sectors and pro-poor initiatives. The GDP growth rate was expected to 
reach a 7.3% annual increase, while the number of poor people was expected to decline from 38 to 29% 
by 2009/10 (MoFED 2006: 39, 55). 
Looking at the selected strategic sectors, there is no consistent change; instead, some old and new issues 
are addressed: agriculture, education, health, AIDS/HIV, infrastructures, tourism, mining, trade and 
industry, urban development, regional development strategy and urban-rural linkages, population, 
gender, addressing children’s specific needs, governance, capacity-building and decentralization, 
environment, pastoralism, youth. The strategies pursued for development were consistent with the 
previous period (MoFED 2006: 57-66). Economic growth constituted the PASDEP’s, as well as the 
SDPRPs, essence to be achieved within the ADLI context, by boosting agricultural production 
diversification and commercialization, and by strengthening inter-sectoral linkages. The development 
of agriculture was considered of vital importance towards strengthening the weak industrial sector. 
Furthermore, the private sector’s contribution to the real, financial and external sectors was expected to 
increase, in order to improve competitiveness, expand trade and increase and diversify exports. Thus, 
micro and small-scale enterprises were expected to play a major role, and to be assisted by the promotion 
of state owned banks and decentralized institutions of governance capacity building, inflation 
containment and exchange rate stability, the expansion of private financial institutions such as the Micro 
Finance Institutions (MFIs), and the creation of private-public joint ventures. International trade 
expansion was also expected to be fostered by the ongoing integration in the World Trade Organization. 
In spite of this continuity, the vision and conceptual support of the PASDEP’s framework represent a 
step forward in the consolidation and maturation process of the government’s political project, as 
witnessed by the following sentences: «[a]lthough the PRSP process started in 2000 as a process largely 
between Government and donors, in Ethiopia, it has now evolved beyond that, and the PASDEP is now 
considered a national plan for guiding all development activities during the coming five years. Equally 
                                                     
60 - Real per capita GDP grew at a 2.8% annual rate, 3% less than the planned level, but poverty head count ratio 
declined more than was expected, from 44 to 38 percent (MoFED 2006: 39). 
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importantly, it is a nationally agreed development plan belonging to all Ethiopians, developed through 
a process of consultation among all elements of society» (MoFED 2006: 1). Accordingly, compared to 
the SDPRP, the PASDEP’s vision is broadened in conceptual and temporal terms. The poverty-reduction 
bias was replaced by the focus on broader economic development: «[t]he main objectives of the Five-
Year Development Plan is to lay out the directions for accelerated, sustained, and people-centered 
economic development as well as to pave the groundwork for the attainment of the MDGs by 2015» 
(MoFED 2006: 44). In line with the MDGs, the PASDEP was supposed to constitute the first phase of 
a long march toward economic progress, that «[i]n the coming 20 to 30 years» would have led the 
country «to reach the level of middle-income countries, where democracy and good governance are 
maintained through people’s participation and where good will and social justice are secured» (MoFED 
2006: 44). The scheduling of a long-term and strategically expanded vision may be interpreted as a step 
forward by the Ethiopian government in its political and economic consolidation process. On one side, 
in so doing the government actually includes the Ethiopian people’s needs and the developmental 
project’s goals, in speeding up the economic development process. The coalition with the Ethiopian 
people, and with the peasants in particular, is thus confirmed and consolidated in view of the 
revolutionary struggle for development. In part 14 of the Introduction, the 2005 EPRDF program stated: 
«[o]ur Front is fundamentally an organization of the peasantry which is the main force behind 
revolutionary democracy».61 On the other side, at the same time, the Plan proves the government’s 
continued allegiance and adhesion to the narrative and values of Western countries and donors, in view 
of the consolidation of its position in international relations and cooperation. 
In accordance with the developmental state project, the state was appointed a strategic role in the 
creation of an enabling environment for private investment and business activities, and a complementary 
role in the economy with greater domestic and foreign private participation: «[t]he role of the 
Government in the framework of free market economy is to support and fill the gaps that could not be 
adequately covered by the private sector» (MoFED 2006: 158). In some cases, this entailed a resurgence 
of the state’s interference in the economy, as demonstrated by the renationalization of wheat imports in 
2008: following the 2007 oil crisis and the soaring domestic prices of wheat in the 2006-2008 period, 
the GoE started rationing the delivery of foreign currency to private importers - who had been controlling 
the markets since the 1990s’ reforms - causing their collapse; and the EGTE began importing wheat in 
2008 and to distribute it through large-scale millers and bakeries at subsidized prices (Minot et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, total spending in the PASDEP period between 2005 and 2010 was expected to increase 
from 25 to 27 percent of the GDP, overall poverty-oriented spending from 14 to 22 percent, and capital 
spending from 12 to 16 percent (MoFED 2006: 55). In developmental terms, the role attributed to the 
state was essential because it was expected to create an enabling environment for the private sector, to 
                                                     
61 - EPRDF Program, 2005: 6. 
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prevent market failures, to protect from rent-seeking behaviours through regulation and control, and to 
invest directly in the growth of agriculture, industry and services. Party- and public-owned enterprises 
conserved a vital role in the economy’s productive and service sectors, as well as in development 
activities (Hagmann, Abbink 2011). At the same time, donors continued to play a major role in the 
Plan’s financing, and three mega development projects were started with their contribution: the Public 
Sector Capacity Building received USD 483 million, the Productive Safety Net Programme USD 350 
million annually, and the Protection of Basic Services USD 1 billion (Dereje 2011). 
 
2.2.4. Party, State and Market in the 2000s: The Consolidation Decade 
The SDPRP and the PASDEP represented the two most important policy papers concerning economics 
and development to have been drawn up in the first decade of the new millennium. During the first half 
of the decade, the I-PRSP and the SDPRP expressed the EPRDF’s continued allegiance to donor-
supported macroeconomic reforms, while at the same time reinforcing once again the state’s role in the 
economy. During the transitional period, the dismantlement of the command economy and the 
introduction of a new phase of market-led reforms were overtly conducted to emphasize the beginning 
of a new phase in political economic terms, and to attract the financial support required to rehabilitate a 
collapsing economy. At the turn of the decade, when the emergency phase was over and the government 
had acquired international support and internal legitimacy, the TPLF-led government found the 
opportunity to take a step back towards its Marxist-Leninist origins, and a step forward to the 
implementation of the developmental state project. Evidence of this turn could be seen in the SDPRP, 
where the focus on liberalizations and privatizations was merged with the definition of the state’s 
regulatory and active role in the economy. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that this new 
emphasis on the state’s role as protector from the rent-seeking deviance of capitalist economies, took 
place within the PRSPs context, and therefore within a Western-oriented conceptual framework and 
economic approach. For this reason, it becomes apparent that the start of the developmental state project 
did not solve the intrinsic contradiction in the EPRDF’s approach to political economy, figuratively 
described above with the seesaw metaphor. On the contrary, because its proposition strengthened the 
link between political legitimacy and economic outputs, the controversial relationship between state and 
market became stronger under the form of «developmental capitalism» and «revolutionary 
economics».62 
During the consolidation decade, two parallel and apparently opposing tendencies were therefore taking 
place: the first, centripetal trend, aimed to maintain the alliance with the country’s peasant-base and to 
                                                     
62 - These concepts are borrowed from Vaughan (2011) and Hagmann, Abbink (2011) and are used to express a 
strategical change occurred in EPRDF’s mission: from socialist transition to a more nuanced version of capitalism 
with social and developmental influences. 
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create a nationally-owned development pathway; the second, centrifugal trend, which pushed for the 
internationalization of the consensus on the developmental state project, and for the integration of the 
Ethiopian economy in the global market.63 The former was in line with the developmental state project 
and concentrated resources and efforts towards the creation of an equal and fair economy, by opposing 
all alternative positions in the name of Ethiopian interests, and by keeping a constant limit on the private 
sector’s full development. Furthermore, as a consequence of the second force, the process of ruling elite 
detachment from peasant society, which started within the TPLF when it shifted from Tigray’s regional 
struggle for independence to become the ruling party of a large country (Medhane, Young 2003), 
became more intense. Thus, the extension of party recruitment (Arriola, Lyons 2016), and the capture 
of local elites into sub-kebele institutions with developmental and political afflatus, taking place since 
the second half of the decade, might be interpreted as attempts to counterbalance this centrifugal 
tendency. 
 
2.3. Transforming Agriculture for Development: Technological Change, Food Security and 
Global Markets 
At the turn of the millennium, agriculture and the agrarian sector still represented the core of the country 
in demographic and economic terms. Ethiopia was still an agrarian-based country since 85% of 
Ethiopians relied on agricultural incomes as their only source of livelihood (MoFED 2002: 113), and 
rural dwellers accounted for over 86% of the population (MoFED 2002: 9). Furthermore, as described 
above, in the political events of the new decade there has also been a confirmation of rural space and 
peasant political centrality for the EPRDF’s legitimacy and developmental narrative: in fact, party 
structure intensification in the rural environment played a fundamental role in the 2005 elections, and 
the peasantry coalition still featured the revolutionary democratic Front. 
                                                     
63 - Both tendencies can be observed in the start of the country’s integration process in the Comprehensive African 
Agricultural Development Programme in 2008, where it formalized a continued commitment to achieve 6% annual 
growth in the agricultural sector, and to expand international relations and volumes of trade (Callihan, Tadesse 
2012). 
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Accordingly, rural and agricultural 
development constituted political 
priorities for the economic growth and 
poverty reduction objectives pursued 
during the decade. As figure 1 shows, 
this commitment was translated into 
financial support: particularly during the 
second half of the decade, the share of 
total expenditure that Ethiopia has 
invested in agriculture has been way 
above the African average. 
The rationale for the continued focus on agriculture within the ADLI strategy was highlighted in the 
SDPRP: compared to their urban fellow citizens, rural dwellers had the worst rates for child wasting and 
stunting, literacy and access to health services. Despite important improvements, national poverty was 
still concentrated in rural areas:64 by 1999/00, 45% of the rural population fell below the international 
standard poverty line.65 The bulk of the rural economy was constituted by subsistence farming 
households, characterized by low capital investments, traditional cultivation practices and decreasing 
plot size: in 1999/00, 64% of Ethiopian households holdings measured less than 1 hectare (MoFED 
2002: 14). In line with the ADLI, rural and agricultural development policies were given priority due to 
their contribution in terms of poverty reduction, food security and economic growth. The strategy was 
based on inter-sectoral linkages and associated to a greater food products supply, higher wages and 
greater raw material supply for industrial production and trade. Increased incomes were associated to 
higher consumption rates, which in turn led to a greater domestic demand for processed goods. This was 
expected to boost the opportunities for domestic capital formation and to improve exportable product 
quantity and quality; consequently, national entrepreneurial and private sectors were expected to benefit 
from the expanded markets and to become competitive on a global scale. 
The following paragraphs will present the strategies for rural and agricultural development outlined in 
the main policy papers issued by the government in the first decade of the millennium, from three 
different perspectives: interventions for technological change and market interaction, private sector 
promotion through global market integration and land administration reforms, and the evolution of the 
food security strategy. 
                                                     
64 - In 1995/96, rural dwellers constituted 86.5% of the total population, but accounted for 90% of the national 
population living in poverty; in 1999/00 these data have respectively changed to 85 and 88.7 percent (MoFED 
2002: 9). 
65 - The data for urban inhabitants is significatively lower: 37% (MoFED 2002: 34). 
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Figure 1 - Agriculture expenditure share out of overall expenditure (%). 
Personal elaboration, source: Benin, Yu (2012) 
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2.3.1. Tailoring the interventions to existing conditions: the extension system for technological 
change 
The rural and agricultural development strategy objectives are explained clearly in the Rural 
Development Policy and Strategy (RDPS), a policy paper issued in April 2003 by the GoE, in consistent 
with the SDPRP and embedded in the ADLI: «[t]he Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
underscores one basic objective with regard to economic development: to build a market economy in 
which (i) a broad spectrum of the Ethiopian people are beneficiaries, (ii) dependence on food aid is 
eliminated; and, (iii) rapid economic growth is assured» (MoFED 2003: 9). Four elements are indeed 
identified in the strategy. First, the ADLI is expected to engender greater economic growth through the 
linkages of agriculture with other sectors of the economy. Hence, despite «[a]ll the economic sectors are 
made to grow in a mutually reinforcing manner (…) [a]griculture occupies the position of prime 
economic mover and industry and trade are made to grow in conjunction with agriculture» (MoFED 
2003: 10). Second, in line with the PRSPs’ principles, the economic growth needs to be broad-based 
and to contribute to the reduction of poverty; accordingly, efforts are envisaged to improve the entire 
population’s productive capacity and for their effective employment. Third, the strategy is intended to 
be a part of the global integration process, and therefore expected to eliminate the country’s food aid 
dependency, increase the purchasing power of the majority of the population and promote an internally 
interconnected national economy. Fourth, growth encompasses a market-oriented strategy.66 
In the Ethiopian agricultural sector context, the transition toward a market economy depended mainly 
on a large-scale growth of marketable inputs and outputs handled by peasant farmers. Accordingly, the 
policies and strategies for agricultural development contained in the SDPRP, the RDPS and the PASDEP 
focused on input adoption intensification and farming method modernization, in view of production and 
productivity growth, and for a market share increase. In line with the PADETES achievements, the 
intensification was linked to greater technological progress, to be obtained through enhanced research 
on and application of improved inputs: mainly seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and machinery. 
Consequently, the SDPRP planned the expansion in the number of farmers receiving extension packages 
from 4 to 6 million by the end of 2005, it created 25 college level agriculturally-oriented Technical 
Vocational Education Training programs, and it supported the creation of Farmer Training Centers to 
be located in each kebele and to eventually house three qualified development agents (DAs) each. During 
that period, the extension system programs attracted a large portion of the public investment in 
agriculture: around 50 million dollars per year, equal to almost 2% of the agricultural GDP, 4 to 5 times 
greater than the investment in agricultural research (Byerlee 2007: 12). 
                                                     
66 - The RDPS, the SDPRP and the PASDEP promoted a linear approach to rural and agricultural development 
with no particular differences between one another; therefore, the following presentation, integrates the three 
papers in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the strategy. 
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As already noted, the shift from the SAPs to the PRSPs was framed by the intention to move away from 
economic reforms designed with a one-size-fits-all perspective. In the same line of thought, the strategy 
associated to the extension system and issued in the aforementioned papers was coherently based on the 
country’s conditions at the time. Therefore, since the rural economy was characterized by low capital 
availability and investments, the strategy was purposely oriented to promote labour-intensive farming 
systems, through the following measures: enhancement of industriousness and work preparedness, 
farming skill improvement through education, farmers’ health protection and dissemination of 
appropriate technology. Similarly, input and training dissemination development packages were tailored 
to the country’s agro-ecological specificities, based mainly on climate and rain conditions of the regions. 
Three particular zones were chosen, and differentiated strategies were designed to take advantage of the 
comparative positive aspects of each area. Drought-prone areas (defined “moisture stress areas” in the 
PASDEP) were targeted with development packages focusing mainly on environmental management 
and protection to reduce production volatility, off-farm income generating activities, emergency 
assistance and voluntary resettlement schemes. In areas with adequate rainfall, packages aimed at the 
intensification of food crop production to fulfil national requirements, foreseeing also transfers from 
food-surplus to food-deficit areas. Furthermore, being market-oriented, for areas with adequate rainfall 
the government promoted the diffusion of high-value crops like vegetables and fruits, but also traditional 
export crops like coffee, tea and spices, in order to increase revenue and accelerate capital accrual. In 
pastoral areas, packages were aimed mainly at market-driven livestock development and water 
conservation and management. 
Development packages were therefore based on diversification and specialization principles, that will 
reappear in various ways in the next paragraphs. During the 2000s, diversification was intended in two 
senses: as previously said, as a reflection of the diversity of agro-ecological zones it was used for the 
designation of bottom-up packages; moreover, it was also promoted on individual farms as a form of 
protection against the risks associated with monocropping. The specialization concept, repeatedly 
mentioned in the papers but not scrutinized in depth, refers to the principle of focusing on selected 
development packages and crops in different regions and zones, in order to benefit from the comparative 
advantages of each location and to promote high-value and export-oriented productions. This principle, 
used also by the PASDEP to select specialized corridors/areas for better supply chain performance and 
fruit and vegetable exports, could be seen as a pioneer to the cluster approach that will be discussed in 
the next paragraphs. 
Interventions were also planned on the market-side of the supply chain, particularly regarding the 
improvement of market information provision, price stabilization and fostering market interaction 
between farmers, private traders and state trading enterprises through semi-public enterprises. Particular 
attention was paid to the improvement of the rural finance sector, by creating a more efficient credit 
supply system for farmers. Previous reforms did not entail significant changes in the sector, since 
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regional administrations still acted as intermediaries between farmers and formal, commercial banks; as 
already seen, this system was highly inefficient and regional governments were often forced to take on 
the burden of debt, and to pay for insolvent farmers. For the sector, the strategy persisted in the expansion 
of the MFIs’ borrowing capacity, and in replacing regional administrations with rural banks to extend 
loans to farmers. 
Multiservice cooperatives were expected to play a central role in agricultural marketing and rural 
finance. In the first case, strengthening the cooperatives’ role was expected to entail an improved access 
to agricultural inputs for member farmers, to aggregate production and provide storage services, to foster 
standardization and grading, and to provide collective agricultural machinery. As a consequence, both 
input and output marketing were expected to benefit from the aggregation of farmers into agricultural 
cooperatives. On the financial side, cooperatives were also expected to act as intermediaries between 
the farmer and the financial institution, thus backing the risk of insolvency, and at the same time 
improving the farmer’s chances of obtaining credit. 
 
2.3.2. Promoting the private sector: tenure security to attract private investments 
In addition to cooperatives, another fundamental actor backed by the government to enhance agricultural 
development, was the private sector: including the better-off small-holding peasant farmers with 
entrepreneurial will, the national middle-class involved in non-farming activities, and foreign investors 
looking for income opportunities in Ethiopia. As seen before, the private sector promotion was not a 
new aspect of the Ethiopian strategy, since even during the so-called transitional period the 
dismantlement of the command economy was expected to bring about a parallel increase in the 
contribution of private capital towards development. However, the link of agriculture with other sectors 
of the economy, and the attraction of foreign capital to agriculture, were definitively given greater 
attention after the turn of the new millennium. 
Market-sensitive farming decisions, and land- and labour-intensive cultivations represented the way to 
increase production and productivity. Along with intensification, pursued through the aforementioned 
technological turn, in areas with adequate rainfall the strategy also envisaged the differentiation into 
high-value crops, which responded better to conditions of land scarcity and labour abundance, and which 
ensured high profits for small plots. In this way, the creation of marketable surplus by smallholder 
farmers was expected to increase their income, boost their competitiveness, and ultimately turn them 
into commercial farmers. The transformation would have entailed higher incomes for peasant 
households, with positive effects on food security and broader economic growth. Moreover, an 
expanded agricultural product market would have also strengthened the linkages with the industrial 
sector, mainly through the stimulation of small and medium scale manufacturers involved in production 
of farming tools, fertilizers, pesticides, as well as in output processing. The PASDEP emphasizes 
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particularly the promotion of agro-industrial programs in traditional high-value crops like coffee, tea 
and spices. If supported with infrastructural development, and an adequate legal framework, high-value 
productions were also expected to be channelled toward exports, whose expansion was continuously 
promoted by the government as a fundamental long-term objective, in line with the ADLI. 
The shift from food crops to high-value commodities was also motivated by the absence of a well-
developed urban economy that could stimulate sufficiently the agricultural production. High-value crops 
presented larger opportunities in the international market and were consequently more attractive to 
national and foreign investors. Through the promotion of private capital investments in agriculture, the 
government gradually moved away from the focus on small-scale peasant farming that originally framed 
the ADLI, in view of a more complex and comprehensive interaction of agriculture with national and 
international markets. In fact, since the SDPRP, the government used different ways to promote the 
creation of large-scale commercial farms, out-grower systems and contract farming schemes, in order 
to integrate local peasant farmers and private capital. Although the agricultural input market was still 
tied up by the dominance of state-owned or parastatal enterprises (Byerlee et al. 2007; Spielman et al. 
2010, 2011), other interventions promoted the creation of an enabling environment for local private 
initiatives to develop, and for foreign private capital to invest in Ethiopia. Accordingly, investments 
were planned for infrastructural development (mainly rural roads, irrigation systems, electricity, 
education and health services), the provision of skilled agricultural labour force was fostered by new 
TVET schools, settlement programs and a more suitable rural land policy were promoted to make land 
more easily accessible to private investors. 
The last issue is remarkably important in terms of agrarian change, since it engendered macro-processes 
of rural economy and space transformation. Hence, a program of rural land registration and certification 
was started in the early 2000s in order to actively foster private investment in «areas having large 
unutilized agriculturally suitable land» mainly in the lowlands (MoFED 2003: 58), or in smaller areas 
of the highlands for capital-intensive crops. The registration or all rural land and particularly the 
individualization of land tenure, constituted contentious issues between the government and internal as 
well as international stakeholders and financial partners – the World Bank first and foremost (Deininger 
et al. 2003a, 2003b) - reflecting a long-standing debate on land tenure and property rights in Africa to 
which many illustrious academics have contributed with contrasting arguments and evidence.67 It is not 
worth going into a detailed presentation of the land tenure issue here, but it is worth remembering that 
in the early 1990s the government refused to privatize land ownership in order to prevent poor farmers 
from selling their land and be left without any asset for their livelihood, to avoid the resurgence of 
inequalities in rural economy, and to keep a strong tool for political control. On the other side, many 
                                                     
67 - For a short review of the relative literature and recent policies and strategies, with interesting references to the 
Ethiopian case see Place (2009). 
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research institutes, financial partners and scholars wanted to provide peasant farmers with clear, 
transparent, exclusive and transferable user rights, as a main way to increase their tenure security - 
intended as the extent to which holders feel their rights will not be arbitrarily violated by any other 
person or governmental administration – thus leading to more land investments, higher agricultural 
productivity, and increased credit accessibility by using land as a collateral (EEA/EEPRI 2002). 
In allegiance to some of these pressures and in order to enhance private initiative in the agricultural 
sector, since the early 2000s the Ethiopian government, in cooperation with some international donors, 
started a rural land registration programme for the four main regions, with the purpose to provide each 
farming household with a use rights certificate and to create a registry at the kebele office. While ultimate 
land ownership was vested by the state, farmer households were to be granted use rights certificates by 
the regional governments, in accordance with Proclamation n. 89/1997 (FDRE 1997: art. 6/10). 
Registration and certificate distribution took place in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) in a dissimilar way and very slowly due to a resource 
shortage and lack of commitment by the local institutions in charge. But during the 2005 election 
campaign period, because the opposition parties were gathering consensus against the government for a 
land administration policy with more secure rights for farmers, the certification process was speeded up 
in order to win back the support of the rural population (Dessalegn 2008b: 193). Moreover, two new 
Proclamations were issued right before the elections: the Rural Land Administration and Use 
Proclamation, and the Expropriation of Landholdings for Public Purposes and Payment of 
Compensation Proclamation. The former replaced Proclamation n. 89/1997, confirmed peasant farmers, 
semi-pastoralists and pastoralists right to have rural land free of charge and the right to use it, and it also 
envisaged the measurement, certification and registration of all rural land (FDRE 2005b: art 6), to be 
carried out by regional and lower-level administrations. At the same time, Proclamation 455/2005 was 
an official confirmation of the principle of state ownership of all land, but at the same time introduced 
a legal system for private investors to access land through expropriations, by stating that: «[a] woreda 
or an urban administration shall, upon payment in advance of compensation in accordance with this 
Proclamation, have the power to expropriate rural or urban landholdings for public purpose where it 
believes that it should be used for a better development project to be carried out by public entities, 
private investors, cooperative societies or other organs, or where such expropriation has been decided 
by the appropriate higher regional or federal government organ for the same purpose» (FDRE 2005a: 
art. 3/1). Therefore, in addition to skilled labour provision, infrastructural improvements and a stable 
macroeconomic environment, also the land policy was adjusted in order to foster Ethiopian and foreign 
private capital investments in agriculture. 
The land tenure certification represented an official recognition of farmer households’ land use rights, 
and was therefore appreciated by Western financial partners (Deininger et al. 2007) and other critics 
who, following certification, documented an increased confidence in farmers’ attitude towards renting 
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land out, and less land disputes (Dessalegn 2008b: 183). At the same time, the regulation of 
expropriations and displacements of farmer households from their land was embedded in the 
developmental narrative, and therefore smoothed: in view of the search for a “better development 
project” for agriculture, the land policy thus enabled the arrival of many national and foreign private 
investors, giving birth to the “land grabbing” season, and raising concern among many observers.68  
 
2.3.3. The Revised Food Security Strategy and the Food Security Program 
The decade under analysis represented a crucial turning point for the Ethiopia’s government food 
security policy. Since the early 1990s, great political commitment was placed on the importance of 
achieving household-level food security thanks to national food self-sufficiency. As already discussed, 
the food security strategy issued in 1996 included measures for an improved early warning system, 
emergency response, international assistance management, and chronic food insecurity relief. Many of 
the household-level food insecurity reduction strategies were linked to rural- and agricultural-related 
development schemes, because of the presence of higher rates of food insecurity in those areas, and due 
to the food security linkage with domestic agricultural production. In spite of some positive trends, at 
the turn of the millennium food insecurity was still a major issue for Ethiopia, as demonstrated by the 
700,000 metric tons of food aid imported annually by the country in the previous 15 years to meet 
peoples’ requirements; and it continued to be a defining feature of rural poverty, since the incidence of 
food poverty (50% of the total population) was higher in rural areas (52%) than in urban ones (37%) 
(GoE 2002: 6). 
Given the perpetuation of a critical situation, worsened by two years of low performance by the 
agricultural sector, the food security strategy was revised in 2002 within the the SDPRP context (GoE 
2002). The overall strategy was very similar to its previous version and its main purpose was to reduce 
national dependency on international aid and to ensure food security at household level. The strategy’s 
main target was chronic food insecurity, where chronic vulnerability was associated to overwhelming 
poverty because of a lack of assets, and therefore linked to the goal of poverty reduction as stated in the 
PRSPs. Accordance with broader rural and agricultural development strategies included in the PRSPs, 
could also be seen in the definition of strategies tailored to the specific conditions of food production 
zones. Likewise, in areas with adequate rainfall, the higher agricultural potential was to be exploited 
more effectively to increase national food availability. Secondly, in moisture deficit and pastoral areas, 
where there was a higher concentration of chronic food insecure households, attention was focused on 
environmental rehabilitation works, livelihood diversification and voluntary resettlement schemes. In 
these areas, additional programs were planned for the most vulnerable groups and households, including: 
                                                     
68 - The next chapter will provide a brief discussion of major features and impacts of the land grabbing in Ethiopia. 
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employment or income support schemes to be created by linking relief and developmental works, 
fostering accessibility to small and flexible loans, and nutrition interventions. Therefore, it is worth 
mentioning that the revision called for an evolution from the strategy’s previous version, since it aimed 
to address both the supply and demand sides of the food equation, by improving both availability and 
accessibility methods. Furthermore, strengthened emergency response capabilities were also envisaged, 
and became the strategy’s third mainstay. 
The expansion of the target, the diversification of measures for food security based on context 
specificities, and the connection of relief with asset building works, constituted three important 
innovations introduced by the 2002 revision, and inspired the creation in 2005 of a broad social 
protection program, the Food Security Program (FSP). In 2003, a New Coalition for Food Security in 
Ethiopia was established between Ethiopian authorities and major international donors and assistance 
organizations, in order to draw up a more effective plan to deal with food insecurity (Tesfahun, Osman 
2003). A survey was conducted among Ethiopian citizens, within the Coalition, in order to assess the 
impact of the SDPRP and parallel food security strategies on health services, education, water and 
agriculture. What the survey discovered was that, although positive results were achieved, additional 
measures needed to shift away from the dependence on emergency relief pattern and to boost the 
integration of asset building actions with assistance relief. For these reasons, a very ambitious program 
aiming to help 15 million people suffering from chronic (8.29 million) and transitory (6.71 million) food 
insecurity was designed (MoFED 2006). 
The FSP, which included 4 mainstays, initially expected to reach its goal in just 10 years, but it is still 
active in 2017. The first was the Household Asset Building (HABP), a component intended to create the 
necessary assets and income generating activities to obtain proper food accessibility: measures included 
strengthened technological packages for agriculture and enhanced credit availability for targeted 
households. Second, the continuation of the Voluntary Resettlement Program intended mainly to move 
chronically food insecure households from inhospitable areas to under-exploited land, to provide them 
with packages of assistance and access to essential social infrastructures: 2 million people were planned 
to be resettled in the coming years, with a total cost of 1.2 billion Birr. The very innovative component 
was the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), a large-scale social protection program, created to target 
chronically food insecure households with income-earning and community asset-building efforts, to 
bridge their food gap. The PSNP is not an emergency program and its goal is the “graduation” of food 
insecure households to food secure status.69 In its first version in 2005, it planned for 287 woreda to 
participate in the safety net; subsequently it was expanded to include more woreda. It is made up by two 
components: labour-intensive public works created mainly for infrastructural development and direct-
                                                     
69 - Interview with Alemayehu Tadesse, Director of the PSNP and the HABP, Department of Food Security, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Addis Ababa, August 2013. 
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support for particularly vulnerable households. While the former accounted for roughly 85% of all the 
PSNP’s activities and was designed to create income and at the same time boost community assets, the 
second is aimed at those special categories that are unable to provide for their self-subsistence, nor 
contribute actively to development work (Devereux, Amdissa 2013). Through public works and direct 
support, aid is distributed in cash and in goods: as opposed to previous versions of assistance, food aid 
is produced nationally and bought and distributed in cooperation with the World Food Program, thus 
combining with other agricultural development initiatives (van Uffelen 2013). The fourth mainstay was 
the Complementary Community Investment Program, planned for the enhancement of non-agricultural 
revenue, through credit promotion, micro-finance institutions, livestock development, nutrition and 
emergency capabilities; according to some analysts, this fourth mainstay’s contribution has been 
marginal (Berhanu 2013). 
The largest and most interesting component of the program was the PSNP, costing 2.5 billion Birr 
annually, and constituting a radical shift from relief granted in emergency situations, toward an 
ambitious social protection program (Dorosh 2013). As is often the case in Ethiopia, in spite of positive 
commitment and financial efforts, many obstacles were run into throughout its first (2005-07), second 
(2007-09) and third (2010-14) implementation phases: corruption and delays often affected the 
household targeting process, as well as aid distribution. Since measures were not sufficiently focused 
on building resilience assets, the FSP’s actions often failed to address the household aid dependency 
issue; furthermore, since the FSP is implemented with strong international donor support, it did not 
contribute to solve Ethiopia’s general dependency on international financial assistance. Despite these 
challenges, the FSP constituted an important evolution of the traditional measures for food security 
carried out in the country, and definitely had an influence on the ongoing process of production and 
reproduction relation transformation pursued by land, and rural and agricultural development policies. 
Moreover, it also reinforced the legitimacy – and the paternalistic attitude – of the developmental state 
project on the struggle for food security and poverty alleviation, by strengthening the EPRDF’s 
ideological attachment to the peasantry and the rural world in general. 
  
2.3.4. Agricultural development within the developmental state 
By the end of the decade, as a consequence of the policies discussed above, the agricultural sector was 
achieving a rapid development, and contributing successfully to attain economic growth and reduce 
poverty. As already seen, this was achieved through a selective adoption of market-led reforms, within 
the developmental state’s political project, which sought to achieve a balanced integration between state- 
and market-led agrarian economy tools. 
There is a widely shared agreement on the fact that trade liberalisations adopted in the 1990s contributed 
to the integration of rural markets nationwide, and reduced the margins between output-surplus and -
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deficit areas (Dercon 1995). However, the effects of these liberalisations in agriculture on poverty 
reduction have been mixed: on one side, the smallholder farmers who converted their production to cash 
crops following expert advice, suffered from increased price variability and market unreliability; on the 
other, those who did not, improved in general their possibility to escape poverty by benefiting from 
increased staple crops sale prices (Adugna 2012). Nevertheless, rural markets have not developed at the 
expected growth rate and, by the end of the decade, most smallholder farmers were not able to direct 
their food crop production toward the markets: official estimates from the beginning of the new decade 
report that less than 15% of cereals produced by private peasants were sold, while 67% were destined 
to self-consumption (CSA 2012a). In addition, the structure and performance of rural markets remained 
hampered by several factors including high transaction costs, asymmetric market information between 
buyers and sellers, and limited access to credit. Smallholder farmers’ general awareness of market 
information remained very low: they obtained limited knowledge of seasonal price patterns, product 
pricing and potential markets; rent-seeking intermediaries and actors took advantage of the lack of 
adequate market information institutions, and of policies to stabilize highly-volatile prices (Bekele, 
Hailemariam 2007). These limited impacts may be attributed to the marginal emphasis placed on 
agricultural marketing by the policies implemented by the GoE, compared to those aimed at engendering 
technological evolution. As the next chapter will show, this trend remained also in the following period, 
and it replicates the patterns of the modernization approach because it blames the lack of development 
mainly on the backward peasants. 
As seen above, the intensification and commercialization of small-scale producers constituted the core 
of the ADLI strategy.70 Over the decades, the GoE established a large extension system to work on 
improving the quantity and quality of agricultural outputs, and diversify outputs into high-value crops, 
aiming to attain food security and increased earnings from agriculture. On one side, the creation of this 
Ethiopian version of the Green Revolution was to be pursued through the implementation of agricultural 
liberalisation, power decentralization and upgrading the private sector; on the other, as discussed earlier, 
cultural and historical legacies in the peasant-state relationship, and the institution of the developmental 
state engendered top-down and state-driven initiatives that were a hindrance (Dawit 2011). 
Following early 2000s’ decentralization policies, the Woreda Offices of Agriculture and Rural 
Development became the main implementers of the extension system, in coordination with their 
correspondents at kebele, the DAs and agricultural cooperative levels (Berhanu et al. 2006). 
Decentralization gave the district offices more financial autonomy, but increased the integration of state 
institutions with party structures as party cadres spread throughout each government level took control 
over resource distribution and policy implementation; evidence reported that in some cases DAs were 
                                                     
70 - Together with the promotion of the domestic private sector and foreign investments in agriculture, whose 
impacts were noticeable starting from the very late 2000s, and which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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appointed by superiors on account of party membership (Teferi 2012). In order to achieve the expected 
growth in agricultural output quantity and quality, the GoE planned to distribute different kinds of 
technology packages to modernize farming techniques and expand the application of improved 
agricultural inputs within a supply-driven system (Berhanu et al. 2006). The DAs were in charge of the 
packages distribution to farmers, and to fulfil regional and woreda annual quota targets; therefore, their 
role often meant making simply an input delivery service, instead of acting as knowledge broker and to 
foster farmer linkage with input suppliers (Berhanu et al. 2006). As some studies have revealed, a one-
size-fits-all approach was implemented, and coercive tools were adopted by extension agents (including 
kebele officials) to achieve the targeted quota and implement the planned strategy.71 These hierarchical 
structures replicated a top-down relationship between DAs and farmers based on historical roots, which 
turned out to be one of the obstacles for the effective transition of small-scale producers toward modern 
farming practices and improved input application (Teferi 2012). 
As seen in previous sections, partial agricultural liberalizations were adopted during the first decade of 
the EPRDF’s rule, aiming to create an efficient agricultural input supply system, that included the private 
sector’s contribution; however, by the end of the second decade, the top-down state-driven approach 
prevailed. The most evident case regarded the fertilizer import and distribution system: many of the 
liberalization reform elements adopted during the 1990s, that contributed to foster the introduction of 
private actors and producer associations in the system, were soon reversed or not implemented (Jayne 
et al. 2002). By 2008, fertilizer imports became a prerogative of the Agricultural Inputs Supply 
Enterprise (AISE, that replaced the AISCO) – conducted according to federal planning based on the 
requirement assessment made by decentralized government offices - and distribution was allowed only 
to cooperative unions (or to the AISE) through primary cooperatives at prices set by the regional 
governments (Rashid et al. 2013). The evolution of the improved seed production and distribution 
systems followed a similar pathway, and after the opening of the systems to private actors, by the end 
of the decade the public sector accounted for 80% of total sales (Spielman et al. 2011). Therefore, the 
highly politicized structures of the extension system have hampered the development of an efficient 
private sector and, as some have highlighted, the purpose of this has been mostly for the government to 
achieve its double objective of economic growth and political control by strengthening its authoritarian 
power and presence in the rural environment (Kassahun, Poulton 2014; Teferi 2012). 
As a consequence of huge public spending in the agricultural input supply and extension service sectors 
– estimated at 2% of the GDP during the 2000s (Spielman et al. 2011) - the rates of improved input 
adoption increased during the decade, but they did not achieve the expected results (Dorosh, Mellor 
2013), since major obstacles were still present. For instance, because of the lack of a relevant regulation 
policy on property rights, absent institutions and information asymmetries, the private sector did not 
                                                     
71 - WIDE, Models & Realities of Transformation – June 2014. WIDE Discussion Brief No. 5 of 5, Ethiopia WIDE. 
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develop sufficiently to allow for ESE to cover all the improved seeds requests made by the kebele 
(Spielman et al. 2011). Moreover, being tied to credit offered by the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
against public guarantees, the extension system linked to fertilizers had large fiscal costs for the regional 
governments (Rashid et al. 2013). Furthermore, although cooperatives were asked to be the major force 
in input distribution and, by the second half of the decade, also in the aggregation of producer outputs 
and linkage creation with markets and value-adding processes, their activities were hampered by 
shortages in financial resources and capacity building. By the end of the decade only an estimated 9% 
of all farmers were members of cooperatives, most of whom had no involvement in agricultural 
marketing, or were conversely in charge of performing social services that depleted their limited budgets 
(Tanguy, Alemayehu 2012). 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the analysis of the trajectory of the FDRE’s state-building has been 
closely connected to its agrarian and agricultural worlds: on one side, through the ADLI the GoE 
promoted an economic development strategy based on the success of the transformation process of the 
smallholder farmer subsector into commercial actors; on the other, peasants have constituted the first 
and foremost target for the creation of the developmental state project’s political foundation. As 
highlighted in the sections above, this double connection has motivated the government to promote a 
wide range of supportive policies for agriculture, rural development and food security. At the same time, 
the government’s developmental purpose and its historical roots have also contributed to consolidate 
state-peasant relations that enhanced the power of the former over the latter, and inhibited the agency of 
peasants (Dessalegn 2008b). 
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CHAPTER THREE – CONTEMPORARY ETHIOPIA: AN AGENDA 
FOR TRANSFORMATION 
 
The previous chapter described the political and economic course followed by the GoE during the first 
two decades, as well as the main initiatives in rural and agricultural development, revealing a close 
connection between state-building and agrarian transformation policies. In this chapter I will continue 
to retrace the trajectory of economic, rural and agricultural development policies implemented by the 
GoE, by focusing on the post-2010 period. The first part will cover the main political events that 
contributed to strengthen the developmental state’s pathway, following the death of its founding leader; 
and it will outline the evolution of the economic strategy aimed at structural transformation and rapid 
growth. The second part of the chapter will delineate the GoE’s latest agenda for rural and agricultural 
transformation, the pursued strategy’s major outputs, and the main trends to date. In the third part, the 
cluster-policy will surface as the current strategy’s fundamental target for structural transformation. In 
that part I will cover the leading cluster-based policies implemented on a national level, their rationale, 
their working principles, their main implementers and their current status of implementation. This part 
will provide innovative findings on the current strategy for agrarian transformation and it will also be of 
help to introduce the analysis of cluster-based initiatives in South Wollo. 
 
1. Transformation After Consolidation 
 
Although the repressive hand of the government has played a significant role in the results of the 2005 
elections, some have argued that the lack of coordination among the oppositions represented a major 
factor for their defeat. The main political forces to have confronted the EPRDF in 2005 were the 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (then Unity for Democracy and Justice) and the United Ethiopian 
Democratic Forces, made up by the convergence of many different smaller parties who used to oppose 
the EPRDF individually (Markakis 2011). Between 2005 and 2010, opposition supporters and 
representatives have been attacked, arbitrarily arrested, threatened, harassed, stripped of any possibility 
to access state resources and public audience (HRW 2010). At the 2010 national ballots, in order to 
merge forces, these two coalitions and other parties created a common front called Medrek – Forum for 
Democratic Dialogue in Ethiopia, which then became one of the main opposition coalitions to stand for 
a liberal democratic order (Markakis 2011). However, due to the effective repression campaign that 
Medrek supporters and activists had gone through, and due to a blurred electoral process, Medrek wasn’t 
able to win but one seat in the House of Representatives, that added to other two seats gained by an 
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independent candidate and the Agroba People’s Democratic Organisation, brought a landslide majority 
in Parliament to the EPRDF (Brigaldino 2011). 
In addition to the actual suppression of any kind of organizational capacity, the oppositions also received 
full de-legitimization by pro-government propaganda. Coherently with Meles’ idea that a developmental 
state needs the united effort by all sides of the society - and political forces – in order to succeed, 
oppositions were labelled movements against peace and development, organizations against Ethiopian 
interests and neo-liberalism supporters (Merera 2011). From a political economy perspective, in one of 
Meles’ most quoted and mysterious essays,72 the former Prime Minister condemned neo-liberal thought 
in Africa of being a dead end street. It was considered worthy because it removed the dead hand of the 
inefficient state, but deemed responsible of replacing it with another inefficient system led by 
oligopolists and self-interest seeking individuals.73 The strict refusal of its economic prescriptions had 
an effect also on the political side. The individual thought envisaged by the neo-liberal paradigm did not 
fit in with the collective and hegemonic thought required by the developmental state project. In this 
respect, democracy was considered a preferable but unviable way to lead development (Plaut 2012). 
From this point of view, all the political forces that challenged the EPRDF political and economic project 
were considered as obstacles to the realization of the developmental pathway, and therefore had to be 
repressed. For these reasons, Merera Gudina’s - the leader of the Oromo Federalist Congress and 
Medrek’s chairman, in jail since November 2016 on terrorism charges74 –, statement in one of his papers: 
«after 20 years of EPRDF rule Ethiopia has a new system of authoritarian rule, in which the ballot box 
has become an instrument of legitimization rather than a tool of democratic expression» (Merera 2011: 
14), did not seem to be inappropriate  
Repressions were not limited to political opponents, but were addressed also to associations and 
organizations of the so-called civil society, who received strict limitations in terms of financial support, 
organizational capacities, and operations following the enforcement of new oppressive laws in the late 
2000s. The Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies Proclamation (621/2009) established 
that civil organizations working on governance, human rights, democracy, community development, 
justice, and other sensitive issues, were allowed to have only 10% of their total budget foreign-based, 
and less than 30% could be spent in non-service-oriented activities (including dissemination, advocacy, 
                                                     
72 - The African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, written by Meles Zenawi, dates back to 2006, and 
was expected to falsify the neo-liberal paradigm and to propose a new one in the wake of Ethiopian experience, 
for the good of other African countries. It was a preliminary draft of a wide monograph on which Meles was 
working, that was never accomplished, but left for public consultation. It includes drafts of a couple of chapters, 
the conclusions of several chapters and in some cases only the chapters’ titles. Some of the insights raised in the 
draft were recalled in a chapter of a monograph he wrote successively (Meles 2012). 
73 - Meles Zenawi, African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, preliminary draft, 2006. 
74 - Dr. Merera Gudina, Dr. Berhanu Nega and Jawar Mohammed Charged with Terrorism, “Ethiopia Zare”, 24 
February 2017: http://ethiopiazare.com/news/local/5416-dr-merera-gudina,-dr-berhanu-nega-and-jawar-
mohammed-charged-with-terrorism 
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research) (Brechenmacher 2017; Aalen 2011). Mass Based Societies were established in their place to 
promote the participation of grass-root citizens in the democratization process. Yet instead of expanding 
the possibility to participate, these organizations turned out to be instruments to increase the people’s 
consensus on the developmental project, and their authoritarian nature replicated similar organizations 
established during the Imperial and the Derg period (FSS, Atos 2012). 
 
1.1. After Meles: Unstable Ethnic-Federalism and the 100% Elections 
The unexpected death of Meles Zenawi in August 2012, from a disease which was kept hidden until the 
last days, left a huge vacuum in the leadership of the country and the party. Suddenly, the charismatic 
leader of the democratic revolution, the liberator from the oppressive red terror, the shrewd politician 
who made Ethiopia the most trustworthy country of the Horn of Africa for the Western world, the 
economist who began unprecedented growth and poverty reduction rates, the clever negotiator who 
established a peaceful coexistence of different ethnicities, the protector of peasants’ interests, the father 
of the party and the nation, was gone, and nobody seemed to be able to replace him. Hailemariam 
Desalegn, who was serving as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, replaced Meles 
and acted in his capacity until the following elections in 2015. Because of his loyalty to the former Prime 
Minister, Hailemariam represented, for the government and the EPRDF, the expression of continuity 
along Meles’ pathway. In the early 2000s, during the tehadso, he was indeed chosen to replace the 
former President of the SNNPR, who had been charged with corruption. Moreover, his international 
career and education as a civil engineer, and his experience as Minister gave him a good standing 
position in the eyes of the foreign partner community. 
Within the country, his Southern origins were seen as an element of discontinuity with the TPLF’s 
prominence in the cabinet and in the party since the establishment of the FDRE. Most of the inter-ethnic 
approval that Meles was able to acquire with the struggle for liberation, and throughout the decades, 
was based on who he was and and his charisma. With his demise, the TPLF lost the cornerstone of its 
political legitimation within the country, and the choice of a candidate coming from the SEPDM, in 
coordination with three Deputy Prime Ministers from the ANDM, the TPLF and the OPDO, was 
expected to prevent requests for representation by under-represented ethnicities (Arriola, Lyons 2016). 
The political move was not successful, and the then defined «TPLF puppet prime minister Hailemariam 
Desalegn»75 was not able to gather the popular approval required to maintain the precarious political 
unbalance characterised by an ethnic minority governing a large under-represented and differentiated 
majority. The government responded to ethnic claims mixed with calls for freedom, participation, 
democratization and employment, with harsh repression, and the political situation turned violent very 
                                                     
75 - Alemayehu G. Mariam, The Zero-Sum Negotiation Games of the T-TPLF in Ethiopia, “Nazret.com”, 3 July 
2017: https://www.nazret.com/2017/07/03/the-zero-sum-negotiation-games-of-the-t-tplf-in-ethiopia/ 
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quickly. In April 2014, three journalists and six members of the Zone 9 blogger collective – reporting 
actively on human rights abuses and campaigning for the GoE to respect the constitution – were arrested 
and charged with terrorism (Simegnish 2016). In November 2015, demonstrations broke out in Addis 
Ababa against the displacement of the Oromo people from their homelands as planned by the Addis 
Ababa Master Plan. Although the government gave up the plan following these demonstrations, 
uprisings expanded to the Oromia Region, arousing Oromo nationalist demands for improved cultural 
recognition and independence.76 Since the creation of modern Ethiopia, the Oromo people (the largest 
ethnic group in Ethiopia, around 35% of the total national population) and many other ethnic minorities 
in the “periphery” of the country, have claimed cultural, political and economic domination from the 
“centre” of Ethiopia, constituted by an Amhara speaking ruling elite (Markakis 2011). The domination 
of the peripheries continued even after the FDRE was established, and the Oromos’ expectations were 
betrayed by the concentration of power in the hands of a Tigrayan elite. University students took the 
lead of protests in several Oromo cities, followed by many rural and urban citizens. Protests targeted the 
regional and federal governments denouncing the unbalances in the federal system. The EPRDF and the 
OPDO leaders, local officials and party representatives were accused of unaccountability, authoritarian 
governance and corruption, and attacked violently.77 Clashes with local and federal police and army 
turned very cruel, toward the end of the year many demonstrators were killed or arrested, many others 
disappeared, Internet access was blocked by Ethio Telecom (the state-owned and sole 
telecommunications provider of the country), local militia were recruited and the federal system 
proceeded to actively suppress the protests. 
In July 2016, protests spread also to the Amhara Region, and became particularly brutal in the area 
surrounding the cities of Gondar and Bahir Dar, close to the borders of the Tigray Region. The clashes 
began in a contested area under the Tigrayan administration, where the majority of inhabitants belong 
to the Amhara ethnic group. In the aftermath of the armed repression of the unrests, demonstrations 
spread widely and rapidly throughout the region. The protests were directed against the federal and 
regional governments for their authoritarian governance, the lack of political representation, and the 
domination of the Tigrayan elite. In some cases, demonstrators reportedly harassed Tigrayan civilians 
because of their ethnicity, and the clashes took the form of an inter-ethnic fight. In August 2016, 
demonstrations against the central government took place also in Addis Ababa and turned immediately 
violent. The government responded with the same means used earlier on: armed repression, 
demonstrator arrests with terrorism charges, Internet blocking, cutting water and electricity supplies to 
the areas involved, imposing curfews and demonstration bans. Demonstrations in Amhara and Addis 
                                                     
76 - E. Chala, Ethiopia Scraps Addis Ababa 'Master Plan' After Protests Kill 140, “The Guardian”, 14 January 
2016: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/14/ethiopia-addis-master-plan-abandoned 
77 - Ezekiel Gebissa in Conversation with Rene Lefort on Political Crisis in Ethiopia, “Oromia Media Network”, 
12 January 2016: https://www.oromiamedia.org/2016/01/12/ezekeil-gebissa-in-conversation-with-rene-lefort-on-
political-crisis-in-ethiopia/ 
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Ababa revamped the Oromos’ protests. Since November 2015, over 11,000 people have been arrested 
and over 500 have lost their lives during the protests (Brechenmacher 2017). In October 2016, the 
government declared a six-month state of emergency which strengthened its executive power with the 
purpose of restoring peace; it was then extended for four more months78 until August 2017, when the 
Parliament approved its end.79 In November, Hailemariam opted for a cabinet reshuffle to replace 
unpopular Ministers80 and expand ethnic representation within the government - only 9 out of the 30 
former Ministers retained their positions81 - and promised drastic reforms to tackle corruption, 
governance issues and job creation. 
Meanwhile, national elections held in 2015 represented a new and final step in the political consolidation 
process of the EPRDF regime. Once again, before the elections, journalists, bloggers, opposition leaders 
and independent voices were repressed and arrested with terrorist charges, and furthermore, the National 
Electoral Board did not allow opposition candidates to register for parliament elections (Arriola, Lyons 
2016). In rural areas, the administrative apparatus achieved an optimal control level: 34 million people 
registered to vote, and there were 6000 candidates: 4166 for regional governments and 1834 for the 
House of Representatives (Afr Res Bull Polit 2015). There was a 100% win in the elections «This is a 
single-party state in all but name» (Clapham 2017: 4). 
Many students and lecturers I met during the fieldwork period, openly complained about the rule of the 
Tigrayan government, and some did not hesitate to define the contours of the inter-ethnic battle 
unfolding 100 km northwest of Dessie as a genocide. Without real democratization and a fair balance 
of power among constituents, the stability of ethnic-federalism in Ethiopia thus seems to be very 
precarious. Evidence seems to confirm that, after Meles, the lack of a unifying and charismatic leader 
has rekindled old ethnic claims, and created the opportunities for the emergence of a call for democratic 
participation, freedom and expression, which is expressed mainly by a generation of better educated and 
interconnected young people, who have not lived through the dictatorship of the 1980s and are therefore 
more hopeful for the future, than worried about the past. Besides the very few remaining opposition 
parties who have survived in the country, thanks mainly to intellectual diaspora support, many have 
joined armed groups like Ginbot 7 who are now challenging the ruling coalition in a political setting 
                                                     
78 - Ethiopia Extends State of Emergency by Four Months, “Al Jazeera”, 30 March 2017: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/ethiopia-extends-state-emergency-months-170330110807086.html 
79 - «The government’s emergency powers brought mass detentions, politically motivated criminal charges, and 
numerous restrictions on people’s movement and communication. While the end is welcome news, thousands 
remain in detention without charge, none of the protesters’ underlying grievances have been addressed, and 
politically motivated trials of key opposition leaders, artists, journalists, and others continue», see Horne F., State 
of Emergency Ends in Ethiopia, Human Rights Watch, 7 August 2017. 
80 - The most evident of which was the Communication Minister Getachew Reda, who had been the official voice 
of the government during the protests and had completely lost any popular legitimation. 
81 Ismail Akwei, Ethiopia Reshuffles Government, Two Oromos Occupy Key Positions, “AfricaNews”, 1 
November 2011: http://www.africanews.com/2016/11/01/ethiopia-reshuffles-government-two-oromos-occupy-
key-positions// 
116 
 
that lies beyond the institutional structure and the democratic competition. Apparently, none of these 
forces has the power to really challenge the EPRDF and to be a valid alternative. Therefore, according 
to Lefort, if there is going to be a change, this will be with and within the present regime.82 
 
1.2. The Developmental State in the Global Economy 
Despite the loathing for the neo-liberal paradigm and Washington Consensus principles, and 
deteriorating conditions in terms of democratization and freedom, the country reached a solid and 
beneficial relationship with Western development agencies and international financial institutions, as 
can be seen by the commitment toward structural adjustment reforms and poverty reduction strategies, 
and by the external development aid received throughout the last two decades. In the last few years, 
after a small decline during the 2005 post-election period, since 2007 Ethiopia has always ranked among 
the fifth-largest beneficiaries of official development assistance and official aid.83 This can be explained 
as a consequence of different factors (Arriola, Lyons 2016; Brechenmacher 2017; Lefort 2015; 
Brigaldino 2011). First, the GoE has been able to take on a very crucial role in the global war against 
terrorism promoted by the US and their allies. Second, Ethiopia has a strategic geopolitical position also 
with regard to the increasing flows of African migrants attempting to reach Europe, and therefore its 
stability is vital to contain and manage these processes. Third, through “economic diplomacy”,84 
Ethiopian leaders have been able to balance international pressures on democracy and good governance 
issues, with (often inflated) statistics on economic growth and development records. Fourth, the 
presence of persistently high percentages of acute poverty and food insecurity works as a deterrent 
against the interruption of international assistance. Fifth, the emergence of new international partners in 
the Middle-East and Asia achieved thanks to trade, deregulation and promotion of foreign private 
investment liberalizations, open up to new financial assistance opportunities. Issues such as ideology, 
national interest and sovereignty have a great influence on the administration of foreign aid (Habtie 
2015). Hence, in spite of affecting the country’s democratization process, international assistance has 
brought financial support to the consolidation of an economically successful non-democratic state. 
The growth reached in international finance has also been prompted by the achievement of a significant 
degree of economic stability, the overture to international markets and investors, and the promotion 
(though partial) of a private sector development. With regard to overall merchandise and services, direct 
foreign investment grew rapidly in the last decade: between 2006 and 2016, incoming investment flow 
                                                     
82 - Ezekiel Gebissa in Conversation with Rene Lefort on Political Crisis in Ethiopia, “Oromia Media Network”, 
12 January 2016: https://www.oromiamedia.org/2016/01/12/ezekeil-gebissa-in-conversation-with-rene-lefort-on-
political-crisis-in-ethiopia/ 
83 - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?year_high_desc=true 
84 - This is the way the MoFED defines its way of conducting international relations on trade (FDRE 2016). 
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grew from 545 to 3,196 USD million, and investment stock went from 3366 to 13,699 USD million.85 
In the 2014/15 year, Turkey, China and India were the top three investors in that order in terms of the 
amount of capital invested in the economy (FDRE 2016). In 1995 incoming direct foreign investment 
stock amounted to 2% of the GDP, and in 2016 it has reached 18.9%; yet in spite of this huge increase, 
its share of the GDP is lower than the East African average (25.3%), and very far from Africa’s or other 
developing economies’ percentages (respectively 37.6% and 30.4%).86 
The international trade volumes have been increasing at a very fast rate throughout both the last and the 
current decade.87 Between 2001 and 2016, the total import value grew from 1.8 to 16.4 USD billion, 
corresponding to an average growth of 17.9% per year. In the same period, total official exports have 
also grown from 403 USD million to 2.6 USD billion, reaching a 15%. average annual growth Increased 
volumes are associated with changing partners. In terms of share of the total export and import value, 
through the years Europe has gradually reduced its role as commercial partner: imports from the 
continent have diminished from 32 to 21.4 percent of the total import value of, and Italy has diminished 
its leading role as exporter to the country; in terms of total export value, European countries have 
reduced their share from 34 to 28.4 percent. North America has increased its trade volume with Ethiopia, 
keeping a constant overall export and import percentage, around 6-7% and 7-8% respectively; the USA 
has shared the largest amount, thus confirming its strong commercial partnership with the country. Asia 
has rapidly acquired a fundamental role in Ethiopian trade: in 2015 the continent (including the Middle 
East and Turkey) accounted for 75% of the total Ethiopian imported value, while in 2001 it amounted 
to 50%; as for exports, the continent received around 35% of the total Ethiopian export, and in 2016 it 
had reached 44%. China has played the leading role: going from 1% of total export values in 2001 to 
14% at present; and from 7.4% of total Ethiopian imports in 2001, to 37% in 2015. 
Some have argued that this constitutes a U-turn in the ADLI strategy, which took place after the renewal 
process and the 2005 elections, and was characterized by a radical turn toward the acceptance of a free 
market economy, new entrepreneurs and constructive investors in the agriculture, industry and service 
sectors (Lefort 2015). Although a gradual trade privatization and liberalization process has been 
undertaken by the government throughout the three decades - as discussed earlier - the issue here is that 
this process has occurred within a political narrative which is embedded in the developmental state 
project, and that any aperture to market forces has been achieved in order to feed the project. The 
outstanding growth in Ethiopia’s international trade, definitely demonstrates a more favourable 
approach by the GoE to commerce and markets, in accordance with the global internationalization 
                                                     
85 - UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017: Annex Tables, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
86 - Ibid. 
87 - Following data are from Trade Map of the International Trade Centre, last consultation on August 2017: 
http://www.trademap.org/ 
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processes of production and trade relations observed earlier on. However, the stable or decreasing 
commercial relations with Western countries, and the concurrent opening to Chinese investors is to be 
interpreted as proof of the rejection of neo-liberalism and the Washington consensus principles, and as 
evidence of the fact that the process has occurred within a party-dominated economy. 
Previous sections of this study have also highlighted that, through the decades, the party/state has 
conserved a strong control of the productive processes, which has ultimately hampered the emergence 
of independent private initiatives; and the study of the agricultural clusters will provide additional 
evidence of this hegemonic and widespread control. As a remnant of old command economy systems, 
the private sector’s development has been challenged by the widespread presence of a vast number of 
companies, foundations, individual holdings and NGOs that keep a strong direct or indirect connection 
with the ruling party (Hagmann, Abbink 2011). Moreover, as political events have demonstrated, the 
commitment against rent-seekers and the repression of any form of independent voice have become 
stronger in the late 2000s and early 2010s, thus contributing further to the creation of a controlled 
economic environment where only aligned actors may have the possibility to thrive: in 2013, The 
Economist estimated that around 80% of supposedly private companies actually belongs to 
conglomerates controlled by state loyalists.88 
Besides a more favourable trade policy, the trade volume expansion has increased thanks also to the 
participation in international trade agreements. An Economic Partnership Agreement was reached with 
the European Union, and regional trade partnerships were strengthened (Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development, Sana'a Forum, The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and 
the COMESA-East African Community-Southern African Development Community Tripartite) 
(MoFED 2010). The admittance process to the WTO started officially in 2003, but due to numerous 
failures in the negotiations between the GoE and the WTO Working Party, at present it has yet to be 
completed. As some observers have pointed out, this has occurred mainly because of the EPRDF’s 
reluctance to hand over control of the banking and financial services sectors to private entities.89 
Admittance to the WTO is emblematic of the conflicting way in which the GoE entered the international 
markets. Further evidence of the appropriateness to interpret the opening to the global economy as part 
of the national developmental state consolidation project - rather than as a result of a radical change in 
                                                     
88 - Emerging Africa: Doing It My Way; Ethiopia and Kenya, “The Economist”, 2 March 2013: 
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572379-ideological-competition-between-two-diametrically-
opposed-economic-models-doing-it-my 
89 - See UiO, The Impact of Ethiopian Accession to the WTO on its Financial Service Sector, Faculty of Law, 
University of Oslo, 2014; and Ethiopia: Market-Oriented Service Offer Bridges WTO Accession, in «Addis 
Fortune», 1 February 2016: http://allafrica.com/stories/201602040769.html 
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the political economy approach - is indicated by a survey conducted by WB in 2010, that classified the 
financial service sector of Ethiopia as the most closed out of the 102 selected countries.90 
 
1.3. Economic Growth and Structural Transformation 
As already noticed, the success of the developmental state project from a political perspective could not 
but be embedded in a successful pathway of economic development, and vice versa. Given the structure 
of Ethiopia’s economy which is characterized by low productivity in all economic sectors, low capital 
intensity, a very weak industrial sector, a poor private sector and high import dependency ratio, given 
its negative trade balance and its reliance on external assistance for development, and given the ongoing 
global transformation processes of production and trade relations frequently mentioned in previous 
sections, attaining economic development required an efficient integration in the world market and a 
structural transformation of the economy. In addition, consistently with national building processes, the 
developmental state had to fulfil its commitment to social development goals, and envisage a sustained 
and solid economic growth by keeping away rent-seekers. All these expectations and objectives were 
summarized in the main programs for economic development issued by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development after the PASDEP: the Growth and Transformation Plans I and II (GTP I and 
GTP II) published respectively for the 2009/10 – 2014/15, and 2015/16 – 2019/20 periods. Based on 
achievements and challenges encountered in the preceding 5-year period, these Plans envisioned for 
Ethiopia to become a middle-income country by 2025, to continue the improvement of social 
development indicators, and to uphold economic growth and industrialization. 
As preceding sections have shown, the longstanding development strategy of the GoE can be summed 
up in the following formula: to achieve poverty reduction, economic growth and industrialization, 
through the promotion of the agricultural sector, by embracing the agricultural surplus creation model 
envisaged by Adelman (1984) and Vogel (1994). Through the decades, the ADLI strategy has indeed 
succeeded in generating positive results in terms of poverty reduction and economic growth, but it has 
failed to transform the country in an industry-based one. The proportion of population living below the 
national poverty line has decreased from 38.7% in 2003/04 to 29.6% in 2010/11 (FDRE 2016), and the 
annual GDP growth rates reached 11% in the last decade (MoFED 2010). 
                                                     
90 - For further inquiries see P. Brenton, N. Dihel, L. Hinkle, N. Strychacz, Africa’s Trade in Services and the 
Opportunities and Risks of Economic Partnership Agreements, Africa Trade Policy Notes, Note n. 6, World Bank, 
August 2010 
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As for the structural transformation objective, in 2009/10, at the end of the PASDEP, the industrial 
sector accounted for only 12.9% of the value added GDP, while agriculture and the service sector 
dominated the economy, amounting respectively to 41.6% and 45.5% of the GDP (MoFED 2010: 4). 
As shown in figure 2, after a negative period in the early years, determined by a severe decline in 
agricultural production, during the 2000s the country sustained a steady economic growth characterized 
by the progressive decline in the agricultural sector’s relative growth, and increasing growth rates in the 
industrial and service sectors. 
At the same time, the agricultural sector’s 
contribution to the GDP declined during the 
decade as shown in figure 3; but this decreasing 
trend did not bring about a significative growth 
in the industrial sector’s contribution to the GDP, 
in spite of having attained remarkable annual 
growth rates. On the other hand, and consistently 
with the trends observed in the SSA region (Bah 
et al. 2015; Rodrik et al. 2016), the 
underperformance of the industrial sector was 
counterbalanced by the growth of the service sector. 
Figure 3 shows the very limited growth of the industrial sector in Ethiopia, compared to that of the 
service one, in terms of GDP share; figure 4 highlights similar trends in SSA, despite a considerably 
higher overall performance by industry compared to Ethiopia. These estimates are confirmed by Martins 
(2014), who observed that in terms of sectoral share of gross value added, agriculture performed a steady 
relative decline from 65.7% in 1991 to 45.2% in 2011, while mining, manufacturing and construction 
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Figure 2 - Real GDP annual growth rate (%), by economic sector. Personal elaboration, source: 
MoFED (2003, 2006, 2010) 
Figure 3 – Value added by economic sector in Ethiopia (% of 
GDP). Personal elaboration, source: MoFED (2006, 2010); 
MoARD (2010); data.worldbank.org 
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grew slightly from 6.4% to 9.3%, and the 
service sector went from 28% to 45.4% 
(Martins 2014). In addition, the 
transformation had a very minor effect on the 
distribution of employment by sectors: 
agriculture accounted for 81% of the jobs in 
1996, and 78% in 2011; manufacturing, 
construction and mining went from 3.3 to 4.5 
percent in the same period; while the service 
sector rose from 14.2 to 17.3 percent (Martins 
2014). Therefore, if a structural 
transformation was obtained, it was not in the desired direction (MoFED 2010: 6). 
Service delivery was the success topic of the developmental state, and its remarkable improvements 
were emphasized as evidence of its legitimacy (Arriola, Lyons 2016). Transports were eased by rural 
road construction and maintenance, a trade agreement made the port in Djibouti accessible, Ethiopian 
Airlines was boosted and Addis Ababa Bole Airport has expanded its travelling capacity. Mobile 
communication network capacity has increased rapidly and reached 25 million clients by 2009/10. New 
hydropower plants were built (Tekeze, Gilgel Gibe II, Tana Belese) in order to enhance power 
generation capacity and reduce dependency on imported oil; access to potable water has increased to 
65.6% in rural areas and 91.5% in urban ones. The gross enrolment ratio reached 94% for primary school 
and 40% for the secondary one; there were over 700,000 trainees undertaking Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training, and 185,000 undergraduate students (MoFED 2010). 
Based on the performance of the economic and social sectors, the GTP I envisioned «to become a 
country where democratic rule, good-governance and social justice reign, upon the involvement and free 
will of its peoples, and once extricating itself from poverty to reach the level of a middle-income 
economy as of 2020-2023» (MoFED 2010: 21). In order to pursue this vision, four main objectives were 
pinpointed for the 2010/11 – 2014/15 period: to reach an 11% annual growth rate of the GDP over the 
five-year period, to improve the quality and delivery of health services and education to fulfill MDGs 
in the social sector, to establish suitable conditions for sustainable nation building through a democratic 
and developmental state, and to ensure macroeconomic stability. It is worth noting that both the vision 
and the objectives of the economic and social sectors were embedded in a political discourse of national 
building based on democracy, proving once again the close link between economics and politics 
envisaged in the developmental state project. 
With regard to the economic side of the strategy, the GTP I focused on the structural transformation of 
the economy, starting from a rapid and broad based economic growth, to be achieved through: 
investments in growth enhancing sectors such as the infrastructure and social ones, sustained support to 
Figure 4 - Value added by economic sector in SSA (% of GDP). 
Personal elaboration, source: data.worldbank.org 
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agriculture, and rapid competitiveness and export performance growth in the industrial sector. Through 
a commercialisation increase, a shift toward high-value crops, support to large-scale commercial 
agriculture, export oriented crop promotion and scaling up best practices, the agricultural sector was 
expected to continue to be the main driving force behind economic growth, and to «serve as a spring 
board for structural transformation in the long run by adequately supplying inputs necessary for 
industrial growth» (MoFED 2010: 23). Ethiopia’s limited industrial base was also expected to improve 
rapidly and to play a leading role in the the economy’s structural transformation process. Within the 
sector, the greatest support was planned for labour intensive, export oriented and import substituting 
industries, with sugar, leather, textile and garment industries leading the export earnings, and agro-
processing, metal and engineering, chemical and pharmaceutical sectors completing the list of priority 
sub-sectors (MoI 2013). Micro- and small-scale manufacturing enterprises were also selected to receive 
public support, because of their potential in terms of employment generation (3 million new jobs were 
expected to be created through MSEs), urban development expansion and connections with the 
agricultural sector. Accordingly, for the 2013-2025 period the Ethiopian Industrial Development 
Strategic Plan is envisaging a rapid increase in the industry’s manufacturing sub-sector’s share: from 
33% in 2013 to 37% in 2015, and up to 67% in 2025 (MoI 2013). 
Following the ADLI strategy, agriculture was still deemed crucially important for economic growth and 
poverty reduction, and still constituted the main source of surplus for the transformation of the 
economy’s structure.91 However, in the GTP I a more balanced pathway of economic development is 
envisaged, with agriculture playing the main, but not exclusive role in leading the transition. To keep in 
line with the PASDEP, the GTP I, called for around 66% of the overall government spending to be 
invested in poverty-oriented sectors such as agriculture and food security, education, health, roads and 
water, amounting to 12.4% of the GDP (MoFED 2010). As pointed out by Lefort (2015: 367), an 
informed analyst who has repeatedly affirmed his political opposition to the Ethiopian ruling coalition, 
«few African governments, if any, have ever done so much for the peasantry». At the end of the GTP I 
period, people living below the national poverty line had in fact fallen to 23.4%, and many other 
achievements have been reached in the social sector, alongside an annual GDP growth rate around 
10.1%, which doubles SSA’s average (FDRE 2016). 
                                                     
91 - «The results realised to date show that it is possible to transform subsistence agriculture to more market led 
production. The key derivers of this change will be improvements in farmers’ productivity and production. Thus, 
to lay the foundation for industrial development, to use agricultural inputs for the industries, to produce sufficient 
food crops and high value products for international market, agriculture will continue to play a leading role in the 
GTP period» (MoFED 2010: 45). 
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As shown in figure 5, Assefa et al. 
(2016) calculate that in spite of a 
remarkable decrease in 
agricultural contribution to GDP 
growth, industry has not generated 
the expected growth, especially in 
the manufacturing sector, whose 
«performance has still fallen short 
of the targets set in the Plan» 
(FDRE 2016: ix). Against 
expectations, in 2014/15 industry 
represented only 15% of the total GDP; the manufacturing sub-sector share remained below 5%, and 
below SSA’s average, while the export share of total merchandise export remained at an average of 
about 10%. At the same time, the annual growth of micro- and small-scale manufacturing enterprises 
was very low compared to large-scale ones, respectively 4.1% and 19.2%. As opposed to manufacture, 
the leading sub-sector in industrial growth has been construction: in the GTP I period its annual growth 
rate reached 28.7%, and its GDP share rose from 4 to 8.5%. 
Access to credit in Ethiopia has been favouring large- and micro-scale companies versus small and 
medium ones, whereas operational factors such as the varying investment climate and poor 
infrastructures have been reported as major constraints towards any private investment. Moreover, 
business entry regulations and processes, and complex bureaucratic entry procedures constituted a 
serious burden for private investment, which was higher for domestic investors than for foreign ones. 
The latter could enjoy the services of the Ethiopian Investment Commission which facilitated access to 
land, loans, utilities, residence permit requests and environmental impact assessment approvals. Instead, 
domestic investors had to deal with local investment offices with a lower capacity and efficiency (WB 
2015). The GoE’s estimates confirm that out of the total gross domestic investment (which accounted 
for 39% of the GDP in 2014/15), a significant portion came from foreign savings (FDRE 2016). 
Moreover, out of the 20,000 domestic private investors who have registered with an investment license, 
for a total of 212 billion birr, only 448 projects have been achieved or started, for a total of 4 ETB billion, 
most of which were operating in the service sector, rather than in the manufacturing industry (FDRE 
2016). 44 public enterprises have been transferred to private investors, mainly in the textile and beverage 
industries and as a consequence of the creation of industrial parks in joint ventures between private and 
public companies, but private investments in manufacture and industry in general during GTP I has 
performed below expectations. 
The unbalance between foreign and domestic entities, and the greater difficulties experienced by the 
private sector in its attempt to thrive may be interpreted as a legacy of the government’s commitment to 
Figure 5 - Sectorial contributions to GDP growth (% of GDP growth rates). 
Source: Assefa et al. (2016) 
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tackle rent-seeking activities and to steer the way of the development path. Further evidence of the 
domination of the state over the economy which characterizes the Ethiopian developmental state model, 
is gathered by Lefort (2015) who, during the GTP I period, observed that: while the private investment 
rate in the country is the 6th lowest in the world, public investment rate is in the top 3; two fifths of all 
economic activities and two thirds of the modern economy are linked to the public sector; state-owned 
enterprises have considerable advantage over private firms as far as credit access and faster customs 
clearance go; of 2.5 USD billion total credit granted to the market, 83% goes to public enterprises, and 
17% to private investors. 
Public entrepreneurship is promoted also in political speeches: «[GTP I] set in motion an economic and 
political dynamic which created the “can-do” spirit within our public»92. The government’s ambition 
can be seen very clearly from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Blue Nile, which is 
expected to cost 6 USD billion and to produce 5250 Mw which will allow Ethiopia to triple its electricity 
production, alleviate its dependence from oil and earn foreign money from hydropower export to Sudan 
and Egypt (Lefort 2015). The full commitment of the federal government has been directed toward the 
construction of the dam, which is expected to be the largest in Africa.93 
The GTP II for the 2015/16 - 2019/20 period is based on the same vision as the GTP I, with the purpose 
to turn Ethiopia into a lower middle-income country by 2025: the target year has been postponed slightly 
due to some under-performing sectors (FDRE 2016). In the GTP II period, the Plan intends to enhance 
and utilize the competitive advantage of the country to sustain economic growth and ensure efficient 
participation in the world economy. The Plan is thus based on improving the productive and competitive 
capacity of the economy, with particular emphasis on developing manufacturing capacity, increasing 
export product competitiveness of and enabling emerging sectors to compete at a national and global 
level. With greater emphasis compared to its preceding edition, the Plan expresses the government’s 
intention to boost its international competitiveness, by increasing efficiency, quality and productivity of 
the agricultural, manufacturing and modern tradable service sectors. Agriculture is again expected to 
remain the main driver and growth source for the «modern productive sectors», but a «new vision has 
been set to render the country a leader in light manufacturing in Africa and one of the leaders in overall 
manufacturing globally» (FDRE 2016: 78). Indeed, based on the barriers faced during the GTP I period, 
a renewed emphasis is placed on developing an export-oriented manufacturing industry, with greater 
participation by the domestic private sector and foreign investors: the manufacturing industry’s share in 
the overall GDP is thus expected to increase from 4.8% in 2014/15 to 8% by the end of the GTP II 
period, and to 18% by 2025 (FDRE 2016). Creating added value and supporting import substitution are 
                                                     
92 - Still Zeroing on Good Governance, “Addis Fortune”, 7 June 2017: https://addisfortune.net/interviews/still-
zeroing-on-good-governance/ 
93 - https://www.salini-impregilo.com/en/projects/in-progress/dams-hydroelectric-plants-hydraulic-works/grand-
ethiopian-renaissance-dam-project.html 
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the leading strategies to transform the domestic private sector, to be achieved through incentive deals 
and improved connections between local and foreign enterprises to facilitate technology and knowledge 
transfer. 
The presentation of the main targets, strategies and outputs pursued so far by the GTP I and II has been 
given in order to complete the economic development course traced by the FDRE, to understand its 
continuity in the developmental state project, to introduce the agricultural development strategies, and 
to frame the analysis of current agrarian transformation. As pointed out, the integration with the global 
economy has been a long process lasting through the decades, and carried on with even greater emphasis 
in these last years. Accordingly, with the GTP II the GoE has pushed its ambitions to penetrate 
international markets with greater intensity than ever before: between 2014/15 and 2019/20, total 
merchandize export revenues are expected to grow from 4.9 to 11.8 percent of the GDP, of which agro-
based export earnings should increase from 2.26 to 7.66 USD billion, and industrial commodity exports 
from 419 USD million to 4.20 USD billion (FDRE 2016). Starting from the GTP II, the GoE aims to 
become a leading nation for light manufacturing in Africa, by 2025.94 
At the same time, a transformation of the of the economy’s structure from agrarian-based to 
industrialized has been pursued in order to increase the output of value-added products, and to reach the 
middle-income country level within the next ten years. Detailed strategies have been planned, and some 
will be described in the next sections. The ones having to do specifically with agriculture are covered in 
the second part. The third and last part of this chapter will explore one of the lead strategies pursued for 
economic development and structural transformation, intended to create industrial, agricultural or agro-
industrial clusters, whose aim is to enhance linkages between different economic sectors, promote 
innovation, create employment opportunities, and benefit from particularly favourable institutional and 
infrastructural assets. To conclude this section, it is worth highlighting that, as the discussion has shown, 
the progressive opening to international trade and gradual integration into the global economy has been 
carried out within the political and ideological framework of the developmental state project, and to 
attain its core objectives. As the GTP II declaims: «While undertaking the above mentioned tasks during 
the plan period, transforming currently dominant rent seeking political economy to ensure the hegemony 
of developmental political economy is a top priority. In this regard, on the one hand, through providing 
quality supports to strengthening developmental attitudes, and on the other hand, by draining the root 
sources of rent seeking, controlling corruption and lack of good governance; the supremacy of 
developmental political economy will be ascertained. To realize this, organised, informed and direct 
participation of the public will be mobilised. In addition, enabling environment will be created to ensure 
                                                     
94 - Declaration of the State Minister, Ministry of Industry of Ethiopia, Mebrahtu Meles, Speaking at UNIDO 
Investment Forum in Addis Ababa, The First International Agro-Industry Investment Forum Ethiopia, 5-7 October 
2016, Addis Ababa, Session 2: Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks and Rural Industrialization. 
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society’s involvement with a sense of ownership, in activities that concern strengthening developmental 
mind-set» (FDRE 2016: 80). 
It follows that the current agrarian question and agrarian transformation process in Ethiopia are 
obviously influenced by international influences, but also closely connected with state- and nation-
building processes. Therefore, this work has addressed the research topics through a perspective that has 
retraced the political and economic courses; and at the same time the study of the clustering policy in 
agriculture provides insights about the way this developmental political economy is carried out. As 
subsequent sections regarding the agricultural sector will show, the developmental state has mediated 
the integration into the global economy through government-led interventions on agriculture, aimed at 
transforming the agrarian and economic structures of the country. The cluster-based strategy, analysed 
in part 3 and chapter 4, represents one of the ongoing leading strategies designed for that purpose, and 
is of major interest regarding Ethiopian peasantry’s future economic and social perspectives. 
 
2. Agrarian Transformation in Contemporary Ethiopia 
 
The economic development path set by the Growth and Transformation Plans in order to reach the 
middle-income country status by 2025, envisioned for Ethiopia’s economy to undergo a structural 
transformation, with the purpose to attain 
national food self-sufficiency, eradicate 
poverty and increase the manufacturing 
sector. As already observed, Ethiopia’s food 
security and economic poverty status on an 
aggregate level has improved considerably 
between 1995 and 2010. Figure 6 reveals an 
impressive drop in total poverty and food 
poverty head counts, figures 7 and 8 confirm 
the positive trends on food security, 
measured respectively in terms of the 
evolution in the prevalence of child 
malnutrition and gross daily calorie intake. 
Figure 6 - Poverty and food poverty head counts (%). Personal 
elaboration, source: MoFED (2002; 2006; 2010), CSA (2012b) 
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As data presented in the previous section has demonstrated, in the last few years there has also been a 
rapid expansion in the international market trade volume and in foreign capital attraction in order to 
sustain the transition. However, the first two decades of the EPRDF’s rule did not succeeded in 
generating the structural change of the economy that had been envisioned by the ruling coalition. As 
showed earlier, overall industrialization at the turn of the decade has performed very poorly compared 
to the rest of the continent: the industrial sector had barely increased its contribution to the economy and 
this trend was particularly negative for the manufacturing subsector. 
However, the positive social and economic performances of the path followed with an outward-oriented 
and agrarian-based developmental state approach were clearly visible in the country and appreciated 
internationally, and motivated the government to continue in the same direction. Indeed, gathering 
insight from the East Asian country models (Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan), whose successful 
experiences were due mostly to their ability to create a structural and rapid transformation of their 
economy based on the yields and benefits of an improved agricultural sector (Francks et al. 1999; ATA 
2016), the ADLI strategy maintained its prominence in the GTP I and II political agenda, and the 
developmental state approach was approved once again as the third way between «the predatory state 
“statist” rent seeking policies, and the neo-liberal paradigm’s mantra of unleashing the market»,95 to 
obtain fair social and economic prosperity. 
 
2.1. Agriculture for Structural Transformation in the GTP I: Inception 
The successful experiences of several Asian countries during the second half of the 20th century were 
obtained mainly through the implementation of public interventions, economic incentives and 
infrastructural investments in agriculture, and particularly for smallholder farmers, who were able to 
                                                     
95 - Meles Zenawi, African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, preliminary draft, 2006: 26. 
Figure 7 - Gross daily calorie intake in Ethiopia. Personal 
elaboration, source: CSA (2012b) 
Figure 8 - Child malnutrition incidence in Ethiopia (%). 
Personal elaboration, source: CSA (2017); Solomon 
(2005) 
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expand the sector’s production and productivity, catalyse capital investments, generate mutually 
reinforcing linkages between agriculture and industry, and bring about growth in the manufacturing and 
service industries (ATA 2016). Based on that model, in the GTP I the agricultural sector was given a 
primary role in the structural transformation process: intending to preserve its position as a major source 
of economic growth, and simultaneously «serve as a spring board for structural transformation in the 
long run by adequately supplying inputs necessary for industrial growth» (MoFED 2010: 23). In order 
for this double role to be fulfilled, the agrarian economy was expected to undergo a radical 
transformation from its low production, subsistence-driven, land- and capital-constrained and overall 
structurally vulnerable conditions.  
In the GTP I, the strategy planned for the agricultural sector towards achieving the goal of becoming an 
industrial and middle-income country by 2025, was focused mainly on increasing the agrarian 
economy’s production and productivity, boosting the national agricultural and agro-industrial product 
market expansion and efficiency, and increasing their access to international markets (MoFED 2010). 
The strategy followed the PASDEP pathway, linked primarily to smallholder farmer and pastoralist 
subsector development, combined with the expansion of private sector investments in agriculture. 
Accordingly, the GTP I envisaged for the sector to continue its production shift from staple to high-
value crops initiated during the previous five-year development program, it promoted specific 
interventions in areas with high growth potential, it aimed to intensify the commercialization of 
smallholder farmer and pastoralist production, it also supported the expansion of large-scale commercial 
agriculture, and advocated a sustainable and more efficient use of water and natural resources (MoFED 
2010). 
 
2.1.1. The Transformation Agenda: Enhancing Production and Productivity 
In greater detail, on the production side of the farming chain, the main approach to the smallholder 
farmers subsector transformation was driven by scaling-up of best interventions, that is to say, the most 
successful development initiatives performed until then, which were adaptable to existing conditions 
thanks to capital-soft, land- and labour- intensive agricultural practices and technologies. This approach 
was to be applied in three strategic directions. First, the best practice scale-up was to be carried out in 
both moisture deficit and adequate areas by: investing in the delivery of extension services and inputs, 
accelerating the growth of improved input application rates, tailoring the interventions to agro-
ecological properties. A modified version of the PADETES: the Participatory Extension System, was 
issued in order to facilitate the diffusion of best practices related to crop selection, farm preparation, 
planting time, planting input quantity and quality, sowing, weeding, harvesting and storing. Farmer 
organization in development groups and social networks was among the new elements introduced: 
farmers were grouped into 25-30 member average units, and in 1 to 5 groups with one model farmer as 
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a leader and five farmers as followers; these networks were implemented both for rural development 
initiatives and for extension service provision (ATA, MoA 2014). Second, the Plan advocated the 
diffusion of irrigation schemes and the improvement of natural resource management. The third 
direction had to do with the gradual shift toward high-value crops, to be carried out bearing in mind 
each location’s agro-ecological differences and market and infrastructure conditions (MoFED 2010). 
A similar approach was designed for the development of the pastoral subsector production, whose 
upgrading was again particularly affected by the provision of extension services. In addition, based on 
the success of large-scale floriculture plantations created in Ethiopia thanks mainly to the contribution 
of Indian investors, in the GTP I the MoFED envisaged increasing and expanding domestic and foreign 
private investor participation in agriculture (MoFED 2010). Indeed, along with small-scale agriculture 
promotion, the GTP I backed with renewed emphasis the creation of large-scale commercial farming in 
the lowlands and peripheral regions in order to create peasant employment opportunities, increase 
national production and productivity, supply raw materials to the growing industry and increase export 
volumes. At the same time, the private sector was expected to take on the development of horticulture 
in the more densely populated highlands, through exportable crop outgrower schemes (vegetables, fruits, 
spices and herbs), to be located near urban centres or where infrastructures allowed efficient connections 
to value-adding chains and international markets. Finally, the GTP I focused on the integration of 
research-farmer linkages and on implementer capacity building – the DAs, the various levels of 
Agriculture and Rural Development Offices, primary cooperatives, model farmers – to expand the 
application of improved technologies and inputs among smallholder farmers, and thus improve 
production and productivity in the whole sector. 
To «enhance the capacity of key stakeholders to achieve agricultural transformation» (ATA 2016: 16), 
the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) was established in December 2010 after two years of 
extensive study of the agricultural sector in Ethiopia, conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MoARD) together with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The ATA was created 
thanks to Meles, who sought to create a new flexible and internationally-oriented institution to sustain 
the Ministry in the development of an efficient strategy for agricultural transformation. The ATA was 
established by Regulation n. 198/2010 under the supervision of an Agricultural Transformation Council 
chaired by the Prime Minister and deputy-chaired by the State Minister of MoARD, and it was assigned 
the following objectives: «1. to identify systemic constraints of agricultural development, through 
conducting studies, and recommend solutions in order to ensure sustainability and structural 
transformation, and support the application of same; 2. to support the establishment of strong linkages 
among agricultural and related institutions and projects in order to ensure the effectiveness of 
agricultural development activities» (FDRE 2011: art. 9). At the beginning of the GTP I period, the 
Council prepared an Agricultural Transformation Agenda intended to provide a coordinated approach 
to remove all obstacles holding back the sector’s development and to support Ethiopia’s transition to a 
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middle-income country status by 2025. In the first phase of inception (2011-15) the ATA was expected 
to contribute to all the GTP I agricultural targets, including doubling staple crop production and 
increasing value addition by 8%. In the subsequent phases (2016-20 and 2021-25) the Agenda aimed at 
integrating agriculture with other market issues and economic sectors; the final phase (2026-30) was 
intended to complete the transition (ATA 2016). 
For the inception period, the Agenda chose 84 deliverables to be flanked by other interventions planned 
by the GTP I, focusing on five objectives overall: to increase crop productivity by applying proper 
agricultural practices, to increase production and productivity by improving agricultural extension 
utilization and input adoption, to strengthen agricultural marketing strategy and increase foreign market 
earnings, to enhance agricultural research and to strengthen natural resource conservation. For the period 
foreseen, interventions focused only on the most important cereals, and were expected to bring a change 
at the smallholder farmers’ level. The deliverables addressed four different aspects of the issue - 
agricultural systems, value chains, crosscutting issues and special projects – aiming at testing pilot 
projects with innovative solutions on longstanding obstacles, such as: the institution of an input voucher 
system to integrate MFIs and the rural savings and credit cooperatives (RUSACCOs) into rural finance 
services for farmers, or the utilization of ICT to expand extension services and agricultural inputs based 
on verified soil analysis (ATA 2016). 
 
2.1.2. Agricultural Marketing: The Alleged Role of Cooperatives 
Even though significant emphasis is placed on accelerating the agriculture transformation process 
intended as the increase in marketed farming output volumes, in the GTP I and the inception phase of 
the Agenda, a minor focus was still being placed on the design of interventions on the marketing side of 
the agricultural chain. By the way, 54 out of the 84 deliverables were targeted to solve problems related 
to the production side of the farming chain, 9 to research, 8 to agricultural marketing and 4 to the natural 
resource conservation issue (ATA 2016). Most of the hope for a solution of the longstanding obstacles 
hindering formal domestic market expansion, and the capacity to penetrate the international one, was 
placed on the recent establishment of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX), the upgrading of the 
cooperative sector, or allocated to future stages of agricultural transformation. 
The chronic obstacles faced in accessing markets were mainly attributable to the lack of appropriate 
infrastructure, institutions and marketing information in most rural villages: the greater the distance to 
the main market in Addis Ababa, the more informal traders and brokers gained a stronghold in 
speculating and setting prices arbitrarily, which was often detrimental for farmers (Minot et al. 2015; 
Poli 2014). The ECX was established in 2008 aimed at creating an efficient and transparent agricultural 
marketing system, to ensure a reliable commodity handling and storing system, to reduce transaction 
costs, to connect all market entities by means of market information diffusion, to promote the 
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participation of all domestic producers in the national markets and to eventually connect them to 
international markets (Hernandez et al. 2015). The ECX became mandatory for the commercialization 
of coffee and other major industrial crops since 2010 (Delelegne et al. 2016). 
The other major tool advocated by the EPRDF to increase agricultural marketing efficiency were the 
agricultural cooperatives, so often mentioned in the Agenda, as well as the issue of a sector’s 
development strategy for 2012-2016, designed jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Federal 
Cooperative Agency (FCA) and the ATA (MoA et al. 2012). The FCA, the main federal government 
cooperative office was established in 2004 under the Prime Minister’s rule, then shifted under the MoA’s 
one, and later under the Ministry of Trade. Out of the 40,000 cooperatives established in Ethiopia by 
2010, 10,000 were «agricultural-producer-owned coops whose primary purpose [was] increasing 
member producers’ production and incomes by helping better link with finance, agricultural inputs, 
information, and output markets» (MoA et al. 2012: 9). In Ethiopia, agricultural cooperative societies 
were organized on four administrative levels: primary cooperatives (serving one or few kebele), unions 
(covering a few woreda or a zone), federations (on a regional level) and the national cooperative league. 
According to official estimates, the number of agricultural primary cooperatives officially registered 
with the Regional Cooperative Promotion Agencies rose by 45% between 2005 and 2011, as proof of 
the increased attention placed by the government in this means for agricultural and economic 
development purposes, as already observed in previous sections. 
By 2010, agricultural cooperatives constituted Ethiopia’s largest group of cooperatives, and together 
with multipurpose cooperatives employed around 70% of the 6.7 mln cooperative members. As 
mentioned earlier on, the role of producer cooperatives and other service cooperatives (such as the 
RUSACCOs) in agricultural development had already been proposed in previous five-year plans, and 
received renewed and reinforced attention during the GTP I period. Once again, the strategy was backed 
by the knowledge of successful experiences in some Asian countries, particularly Taiwan, India and 
Vietnam, whose cooperative sectors served as a perfect tool for the efficient distribution and aggregation 
of farming inputs and outputs, which in turn led to national food self-sufficiency, agricultural 
development and the economy’s structural transformation (MoA et al. 2012; Francks et al. 1999). 
Based on international models, in order for agricultural cooperatives to contribute to the structural 
transformation of the Ethiopian economy, they are expected to fulfill many functions, including: input 
procurement and distribution, extension services, surplus allocation, output marketing and other 
financial and social services. By 2010, Ethiopia’s cooperatives were the main seed and fertilizer 
distributors to farmers (over 90% for both according to government estimates), based on a system that 
is still ongoing: the DAs and the unions assess the input demand required by the cooperatives to satisfy 
member and non-member needs and they foster loans from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia for 
primary cooperatives to purchase the required inputs. However, according to the MoA and other relevant 
planners’ expectations (MoA et al. 2012) cooperatives did not fulfill their role in the provision of 
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extension services, the distribution of dividends among members and the delivery of finance and social 
services adequately. 
Most importantly, cooperatives offered an insufficient contribution to the development of the 
agricultural sector concerning output marketing, particularly with regard to: aggregating and buying 
farmer outputs, providing connections with reliable demand sources, offering storage services, helping 
with value-adding processing, issuing quality certificates and providing cash advances to farmers. As 
seen in the development strategy planned during the GTP I period (MoA et al. 2012), primary 
cooperatives were indeed expected to aggregate output sales and establish linkages with higher-tier 
cooperatives (unions and federations) for more advanced services such as branding and quality controls, 
to create value addition through agro-processing activities or linkages with relevant domestic actors, and 
eventually to connect farmers with international markets. In order to foster the the sector’s upgrading in 
the target period, the strategy did not deliver any considerable solutions but just feeble suggestions 
regarding: the enhancement of the cooperative certification process, providing capacity building 
services, improving marketing structures and infrastructures, strengthening public sector support, 
issuing a comprehensive cooperative development policy and guideline, improving the rural financing 
system by strengthening the role of MFIs, RUSACCOs and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia as semi-
dedicated agricultural cooperative lenders (MoA et al. 2012). 
 
2.1.3. Catalysing International Assistance for Agricultural Transformation: PIF and AGP 
The cooperatives central role was stressed also in the Ethiopia’s Agricultural Plan of Investment 
Framework (PIF), a document issued in 2010 and intended to enact the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Compact signed by the GoE and its development 
partners (MoARD 2010). In the second of the four strategic objectives set by the PIF, strengthening 
cooperatives was presented as one of the means envisaged to enhance rural commercialisation and agro-
industrial development. Since the PIF represented a platform to coordinate and line up the GoE and 
development partner investments under the CAADP, it constituted the framework for the planning and 
implementation of numerous foreign assistance projects for agricultural transformation, rural 
development and food security, and it reaffirmed the GoE’s commitment and leadership in the process 
(Mafa et al. 2015). In order to complete the presentation of the GoE’s approach to agricultural and 
structural transformation, it is worth analysing here some of its major mainstays. 
Though Ethiopia endorsed the principles provided by the Maputo Declaration in 2003, the country’s 
actual commitment commenced in 2008,96 with the initial works for the preparation of the PIF, whose 
                                                     
96 - According to Kassahun (2016) this delay was mainly due to long bureaucratic procedures characterizing the 
process of cascading the CAADP to existing policies in the member countries. 
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final version was issued in March 2011. Out of a total budget of USD 15.5 billion set for the PIF’s 
implementation period (2010-20), USD 9.3 billion were provided by the GoE, and the remaining 40% 
by development partners (Callihan, Tadesse 2012). Since at that time Ethiopia was already respecting 
the CAADP’s targets of achieving a 6% annual growth rate in the sector and dedicating over 10% of 
total budget spending to agriculture and food security (FAO 2014), the PIF did not entail any real 
changes in government incentives and strategies surrounding agricultural development and food 
security, except for an inner reorientation of funding allocation from food security to rural and 
agricultural development (MoARD 2010).97 More relevantly, as observed by Kassahun (2016), the GoE 
viewed the adoption of the framework as a guarantee for constant development assistance fund inflows 
to the country and as a means for its development partners to legitimize the positive impacts of the 
strategy adopted. In addition, since the management committee was established in April 2008 – the 
Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group – was chaired by the Minister 
of Agriculture and Rural Development co-chaired by rotating representatives of major donors (Callihan, 
Tadesse 2012), the PIF accorded the GoE a leading position in coordinating donor activities with 
considerable relevancy in agricultural and agrarian terms, further enlarging an already widespread 
command system. 
Accordingly, the PIF adopted the main goal of transforming Ethiopia into a middle-income country by 
2020 set by GTP I, and combined it with the development objective of «sustainably increase rural 
incomes and national food security» (MoARD 2010: 16). The PIF explicitly preannounced the vision of 
the GTP I and II concerning agricultural transformation, regarding mainly the graduation of smallholder 
farmers – that generate 95% of the agricultural GDP and constitute 85% of total employment - from 
their subsistence condition to semi-commercial status. The first strategic objective addressed by the PIF 
(SO1) was aimed to achieve a sustainable increase in agricultural production and productivity by 
focusing on high potential areas, closing the gap between model and common farmers, scaling-up best 
practices, strengthening agricultural research and extension services, promoting supply channels for 
farming inputs and improving water and land use. The second (SO2) was intended to accelerate 
agricultural commercialisation and agro-industrial development by increasing output volumes entering 
the markets or supplying raw materials to the agro-industrial sector, strengthening smallholder farmers 
connection with agro-processing companies, expanding food demands for urban centres, encouraging 
private sector investments in commercial farming, promoting value chains with high potential for 
growth and value addition. By using the tools indicated by the GTP I, the SO2’s strategy was expected 
to be fulfilled through the prominent role of cooperatives, through a transparent private and public 
                                                     
97 - Between 2007/08 and 2009/10, 66% of MoARD’s expenditures were assigned to food security and disaster 
risk management. Conversely, between 2010 and 2010, the PIF planned a gradual increase in funds allocated to 
rural and agricultural development from 6.2% (2008/09) to 7.5% (in 2020) of GDP, with more than half of the 
funds directed to enhancing production and productivity, and less than a quarter for food security (MoARD 2010). 
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investment system, by fostering the expansion and functions of financial services and ECX, regulating 
contract farming, issuing competitive trade policies and public-private partnerships. As for fund 
distribution, only 7% of total spending was allocated to SO2, while 51% went to SO1, and the rest was 
divided equally between the two remaining strategic objectives: to reduce degradation and improve 
productivity of natural resources (SO3); to achieve universal food security and protect vulnerable 
households from natural disasters (SO4). 
Both the strategies and the fund distribution revealed once again the financial and strategic commitment 
to focus on smallholder farmer subsector upgrading in order to transform agriculture as a whole, and a 
limited focus on the marketing side of the farming chain which was carried on from the previous five-
year development plans. However, it is worth remembering here that the PIF was not designed as a 
project or program and, contrarily to the Agricultural Transformation Agenda, it had not explicitly 
named deliverables (Mafa et al. 2015). However, the government has organized the PIF in order to link 
flagship programs to each of the strategic objectives: the SO1 and SO2 were managed by the 
Agricultural Growth Project (AGP), the SO3 by the Sustainable Land Management Project, and the SO4 
by the various components of the Food Security Program (Callihan, Tadesse 2012). In the alleged 
inception period, the AGP complemented the GTP I strategies for agricultural transformation, filling the 
strategic and financial gap left by a food security-biased development strategy implemented by the GoE 
and its development partners. 
The AGP was based on over USD 250 million in proposed grants and credits by the WB funded 
International Development Association, a multi-donor trust fund, USAID and other donors, over a five-
year period (2011-15); 98 in line with the above-mentioned development strategies, the AGP aimed at 
accelerating broad-based sustained agricultural growth to reduce poverty and food insecurity, boosting 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and contributing to the CAADP goals (WB 
2010). The project focused on 20 woreda clusters, selected in the four main regions for being food- and 
moisture-secure areas, and for having considerable agricultural growth potential. An ambitious target of 
83 woreda and 9.8 million small- and medium-scale farmers (ranging between 0.25 and 2.3 ha) were 
selected as beneficiaries; and an initial list of key commodities has been selected using a value chain 
approach, based on their growth potential and spill-over effects. 
The project was made up by two technical components and a project management and monitoring and 
evaluation component (WB 2010). Regarding the agricultural transformation strategy envisaged by the 
AGP, component n.1 which focused on agricultural production and commercialization is worth 
mentioning here.99 This first technical component was allocated the second largest funding portion of 
                                                     
98 - GoE and beneficiaries’ contributions to financing the project were less than 30 USD million, out of a total 
planned cost of 280 USD million (WB 2010). 
99 - The component 2 of the AGP invested 142 $US million to small-scale rural infrastructure development and 
management. 
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the project (USD 118 million), and was divided into three sub-components: institutional development 
and strengthening (USD 38 million), scaling-up best practices (USD 30 million) and market and 
agribusiness development (USD 51 million). Within the first sub-component, the project aimed at 
strengthening key public advisory services such as agricultural services (mainly farming training 
centers, DAs and access to improved information technology), soil fertility management services and 
animal health services; and to strengthen or establish formal organizations and informal farmer groups 
sharing common interests, to register as cooperatives, to foster collective action and to promote group-
to-group and farmer-to-farmer learning. With the second sub-component the project’s purpose is to 
identify best practices in each kebele involved using a decentralized, market-oriented and value chain 
approach (from input supply to post-harvest processing and including land management and natural 
resource conservation); and to spread it through the extension support of DAs, woreda experts, 
cooperatives, farmer groups, agribusiness players and other service providers. The third sub-component 
aims specifically at diffusing market orientation and promoting agribusiness through the private sector’s 
enhanced participation, to stimulate agricultural production and competitiveness, and provide 
opportunities for rural income diversification. This particular strategy targeted key selected value chains 
in the four regions; it stimulated links between agro-enterprises and cooperatives, and regional, domestic 
and international markets through innovation and demonstration funds dedicated to all private 
stakeholders along the value chain (farmer groups, primary cooperatives, unions, traders, agro-
processors, wholesalers, retailers and exporters) to identify new markets, acquire innovation technology 
and provide support services; it promoted links to MFIs, RUSACCOs and private bank lending; and 
lastly boosted livestock breeding improvement and better seed multiplication, regulation and quality 
control. 
Starting from a common orientation toward the small-scale production subsector, the AGP introduced a 
set of new elements in the agricultural transformation strategy. First, as opposed to the other above 
summarized strategies of the same period, this strategy was more closely linked to the value chain 
approach, and developed through all the stakeholders. Secondly, those strategies’ alleged market-
orientation was replaced by a more structured approach to inter-sectoral linkages between agriculture 
and industry, agribusiness and value addition. On the other side, the project confirmed some of the 
agricultural transformation guidelines highlighted earlier as typical of the analysed period. Particularly: 
the introduction of a spatially-centred development strategy focusing on areas and commodities with 
high growth potentials; the promotion of farmer aggregations and collective actions to achieve 
technological progress and explore new marketing strategies; the existence of a differentiated peasantry 
and the possibility, for the majority, to benefit from scaling-up best practices implemented by 
progressive farmers. 
 
2.2. Current Trends and Trajectories 
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Following a greater domestic economy penetration in international production and trade relations, and 
the implementation of the developmental state project, the inception period, the Transformation Agenda, 
the GTP I’s strategies, the PIF’s framework and the AGP have introduced new elements in the 
agricultural transformation strategy. Some of the new patterns created have been presented above, and 
others will be discussed in this section. However, it is necessary to point out that, as proved by the 
presentation, the ADLI plan and its strategic support of the smallholder farmer subsector as a main 
source of growth, poverty-reduction and food security, have characterized the whole trajectory, and still 
represent a main cornerstone of the development policy. As already observed, on one side, this has 
certainly been influenced by the neo-populist approach to rural and agricultural development that 
optimistically sees in peasant economy and small-scale producers the potential to attain food security, 
poverty reduction and equal development; and that has been the mainstream model for agrarian 
transition in the Western-minded strategies of the last decades. On the other, this approach is also 
embedded in the political-ideological alliance with the peasantry which confirms the legitimacy of the 
EPRDF’s rule (Kassahun 2016), and for this purpose it has been framed and carried on. 
Providing over 90% of the agricultural GDP, which in turn constitutes the overall economy’s leading 
sector, it is certain that a relevant share of the positive trends observed in the social and economic indexes 
throughout the 2000s is attributable to smallholder farmers; and consequently, this performance may be 
seen as proof of the success of small-scale-oriented strategies for agricultural development and food 
security. As described further in the following section, the subsector did actually experience 
considerable growth since the inception of the ADLI, but evidence suggests that this growth has not 
been associated to a structural agrarian transformation. 
 
2.2.1. Major Changes in Agriculture in Two Decades 
Looking at the evolution in major crop production and its land distribution over the last two decades - 
reported in tables 3 and 4 in appendix A, based on CSA annual Agricultural Sample Surveys’ data100 - 
the positive trends can easily be seen. Growth has occurred in both grain and non-grain crops. Between 
1994 and 2016, grain crops production growth has been pervasive: on a national level, overall cereal 
production reached an 8% annual growth rate, 7% for pulses 12% for oilseeds. Other major crops such 
as vegetables, root crops, fruits, coffee and hops experienced lower growth rates. Table 3 in appendix A 
shows detailed data on aggregated production and production growth reached in 2016 from the baseline 
year (1994). The table shows that few non-traditional cash crops such as sugar cane, sesame, rapeseed, 
and haricot beans (in that order) have achieved the highest growth rates, which may be attributed mainly 
to large-scale development projects carried out by private and public initiatives in specific high potential 
                                                     
100 - Data are from all the available annual CSA’s Agricultural Sample Surveys on area and production of major 
crops, and on land utilization, between 1995/96 and 2016/17: CSA 1995/96 – 2016/17a; CSA 1995/96 – 2016/17b. 
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geographical areas. It is worth pointing out that, these successes have led to interventions aimed at 
developing specific agricultural value chains in areas with high growth potential within the AGP, and 
other cluster-led initiatives that will be presented in the following section. 
As for the grain crop increase, in spite of a diffused growth, no considerable changes have been found 
among different types of crops, in terms of land distribution and production. Regarding major cereals – 
the most diffused crops in the country - figure 9 shows increasing trends in cultivated area and output 
between 1994 and 2016; with the sole exception for barley, where land occupation and production have 
shown no remarkable increase. 
As for the breakdown between the different cereals, teff 
continues to be the first cultivated cereal in terms of land 
occupation, and maize production has achieved higher 
performances in terms of output. According to personal 
calculations, the correlation between land expansion and 
production growth for the analysed period was high (0.91), thus 
proving that land expansion contributed significantly to 
production growth. This interpretation confirms the findings of 
Byerlee et al. (2007) and Alemayehu et al. (2013), who 
calculated that the top source for farmer revenue change and cereal production growth between 1998 
and 2008 was acreage expansion, rather than crop intensification or price variations. However, as shown 
in table 1, cereal yields have more than doubled in the two decades, contributing further to the output 
increase, and showing the positive impact of those staple crop-oriented policies for agricultural 
development and food security, that have been implemented through the decades. 
 1994 2016 % 
CEREALS 10.7 24.8 131.9 
teff 7.0 16.6 136.2 
barley 9.6 21.1 118.9 
wheat 13.3 26.8 101.0 
maize 15.1 36.7 142.6 
sorghum 12.7 25.3 99.4 
Table 1 - Major cereal yields (qt/ha) and 
growth rate (%) from 1994 to 2016. 
Personal elaboration, source: CSA 
Figure 9 - Total private holding cereal production surface (left, in '000 ha) and volumes (right, in '000 qt) during 1994-2016 
meher seasons. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 
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As indicated in figures 10 and 11, and observable from tables 3 and 4 in appendix A, similar trends have 
marked the evolution in pulses and oilseeds: their growth in terms of output and area occupation has 
varied just marginally, the crop type distribution in the last two decades; at the same time, pulses yields 
have doubled in the analyzed period, and increased threefold for oilseeds in general. With regard to 
pulses, faba beans still represent the most produced and cultivated type, lentils are the lowest, and haricot 
beans have only shown a slightly greater increase compared to other legume growth rates. As for 
oilseeds, sesame showed an interesting trend, going from very low levels in 1994, to become the leading 
oilseed crop in terms of land occupation, and the second in terms of output by 2016. More diversified 
trends have characterized the major non-grain crops – vegetables, root crops, fruit crops, khat, coffee, 
hops and sugar cane - whose land occupation grew by a 7% average between 2003 and 2016, but yields 
have increased considerably only in the case of sugar cane (86% average annual growth). 
Figure 10 - Total private holding pulses production surface (left, in '000 ha) and volumes (right, in '000 qt) during 1994-2016 
meher seasons. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 
Figure 11 - Total private holding oilseed production surface (left, in '000 ha) and volumes (right, in '000 qt) during 1994-
2016, meher seasons. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 
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As presented in chapter 2, one of the agricultural commercialisation strategies implemented during the 
2000s was associated to the shift from staple to high-value commodities. Coherently, recent studies have 
provided evidence of an ongoing economic transition process which is currently affecting Ethiopian 
peasantry, associated mainly to the shift from staple to cash crops, thus leading to the growth of peasant 
integration in national markets, peasant entrepreneurship and social differentiation.101 However, official 
data gathered on a national level shown in figure 12 indicate that between 1995 and 2015 the variation 
in land distribution per crop has been just marginal (CSA 1995/96 – 2016/17b). Cereals have remained 
the most diffused crop in the country, in spite of a slight 8% reduction in the last two decades: 6% was 
replaced by non-grain crops (after 2003), and 2% by pulses and oilseeds (as seen between 1995 and 
2003).102 Similarly, no remarkable change has taken place regarding the distribution of 
temporary/contemporary crops: out of the total crop land, the prevalence of the former as seen in 1995 
(93.4%) was still significant in 2015 (89.6%). 
Therefore, in spite of increasing crop production, crop distribution on the land has not varied much in 
the last two decades; but, total cultivated land in Ethiopia has expanded significantly, from 8.69 mln ha 
in 1995 to 14.52 mln ha in 2015. This remarkable increase in total cultivated land has been 
counterbalanced and nullified by population growth: between 1995 and 2015, land size per farming 
household has decreased from 1.02 to 0.88 hectares. This declining trend has been observed by Headey 
et al. (2014), who demonstrated that, although land scarcity in the Ethiopian highlands is associated to 
greater improved input purchases, family farm labour, cereal yields and gross farm incomes (thanks 
mainly to the adoption of high-value crops), land constraints ultimately have serious negative 
consequences on net farm incomes. Less ambiguously, Kidane (2014) and Kibrom et al. (2016) observed 
                                                     
101 - For further inquiries see S. Ege, The New Economy: Agricultural Transformation in North Shäwa, Ethiopia, 
Paper presented at the 19th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Warsaw, 24‐28 August 2014. 
102 - The relevance of this transformation is influenced by the fact that the computation of non-grain crops in the 
Agricultural Sample Surveys took place only after 2003; since when the shift toward non-grain crops affected less 
than 4% of all crop land. Missing years in figure 12 correspond to the lack of relevant CSA surveys. 
Figure 12 - Cultivated land distribution per crop type. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 
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a positive relationship between farm size and input purchase and adoption, thus emphasizing further the 
risks associated with the ongoing average farm plot decrease. 
As a consequence of this trend and of hampered economic differentiation and agricultural 
commercialization, smallholders still constitute the majority of agricultural producers, in spite of the 
slight decrease observed in the first half of the 2000s. Figure 13 illustrates these trends by reporting the 
evolution in holder distribution by land size, as estimated by CSA.  
Figure 14 gives a rather different picture: between 1995/96 and 2015/16, holders below 1 ha owned 
between 22 and 33 percent of the total crop land, those between 1.01 and 2 ha shared between 32 and 
35 percent of the total crop land, and at present the largest share of cultivated land is being exploited by 
holders between 2 and 5 ha. Changing tendencies show a slight growth in total land being cultivated by 
over 5 ha holders, a significant decline in under 1 ha holdings in the mid-2000s followed by a gradual 
recovery in later years, an opposite trend for holdings between 2.01 and 5 hectares, and a stable share 
for holdings between 1.01 and 2 hectares. Since under 2 ha holdings share has not changed considerably 
from 85% of the total crop land, it is possible to assert that, in spite of an increased production and 
overall productivity, the small-scale producer subsector has undergone a slight change in its position 
vis-à-vis the agricultural sector and the rest of the economy. 
Figure 13 – Holder distribution per land holding size (% of overall holders). Personal 
elaboration, source: CSA 
Figure 14 - Land use distribution by holding size (% of total crop land). Personal elaboration, 
source: CSA 
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A significant contribution towards the production and productivity growth observed in the last two 
decades, may be attributed to the change in farm management practices which in turn has been fostered 
by the creation of a large extension system. As presented earlier regarding the rural and agricultural 
development policies adopted, the change has been pursued mainly through attempts to expand irrigated 
land and spread the adoption of improved agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides. Data 
from Agricultural Sample Surveys between 1995 and 2016 demonstrate a considerable increase in the 
adoption of agricultural inputs: in terms of hectares served, out of the total cultivated land the use of 
improved seeds grew from 0.7% in 1995 to 9.6%, the use of pesticides increased from 9.4% to 24.1% 
and the use of fertilizers shifted from 32.7% to 46.8%.103 Therefore, considerable improvements have 
been achieved in this period regarding input use, with consequent positive impacts on cereal production 
and yield, as asserted by Minten et al. (2016), Rashid et al. (2015), Minot et al. (2016). 
However, current input use rates show that even for the highest performing input (fertilizers), the 
adoption share is below half of the entire farming community; therefore, in spite of a positive trajectory, 
overall data suggest that a lot is yet to be done in the sector. In addition, it is worth pointing out that 
these statistics and indexes may not provide a correct picture. For instance, as suggested by Spielman et 
al. (2011) and Minot et al. (2015), statistics block out the high rates of seed recycling (for self-pollinated 
crops like wheat) and hybridization (for cross-pollinated ones like maize) usually undertaken by farmers, 
and include in the land affected by improved types even the areas planted with seeds that are not first 
generation, which may have lost their yields.104 
As observed earlier, input purchase and use have been promoted and complemented by the creation of 
a widespread extension system providing various services - such as training and visits, technical advice 
and credit - carried out mainly through the deployment of extension agents in the rural kebele, the 
establishment of rural financial institutions and primary cooperatives. According to recent estimates, the 
GoE has developed the lowest extension-agent-to-farmer ratio in the world (1:476), and established 
12,500 farming training centers and 59,000 basic cooperatives which include agricultural and rural 
development activities (ATA 2016; FDRE 2016). However, considerable amount of literature points out 
that many obstacles of a political and economic kind still challenge the development of efficient 
extension services, and improved input provision, distribution and application patterns (Dawit 2011; 
Berhanu et al. 2006; Kassahun, Poulton 2014; Tilaye, Daniel 2016; Spielman et al. 2010). 
                                                     
103 - According to the definitions adopted by the CSA, natural fertilizer consists of farm yard manure and wood 
ashes, the chemical type consists of DAP (di-ammonium phosphate), UREA (ammonium nitrate) and NPS 
(nitrogen, phosphorus and sulphur). During the period under examination, chemical fertilizers use growth has been 
accompanied by an almost total elimination of natural fertilizers use: the share of total cultivated land served by 
the former shifted from 25.8% to 46.8%, while use of the natural type declined from 6.9% to 0.1%. 
104 - With regard to wheat seeds, for instance, Minot et al. (2015) observed that on average wheat farmers purchase 
improved seeds every 17 years, which is very high by international standards (every 3 years in USA and 5 in 
India). 
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In summary, along with the aforementioned improvements in farming production, productivity and farm 
management, significant development has also affected rural roads and communication infrastructures 
which have strengthened rural-urban linkages, and the marketing information system that has led to an 
improved spatial price integration (Minten et al. 2014). However, as recent official data reports, the 
smallholder farmer subsector is still anchored to a subsistence-led production system since, on a national 
average, 67% of cereal production is still destined for self-consumption, and only 15.7% is for selling.105 
It is true that the figure is different for pulses (26%), oilseeds (53%), vegetables (23%), root crops (20%) 
and permanent crops (43%), but considering the production volumes, the weighted average is 20.1%, a 
very low rate which suggests that the ultimate objective of transforming Ethiopian peasants into 
commercial or semi-commercial actors, is still being hampered. 
 
2.2.2. Large-Scale Investments in Agriculture 
Considering the wide and diversified range of developing countries, in the period at issue Ethiopia was 
(and still is) among those to have obtained the most positive economic record track. However, as 
observed so far, in spite of the government’s huge support, the Ethiopian agrarian environment has 
struggled to bring about a radical change in its core structure, characterized by a subsistence-led 
smallholder-farming community adopting rudimental farm management practices and coping with a 
wide range of obstacles (mentioned above, to be added to other fundamental aspects such as: 
environment, climate change, gender, food insecurity, illiteracy, health vulnerability, and so on and so 
forth). The mixed performance by the Ethiopian agrarian transition pathway and the delays in the 
structural transformation process already seen in the early 2000s, combined with the rapid emergence 
of global-competitive and outward oriented economies and the expansion of international processes and 
agri-food value chains (to name just a few), fostered the promotion of a strategic economic opening to 
foreign and large-scale investments in agriculture. 
As already observed, since the early 2000s the GoE promoted the creation of large-scale commercial 
farms in «areas having large unutilized agriculturally suitable land» (MoFED 2003: 58), aimed at 
encouraging foreign and emerging domestic private sectors to invest in agriculture and thus contribute 
to the economic vision of the developmental state project. Starting in 2002, for the whole decade the 
GoE issued a very generous investment legislation for foreign investors which offered (among other 
things): very low capital requirements for businesses wishing to invest, the possibility to fully repatriate 
profits and dividends, guarantees against expropriation, income tax exemption for investment projects 
exporting over 50% of their outputs, free custom duty for import of all capital goods, spare parts and 
construction materials (FDRE 2002; FDRE 2003; FDRE 2008). The income tax exemption tool was 
                                                     
105 - 13.8% is for seeds, 1.1% generates wages in kind, 0.5% for animal feed and 2.9% for other purposes. 
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used pervasively to attract investors, and specific exemptions were approved for investments in 
«relatively under developed Regions such as Gambella, Benshangul and Gumuz, South Omo, in Afar 
Zones to be determined by the Board» (FDRE 2003: art. 4/7), and extended further in subsequent years, 
to include also other lowland and pastoralist areas (FDRE 2012a: art. 5/2). 
These incentives were not exclusively centred on agriculture, but rather extended to many economic 
areas, with the exception of exclusive industry sectors reserved for Ethiopian nationals (FDRE 2012a); 
but in the initial phase, most of the political and investor attention was focused on the agricultural sector. 
These incentives were indeed in line with the rural and agricultural development strategy planned by the 
government during the 2000s and formalized with the SDPRP and PASDEP, aimed mainly at 
encouraging a «proper use of land» in scattered areas (MoFED 2002: 53), expanding high-value crops 
for export, and connecting smallholder farmers to private investors with out-grower schemes for mutual 
benefits (MoFED 2003, 2006). These fiscal incentives combined with the land certification process 
started in early 2000s, and with the land tenure reforms implemented in the following years, making it 
easier for the various government administrative tiers to attract investors: Proclamation n. 456/2005 
affirmed that «government being the owner of rural land, communal rural land holdings can be changed 
to private holdings as may be necessary» (FDRE 2005b: art. 5/3), and Proclamation n. 455/2005 
established the legal system for land expropriation to be achieved for «a better development project to 
be carried out by public entities, private investors, cooperative societies or other organs» (FDRE 2005a: 
art. 3/1). 
In 2005 Proclamations n. 455 and n. 456 also enforced the self-determination and decentralization 
principles as expressed in the Constitution, and already affirmed by Proclamation n. 89/1997, according 
to which land administration was vested to regional states. However, in 2008, the Agricultural 
Investment Support Directorate (within the MoARD) was designated by the GoE as the lead agency to 
deal with land investments over 5000 ha. At that time, all consolidated investment lands and potential 
areas for future investments above 5000 ha, were transferred from the regional authority to a Federal 
Land Bank, that potential investors were to access, through the MoARD. Although revenue from 
transactions (mainly land rent and income taxes) and smaller-sized investments was planned to be kept 
by the region involved, all the aspects of large-scale land deals were to be decided and carried out at a 
federal level.106 In this way, the authority for land administration was recentralized, making room for 
the state to strengthen control over rural land. 
The foreign large-scale investment phenomenon kicked up in Ethiopia and in many other African 
countries from the second half of the 2000s, and became particularly intense due to the convergence of 
                                                     
106 - See Imeru Tamrat, Governance of Large Scale Agricultural Investments in Africa: The Case of Ethiopia, 
Paper presented at the World Bank Conference on Land Policy and Administration, 26-27 April 2010, Washington, 
D.C. 
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different global factors such as the 2007/08 food price crises, the rapid deterioration of climate-change-
related transformations, and emerging economies’ increased demand for fuels and biofuels. The issue 
raised analyst, development agency, international financial institution and national government 
attention, concerning the implications of large-scale investments on land, in terms of social, economic, 
political and environmental impact. To make it very simple, the debate developed around two main 
positions: on one side the mainstream thought sustained by many development agencies saw the process 
as a positive tool to create win-win cooperation scenarios, with multidimensional development benefits 
for the hosting economies (WB 2007; Collier, Dercon 2014). On the other, many analysts connected the 
analysis to longstanding agrarian political economy matters and argued that the land (and natural 
resource) grabbing process carried out by strong private or state-led companies in vulnerable economies 
and society favoured international capital economic interests to the detriment of hosting country food 
security and development; and in so doing it generated local expropriation and marginalisation 
mechanisms, indigenous community displacement, and smallholder farmer differentiation, de-
peasantization and proletarianization. In those circumstances with structural conditions comparable to 
those of Ethiopia, the relationship between local peasant/pastoralist communities and large-scale 
investors, became rapidly the core question of the debate. 
The GoE addressed the opportunity of land deals from an optimistic approach and included the 
promotion of foreign and domestic large-scale investments among its economic growth and 
development strategies. Concerning agriculture in particular, as observed by Dessalegn (2011), the 
MoARD assessed land deals for their expected contribution to the sector’s growth, from a wide range 
of perspectives: high-value and export crops production increase, foreign revenue benefits and agro-
industry fostering, creating employment opportunities, promoting infrastructure and social asset 
enhancement, favouring technology transfers and innovation spill over, ensuring energy security. Within 
this strategic framework, the EPRDF addressed the core question in two ways. On one side it was framed 
within the historically embedded social and political coalition with the peasantry, and sheltered 
smallholder farmers living in the highlands of the central regions from being expropriated of their assets. 
In this situation, to avoid displacements large-scale investments could only come in the form of 
contractual agreements with local producers. On the other hand, in lowland areas of peripheral regions, 
land leases were conceded more easily because of the lower political and economic participation to the 
developmental project, accorded to their inhabitants. These regions have historically suffered from being 
excluded from the decision-making taken at the centre (Markakis 2011; Abbink 2011), and this ethnic 
and spatial division has been replicated in the GoE’s call for investors in communal and grazing land in 
pastoral areas because of their underperformance, and for this reason, it has advocated for its 
developmental core, the authority to replace them with other production forces. 
Any attempt to assess the relevance of the phenomenon with empirical data is challenged by a 
multidimensional range of obstacles. The question of data transparency is a crucial issue in the analysis 
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of African land deals since, as Oya and Cotula have pointed out (Oya 2013a; Cotula, Oya 2014), many 
of the dichotomies that often influence the debate are gathered from the analysis of limited case studies, 
or taken from databases lacking accuracy or reliability. Available data on the evolution and relevancy 
of land deals in Ethiopia are indeed ambiguous and present a rather different picture depending on their 
source. To name but a few of the most credited estimates, in 2011, an alarming report from the Oakland 
Institute reported that by the time of survey, over 3.6 mln ha had been transferred to land investors - 
mainly from Oromia, Benishanghul-Gumuz, SNNPR and Gambella, and were being used to produce 
cotton, oil crops, pulses, maize and horticultural crops (in that order) - and many more were declared 
available for large-scale investors (Horne 2011). Instead, Dessalegn (2011) observed that according to 
WB data, between 2004 and 2008 1.2 mln ha were transferred to land investors, and that an additional 
0.5 mln ha were transferred in 2009 and 2010. In addition, the analyst claimed that almost 3.6 mln ha 
were transferred by regional governments to the Federal Land Bank as potentially available for investors 
by 2011, and by 2012 he estimated that the total land handed over to investors ranged between 3 and 3.5 
mln ha (Dessalegn 2014). Sharing a common view with other leading analysts and case study researches, 
these studies raised huge concerns about the impact of these investments in terms of massive 
displacements without a balanced compensation, negative implications on poverty and food security, 
and dangerous effects on the environment and on socio-cultural relations. Furthermore, in 2014 the 
International Institute for Environment and Development published a report that revealed that between 
2005 and 2012 over 1 mln ha of land had been transferred for large-scale investments - of which 380,000 
ha from the Federal Land Bank, 335,000 ha by regional governments and 335,000 ha for state-run sugar 
plantations – and as for the previous ones, it found that this had major negative consequences on 
pastoralist livelihoods, raised conflicts over land and brought a very small contribution in terms of 
employment generation (Keeley et al. 2014). Differently, yet again, a recent study conducted by the WB 
Group assessed that the “land rush” denounced by some widely quoted reports was much less than 
claimed. The study was based on nationally representative large farm surveys conducted in Ethiopia 
between 2010/11 and 2013/14, and observed that between 1991 and 2013 a total 1.77 mln ha of land 
had been assigned to commercial farms (including also farms with less than 20 ha), with the transfer 
rate having reached a peak in 2008, and declining to pre-2007 levels since then; which is in stark 
contradiction with what was declared by Dessalegn and others (Ali et al. 2015). Official estimates by 
the Ethiopian government asserted that out of the total 2.4 mln ha transferred to investors by 2014/15, 
840,000 ha were transferred during the GTP I period, with foreign investors focusing on floriculture, 
and domestic ones on cotton and horticulture (FDRE 2016). 
This data uncertainty makes it very hard to assess the real impact and relevancy of the issue in the 
Ethiopian context and gives credit to Oya and others’ call for further researches and investigation. 
Nevertheless, observers and analysts share a common view on the fact that so far, the strategy has not 
generated the expected results in terms of employment creation, food security attainment, and 
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agricultural transformation. Successful cases have remained isolated and on a national level the strategy 
has not engendered significant technology transfers, innovation spill overs or economic externalities to 
local communities; rather, many have observed negative impacts and have raised severe condemnations 
regarding the suppression of human rights and environmental damages caused. In addition, as observed 
also in previous sections, nationally agriculture has not undergone a structural transformation: large-
scale investments have rarely succeeded at integrating smallholder farmers into contract farming, 
outgrowing schemes or permanent employment. Instead, the peasant communities involved have often 
been expropriated of their assets and means of production, or forced to agree to unfavourable and/or 
unreliable forms of agreement. 
Unlike many other African countries, the institutional setting presented above created a special condition 
in Ethiopia whereby all the land dealing process has been run by the state: from attracting investors, to 
the selection, clearing and allocation of land (Dessalegn 2014). Through the regional governments and 
the MoARD, or as the result of public corporation investments, the developmental state has indeed 
mediated the pressures of foreign and domestic private investors in the interest of its political and 
economic objectives (Lavers 2012). Hence, by applying the unbalanced centre-periphery power 
division, the highland-central state has made the pastoralist economy based lowland resources accessible 
and extractable, to pursue an agrarian transformation strategy based on the accumulation by 
dispossession process (Dessalegn 2014; Fana 2016). Instead, in the densely populated highlands, 
smallholder farmer commercialization has sought to avoid dispossession, to avoid undermining the 
politically-strategic alliance with the peasantry (Kassahun 2016); but observers have reported that quite 
often farmers had no choice but to participate to the outgrowing schemes, or were even displaced to 
allow the establishment of flower-farms in Oromia (Lavers 2012). 
Some have argued that through its large-scale investor promotion, the GoE has radically shifted its 
structural transformation and economic growth strategies from being in favour of smallholder farmers, 
to one serving a growing class of large landholders and middle-income entrepreneurs.107 This position 
is confirmed by the evidence that, according to most of the surveys, this agrarian transformation process 
is mainly driven by Ethiopian actors, since the vast majority of the investors are Ethiopian or are directly 
linked to the government (Ali et al. 2015; Keeley et al. 2014; Tsegaye, Spoor 2015). Hence, according 
to some, new entrepreneurs rather than smallholder farmers now have priority for new land allocations 
(Lavers 2012). Regardless of the accuracy of these observations, the issue is that if this is an ongoing 
trend, it cannot be seen as smallholder farmer subsector exclusion from the centre of the agricultural and 
agrarian transformation strategy, but it should rather be considered as a state-mediated turn toward that 
                                                     
107 - See Lavers 2012; Lefort 2012; Lefort R., From Individual Food Security to National Food Self-Sufficiency: 
The Ethiopian Way, Its Impact and Some Future Scenarios, Paper presented at the 18th International Conference 
of Ethiopian Studies, Dire Dawa, 2012. 
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«agrarian pluralism» envisaged by Dessalegn (2008b); it doesn’t seem right either, to interpret the 
change as a U-turn toward market capitalism, as claimed by Lefort.108 
Indeed, through the appropriation of full control over the land, the government has handed the authority 
(and legitimacy) over to its land administration structures to pursue the perfect combination of capital, 
labour and land (Lavers 2012). However, as the study of agricultural clusters will reveal, the smallholder 
farmer subsector has not been excluded at all from the pursuit of this objective. Instead, it has been 
(sometimes forcefully) included in an ambitious agrarian transformation project which is focused on 
changing their production and trade relations, their performances and their accumulation methods. 
Hence, rather than diminishing its importance within the strategy, these evolutions have further 
deepened the dependence and submission of the smallholder farmer subsector vis-à-vis the state, they 
have enhanced the state’s control over production and trade relations, and in some circumstances further 
limited the possibilities for free market forces to expand within the rural economies. Therefore, 
regardless of the group targeted for development (whether small- or large-scale landholders, or pro-poor 
or capitalist-oriented initiatives), the current agrarian transformation processes are affected even more 
by the state’s pervasive power centralization, which places all private actors under the same rigid control 
policy. Therefore, two facts are worth mentioning here, as evidence of the extent of the government’s 
control and authority over land deals and agrarian transformation. On one side, the government-led 
Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, established in 2010 to develop large-scale factories, massive constructions 
and land procurement, following the acquisition of some private competitors, in 2014 controlled almost 
half a million ha of land in its projects which included plantations, factories, dams, irrigation canals, 
houses for labourers and staff (Dessalegn 2014). On the other, in 2016 the government decided 
arbitrarily to cancel a100,000 ha land lease conceded in 2010 to the Indian-based agricultural company 
Karuturi, for having developed just a very small quota of the land received,109 showing once more its 
strong presence and developmental vision. 
 
2.2.3. GTP II and the Second Phase of the Agenda 
During the GTP I period the economy continued its fast growth trend. In addition, regarding the sectors’ 
contribution to growth, the patterns observed during the last period of the PASDEP (figure 1), were 
reinforced during the new decade. Industrial development was given priority during the GTP I, and as a 
consequence – as the graph shows in figure 15 - agriculture growth slowed and industry became the 
highest performing sector in terms of value added growth rate. However, at the end of the period the 
                                                     
108 - Lefort op. cit. 
109 - A. Rosen, One of Africa’s Most Promising Economies is Facing a Fundamental Problem, “Business Insider”, 
18 January 2016: http://www.businessinsider.com/one-of-africas-most-promising-economies-is-facing-a-
fundamental-problem-2016-1?IR=T 
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alleged structural transformation toward industry was still lagging behind expectations because, in terms 
of GDP share, industry shifted from 12.5 to 15.1 percent, agriculture from 41.6 to 38.5 percent and 
services from 45.5 to 46.3 percent (FDRE 2016). In addition, by 2014/15, the share of employment in 
agriculture reached 75%, and the expected surplus labour transfer was not achieved (FDRE 2016). 
Furthermore, agriculture’s contribution to the 20% annual export earnings growth rate obtained by the 
country between 1995 and 2014, has been rising over time (Admasu 2017),110 while in 2015 the 
manufacturing share of the total merchandise export value stood at 12.5% (FDRE 2016). Therefore, as 
observed earlier, if a structural change has occurred, this was more in favour of the service sector, and 
certainly not of the manufacturing 
industrial subsector, whose share of 
employment and of the GDP remained 
below 1 and 5 percent respectively 
(FDRE 2016). 
The plan envisaged by the GTP II for the 
agricultural sector, carries on the targets 
and strategies set by the GTP I. 
Agriculture is expected «to remain the 
main driver of rapid and inclusive 
growth and development (…) [and] to 
be the main source of growth for the 
modern productive sector», and 
therefore special attention is given to 
enhancing quantity and quality of high value crops, industrial inputs and export commodities (FDRE 
2016: 78). The plan aims at recovering an 8% annual agricultural growth rate, by enhancing crop and 
pastoral farming production and productivity, and by promoting private sector investments in 
agriculture. At the same time, the agricultural transformation and development strategy aims at creating 
job opportunities in industrial and agro-industrial sectors, by simultaneously reducing the share of 
agricultural employment over total employment. The implementation strategy includes: doubling the 
amount of rehabilitated and irrigated land, doubling the improved seed and fertilizer supply, expanding 
extension service delivery to reach 16.8 million farmers, strengthening food security and biodiversity 
conservation. In addition, among the targets specifically set for private sector development in 
agriculture, the GTP II aims at transferring almost 700,000 ha to investors by 2019/20 and to enhance 
domestic investor participation, whose contribution has been limited and unsatisfactory (FDRE 2016). 
                                                     
110 - Within the agricultural sector, the growth was mostly characterized by the relative decline in coffee and the 
parallel growth of some traditional and non-traditional agricultural export commodities, such as cut-flowers and 
dairy products and eggs, that obtained 49% and 29% annual growth rates respectively (Admasu 2017). 
Figure 15 - Real GDP annual growth rate (%), by economic sector. Personal 
elaboration, source: FDRE (2016) 
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The second phase of the Growth and Transformation strategy coincides with the second phases of the 
AGP, for which the GoE received additional USD 350 million (WB 2015), and of the Agricultural 
Transformation Agenda designed by ATA. While the first phase focused mainly on boosting the 
agricultural sector’s production and productivity, in the inception of the second phase the ATA aimed 
at including intersectoral elements, traditionally associated with industry, trade and water resources, to 
attain a rapid and structural change in the agricultural sector, and engender economic transformation 
mechanisms. These intentions give credit to the considerations mentioned above, according to which 
the whole agricultural transformation trajectory created during the 2000s, and carried on with the GTP 
I, approached the prospect of transforming the smallholder farmers’ subsector from a production-biased 
perspective that neglected the linkages with the markets and other economic sectors. 
Based on this perspective – inspired once again by the East Asian country model - the second phase of 
the Agenda in the GTP II is indeed focused on improving crop and livestock production and productivity 
and diversifying production into high-value crops; creating an environmentally sustainable and socially 
inclusive growth; strengthening market systems; and enhancing implementation capacity (ATA 2017). 
50 deliverables and 190 sub-deliverables are distributed among these 4 mainstays that compose the 
strategy, and a new Anchor Initiative – the Agricultural Commercialization Clusters initiative (ACC), 
that was launched during the GTP I’s last year, but whose implementation is being carried out mainly 
at present – whose purpose is to integrate the most relevant interventions in high-priority geographies 
and commodities. Following the intentions mentioned above, the Agenda includes a wider spectrum of 
actions compared to its previous version, that plan to add initiatives mainly for: livestock production 
and productivity, watershed and agro-forestry development, land use planning and administration, 
biodiversity, implementation capacity, domestic and export market volumes, agro-processing and value 
addition. 
As previous sections have pointed out, the implementation of an agricultural transformation strategy 
narrowly centred on increasing production volumes, has certainly contributed to the economic 
development of the agricultural sector, but it has failed to generate a structural transformation of the 
sector. In addition, the declining growth rates experienced by the sector in the last period seem to suggest 
that, should it continue on this pathway, the growth margins will be progressively narrower in future 
years, unless it undergoes a radical change. Earlier sections’ findings suggest that this radical change is 
not foreseeable for two main reasons. First, although the picture may be different for the peripheral 
regions, neither the domestic rural “new entrepreneurs” identified by Lefort (2012) – among which 
commercial farming investors and graduated model farmers -, nor the foreign investors in agriculture 
have so far generated a significant change in the agrarian production structure – figure 14 shows that 
similarly to 20 years ago, 60% of total cultivated land is owned by private peasant holders ploughing 
less than 2 ha –, nor does the nature of their actual engagement seem so considerable as to suggest any 
unquestionable expectation for change in the near future. Second, because of the peasant-based and 
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revolutionary aim on which the developmental state’s political legitimacy is grounded, a radical land 
reform with structural transformative impacts is not likely to pass in the ruling coalition’s policy agenda 
any time soon; and neither is a democratic alternation in power. 
Therefore, in the coming future, Ethiopian agricultural sector development will again depend mostly on 
the performance of the smallholder farmers’ subsector. In turn, this will weigh - most probably, and 
more heavily than in the past - on the capacity to improve the quantity and quality of the subsector’s 
marketed outputs, and to connect them with the international trade. 12 deliverables are associated to the 
commercialization strategy in the second phase of the Agenda, aimed mainly at improving agricultural 
market efficiency and market information transparency, reducing transaction costs, increasing 
investments in medium and large size commercial farming and creating a valuable agro-industry supply 
system. The main tools intended to achieve those targets are: issuing regulations, for instance on quality 
certificates, contract farming and out-grower schemes; strengthening market centres on all levels; 
improving access to rural finance; promoting cooperative role in aggregation, value addition and 
exports; promoting spatial development initiatives in agro-industry in areas with high growth potential, 
through the ACC. The success or failure of these initiatives will most probably shape the direction of 
the whole trajectory of agricultural and agrarian transformation. 
Regulations, especially those concerning agreements between small-scale producers and commercial 
farming systems, are of crucial importance towards promoting fair and equal growth, and to avoid the 
exclusion of smallholder farmers from the transformation process; however, despite repeated calls for 
intent, no considerable legislation has been produced so far.111 Cooperatives are still a fundamental tool 
for the GoE: during the GTP II period, the FCA intends to double the number of members and the 
available capital (FCA 2015). However, despite the great potential and rationale behind cooperative 
promotion for input delivery and output marketing (Dorosh, Mellor 2013), so far the sector has not 
produced the expected results, and their actual performance is severely challenged by financial 
constraints and local government interference in their organization and daily activities (MoA et al. 
2012). Great expectations are therefore linked to the ACC initiative, which focuses on adopting the 
Agenda’s most relevant activities to strengthen specific value chains in selected areas, and may embody 
the preview of the strategy to be implemented nationwide at a later time. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting some of the points analysed so far. First, with the Agenda the GoE has 
embarked on an ambitious transformation project that so far has contributed considerably to the growth 
of the agricultural sector and the economy. Secondly, the project has not generated relevant 
transformation in agrarian production and trade relations, and the sector has not created consolidated 
value addition structures, nor has it transformed the subsistent nature of the dominant producer category. 
                                                     
111 - Interview with Eshetayehu Tefera, Senior Expert in Commercial and Contract Farming Program, the Ethiopian 
Agricultural Transformation Agency, 12 July 2016, Addis Ababa. 
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Thirdly, given the great opportunities offered by the global economy, the trajectory has attempted to 
penetrate international markets by using the developmental state’s mediation, but so far this integration 
has not generated the expected outcome.  
Grounding on the longstanding obstacles and the positive results generated, being inspired by domestic 
and international successful examples and spurred by the need to benefit from the relentless integration 
with the global economy, the ACC proposes an approach to agricultural transformation centred on 
spatial development initiatives, focused on selected value-chains, characterised by intersectoral 
linkages, and outward orientation. As the case studies will demonstrate, given this wide perspective, for 
the coming future it is worth monitoring the (alleged) nationwide application of the approach proposed 
by the ACC, for its agricultural and agrarian transformation potentials. 
 
3. Clustering, an Agenda for Structural Transformation 
 
One of the economic development and growth strategies implemented during the Growth and 
Transformation Plans period was the creation of cluster-based initiatives. According to the relevant 
literature analysed in chapter 1, clusters have the potential to enhance competitiveness, productivity, 
innovation and economic externalities through vertical and horizontal linkages among different actors 
involved in the same industrial sector. As already observed, combined with other spatial development 
initiatives, clusters have been recently adopted in several developing countries for the purpose of 
concentrating development initiatives in the most suitable potential areas. Cluster-based approaches 
have been applied in many different industrial sectors, including agrobusiness, and have in some cases 
succeeded in expanding markets, generating profits and alleviating poverty (Zeng 2008). 
The following sections will present the recent emergence of cluster-based initiatives in the Ethiopian 
economic development and structural transformation trajectory of the last decade. As part of the GTP I 
and II, both the Industrial Parks and Agricultural Commercialization Cluster initiatives are created to 
promote domestic private sector development and to attract foreign investors, through the geographic 
concentration of interconnected companies and initiatives. This indeed constitutes one of the strategies 
pursued to exploit the country’s comparative advantage in agriculture and in the industrial sector, in 
view of international market penetration and for the economy’s structural transformation. With regard 
to agriculture in particular, as already observed the agricultural transformation strategy created by the 
GoE includes the enhancement of inter-sectoral linkages and outward-oriented relations, and aims to 
respond to the need to integrate smallholder farmers into well-connected value chains. Ideally, by 
establishing favourable conditions in spatially defined areas selected for their growth potentials, the 
creation of agricultural and agro-industrial clusters is expected to overcome the structural obstacles that 
have hampered the agrarian sector’s structural transformation so far. 
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Through the discussion of the basics of these new initiatives, the next sections will provide greater 
insight into the process and strategy of implementation, and will show the way that they are created 
through the developmental state’s mediation, in line with the political and economic trajectory created 
over the last two decades. Obviously, since most of the initiatives were started only very recently, the 
discussion will not focus on outputs and outcomes, but rather on analysing some main issues regarding 
the implementation process. Following the first section which is dedicated to parks and cluster-based 
initiatives created in industry, in order to introduce the strategy’s rationale and essentials, the second 
section will explore in greater depth the implementation of cluster-based initiatives in agriculture and 
agro-industry, to define the institutional and strategic fundamentals that shape the creation of 
agricultural clusters in South Wollo, that will be analysed in chapter 4. 
 
3.1. Industrial Parks and Clustering 
The overall objectives set by the GTP I and II are linked to the expansion of production, productivity, 
quality and competitiveness of its manufacturing industry, given its potential development in bringing 
about a structural transformation in Ethiopia. To ensure a competitive industrial development, the 
government has focused on creating favourable conditions for investors by investing in human 
resources, boosting developmental thinking, creating a conducive investment climate, facilitating legal 
frameworks and organizational structures, and improving infrastructures (FDRE 2016). The light and 
agro-processing industry constitutes the strategy’s backbone and is expected to increase by 21.9% 
annually during the GTP II period. Detailed development plans have been prepared to promote the 
development of the textile and garment industry, the leather and leather product industry, the metal and 
engineering industry, the meat, milk and honey industry, the chemical and construction supply industry, 
the agro-processing industry, and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Various strategies were planned, among which the creation of industrial development zones, to support 
the manufacturing industry’s development. Particularly in the case of small- and medium-size firms, 
Ethiopian entrepreneurs face many obstacles in their ordinary activities, specially when it comes to 
obtaining credit, protecting minority investors, trading across borders, dealing with construction permits 
and starting a business (WB 2017). Moreover, as reported by two representatives of the UNIDO and 
Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo I met in Addis Ababa in July 2016, the government 
uses its administrative and financial tools to control the activities of entrepreneurs, thus leading to their 
discouragement and limitation.112 Further obstacles have been identified by recent studies concerning 
the Ethiopian manufacturing industry: land titling and access are complicated, importing and exporting 
                                                     
112 - Interview with Chiara Scaraggi, Associate Expert in Agribusiness Development at UNIDO Ethiopia, and 
Filippo Archi, Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, Ethiopia, 5 July 2016, Addis Ababa. 
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goods is very costly, currency overevaluation is a challenge for its competitiveness, and labour 
productivity is very low (WB 2014). 
In order to overcome all these barriers, by emulating the path of other industrializing economies, the 
GoE has chosen precise geographical industrial development zones for the construction of industrial 
parks (IPs) – agglomerations of industries specializing in specific manufacturing sectors - where special 
trade and fiscal agreements are established, and infrastructures and finance institutions are appropriate 
to attract investments. “Industrial development zones” were established by the Investment Proclamation 
n. 769/2012, Part Eight, and defined (in the amended version issued in 2014) as «areas with distinct 
boundary designated by the appropriate organ to develop identical, similar or interrelated industries 
together or to develop multifaceted industries, based on a planned fulfilment of infrastructures and 
various services such as road, electric power and water, and having special incentive schemes, with a 
broad view to achieving, planned and systematic, development of industries, mitigation of the impacts 
of environmental pollution and development of urban centers, and includes special economic zones, IPs, 
technology parks, export processing zones, free trade zones and the likes designated by the Investment 
Board» (FDRE 2014: 7451; FDRE 2012b). 
So far twelve public IP projects have been completed or planned in top priority sectors: leather, textile 
and garment, metal engineering, construction materials, pharmaceutical, and agro-processing. Public 
IPs are (or will be) located in Hawassa, Mekelle, Kombolcha, Adama, Dire Dawa, Bole Lemi, Kilinto, 
Jima, Debre Birhan, Bahir Dar, Aysha and Hunan.113 In the first phase of their construction, public 
industrial parks will occupy from a minimum of 75 up to a maximum of 365 hectares of land, and upon 
completion of the largest park (in Dire Dawa) the occupied land is expected to reach 4000 ha. 114 IPs are 
established primarily to lure foreign medium- and large-scale investors, with the aim of stimulating 
further growth in the domestic private sector; 10 to 15-year income tax exemption periods are introduced 
for IP developers focusing on export goods.115 These are comparable to special-economic zones created 
by developing economies based on the model of more industrialized ones (Korea, Mauritius, Taiwan, 
China), where special economic policies and incentives were provided in specific geographic locations, 
to enterprises that could create jobs, attract foreign direct investments and develop exports, in a free 
trade environment which enabled them to compete in global markets (Monga 2011). 
The first park to be created and to become active was the apparel Bole Lemi Industrial Park in Addis 
Ababa, which was established on 156 ha of land, thanks to a 1.2 billion Birr agreement with 13 local 
                                                     
113 - Six additional projects have been planned for private industrial parks in Dukem, Mojo, Minjar, Dire Dawa 
and Adama, to be built and managed exclusively by Chinese and South Korean investors, see Fitsum Arega, 
International Investment Forum, Addis Abeba, Ethiopia, The First International Agro-Industry Investment Forum 
Ethiopia, Session 1: Investment Climate and Growth of the Private Sector in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 5-7 October 
2016. 
114 - http://www.ipdc.gov.et/index.php/en/industrial-parks 
115 - Fitsum Arega, op. cit. 
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contractors; Bole-Lemi II is currently being developed on 186 ha of land in collaboration with the WB 
Group and Japanese investors.116 In June 2017, the first phase of the Hawassa Industry Park, 300 km 
south of Addis Ababa in Oromia Region, has become operative.117 The construction of the park was 
performed by the China Civil Engineering Corporation, following a 246 USD million agreement that 
was signed in July 2015.118 18 global leading textile and apparel companies and eight domestic investors 
are part of the Hawassa Industrial Park, which was considered the blueprint for the establishment of the 
others.119 In early July, the Kombolcha Industrial Park and the Mekelle Industrial Park have been 
inaugurated in the presence of the Prime Minister Hailemariam who stated: «The completion of 
Kombolcha Industrial Park today is a big step forward in the economic transformation of the country».120 
The park occupies 75 ha of land and while 30% of its built-up area will be occupied by local companies, 
the remaining 70% will be dedicated to foreign companies including US, Korean and Italian enterprises 
who have requested to establish their plants in the park; the park is expected to create a total of over 
20,000 new jobs. Both parks have been constructed by the China Civil Engineering Construction 
Corporation, for a total cost ranging between 190 and 250 USD million.121 The Mekelle Industrial park 
currently occupies 100 ha and is expected to create another 20,000 jobs.122 
The government has been investing heavily on the creation of these parks. The Industrial Parks 
Development Corporation (IPDC), a public enterprise that plays a fundamental role in the realization of 
the parks, was established in 2014. Together with the Ethiopian Investment Commission123 and the 
Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority, the IPDC promotes IP creation by leasing land to investors, 
managing the relationship with federal and regional institutions, ensuring the necessary infrastructures, 
attracting investors and setting up financial agreements.124 As expressed in the GTP II, the GoE is also 
                                                     
116 - Two references from official authorities of the Ethiopian government: 
http://www.ipdc.gov.et/index.php/en/industrial-parks/bole-lemi-i and Japanese Company to Develop Special 
Zone in Bole-Lemi II Industrial Park, “Ethiopian News Agency”, 14 June 2017: 
http://www.ena.gov.et/en/index.php/economy/item/3336-japanese-company-to-develop-special-zone-in-bole-
lemi-ii-industrial-park 
117 - Girmachew Gashaw, Ethiopia: Hawassa Industry Park Goes Operational, “The Ethiopian Herald”, 21 June 
2017: http://allafrica.com/stories/201706210655.html 
118 - Chinese Corporation to Construct Hawassa Industrial Park for $246m, “AddisBiz”: 
https://addisbiz.com/ethiopian-business-news/169-chinese-corporation-to-construct-hawassa-industrial-park-for-
246m 
119 - Hawassa Industrial Park to be Fully Operational, “Ethiopian News Agency”, 16 June 2017: 
http://www.ena.gov.et/en/index.php/economy/item/3345-hawassa-industrial-park-to-be-fully-operational 
120 - Kombolcha Industrial Park Inaugurated, “Ethiopian News Agency”, 8 July 2017: 
http://www.ena.gov.et/en/index.php/economy/item/3464-kombolcha-industrial-park-inaugurated 
121 - Official data by the Ethiopian News Agency reports USD 190 million, whereas 250 is reported by Kombolcha 
and Mekelle Follow Hawassa in Inaugurating Industrial Parks, “Semonegna.com”, 9 July 2017: 
http://semonegna.com/mekelle-kombolcha-industrial-park-inaugurated/ 
122 - Mekelle Industrial Park Inaugurated, “Ethiopian News Agency”, 9 July 2017: 
http://www.ena.gov.et/en/index.php/economy/item/3468-mekelle-industrial-park-inaugurated 
123 - The Ethiopian Investment Commission is a government organization established in 1992 as Ethiopian 
Investment Agency (then renamed Commission), which is accountable to the Investment Board, in turn chaired 
by the Prime Minister.  
124 - http://www.ipdc.gov.et/index.php/en/about-us 
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committed to simplify the access to financial institutions, to tackle market constraints by creating 
connections with local industries, and to address all the infrastructural issues that arise during the project 
period (FDRE 2016). 
As proven by the majority of cases reported, direct foreign investments are expected to fulfill the lack 
of domestic large-scale firms, and to constitute the nucleus of the IP ventures, as both main constructors 
and leaders of the productive process. These foreign or local, medium to large companies are more likely 
to foster and employ innovative knowledge, new technology and capital, and to stimulate the creation 
of satellite activities, with important benefits for regional development. Employment creation is indeed 
among the most highlighted outputs of the project, and moreover a belt of Ethiopian suppliers, mainly 
small- and medium- scale enterprises surrounding the industrial zone, is expected to be stimulated, by 
an increased product demand (FDRE 2016). With the establishment of industrial zones, the GoE has 
indeed tried to facilitate the generation of these externalities through regulatory means, such as reducing 
investment entry and operating costs, facilitating access to finance and land, and easing the bureaucratic 
procedures to run a business. However, these tools may not be sufficient since there are also non-
regulatory constraints that challenge the connection between Ethiopian suppliers and large- and 
medium-scale firms, such as information gaps, skilled worker shortage, and quality and standard 
unbalances (WB 2014). 
Strengthening the connection between medium- to large-size enterprises, and micro- to small-size ones 
is among the government’s top priorities for the manufacturing sector, since the latter are considered 
«a[n] engine for development and job creation» (MoI 2013: 55). The organizational structure envisaged 
by the IPs in Ethiopia thus is similar to the one of other industrial clusters that have spread since the 
1990s in developing economies. Starting from similar circumstances characterized by weak 
infrastructures, limited capital availability, high transaction costs, scarce technology and cheap labour 
abundance, the need to concentrate industrialization efforts within geographically limited areas 
stimulates competition and collaboration among firms that produce externalities and advantages for the 
whole cluster. For this reason, cluster development strategies intended to alleviate production and sales 
problems faced by micro- and small-size enterprises have been issued in Ethiopia since 2003, in 
collaboration with the UNIDO (Ali et al. 2016). These have been implemented differently in the country, 
sometimes beginning from already existing manufacturing industry “natural clusters” mainly in the 
Addis Ababa surrounding area, or creating new ones from scratch.125 However the creation of these 
areas was tainted by some fallacies which basically resulted in failed experiences: the selection of the 
locations did not take available market outlets and the overall economic environment into proper 
consideration; limited attention was given to the organization of production and working conditions; 
                                                     
125 - The Gundish Meda textile and garment cluster were created in the vicinity of the existing natural handloom 
cluster at Shiro Meda, while the Kirkos textile and leather clusters and the Jackros construction, wood and metal 
work cluster were established by the government from the beginning (Ali 2012). 
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proposed incentives did not attract sufficient enterprises; basic infrastructures were not provided in time 
(Ali 2012). 
Based on these experiences, the objective of the ongoing IP project is to overcome the abovementioned 
problems, by relying more on direct foreign investments and on a better promotion of large-small 
enterprise connections. Lately several areas have been chosen for industrial cluster creation by federal 
and regional governments in collaboration with the UNIDO and the UNDP, with or without direct 
connections to the aforementioned IPs.126 Indeed, there is a recent and rapidly increasing emphasis on 
cluster-based development programs, which is apparently becoming one of the leading strategies for the 
economy’s structural transformation. The GTP II planned to build about 2247 standardized one stop 
service centres, to activate credit for 21 billion Birr, and to provide manufacturing premises to new and 
potential mid-size enterprises in the industrial zones (FDRE 2016). 
It is too early and not relevant to this work, to assess the performance of these arrangements. However, 
as pointed out by Monga and Farole when speaking about other similar experiences in SSA (Monga 
2011; Farole 2011), a government’s paternalist and non-transparent conduct is more likely to generate 
negative results. As highlighted by the political economy path traced in previous sections of this work, 
these represent real risks for the GoE. Recent studies on contemporary change dynamics in the micro- 
to medium-size industry reveals that: as a consequence of industrial policies, an outstanding number of 
micro enterprises (less than 5 employees and total assets of not more than 6000 USD) have been started 
in the manufacturing sector, with important consequences on job creation; nevertheless, an excessively 
narrow focus on consolidation strategies has hindered the upgrading of these micro firms and it is not 
likely to change any time soon. At the same time, small- and medium-scale enterprises are constrained 
by finance access issues, since MFIs are still considered the major source of enterprise funding, but they 
are not able to provide sufficient credit. Furthermore, the developmental role played by the government 
sometimes hampers the sector’s transformation by doing business through its agencies and organizations 
– such as the Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency, which is under the Ministry 
of Urban Development and Construction – instead of supporting small and medium firm promotion 
(Amare 2017; Ali et al. 2014). 
 
3.2. Clustering in Agriculture 
With the GTP I and II, the cluster-based approach has spread also in the GoE’s agenda for agricultural 
development and transformation, with four main programs: the Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks 
(IAIPs), the Agricultural Commercialization Clusters (ACC), the Livestock Master Plan and the 
                                                     
126 - See Ali et al. (2016), UNIDO (2016b) and UNDP, Moving Towards Industrial Cluster Development 
Initiatives, United Nations Development Programme Ethiopia. 
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Agricultural Growth Program (AGP). As reported by Zegeye Teklu, Agribusiness Market Linkage 
Manager at ATA, clustering in agriculture is made to enhance an effective use of resources and 
ultimately to increase agricultural producers’ production and productivity. Improving production and 
productivity is consistent with the transformational agenda envisaged by the government and its 
connected agencies for the agricultural sector, which should shift from subsistence to commercial 
farming. While the AGP has already been presented in previous sections, and the Livestock Master Plan 
will not be part of this discussion, the IAIPs and ACC programs are briefly presented here, before 
moving on to the exploration of the grassroot implementation of the clustering approach in South Wollo. 
 
3.2.1. Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks 
The IAIPs follow the pattern of other IPs presented earlier, associated to the objective of boosting light 
manufacturing in Ethiopia in order to achieve the middle-income country status by 2025. The agro-
industrial sector represents one of the main manufacturing industry subsectors on which the GTP I and 
II focus. According to recent estimates (2014), the value added in agro-industry has tripled since the 
beginning of the decade.127 The main share of this growth is due to the agri-food subsector (food and 
beverages) that, according to UNIDO (2016a), by 2013 represented the manufacturing sector’s largest 
group (50%). At the same time, the share of processed products out of the total agro-industry sector 
exports amounts to only 1.3%, but since the global export of processed agricultural commodities is 
increasing by 10% annually, there is reason for Ethiopia to penetrate these expanding market 
opportunities (UNIDO 2016a). Therefore, the IAIPs have been set up in order to coordinate the 
agricultural sector’s growth potential, the agro-industry’s increasing global market opportunities, and 
the objectives established by the GoE in terms of economy’s structural transformation and poverty 
reduction. 
Modeled on the same cluster-based approach of the IPs, the IAIPs are indeed created to attract investors, 
to facilitate private sector development, to improve the integration between agricultural value chain 
entities, to stimulate competition and collaboration, to increase exports, and so on and so forth. 
Moreover, by fostering the linkage between industry and agriculture, IAIP creation is also intended to 
stimulate and carry on a deep transformation of the subsistence-oriented farming production method, 
which in turn represents the main source of income for around 80% of the population. «The park is 
going to take farmers toward global value chain (…) toward the global market» the State Ministry of 
                                                     
127 - See Amare Legesse Reda, Assessment on the Availability of Agro Food Industry Data on the Annual 
Manufacturing Industry Survey of Ethiopia, Presented in the FAO- UNIDO expert group meeting on Agro-
industrial Measurement, 23-24 November 2015, Rome. 
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Industry stated vehemently in a recent speech.128 By including smallholder farmers in contractual 
agreements with enterprises operating in the IAIPs, the GoE intends to ensure their access to markets, 
to improve their knowledge and technology, and to connect them to global value chains, thus promoting 
a response to opportunities and challenges offered by contemporary changes in global production and 
trade relations. At the same time, it is quite obvious that the expected outcome in terms of social and 
economic development, associated to the creation of rural non-farming jobs, the promotion of 
livelihoods and the transformation of traditional production and reproduction relations, are emblematic 
of the way the classic agrarian question still constitutes a major issue for the country, and the steps 
undertaken by the government towards its solution. 
As reported by an Associate Expert in Agribusiness Development at the Ethiopia UNIDO I interviewed, 
the IAIP initiative has been designed in close collaboration with the UNIDO, and it is part of the 
Programme for Country Partnership for Ethiopia, with the participation of numerous development 
partners and UN agencies, and it focuses on three light manufacturing industries: agri-food processing, 
textiles and apparel, and leather and leather products.129 «An IAIP is a geographic cluster of independent 
firms grouped together to gain economies of scale and positive externalities by sharing infrastructure – 
roads, power, communication, storage, packaging, by-product utilization, effluent treatment, logistics 
and transport, laboratory facilities, etc. – and taking advantage of opportunities for bulk purchasing and 
selling, training courses and extension services. Multiple agro-processing functions take place in the 
IAIPs, such as final processing, storage, packaging, marketing and distribution. Support businesses and 
social infrastructure are also present. IAIPs will include open area production zones, controlled 
environment growing, precision farming, knowledge hubs and research facilities, rural hubs, agri-
infrastructure, collection centres, primary processing hubs, [rural transformation centres] RTCs, social 
infrastructure and agri-marketing infrastructure, among others» (UNIDO 2016a: 6). 
The IAIPs rationale is to exploit the competitive advantage of the locations selected, by integrating 
agriculture and industry within a successful joint productive process carried out locally but with a global 
view. For this purpose, feasibility studies were conducted in 2015 by a joint effort between the UNIDO, 
FAO, UNDP, the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoANR), the Ministry of Industry 
and the Ministry of Finance and Cooperation. These studies led to the identification of 17 agro-industrial 
growth corridors, with IAIP establishment potential.130 Within these corridors, four pilot IAIP sites have 
                                                     
128 - Mebrahtu Meles, Speaking at UNIDO Investment Forum in Addis Ababa, The First International Agro-
Industry Investment Forum Ethiopia, 5-7 October 2016, Addis Ababa, Session 2: Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks 
and Rural Industrialization. 
129 - Interview with Chiara Scaraggi. 
130 - These corridors are located in 34 zones: West Tigray, North West Tigray South Tigray in Tigray Region; 
North Gondar, Awi, West Gojam, East Gojam, South Wollo, North Shewa in Amhara Region; West Wellega, 
Illubabor, Jimma, East Wellega, Horo Gudru, West Shewa, South West Shewa, East Shewa, Arsi, West Arsi, Bale, 
Borena in Oromia Region; Guraghe, Siliti, Hadiya, Yem Special Woreda, Sidama, Gedeo, Gemo Gofa, South Omo 
in SNNPR; Agnuwak in Gambella Region; Metekel in Benishangul-Gumuz Region; Zone 1 in Afar Region; 
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subsequently been identified in the four main regions, based on six criteria: agricultural production 
potential for strategic commodities, inter-industry linkages and triggering effect, infrastructure facilities, 
market potential, access to commercial and support services, enterprise concentration and attractiveness 
to investors (UNIDO 2016a). The selected sites are: Bulbula in Central Eastern Oromia, Baeker in 
Western Tigray, Bure in South West Amhara and Yirgalem in Eastern SNNPR (UNIDO 2016b). A 
master plan for each of the four pilot IAIPs was drawn up and on 8 February 2016 the Prime Minister 
officially launched the second phase of the IAIP initiative, consisting of detailed engineering designs 
(UNIDO 2017). The parks will bring together and transform agri-food commodities of all different kinds 
within the same plant: cereals, pulses, fruit and vegetables, coffee, dairy products, honey, fishery, meat 
and other animal products. The commodities will be gathered from the surrounding areas available to 
supply raw materials to the parks: the estimated available land for this purpose ranges from 163,461 ha 
for Yirgalem Park, up to 524,706 ha for the Baeker Park. According to the master plans, the total area 
of the parks - including the industrial units, the multi facility complex utilities and the residential zones 
– will range between 109 ha in Yirgalem and 263 ha in Bulbula. After an estimated initial investment 
of around USD 267 million, over the following four years it will surpass USD 660 million (UNIDO 
2016b). With the appreciation of the community of development partners involved, the GoE has 
committed USD 300 million to the development of IAIP infrastructures, in addition to capital 
investment, support for small- and medium-size enterprises, support for foreign operations, a public-
private partnership to provide services to the companies, logistical support, a 0% export tax with the 
exception of leather and skins, connection with Universities and other educational and research 
institutes.131 
In October 2016, the First International Agro-Industry Investment Forum was held in Addis Ababa. The 
event was organized jointly by the GoE and the UNIDO within its Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial 
Development Agenda, aimed at promoting international private investments in the three priority light 
manufacturing subsectors of: agro-processing, textile and garment, leather and leather products. The 3-
day Forum gathered international investors, representatives from international financial institutions, 
domestic industrial associations, for a total of 1,200 participants (UNIDO 2016b), confirming the remark 
made by Li Yong – the UNIDO General Director – at the opening of the Forum: «With foreign direct 
investment flows to the country amounting to over USD 2 billion in 2015 alone, Ethiopia is becoming 
a hot spot for investors, especially in textile and garments».132 Development partners and representatives 
                                                     
Shinele, Jijiga in Somali Region. See Suresh B., Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks Feasibility Study and Business 
Plan, The First International Agro-Industry Investment Forum, 5-7 October 2016, Addis Ababa, Session 2: 
Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks and Rural Industrialization. 
131 - From UNIDO (2016a, 2016b), and Mebrahtu Meles op. cit. 
132 - UNIDO, Ethiopia Attracting Billions from Investors in the Manufacturing Sector, Say Participants of Agro-
Industry Investment Forum, Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial Development, United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, 5 October 2016. 
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of the business sector expressed deep support for the IAIPs initiative (UNIDO 2017). In spite of the 
federal government’s huge commitment, the IAIPs are expected to be owned, regulated, implemented 
and overseen by regional governments, through a Regional Industrial Park Corporation, to which the 
central government has handed the burden of «making out business from the parks».133 The cornerstones 
for the construction of the four IAIPs were laid between February and March 2017.134 They are expected 
to be completed within four years, to create 600,000 job opportunities, and to generate around USD 2.22 
billion annually.135 
The IAIPs are expected to be served by a surrounding belt of raw material suppliers, including 
smallholder farmers, pastors and large-scale commercial farmers. Contractual agreements between local 
producers and processing firms are planned to be drawn up, with the aim of ensuring the supply of fixed 
amounts of quality products, and as a sort of market guarantee for the producers.136 Various stages and 
types of intermediary structures between the IAIPs and raw material suppliers have been created, in 
order to provide adequate market information and services to small-scale producers, to collect produced 
goods and channel them to the processing plants. Farmers organizations such as producers cooperatives, 
organized at kebele level, are expected to play a vital role in commodity consolidation, issuing contracts, 
collecting commodities and establishing quality control systems. At the same time, extension agents will 
continue to help farmers to adopt new technologies, apply improved inputs and scale up optimum 
production methods; as declared by the State Minister of Agriculture and National Resources, Ethiopia 
has the highest extension worker/farmer ratio in the world.137 
After cooperatives – whose importance has been underlined also by a FAO’s Agribusiness Officer I 
interviewed in Addis Abeba,138 - the master plans foresee the establishment of Rural Transformation 
Centres (RTCs). RTCs are geographic infrastructures and service clusters through which farmers and 
farmers groups receive agricultural inputs and deliver their produce. RTCs will be in charge of 
providing: training and capacity building for rural populations; information on market prices, trends and 
demand; and other agriculture support services. Moreover, these will also collect and store the products 
and may perform primary processing activities before transferring them to the IAIPs (UNIDO 2016a). 
In the four pilot master plans, 28 RTCs have been planned in strategic areas surrounding the IAIP and 
                                                     
133 - Mebrahtu Meles, op. cit. 
134 - UNIDO, Ethiopia Inaugurates Integrated Agro-Industrial Park as Part of the Programme for Country 
Partnership, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 15 March 2017.  
135 - Alazar Shiferaw, Ethiopia: Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks for Economic Transformation, “The Ethiopian 
Herald”, 18 February 2017: http://allafrica.com/stories/201702180279.html 
136 - As declared by the State Minister, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Wondirad Mandefro, 
Speaking at UNIDO Investment Forum in Addis Ababa, The First International Agro-Industry Investment Forum 
Ethiopia, 5-7 October 2016, Addis Ababa, Session 2: Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks and Rural Industrialization. 
137 - Wondirad Mandefro, op. cit. 
138 - FAO is a primary collaborator of the GoE for the creation of IAIPs. Interview with Filippo Brasesco, 
Agribusiness Officer at FAO Ethiopia, 7 July 2016, Addis Ababa. 
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are considered as functional parts of the initiative (UNIDO 2016a); producers’ cooperatives, however, 
are not part of the programme and their involvement in these value chains is delegated to local 
administrations. 
The realization of huge nationwide industrial clusters is one of the main pathways undertaken at present 
by the GoE toward industrialization, namely, towards the transfer of resources from agriculture to 
industry. The agricultural sector is indeed expected to decrease its share of the GDP, to supply the 
necessary cheap labour force to the industrial clusters, and to lose arable land by handing it over to 
higher-value added productive processes and their required facilities and infrastructural methods. But, 
with the integration of agriculture and industry in the same transformational agenda represented by the 
IAIPs initiative, the smallholding peasantry is expected to keep its fundamental role in fueling the 
transition by supplying raw materials, and not just by being squeezed out of agriculture through taxation 
and displacement. Taking the cue from the successful model of East Asian countries (Francks et al. 
1999), the small-scale family-farm remains the basic agricultural production unit, to be boosted by rapid 
technological advancement (a sort of African green revolution) and a village-level cooperative and 
association system. This is not to neglect the fact that large-scale commercial agricultural schemes are 
promoted and welcomed in the Ethiopian context. But in public speeches, policy papers and spending 
budget allocations as well, the small-scale farming sector, and peasants in general, conserve their 
prominent role in the economy and the political scenario. 
 
3.2.2. Agricultural Commercialization Clusters 
If what has been pointed out at the end of the previous section is certainly true – that the smallholder 
farming sector holds a major role in the industrialization process – it must also be said that the strategy 
followed to improve peasant sub-sector productivity and marketability, is creating opportunities for a 
radical change in its core structure. This is to actually say that, through the application of the cluster-
based approach within these strategies, smallholder farmers may undergo a transformation in their 
production and reproduction relations. As the analysis of the South Wollo case will explore, these 
changes are predominantly featured by the top-down, output-oriented and control-biased characters of 
the political practice carried out by the numerous local administration structures, and may lead to capital 
expropriation, a bad attitude towards work, vulnerability, dependence, off-farm activity reduction, and 
other negative consequences. 
In order for the IAIPs to operate, it will be necessary to have a stable inflow of raw materials from the 
surrounding “growing areas” to the processing plants. As claimed by the State Minister of the MoANR, 
despite the availability of 16-17 million hectares of potentially suitable land for large-scale commercial 
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farming, these schemes are not properly developed yet, because they lack capital and investments.139 
For this reason, the vast majority of raw materials for the IAIPs is expected to come from smallholder 
farmers, who still make up 95% of the country’s total agricultural production (ATA 2016). Therefore, 
the sector’s transformation as envisaged by the ATA and the MoANR, and discussed in previous 
sections of this work, is directly connected to the outcome of the IAIPs; and particular emphasis is given 
to the ACC initiative, which is linked directly to the IAIPs, since it can ensure the selected commodity 
supply, through contractual agreements that guarantee quality standards for buyers (processors) and 
markets for sellers (farmers).140 As reported by a Senior Expert in the Agricultural Extension Directorate 
at the MoANR, 86% of the total 239 woreda selected by the ACC in the 2015-16 period, are also part 
of the IAIPs; and the overlap is reportedly expected to be reached soon.141 
The ACC is part of the broad transformational agenda designed by the GoE and its development partners 
for the agricultural sector, and it is being discussed here because it makes up the main federal policy for 
clustering in agriculture, currently being implemented in Ethiopia. The ACC was launched as an 
“Anchor Initiative” in the last year of the GTP I (2014/15), by ATA, aimed at integrating the four pillars 
of the second phase of the Transformation Agenda – increasing crop and livestock production and 
productivity; environmentally sustainable and inclusive growth; commercial orientation of smallholder 
agriculture and market development; enhancing implementation capacity - in specific strategic locations 
and commodity value chains (ATA 2017). Accordingly, the ACC initiative aims to accelerate the 
development of priority agricultural commodity value chains through a geographically-focused 
approach envisioned to: commercialize smallholder agriculture, increase farmer incomes, improve 
access to domestic and international markets, increase agro-processing and value-addition, to create off-
farm employment opportunities.142 
The ACC initiative gathers inspiration from several geographically-focused approaches used to drive 
economic growth and structural transformation in East Asian countries during the second half of the last 
century, and from more recent agro-based cluster experiences in other parts of the world. The National 
Framework for ACC refers specifically to special economic zones, free trade zones and export 
processing zones created in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, China Indonesia 
and Philippines since the 1950s; as well as to successful cluster-based value chain approaches performed 
for green beans and avocado crops in Kenya, to staple crop processing zones implemented in Nigeria, 
and to fruit clusters created in Brazil, Chile and Mexico.143 As already discussed in the first chapter, 
                                                     
139 - Wondirad Mandefro, op. cit. 
140 - Wondirad Mandefro, op. cit. 
141 - Interview with Abrham Mulatu, Senior Expert in Agricultural Extension Directorate, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources, 9 August 2016, Addis Ababa. 
142 - ATA, National Framework for Agriculture Commercialization Clusters in Ethiopia. Concept, Vision, 
Strategic Interventions and Implementation Framework, Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency, 
unpublished draft. 
143 - Ibid. 
163 
 
lately agro-based cluster approaches have been expanding at a rapid pace in developing countries, as a 
consequence (and deciding factor) of global changes in trade and production relations. Since the 1990s, 
indeed, geographically-focused special trade policies, fiscal regimes and service-providing public 
interventions have been implemented to exploit and enhance the comparative advantage of developing 
economies, usually associated to abundant and cheap labour, easy natural resource exploitability, scarce 
domestic competition and favourable currency exchange (Zeng 2008). In line with these trends, in 
accordance with its trade and production internationalization path, and with its goal to become a global 
competitor in agro-based exports and light manufacturing in the next ten years, Ethiopia has developed 
geographically-focused approaches to enhance agricultural commodity value chains. 
Geographically-focused initiatives for rural and agricultural development were already implemented in 
the PASDEP and the GTP I strategic frameworks, to enhance the specific comparative advantages of 
agro-ecological zones or to fulfill particular needs.144 In spite of significant achievements in terms of 
farming outputs, none of these have addressed the issues of linkages to market and industry from a 
comprehensive value-addition perspective. Instead, the ACC is actually intended to support agricultural 
clusters through a value-chain approach that focuses on clear linkages between (and integration of) 
inputs, production, aggregation, processing and value addition, and consumption. In addition to acting 
on production, productivity and market linkages, the ACC will also include small- to large-scale actions 
to promote agro-processing and value addition in selected locations, in coordination with the industrial 
development regional branches.145 As a result, being agriculture the means of integration of the whole 
Transformation Agenda, and promoting the coordination with IAIPs and other agro-industrial solutions, 
the ACC is a very ambitious initiative that surpasses the previous sector-specific experiences, and might 
be seen as the GoE’s leading strategy for its present and forthcoming pathway towards the middle-
income country status. 
According to the ACC framework, and as confirmed also by Zegeye Teklu, clusters need to be 
commodity-based and market oriented, and to be established where there are the highest growth 
prospects. The rationale is to focus on high potential commodities and areas where surplus production 
is already present, or where there is the possibility to increase this surplus and boost value addition. The 
ACC has also a special significance for exports since, as he underlined, it allows for more productivity, 
better quality and traceability of the commodities, and more domestic value addition, which in turn mean 
an increase in revenues coming from export. The selection process – performed jointly by federal and 
regional agriculture offices, NGOs and major private sector actors (ATA 2016) - starts with the 
                                                     
144 - For example: the Pastoral Communities Development Program, the Economic Growth Corridors, the FSP 
initiatives aimed at boosting food insecure woreda, the Sustainable Land and Watershed Management, the AGP 
and various bilateral development partner projects conducted on high-value crops in high potential areas. See ATA, 
op. cit. 
145 - Ibid. 
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identification of the commodity, evaluating its production potential, marketability for export or import 
substitution, and value addition potential;146 other criteria included in the draft of the National 
Framework for ACC concerned domestic market potential, smallholder farmers coverage and domestic 
market opportunity.147 Subsequently, the cluster’s location is decided based on the area’s production 
potential and natural resource availability; cluster’s size is supposed to vary between 5 and 15 woreda. 
Once they are picked out, clusters are prioritized according to their current and potential production 
levels, value addition capacity, access to markets and ongoing parallel initiatives. Each cluster is 
expected to have one primary commodity, and one or two additional rotation crops.148 The number of 
selected clusters and commodities vary from one policy paper to another: the unpublished draft of the 
National Framework for Agriculture Commercialization Clusters in Ethiopia announced that 21 clusters 
and 12 commodity types had been chosen,149 and this information was confirmed by Zegeye Teklu in 
July 2016.150 The 2011-15 Progress Report announced the designation of 31 and that an additional 16 
were in the works for interventions during 2015 (ATA 2016). The most recent official paper reported 
that 26 clusters and 10 commodities had been selected,151 but since a federal strategy has been issued 
for only 7 commodities, just 14 clusters are being implemented (ATA 2017). 
Nine clusters over 114 woreda and ten commodities have been picked out in the Oromia Region, 
amounting to a targeted total of 4.6 million hectares and 1.3 million farmers. In 2015-16, five clusters 
and commodities were given top priority: the maize cluster in the Horro Guduru Wellega, East Wellega, 
and West Shewa areas; the malt barley cluster in the Arsi and West Arsi areas; the bread wheat cluster 
in the Arsi, West Arsi and Bale areas; the durum wheat cluster in the Bale area; the teff cluster in the 
West Shewa, East Shewa (where the Bulbula Park is located), South West Shewa areas (ATA 2017). 
Out of a total of 739,727 ha of land that had been allocated to these five clusters, 134.235 ha is the actual 
surface that the they occupy, as reported by the MoANR in August 2016.152 Operations concern mainly: 
an increased adoption of improved inputs and access to credit, linkages with agro-industries, building 
agro-processing capacity in local factories and strengthening farming contract agreements between 
farmers and buyers. Primary cooperatives and unions are appointed a major role in collecting production, 
raw material storage, increasing their agro-processing capacity or linking farmers with industries, 
finding market opportunities. Huge expectations surround the potentiality of these clusters, in terms of 
production, productivity, share of marketed products, agro-processing capacity, farmer use of 
                                                     
146 - Interview with Zegeye Teklu, Agribusiness Market Linkage Manager at ATA, 13 july 2016, Addis Ababa. 
147 - ATA, op. cit. 
148 - Ibid. 
149 - Ibid. 
150 - Interview with Zegeye Teklu. 
151 - Confirmed also during a recent interview to Zegeye Teklu reported in Alazar Shiferaw, Ethiopia: Smart 
Interventions to Transform Agriculture Sector, “The Ethiopian Herald”, 4 July 2017: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201707040718.html 
152 - Interview with Abrham Mulatu. 
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recommended inputs, and revenue from export growth (ATA 2017). Oromia apparently reported the 
highest results for the period: the clusters supplied around 700,000 qt of crops (durum wheat and malt 
barley) to agro-industries such as the Asela Malt Factory; 800,000 qt of bread wheat have been 
channelled to the EGTE through unions; five unions delivered 130,000 qt of maize grain to the WFP, 
the Mama Injera and Consumer Association in Addis Ababa, and other buyers through contractual 
agreements (ATA 2017). 
Similar objectives and operations have been planned for the promotion of agro-based clusters in 
Amhara, Tigray and SNNP Regions. In the Amhara Region, 16 clusters have been planned over 128 
woreda, but 6 of them have been prioritized for ATA support, based on 7 commodities: the sesame 
cluster in North Gondar and Awi Zones, mainly to boost the processed good export share; the maize 
cluster in the West Gojam, South Gondar and Awi areas, designed mainly to increase domestic sales 
and processing industries for import substitutions; the bread wheat cluster and the tef cluster in the West 
Gojam and East Gojam areas, to supply the Bure Agro-Industral Park and to increase processed good 
domestic sales through unions and cooperatives; the malt barley cluster in the North Shewa area 
established mainly to supply the Gondar Malt Factory (ATA 2017). Out of the total 1.2 million hectares 
allocated to cluster occupation, the actual coverage reported in 2015-16 was around 782,000 hectares.153 
The eventual target set by the ATA (2017) for the Amhara ACC, encompasses 1.2 million farmers over 
5.3 million hectares. Similarly, in the SNNPR, 6 clusters with 5 commodities were prioritized for the 
GTP II, but only two were started in the 2015-16 period: the bread wheat cluster in the Silte, Hadiya, 
Kembata Tembaro, and Gurage areas; the haricot beans one in the Sidama (where the Yirgalem Park is 
located), Gamo Gofa, Wolaita and Halaba areas. Clusters in the SNNPR are designed to target 1.3 
million farmers over 3 million hectares; according to the MoANR office, the two clusters created up to 
2016 covered 57,000 ha of land.154 In the Tigray Region, bread wheat, sesame and teff have been 
prioritized for the 2015-16 period: the first cluster lies in the Eastern, Southern and South-Eastern areas; 
the second in the Western and North-Western areas (Beaker Park will be built in the Western area); the 
third in the Central and North-Western areas. Out of a total targeted coverage of 4.5 million hectares 
and 712,000 farmers (including future expansions into horticulture, beef, honey and dairy), clusters’ 
actual occupation in Tigray, as of August 2016, was 319,624 hectares.155 
Almost 1.3 million hectares have already been occupied by the first lot of ATA-supported pilot clusters, 
in the four main regions. While the ATA designed and planned the ACC, the implementation has been 
in the hands of the MoANR, the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, the Ministry of Industry, the 
Ministry of Finance and Trade and FCA, and their respective regional and sub-regional offices, as well 
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as the MFIs, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and various research institutes.156 The ACC clusters 
designed by the ATA are indeed supposed to be scaled up by government offices after the first stage 
will be completed. Hence, the clusters indicated above are the ones that have been selected and 
prioritized by the regional and federal institutions involved (in collaboration with the ATA) because of 
their surplus potential, to boost the diffusion of the cluster approach to agricultural development 
downward, through the various administrative levels. But, as the Ministry officer pointed out in the 
interview, which was confirmed by the ATA Report for 2015-16, and revealed also by the fieldwork 
conducted in South Wollo, the MoANR and Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries are negotiating with 
their regional partners to implement the cluster concept nationwide. The regions are already selecting 
commodities and woreda that are suitable for cluster-based approaches, to plan their interventions in 
farming service delivery and value addition.157 «Outside of the work led by the ATA for these clusters, 
the [Amhara] regional government is utilizing the cluster approach across the region» (ATA 2017: 106). 
The cluster approach is therefore supposedly expanding throughout the country, as a tool for promoting 
agro-based value chains. The initiative is expected to integrate the different agricultural development 
operations performed for the smallholder farming community, and to generate externalities and revenue 
growth through inter-sectoral linkages. However, according to the interviews done with key informants, 
integration with both the AGP and the IAIPs is not pursued at the present stage. Regarding the AGP, 
Zegeye Taklu observed with disapproval that, despite official papers, it has no «cluster thought» and it 
is not contributing to the creation of agro-based corridors nor value chain promotion. Concerning the 
IAIPs, the representatives of the UNIDO and the Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo 
claimed that the collaboration with and between governmental and non-governmental agencies for 
development of the agricultural and industrial branches is not easy.158 On the one side, the entities 
involved in the IAIPs promotion (including the Ministry of Industry, the UNIDO, the Agenzia Italiana 
per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, the FAO) complain about a too limited financial budget being 
allocated to industrial development by the GoE. On the agricultural side, the establishment of the ATA 
by Meles has created a power dispute with the former MoARD which continues at present (with the 
MoANR), thus jeopardizing the success of rural and agricultural development policies. This embattled 
environment is characterizing the initial phases of the ACC initiative implementation and the broader 
application of cluster-based and value chain approaches to agricultural development at regional, zonal, 
and woreda levels. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - CLUSTERING IN AGRICULTURE, EVIDENCES 
FROM SOUTH WOLLO ZONE 
 
The fieldwork conducted in South Wollo between July and September 2016 was intended to explore the 
implementation process of the cluster-based approach to agricultural development, as embedded in the 
broader purpose of this work is to outline the major traits of the contemporary pathway to agrarian 
transition undertaken by the GoE. The presentation of the evolution of the political economy and 
agricultural policy approach since the early 1990s, has defined some of the most relevant policy 
decisions, as embedded in the national developmental state project and in the evolution of Ethiopia’s 
international position. The presentation has highlighted how the transitional narrative of the first decade, 
and the developmental plan carried forward since the early 2000s, brought the solution of the agrarian 
question to the centre of the political and economic agenda. Smallholding farmers represent the political 
core of the TPLF-led ruling coalition and they were at the centre of the ADLI strategy envisioned to 
generate equal economic growth and a drastic poverty reduction. Also in this decade, in spite of a 
significant diversification of the national economy, and the promotion of a large-scale commercial 
farming sub-sector, small-scale farmers still represent the agricultural sector’s as well as the whole 
economy’s backbone. Moreover, in the current setting of an expanding economy, the agricultural sector 
(and consequently the smallholding farmers sub-sector) is expected to foster the structural 
transformation envisioned by the GTP I and II, and to contribute to turn Ethiopia into one of the top 
global light manufacturing countries. The clustering approach is seemingly expanding its incidence in 
the development agenda, as a major means to bring about the economy’s transformation. Based on the 
model of some successful cases in other countries, - in agriculture as well as in the manufacturing 
industry - the agglomeration of producers, retailers, traders, service provider facilities, research institutes 
and financial institutions in integrated value chains is considered nowadays the leading strategy to: 
promote the country’s comparative advantage, improve public investment distribution, to attract foreign 
capital, to create value addition, and to promote a sustainable and inclusive economic growth. Given the 
very few researches on the topic, the fieldwork provides some unprecedented and useful insight into the 
implementation of the cluster approach in rural Ethiopia. 
Consequently the research on agricultural clusters in South Wollo constitutes a valid tool for the analysis 
of the ongoing structural transformation process being performed in one of the currently most successful 
developing economies. Accordingly, by studying the patterns of rural politics and agricultural 
development practices, the fieldwork will stimulate further some hypothesises on how the contemporary 
focus on agrarian issues is framed by the peasant-state relationship in the developmental Ethiopia. The 
last section of this chapter will analyse further the understanding by historicizing this relationship and 
pinpointing continuities and changes with the past. 
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1. Methodology 
 
The following discussion is based on the fieldwork I conducted between July and September 2016. As 
already stated, the main objective of the fieldwork was to gather major information on the status of the 
cluster-based approach to rural and agricultural development, to observe some patterns of 
implementation, and to understand them on the basis of the long-term perspective of agrarian change 
mechanisms and peasant-state relationship. Dealing with a very recent policy which has not yet been 
the object of empirical research, the fieldwork methodology was tailored to gather a comprehensive 
overview of the phenomenon through qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis, which 
may allow some broad considerations about the research topics. 
At first, the fieldwork was primarily intended to investigate the presence of cluster-based initiatives in 
agriculture in the area, their relevance in the context, the leading objectives and some specific elements 
regarding: the selection process, the role of model farmers and cooperatives, and the level of allegiance 
to the initiative gathered from the farmers involved. Thanks to the affiliation with the Wollo University, 
several meetings had been arranged with the Zone Office of Agriculture and Rural Development in 
Dessie, where interviews and semi-structured questionnaires have been issued to officials. Ato Sitot, the 
person in charge of logistical and administrative facilitation during my stay at the Wollo University, 
helped me to arrange those meetings and often worked as translator in this first stage of the fieldwork. 
In addition, the daily exchange with researchers and lecturers at Wollo University have been also useful 
to investigate the ways in which a research institute is involved in the implementation of rural and 
agricultural development initiatives, and if this involvement is adopting a cluster-based approach. A 
third important contribution came from the exchange with some members of the US Peace Corps that 
were deployed in various woreda of South Wollo, from whom I had the chance to collect information, 
data and impressions about clustering in the zone. 
Subsequently, 4 woreda and 10 kebele were selected to carry out an in depth analysis and to interview 
the farmers involved in the cluster initiatives: Abaso Qotu in Dessie Zuria; Wodajo, Addis Mender and 
Takake in Qalu; Gobeya, Wohilo, Jari and Hitacha in Tahuladere; Adarash and Segno Gobeya in Were 
Ilu. These were chosen based on three main factors: the relevance of cluster-based initiatives in the area; 
the accessibility to large market opportunities offered by the proximity to the main road (Addis Ababa 
– Mekelle); the logistical approachability. Again, at first, the main objective was to investigate the extent 
of clustering in the woreda, the main targets of the programmes, and some specificities concerning the 
implementation process. For these purposes, the research was conducted through questionnaires and 
semi-structured interviews with local government officials and development agents. Secondly, the 
attention was focused on exploring “farmers’ perspective” on clustering through individual semi-
structured interviews and focus group discussions conducted with 95 farming household heads. 
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As explicitly stated by the Head of the Zone Office of Agriculture, and repeatedly asserted by Ato Sitot 
and the two translators with whom I collaborated, interviews with farmers had to be arranged through 
the DAs. Consequently, the DAs were informed some days before our arrival and were asked to gather 
10 farmers with different economic status, who had been participating in clustering activities. It is 
undeniable that the DAs were given total decision power in the selection of the farmers, and this fact 
needs to be taken into consideration when examining the results of the interviews. On one side, this fact 
did not allow to have a representative sample of the population, which in any case was not pursued, 
given the small number of farmers selected for each kebele. On the other side, it is worth underlining 
that arranging meetings through the DAs allowed me to interview a reasonably large number of farmers 
which would not have been possible otherwise, and to investigate in greater depth some crucial issues 
which emerged during the interviews. 
Moreover, in order to limit the potential distortive effects of this unavoidable premise, the selection and 
training of the translators was given utmost priority prior to the interviews with the farmers. The first 
translator, Getachew, was a lecturer at the Wollo University College of Agriculture, with remarkable 
experience in academic fieldwork on agrarian disciplines and therefore very used to deal and talk with 
farmers in South Wollo. The second translator, Fisseha, with whom I conducted the largest part of the 
farmer interviews, was a Master student at the Addis Ababa University Faculty of Psychology, with 
previous experiences in field research with peasants, and with a remarkable knowledge of the South 
Wollo Zone, his motherland. Before starting the interviews, some intensive work was done with both 
translators to share the objectives of the fieldwork and adjust the list of questions according to specific 
circumstances. Moreover, at the end of each day we reviewed together the farmers’ answers, in order to 
have their precise translation. 
In most cases, the interviews and focus group discussions were performed near the kebele offices, where 
selected farmers were asked to gather. The DAs and local government representatives were asked not 
to attend the meetings so that they would not influence the results; most of them were reticent but then 
accepted, showing a widespread suspicious attitude towards my research topics. I noticed also a diffuse 
inclination to demand payment for their (unrequested) contribution. In some cases, it has been possible 
to interview farmers directly on their farmland, during their farming activities (during weeding time, a 
very repetitive and static work which allowed my translator and me to follow them on the field), to avoid 
having them waste any time and to get a more real picture. In these cases, I selected the farmers based 
on their presence in the field and their collaborative attitude. 
The field research methodology was carefully designed during the research period I spent at the 
Department of Social Anthropology of the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, when I 
had the opportunity to collaborate with Professor Ege and Aspen. During the fieldwork I encountered 
important challenges related to VISA extension and the high political instability of the country which 
hampered telecommunications and travels. Also, it is worth mentioning that some local government 
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representatives and development agents were reluctant to be interviewed, and some did not attend the 
arranged meetings or did not provide the requested data, even after having been showed the research 
permits, duly signed by the competent federal or local office. In spite of all the problems encountered, 
thanks to the support received by the Wollo University, a relatively detailed and consistent amount of 
information has been gathered. The findings demonstrate the relevance of the phenomenon in the 
surveyed area, allow for a relatively complete comprehension of the topic’s main elements, and foster 
some generalized considerations on the trajectory of rural and agrarian transformation in contemporary 
Ethiopia. 
 
2. Clustering in South Wollo 
 
South Wollo Zone was selected as the location where the fieldwork was to be carried out for four main 
reasons. First, because South Wollo is a poor and drought-prone zone, with generally low potentialities 
for agricultural production, and where the potential for agriculture commercialization is extremely 
limited. The area has reportedly been hit several times by harsh droughts in the second half of the last 
century. The most dramatic drought-related famines were registered in 1966, 1972-74 and 1983-84; 
scarce rainfalls, in addition to inefficient early warning and disaster risk management systems, 
politicized distribution of food aid, food price volatility and cattle loss, all contributed to the events 
which had dramatic consequences.159Scarce rainfalls have caused famines in South Wollo also during 
the 1990s160 and up to nowadays, urging food aid measures to be taken to prevent disasters.161 Recent 
studies have revealed that total rainfall in the short rainy season (belg) has drastically diminished since 
the 1980s (Rosell, Holmer 2007), and worsened after 1996: data collected in Kombolcha and Hyke 
revealed that between 1997 and 2012, the number of rainy days have decreased, rainfall has become 
more scarce, and total belg rainfall declined by 90 mm, equal to 25-30% of annual belg rainfalls (Rosell, 
Holmer 2015). In addition, between 1957 and 2010, average temperatures have increased by 2° C, 
reducing water availability (Rosell 2014). These factors have drastic consequences on agriculture in 
South Wollo Zone: teff, which constitutes a major crop in the zone, requires at least 400 mm of rainfall 
and an average temperature of 15-21° C during its 90-day growth period (Rosell, Holmer 2015), and the 
increased variability and unpredictability of the belg season has devastating effects on its yields (Cafer 
et al. 2015). The problem is made worse by the limited expansion and capacity of irrigation schemes in 
                                                     
159 - In 1972-74, a quarter of a million people between Tigray and Wollo provinces reportedly starved to death, 
while livestock loss was estimated at 50% (Graham et al. 2013: 258). 
160 - For more detailed information see Graham et al. (2013), Devereux, Sharp (2006) and Spiess H., Situation 
Report of South Wollo Zone (Region 3), (21-26 March, 1994), United Nations Development Programme, 
Emergencies Unit For Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 30 March 1994. 
161 - See WFP, Ethiopia Food Security Outlook. June 2016 to January 2017, Famine Early Warning Systems 
Network, World Food Programme, 6 February 2017. 
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the area: in line with the rest of the country, in 2015/16 only 1.35% of the zone’s crop land was irrigated, 
consistent with 1.49% of the Amhara Region, and 1.25% at federal level (CSA 2016c); thus most of the 
smallholder farming is rainfed. Furthermore, due to intensive farm land exploitation and to inappropriate 
land management and conservation practices, the South Wollo soil has a very low organic content and 
is subject to erosion: gullying is common in the highland areas, and wind erosion in the lowlands (Rosell 
2014). Due to all these agroecological factors, agricultural production in South Wollo is very limited 
and rarely surpasses the subsistence level. The implementation of the clustering project in the South 
Wollo context provides some interesting insights on the complicated and dual role given to the 
agricultural sector in the development pathway created by the GoE: on one side being directed to fuel 
the transformation of the economy through agro-industrial value addition and export-orientation, on the 
other being associated to food security and poverty reduction challenges. It is therefore relevant to the 
overall objective of this work, consistent with the definition of the country’s trajectory of agrarian 
transformation, to observe the way that agricultural commercialization is promoted through clusters 
created on the ACC’s model, and to explore how this relates to peasant resilience and coping 
mechanisms.  
A second reason for selecting South Wollo Zone for the fieldwork is its representativeness of the major 
production patterns and obstacles which can be found in agriculture in a large part of the Ethiopian 
highlands.162 Smallholder farming is prominently the most diffused farming system of the zone, and of 
the country: 94.9% of holders in South Wollo cultivate less than 2 ha of land, the same indicator marks 
83.2% in the Amhara Region and 85.7% nationwide (CSA 2016b). For the most part, farming patterns 
are non-mechanized, low performing and with low rates of technology adoption. Improved input 
adoption is limited: fertilizers (DAP and urea) are spread on 18% of total national cultivated areas, and 
on 36.2% in South Wollo; instead, improved seeds are sown on 7.7% of the country’s crop land, but 
only on 3.6% of South Wollo’s land (CSA 2016c). Land is scarce, especially in the highlands: an 
Ethiopian household cultivates an average 0.88 ha, and in South Wollo only 0.69 ha (CSA 2016b); more 
detailed data about land use, and comparisons between South Wollo, Amhara and Ethiopia, are found 
in table 5 in appendix B. Agricultural production is challenged by low capital investments: both 
                                                     
162 - The WB included South Wollo among the low potential and high risk Eastern highlands of Ethiopia, on the 
basis of common conditions such as land endowment, rainfall variability, labour availability and general reliability 
of the agricultural sector, In terms of these conditions, South Wollo is comparable to other northern, central and 
southern highlands, which are located along the Rift Valley, including: eastern, central and southern zones of the 
Tigray, Weg Hemra, North Wollo, Oromia zones of the Amhara Region, Western and Eastern Hararge in Oromia 
Region, and Gurage and Sidama in the SNNPR (WB 2004). This classification is not taken here as a criterion for 
t a simple generalization of this study’s results: that group of zones does not constitute the applicability range for 
these results. But, the conclusions and considerations that will be put forward in the next sections, will definitely 
provide some new and useful insights into the agricultural clustering initiative, that are expected to provide 
awareness and knowledge on some aspects of the implementation process. Some of the surveyed dynamics are 
expected to be found also in other contexts, but this inference is not being focused on here: their application in 
different contexts is yet to be proven with empirical evidences. 
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nationally and locally money shortage and failure to pay back loans were recently reported as the main 
causes for not using extension packages and credit services (CSA 2016c). In addition, population growth 
means surplus labour availability, increasing landlessness rates and fostering migrations towards major 
towns that are unable to absorb the inflow: in 2013 unemployed and economically inactive people 
accounted for 52.2% of the total population over ten years old in Kombolcha, 50.5% in Dessie and 
50.4% for all Ethiopia’s major towns (CSA 2014); in 2016 the same indicator measured 52.9% in Dessie 
and 48.9% at aggregate level (CSA 2016d).163 South Wollo may therefore be considered as a monitor 
for Ethiopia’s main agricultural patterns and obstacles, given its particularly unfavourable conditions. 
Land scarcity, low capital investment and labour abundance are indeed the most common conditions 
that agricultural development initiatives have to deal with in the Ethiopian highland context. The study 
of the implementation of agricultural clusters in the South Wollo context may therefore suggest some 
generalizations and some considerations with a broader applicability. 
Thirdly, historically, Wollo people have demonstrated a deep attachment to the land, and a strong 
opposition to agrarian reforms, which may be replicated in the current clustering policy. South Wollo is 
characterized by a high population density164 and a topography consisting of steep slopes that hamper 
cultivations and other agricultural-related activities.165 These factors contribute to determine the 
abovementioned land scarcity and increase the importance of land as a livelihood asset. In line with 
Lund, Boone (2013) and many other studies on agrarian change that pointed out that land in Africa takes 
on a connotation which goes beyond the direct link with food security and economic status, Dessalegn 
(2008b) stated that, historically, the land issue is of utmost importance in Wollo. Landlessness was an 
issue already in the 1960s, when, according to estimates, it affected around 14% of the rural population: 
land scarcity and poor agricultural productivity were indeed among the main reasons for outbound 
migrations from the Wollo province during the Imperial period. The attachment of Wollo people to this 
scarce asset has been demonstrated throughout the decades, in their opposition to land and agrarian 
reforms which destabilized the pattern of land ownership and accessibility. Dessalegn (2008b) reports 
that violent revolts were caused in 1967 by the introduction of a tax on rental income. The new fiscal 
system intended to transfer part of the tax burden suffered by tenants to landowners; but the new land 
and production measurement system introduced, and the constant arbitrariness which characterized 
                                                     
163 - The aggregate measure for Ethiopian major towns was 50.4% (2013). Reasons for being economically inactive 
include: home maker, pregnancy, student, disabled, illness, too young, old age, retired, remittance and other. 
Unemployment rates alone measured 22.1 and 22.6 percent in Dessie (2013 and 2016), 26.4 percent in Kombolcha 
(2013), 21.3 and 19.2 for Ethiopia’s major towns (2013 and 2016) (CSA 2014, 2016d). 
164 - In 2013/14, South Wollo had the second highest population density of the region (168.6 person/kmsq), 
excluding Bahir Dar City Administration, after West Gojjam (186.1 person/kmsq), see BOFED, Development 
Indicators of Amhara Region (2013/14), Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, Amhara National 
Regional State. 
165 - South Wollo is among the firsts zones of the Amhara Region according to the slope classification: 77% of its 
land is classified above 8%, 47% above 16% and 13% above 32%. Highest rates are present only in Wag Himra 
Zone and Argoba Special Woreda (BoFED 2014). 
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landowner-tenant relations, caused widespread discontent in both parties. Uprisings broke out in the 
province, and by the end of 1969, much of rural Wollo was in a state of turmoil (Dessalegn 2008b). A 
few years later, the implementation of the 1975 land reform largely overturned land ownership relations, 
leading once again to violent revolts. A diverse group of local gentries who refused a rude army’s take 
over in governmental posts, joined the opposition to the land reform led by former feudal title holders, 
and led to widespread armed conflicts which became particularly brutal in Wollo; many insurgent 
opposition fronts arose in the area, including the TPLF (Dessalegn 2008b). Also recently land was a 
conflict issue in Wollo, when the certification and redistribution policies implemented by the EPRDF’s 
local representatives have reportedly generated numerous disputes over land accessibility, it has 
undermined the legitimacy of the regime for those who were not included among the privileged ch’equn 
geberé (oppressed farmers) (Ege 1997), and eventually confirmed the authoritarian approach to rural 
politics seen in previous regimes (Dessalegn 2008b). Inasmuch as the creation of government-led 
clusters may transform the peasant-land relationship, the study on the agricultural cluster 
implementation in the zone is particularly relevant given the special attachment to the land demonstrated 
by the Wollo people over the decades. Thus the way this transformation will be carried out, the shape it 
will take, and the response that the peasants will give are relevant issues to be analysed in the area, and 
to be included in this work as part of its overall objectives. 
Lastly, South Wollo was selected also because of Wollo University’s presence in Dessie, the zone’s 
capital. Wollo University is a university that was founded recently and intends to become one of the top 
five universities in the country by 2025, in terms of quality education, research, technology transfer and 
community development services. In 2016, I received an affiliation with the Wollo University College 
of Agriculture, and during the period that I spent in Dessie I was guaranteed full access to the Dessie 
Campus, its libraries and its academic staff. I was provided accommodation facilities, and logistical 
support to foster part of my travels to the fields. During my stay, I was able to appreciate how the 
University, through the College of Agriculture, is involved in community development services, and 
research and technology transfer initiatives in many rural areas of the South Wollo Zone. These include 
reforestation projects and boosting awareness on the damages caused by deforestation, research on 
improved seeds to be applied in the zone’s specific contexts, training and other forms of collaboration 
with development agents, distribution of improved inputs, demonstrations on new technology 
implementation. The participation in some of these initiatives gave me the possibility to see that: the 
institute collaborates with various governmental bodies for the implementation of rural and agricultural 
development activities in the zone;166 the institute contributes significantly to the performance of the 
extension system by providing research outputs, practical support, and by training current and future 
development agents; and the cluster-based approach is applied also by the University. Both the doctrine 
                                                     
166 - Including the zone and woreda bureaus of agricultural and rural development, the kebele officials, the 
development agents, the primary cooperatives and the cooperative unions. 
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and the model for agricultural clusters drawn up by the Ethiopian government in the ACC and other 
cluster-related programmes does in fact emphasize the contribution of research institutes towards the 
initiatives’ positive outcome. Therefore, where these initiatives have been coordinated with other 
cluster-based activities (or else by directly adopting the model), they will be considered part of the 
clustering process in toto, and will contribute to the formulation of some broader considerations. 
 
2.1. The Context 
South Wollo is one of the 10 administrative zones of the Amhara Region. It is located in the eastern part 
of the region and is subdivided into 19 woreda and 4 town administrations. Out of the 547 kebele 
registered in 2010, 498 were classified as rural, and the remaining were urban.167 Three of the zone’s 
four major urban centres are located on the main road that connects Addis Ababa to Mekelle town, 
which crosses the zone in its eastern part: these are Dessie, Kombolcha and Hyke; Mekane Selam is the 
fourth town of the zone, located in Borena woreda, western South Wollo. Most of the population lives 
in rural areas: around 84.8% of a total of 3,033,604 in 2015.168 Notwithstanding, urbanization continues 
in South Wollo, as well as on a regional and a federal level: since the last national census (2007), urban 
population in the zone has increased from 12% (over the total population, 2007) to 15.2% (2015); from 
12.3 to 16.2 in Amhara percent, and from 16.1 to 19 percent on the federal level. At the same time, 
population in the zone has grown by 2.1% annually, at a similar pace as in the Amhara (1.9%), but 
slower than the federal average (3.3%). According to recent Regional Bureau of Finance and Economic 
Development (BoFED) estimates, South Wollo is the second most populated zone in the region, after 
North Gondar, and the second most densely populated.169 In South Wollo, besides the four urban centres, 
population density in Qalu, Tahuladere and Albuko surpasses 200 people/kmsq.  
In line with the regional average,170 agriculture plays a prominent role in the South Wollo Zone’s real 
economy: farming constitutes the main source of income for most of the population. Population growth 
and density, and the lack of relevant opportunities for inter-sectoral income differentiation, increase the 
need for an efficient and high performing agricultural sector. However, an adverse topographic 
endowment and very unreliable rainfall, hamper the sector’s development in the zone, and retain farmers 
at, or even below, subsistence levels. According to official estimates regarding the meher season in 
                                                     
167 - BOFED, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2002 E.C., Geographic Information System, Bureau of Finance and 
Economic Development, Amhara National Regional State. 
168 - This is 1 point higher than the average registered on the same year for the Amhara Region reported by regional 
estimates, and about 4.7 higher than the Ethiopian average estimated by WB. Data on urbanization and population 
growth used in the paragraph are from CSA (2007); BOFED, Population Size of Amhara Region – 2015, Bureau 
of Finance and Economic Development, Amhara National Regional State; 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2015&locations=ET&start=1960 
169 - BOFED, op. cit. 
170 - Estimated at 54.4% of GDP in 2010/11, see BOFED, Development Indicators of Amhara Region (2011/12), 
Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, Amhara National Regional State. 
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2015/16, productivity in South Wollo has indeed performed below the federal average in all major crops 
cultivated in the zone, except for some kinds of pulses, oilseeds and potatoes (CSA 2016a). As for the 
2015/16 meher season, the adversities of El Niño have definitely had a big influence on the zone’s 
productive performance; however, even in comparison with federal and zone yields for 2010/11 (a 
standard year in terms of climate conditions) the latter were lower in all but sorghum, some kinds of 
legumes, oranges, khat and hops (CSA 2011). Comparisons between cereal production yields in South 
Wollo, Amhara and Ethiopia, for 2010/11 and 2015/16 are found in table 8 in appendix B. 
Scarce productivity and the unpredictability of the main rainy season, together with a high plot 
fragmentation, and low adoption of improved inputs, vaccines, pesticides and proper storage 
mechanisms, compel South Wollo peasants to rely heavily on belg rainfalls for cultivation and animal 
husbandry (Little et al. 2006). Because of this agricultural and economic vulnerability, both chronic and 
transitory food insecurity are relevant issues for the zone, which has been repeatedly targeted by the 
FSP and other initiatives. Recent data for standard climate years (2009/10) reveals that South Wollo 
requested the largest amount of aid from the Amhara National Regional State Food Security 
Coordination and Disaster Prevention Office, compared to other zones of the Amhara Region. 332,210 
people were declared in need of aid in the form of crop, pulses, oil and nutritional food; and in the same 
year, 794,303 more users benefited from the PSNP initiatives, equal to 31.5% of the total coverage 
carried out in the region.171 Similarly, about 35.2% of regional users who were expected to free 
themselves from food insecurity through community development programmes in 2013/14, were located 
in South Wollo. Furthermore, the number of people in need of aid and not included in safety net 
programmes was estimated at 232,460 for 2013/14, corresponding to 44.9% of the total estimated 
population in need in the region (BoFED 2014).172 
This data definitely gives a clear picture of the situation of people and agriculture in many parts of South 
Wollo. However, there are some intra-zone differences that must not be neglected. Differences are due 
mainly to the area’s agroecological nature, and to the relative different agricultural potentials. The zone’s 
topography is constituted mainly by a group of central woreda characterized by steep slopes and high 
mountains, which is surrounded by a larger number of lower average altitude districts, which become 
even lower in the very peripheral areas of south-western and eastern border woreda. Most of the area 
(53.5%) is indeed classified as woine dega, corresponding to an altitude between 1500 and 2500 metres, 
                                                     
171 - BOFED, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2002 E.C., Agriculture, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, 
Amhara National Regional State. 
172 -  Based on predictions, Kebele and Community Food Security Task Forces are in charge of preparing the list 
of potentially vulnerable people, to be targeted by the PSNP. The lists are then transmitted to the Woreda Food 
Security Office, in charge of crosschecking the predictions from the kebeles with the information from the Early 
Warning System, and of communicating budget requests to the BoFED. This procedure is repeated every year and 
several times a year (Hoddinot et al. 2013). The perceivable differences between the two reported years are 
therefore not attributable to graduation (if not just marginally), but rather to the high variability of the kebele and 
woreda predictions, which are consistent above all with the irregular performance of agriculture. 
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and dega (36.4%), between 2500 and 3500 metres above sea level; these two agroecological zones are 
found in almost all South Wollo woreda. Wurch, above 3,500 metres, is found in very central woreda 
such as Legambo, Dessie Zuria and the northern part of Were Ilu, which accounts for roughly 2% of the 
total. Kolla, the agroecological zone located between 500 and 1500 metres, covers 8% of the total zone, 
and is found mainly in eastern woreda like Werebabo and Qalu, and in very peripheral parts of the south-
western woreda Kelela, Wegdi, Debresina, Mehal Sayint, Sayint and Mekdala.173 The zone’s most 
productive areasare located in the woine dega and kolla areas where soil is more fertile, rainfalls are 
more reliable, slopes are less steep and population density is moderate: these conditions are found mainly 
in southern Qalu and in western parts of Wegdi, Debresina, Sayint, Mehal Sayint, Mekdala.174 Contrarily 
to most of the zone, these areas are more likely to obtain better results from farming, and peasants living 
there suffer less frequent food insecurity and have higher economic gains. The Zone Office of 
Agriculture did not provide any individual data on each woreda’s agricultural production to verify these 
trends, but they are confirmed by researches conducted in the area over the past 10 years. 
According to several researches gathered in the Household Economy Approach website – a platform 
created by Save the Children with the Food Economy Group’s support and funding by the European 
Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations – South Wollo Zone is intersected by seven 
livelihood zones identified according to access to food, income and market patterns.175 
                                                     
173 - Data on the altitude distribution in South Wollo are from Ege (2004) and BOFED, Annual Statistical Bulletin 
2002 E.C., Geographic Information System, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, Amhara National 
Regional State. For more details on the definition and location of the agroecological zones on a national level see 
Alemayehu (2006). 
174 - Information gathered from personal communication with scholars at the College of Agriculture of the Wollo 
University, July 2016, Dessie. 
175 - Unless specified differently, the following data are from HEA LZ, Household Economy Approach, Livelihood 
Zoning Profiles, Amhara Region, Ethiopia, 2007. 
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The most widespread in the area is the South Wollo Meher Livelihood Zone (SW Meher): this area, 
where dega and woine dega agroecologies are predominant, is characterized by high deforestation, poor 
vegetation and low precipitation every third year. It is densely populated and crop production, almost 
totally rainfed, depends on the kirmet rainy season and is focused on wheat, teff, barley, red sorghum 
and legumes. The belg rainy season is generally less relevant here, but farmers residing at higher 
altitudes are forced to depend on it for subsistence; since belg rainfall is often erratic, these farmers are 
more prone to drought and famines (Kebede, Zewdu 2014). Crop production and livestock rearing 
constitute important food and cash sources for the more vulnerable groups of farmers: their own 
production accounts for 35-40 percent of total cash earnings and satisfies 40 to 60 percent of their food 
requirements. Soil analysis conducted in Wegdi showed that its composition is moderately to highly 
suitable for crop production (Motuma et al. 2016), however, the production of a marketable surplus is 
challenged even for middle and better-off farmers, who rely on non-farming sources of income for 30% 
of their total earnings. Similar conditions are found in the South Wollo Meher and Belg Livelihood Zone 
(SW Meher and Belg), characterized mainly by woine dega and kolla, where crop production follows a 
bimodal rainfall regime, and is composed mainly by sorghum, maize, teff, pulses and khat as cash crop. 
Despite generally good soil parameters for food production, soil erosion is a major issue for this zone, 
especially in areas cultivated with wheat and teff; furthermore, the relatively high population density 
causes a significant land scarcity problem (Rosell, Olvmo 2014, on Tahuladere woreda). Surplus 
production is low and concentrated among small groups of better land-endowed farmers, while poor and 
Map 16 - South Wollo, livelihood zones. Personal elaboration, source: HEA LZ platform 
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very-poor farmers’ performance is similar to that of the former zone, and they must rely on the PSNP 
for subsistence. 
Scarcer livelihood assets are found in the northern part of Delanta woreda, which is included in the 
North Wollo Highland Belg Livelihood Zone (North Wollo Belg), a high plain which extends also in 
the North Wollo Zone. The land is hardly suitable for agriculture, since water logging and frost are 
frequent due to the high altitude. The crop production follows two rainy seasons, but because of the 
harshness of kremt rains, farmers rely more on the belg for cultivation, and therefore are highly prone 
to droughts. Due to these factors, there is almost no potential for surplus crop production and almost 
50% of the population rely on the PSNP. Similar livelihood assets and agricultural production patterns 
are found in the South Wollo Belg Livelihood Zone (SW Belg), a chronically food insecure area 
characterized mainly by wurch and dega agroecologies. Because of natural events and human activities, 
the land is highly deteriorated and deforested, and the soil has a very low fertility. Heavy rains during 
kremt make the land very erodible thus peasant farmers must depend on belg. In addition, high 
population density and belg variability jeopardize peasant livelihoods even more. Major crops cultivated 
in the area include barley, faba beans, oats and lentils, which are often not enough to cover the zone’s 
requirements. Surplus production is very marginal, and very small incomes come from crop sales, even 
among the wealthiest farmers. 
Chronic food insecurity characterizes also very different agroecological contexts. In the South Wollo 
and Oromiya Eastern Lowland Livelihood Zone (SW and Oromiya), kolla is predominant, followed by 
woine dega, but agricultural production is extremely difficult for the most vulnerable farmers. 
Agriculture in the area depends mainly on kremt rainfalls, but irregular precipitation and rain scarcity 
are frequent: this is the area that has the lowest rainfall levels in the whole region; in 1994, a UNDP 
report indicated these areas as the most vulnerable to droughts.176 Sorghum, teff and maize are the main 
crops cultivated in the zone, with a very limited surplus production being obtained by better-off farmers, 
whose wealthier condition is determined mostly by their possession of livestock. 
Inverse trends are found in the rest of the South Wollo Zone: the peripheral areas in western, north-
western and south-eastern woreda. The Abay Bashilo Livelihood Zone is a kolla area suitable mainly 
for the cultivation of sorghum, teff, maize and haricot beans, which extends along the Abay and Bashilo 
rivers. The area is characterized by high temperatures, sandy soil and erratic rainfall, but the river 
proximity and the availability of uncultivated and arable land, make the area a potential surplus zone. 
As for livelihood assets, crop production and livestock rearing are the major sources of income and 
nutrition for the group of wealthiest farmers, whose condition is attributable mainly to land and livestock 
endowment; contrarily, vulnerable peasants must rely mostly on safety nets for income and produce 
only 30% of their annual food needs. In the Abay Tekeze Livelihood Zone, woine dega agroecology 
                                                     
176 - Spiess H., op. cit. 
179 
 
and moderate population density, allow for better agricultural production, generally focused on wheat, 
barley, teff, pulses and oil crops. Compared to the previous zone, self-oriented production covers a 
higher proportion of the farmers’ annual food requirements; moreover, crop and livestock sales (for 
middle and better-off farmers), and agricultural labour (for poor and very poor farmers) lowers their 
reliance on safety nets. Therefore, the southern part of Qalu presents better livelihood and surplus 
production conditions. The area, which is part of the Cheffa Velley Livelihood Zone, is characterized 
by rich loam and black alluvial soil which is eroded from the highlands and deposited in this lowland 
area. Crop production follows a mostly reliable kremt and concentrates mainly on sorghum, maize, teff, 
mung beans (masho), tobacco, fruits and vegetables. The low-density population contributes to the 
area’s food security and to generate surplus production; only a marginal group of very poor peasants 
need assistance from safety nets. Agricultural laborers immigrate seasonally from more vulnerable areas 
in Wollo and Shewa, and contribute to the creation of high incomes from crop and livestock sales, 
predominantly from better land- and cattle-endowed farmers. 
 
2.2. Agricultural Clusters in South Wollo 
As the previous section has pointed out, a mix of unfavourable agroecological conditions, population 
density, erratic rainfalls, land scarcity and low technological adoption in cultivation patterns, are 
associated to a particularly adverse climate for agricultural production in South Wollo, which often 
causes major problems in terms of food insecurity and economic poverty. The zone is mostly a food 
poor area, it is considered part of the Ethiopian famine belt since it is among the most famine prone 
areas of the country (Little et al. 2006), and it is being served by international food assistance and the 
PSNP since its introduction in 2005. As already observed, farming represents the main livelihood asset 
and source of income for the largest portion of the population; particularly, cereals and pulses are by far 
the most important crops cultivated in the area, both in terms of expansion (95.76% of all crop land) and 
total production (95.27% of total crop production volumes) (CSA 2016a). As pointed out in tables 6 and 
7 in appendix B based on the CSA’s surveys, and as confirmed by data collected on a zone level,177 teff, 
wheat and sorghum are the main staple crops in South Wollo. In 2016, wheat production was estimated 
at 1954 thousand qt, followed by teff 1823 thousand qt and sorghum 1589 qt; grown respectively on 
96,665, 124,418 and 66,550 hectares, with yields of 20.21, 14.65 and 23.87 qt/ha. 
According to these conditions, except for some very limited areas, the South Wollo Zone does not seem 
to be suitable for the implementation of the kind of commercialization clusters envisaged by the ATA 
in ACC initiative. Clustering was indeed conceived by ATA for areas where surplus production is a 
relevant factor, and where there is potential for value addition; therefore South Wollo was not included 
                                                     
177 - Data gathered at the the Zone Office of Agriculture, July 2016, Dessie. 
180 
 
among the prioritized areas selected for the ACC.178 Nevertheless, as reported by many local government 
officials,179 extension agents180 and development partners,181 and as observed during the field visits, 
clustering is currently used as a foremost approach to agricultural development in many parts of the 
South Wollo Zone, it is part of the developmental narrative of official government representatives, and 
it is bringing about major transformations in production patterns. 
The definition of agricultural clusters (or agro-based clusters, considering that no distinction is made by 
the respondents) provided by the officials of the Zone Office of Agriculture who participated to fill out 
the questionnaire I submitted runs as follows: «an agro-based cluster is simply a geographic 
concentration of producers, agribusinesses and institutions engaged in the same agricultural or agro-
industrial sub-sector, that interconnect and build value networks when addressing common challenges 
and pursuing common opportunities». Agricultural clusters are composed of bordering or nearby plots 
(kuta gettem, in Amharic) where farmers receive instructions and training on the commodity with the 
greates potential for the area based on its agro-ecology and market demand. Clusters are envisaged to 
improve cultivation patterns and productivity levels through a more effective use of natural resources 
and the adoption of appropriate technologies and agricultural inputs. As declared, with clusters the GoE 
envisages «to change farmers’ attitude toward cultivation» by shifting from multi- to mono-cropping, 
and to stimulate the growth of marketable surplus as a result.182 Farmers are provided specific inputs 
and credit, and are followed by cluster leaders, 1 to 5 teams and development agents to encourage the 
adoption of best cultivation practices. Furthermore, clusters are expected to foster collaboration among 
producers, to improve their market accessibility, to lower transaction costs throughout the agro-
industrial value chain, to enhance integration among actors, and ultimately to attract foreign investors 
and boost export commodities. The main implementers of the agricultural clusters found at the Zone 
Office were all those involved in the delivery of agricultural extension, credit and marketing services: 
the Zone and Woreda Offices of Agriculture, the kebele authorities, the DAs, the cooperative unions, 
the primary cooperatives and the farmers. 
This total coherence with the objectives and rationale set by the National Framework of the ACC is 
compelling.183 Considering that the ACC is set to operate in surplus areas and where there is 
agroecological potential for value addition,184 and that South Wollo does not enjoy a competitive 
                                                     
178 - Interview with Zegeye Teklu. 
179 - Interview with Mesfin Dagne, Head of the Zone Office of Agriculture, 20 July 2016, Dessie. Interviews with 
the representatives of the selected woreda, July-September 2016. 
180 - Interviews with extension agents in the selected kebeles, July-September 2016. 
181 - Information gathered at the College of Agriculture of the Wollo University and from personal exchanges with 
representatives of the US Peace Corps, July 2016, Dessie. 
182 - Interview with Mesfin Dagne. 
183 - ATA, National Framework for Agriculture Commercialization Clusters in Ethiopia. Concept, Vision, 
Strategic Interventions and Implementation Framework, Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency, 
unpublished draft. 
184 - Wondirad Mandefro, op. cit. 
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advantage in this sense, this dissidence raises major concerns regarding the appropriateness and 
operational viability of similar clusters in these contexts. Likewise, the reasons for not including South 
Wollo among the ACC initiatives were linked to its agro-ecology, population density and food security 
conditions.185 For this reason, on a national level the ACC prioritized other areas with stronger 
potentials. However, at the same time, respondents at the Zone Office of Agriculture in South Wollo 
declared that in the last years (without specific dates), the Office had started identifying areas and 
commodities with potential for agricultural clusters.186 The process has been conducted in collaboration 
with the ATA, the MoANR and its regional desk, and has led to the selection of four areas with «suitable 
agro-ecology, area coverage and farmer experience». The key point to understand the ambiguous 
scenario was given by respondents at the Zone Office of Agriculture: «clusterization has not started with 
a federal or regional proclamation; we receive clusterization directly through different technical 
trainings and by considering our potential». For this reason, although information and reports from the 
ATA announced that agricultural clusters were still in the planning and rudimentary phases of 
implementation in other areas of the country, evidence from South Wollo suggested that the approach 
has already made a vehement entry on the scene of rural politics, with a substantial potential in terms of 
agrarian change. 
According to information gathered at the Zone Office of Agriculture, the identification of the four main 
clusters was done following selection criteria that associated potential commodities with woreda. 
Commodities were selected for their potential in terms of import substitution, export, agro-processing 
opportunity, productivity growth, food security, job creation and local market demand. Woreda were 
grouped accordingly based on agroecological similarity and geographic proximity. The whole South 
Wollo Zone area was subsequently subdivided into four main clusters by the agricultural experts, as I 
illustrated in map 2. Each cluster extends over different woreda: all the woreda are included in one or 
more clusters, and every kebele of each woreda is expected to participate. Consequently, all the crop 
land of the zone is classified according to its agricultural potential, and potentially affected by cluster 
policy. However, interviews with officials from the sampled woreda reported that only a limited number 
of woreda and kebele was selected for clusters. 
                                                     
185 - Interview with Zegeye Teklu. 
186 - Data gathered at the Zone Office of Agriculture through the submission of a written questionnaire in July 
2016, Dessie. The following quotes and information in the paragraph are taken from open answers to the 
questionnaire. 
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For each main cluster, several commodities (between 4 and 10) were selected by the agricultural experts 
according to their development potential: cereals (wheat, teff, sorghum, barley), pulses (mung beans, 
haricot beans, faba beans, field peas, field lentils, fenugreek), horticultural crops (apple, plum, mango, 
banana, citrus and various vegetables), animal products (from beekeeping and dairy) and livestock 
(goats, sheep, poultry and fish). Nevertheless, for the main cropping season in 2016, officials stated that 
the Zone Office gave priority to only 3 cereals: wheat for consumption and the local flour factory, malt 
barley to supply the local malt industry, and sorghum for food security and local markets. Yet, as the 
following sections will demonstrate, extension agents and officials in the administration’s lower tiers 
had selected these and many other commodities for clusters. 
Within each main cluster, all the woreda were subdivided further into smaller clusters and sub-clusters 
-whose extent varied from area to area - where specific commodities were identified, given priority, 
promoted and fostered. As reported by the zone Head and observed during the following interviews in 
the woreda, at the time of the survey cluster development had not achieved an equal distribution in South 
Wollo. Although the project was expected to cover all of the zone’s cultivated land, by 2016 the woreda 
boards and the kebele authorities had targeted only limited portions of it for clustering. Therefore, as far 
as land and commodities were concerned, the central planning proposed and boldly endorsed at zone 
level, did not prove to be effective on the field. 
 
3. Clustering, Evidence from the Field 
 
Map 2 - Four main clusters in South Wollo. Personal elaboration, source: Zone Office of Agriculture 
183 
 
Three points have emerged so far, that need to be explained in order to understand the process of 
implementation of the cluster-based approach in Ethiopian agriculture, and to introduce the evidence 
from the field visits. To begin with, since clusters are aimed at targeting each phase of the agro-industrial 
value chain, the implementation process is expected to take on different shapes and to involve different 
actors, depending on the phase. Clustering in South Wollo has started in the past few years and its 
development pathway is closely connected to the above mentioned limiting factors that hamper the 
agricultural sector’s performance of the. Accordingly, the fieldwork is centred mainly on the agricultural 
side of the chain from the perspectives of the peasant and the agrarian change studies, and has focused 
mainly on the major issues of land tenure, input accessibility, farming practices and, only marginally, 
market access.  
Secondly, the information gathered on a federal and zone level, shows that the clustering policy in 
Ethiopia was proceeding simultaneously on different administrative tiers: on the top level, the ATA has 
promoted the selection of a few choice clusters and paved the way for its emulation by the MoANR and 
downward to its decentralized desks. At the same time, through technical training, recommendations for 
a cluster-based approach to agricultural development were spread downward to regional, zone, woreda 
and kebele levels. Moreover, the dialectic used by the interviewed officials revealed an upward 
accountability by each administrative post, according to which a greater extent of targeted land and 
higher number of involved farmers, yielded improved results; and this upward accountability may 
explain the data discrepancy on cluster size, that was found at different levels of the administration. 
Interviews and personal talks with DAs, kebele leaders, and local government representatives (on 
different levels), as well as watching their attitude toward farmers, have provided useful insights towards 
understanding these dynamics. 
Thirdly, it is worth pointing out that the lack of a relevant policy framework, declaration or guideline 
for agricultural clusters, reveals the co-existence of different agrarian policy decision and command 
entities, that have significant influence on daily rural politics. Accordingly, it is apparent that 
government-induced agrarian change processes in contemporary Ethiopia are not only tied to officially 
declared policy acts or reforms, but are also affected by less discernible administration and command 
entities that operate through a top-down approach. The fieldwork explored how these mechanisms 
operate at grass-roots level and how this affects peasant production relations. 
Due to the novelty, and the unclear policy framework, that characterizes the implementation of these 
clusters in Ethiopia - particularly so for areas with low to medium agricultural potentials – the topic has 
not attracted yet significant attention by the academic and research-oriented realms. The fieldwork has 
therefore aimed at filling this gap by surveying the status of implementation of the cluster-based 
approach in multiple locations and from the main implementers’ different perspectives. Based on the 
information gathered from the Zone Office of Agriculture, on the Wollo University staff’s contacts, and 
on logistical accessibility, four woreda where clusters have reached a relevant level of development 
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were selected for further investigations: Tahuladere, Qalu, Dessie Zuria and Were Ilu. As the interviews 
with each woreda’s officers have proved, almost every woreda and kebele owns statistical information 
on land size and the number of farming households included in the clusters. Based on data gathered from 
each of these Woreda Offices of Agriculture, 10 kebele with a relevant presence of crop clusters were 
selected for field visits: four in Tahuladere woreda, three in Qalu, one in Dessie Zuria and two in Were 
Ilu. In order to study the different ways the crop clusters are created based on local agroecological and 
agroeconomic conditions, and how their transformational potential is shaped by context-specific 
relationships between peasants and the state/party multilevel apparatus, the presentation will proceed 
one kebele at a time, grouped by woreda, according to the order given above. Subsequently, the main 
evidence from the field visits will be gathered, completed with additional information and discussed 
from an overall perspective, in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the most substantial 
and widespread elements of agrarian transformation. 
 
3.1. Tahuladere 
Being part of the abovementioned South Wollo Meher and Belg Livelihood Zone, Tahuladere woreda 
is characterized mainly by woine dega and kolla agro-ecologies, two rainy seasons and low-medium 
agricultural potential compared to the rest of the zone. Soil erosion and high population density187 lead 
to a particularly severe land scarcity which hampers further the area’s food security and economic status 
                                                     
187 - Population density figures per woreda come from BOFED, Regional Atlas Maps, Bureau of Finance and 
Economic Development, Amhara National Regional State. 
Map 3 – Kebele selected for fieldwork 
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(Rosell, Olvmo 2014). The Woreda Office of Agriculture confirmed that agriculture in Tahuladere has 
a low performance, its production is almost totally used up for subsistence by small-scale farming 
households or redistributed through local markets to food deficit households; these conditions make 
Tahuladere a food insecure area thus included in the PSNP.188 The woreda is subdivided administratively 
in 21 kebele and covers around 469 kmsq.189 Wheat, teff and sorghum are the woreda’s main crops, 
taking up a total of 16,133 ha of land. The woreda is part of the Qalu-Worebabu main cluster selected 
on a zone level. 126 clusters have been created in the woreda, covering over 7222 ha and involving 18 
kebele; these are distributed as follows: 33 clusters for sorghum, 69 for teff, 19 for wheat and 5 for 
mango. 
Clusterization in Tahuladere started in 2013, following directives issued by the Regional Office of 
Agriculture, which informed the woreda counterpart about the urgency of creating clusters for 
agricultural development. As declared by the interviewed official, the only purpose of clustering in 
Tahuladere is to increase the quantity and quality of farmers’ production, and consequently improve 
their food security status. In the clustering narrative on the woreda level, no reference is made to 
improving commercialization or marketable surplus for any value addition activities. Therefore, 
clustering in Tahuladere is intended mainly to promote an efficient application of inputs, to improve 
natural resource management, to prevent plant diseases, and to promote collaboration among farmers 
and scaling up of best practices. Clusters are indeed defined simply as bordering plots which are 
considered suitable for cultivation of the same crop, and therefore selected by kebele authorities and 
development agents. Because of poor production, within the woreda there is no structured aggregation 
or collection of farmers’ production from clusters after harvest, nor specific linkages to cooperatives or 
processing factories. 
 
3.1.1. Hitacha 
Hitacha kebele extends mostly on a medium altitude woine dega area, on the main road which connects 
Hayk and Dessie. The first clusters were created in 2015, following recommendations by the regional 
government: three teff clusters were active in 2016, covering a total of 748 hectares and involving 739 
household farmers.190 The selection of land and crops to be farmed in the three clusters has proved 
particularly interesting in Hitacha. Although the two local DAs that have been interviewed declared that 
the selection has been made primarily by local experts, this may have been influenced by specific 
                                                     
188 - Data are gathered from the interview with an official of the Tahuladere Office of Agriculture, 24 August 2016, 
Wohilo kebele. Information, rationale and definition of clusters provided in the section are gathered from that 
interview. 
189 - BOFED, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2002 E.C., Geographic Information System, Bureau of Finance and 
Economic Development, Amhara National Regional State. 
190 - Interviews with two DAs working in Hitacha, 25 August 2016, Hitacha kebele. Following information and 
quotes are gathered from these two interviews. 
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instructions from higher administrative posts. As reported, the selection was indeed done based on the 
area’s productive potential (as repeatedly stated on a federal and zone level) and on the «development 
packages distributed by the Amhara Region». The development packages consist of improved inputs 
(mainly seeds and fertilizers) and training distributed to the Woreda Office of Agriculture and the DAs 
by regional experts (bypassing the zone level), destined to be subsequently extended to farmers. These 
packages are commodity-led, and their distribution to the DAs (carried out directly by the Woreda Office 
of Agriculture or through its kebele correspondent) is determined by the kind of «crops selected by the 
region for cluster purposes». Therefore, the DAs have access only to development packages assigned to 
specific commodities which have been selected at higher levels, and can only allocate the extension 
services they deliver to farmers’ clusters, on this limited basis. No complaints have been raised directly 
on the issue by the interviewed DAs; nor does this study dispute the fact that any decisions made on a 
regional level may be wrong simply because of their distance from the local contexts. However, this 
top-down mechanism is particularly compelling. 
Moreover, during the interviews the DAs pointed out in a covert manner the area’s suitability for khat 
cultivation, and this crop’s importance in terms of cash earnings for local farmers. At the same time, 
they showed some disappointment for the fact that this income potential is not being exploited because 
khat is not included among the commodities selected for development packages or clusters in the area, 
because of the dependency pattern it may cause in its consumers. Therefore it is evident that clustering 
decisions on a local level are limited to a range of options defined at higher government tiers. At the 
same time, it is equally obvious that smallholder farmer income earning opportunities through cash crops 
are channelled, if not hampered, by an agricultural policy aimed at attaining national food self-
sufficiency through the mass production of staple crops. 
One of the three clusters created in Hitacha has been sponsored by the Wollo University, who organized 
the training and distributed improved teff seeds to farmers who own bordering plots with similar 
agroecological conditions.191 The University also trained farmers to create an association for seed 
multiplication among the cluster’s producers: the Hitacha Seed Multiplication and Buying Association, 
that in 2015 was able to sell 15 qt of seeds to the Amhara Rehabilitation and Development Association 
(AMELD, a government-led development association), that subsequently distributed them to other 
kebele in Tahuladere. 8 interviewed farmers were part of this cluster: they received improved seeds for 
free from the University, but were obliged to buy fertilizers from the multiservice cooperative, the only 
legal supplier. In spite of the presence of a preferential access to the AMELD to whom farmers sold 
collectively (at 28 birr/kg) to lower transportation costs, none of the farmers had a contract agreement 
with the association, nor with the Wollo University. According to the DAs, the University, who provided 
                                                     
191 - Information, data and opinions expressed in the following paragraphs are gathered from individual interviews 
with 10 farmers and 1 focus group discussion realized with the same farmers, 25 August 2016, Hitacha kebele. 
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the improved seeds, will probably request part of the harvest as a form of payment, but none of the 
interviewed farmers was aware of that, nor were they willing to give up any of their outputs; the lack of 
written contract agreements between the parts is a major issue. The cluster is driven by a central 
committee that monitors cultivations and controls the quality of the product before selling to the 
AMELD; most of the interviewed farmers were not included in the elections for the cluster leader, who 
is a model farmer and an active party member. 
The other two clusters were created by kebele leaders and DAs: farmers bought inputs from cooperatives 
and from the Kebele Office of Agriculture, and sold their surplus production to local markets. Contrarily 
to what is designed on a national level, cooperatives were not indicated by the DAs as the preferential 
destination for farmers’ outputs, and the interviews with farmers confirmed that no change has occurred 
in their marketing relationship with cooperatives following the creation of clusters. In these cases, no 
kind of post-harvest aggregation was organized in order to lower transportation and transaction costs. 
Farmers complained about the constantly increasing prices of fertilizers and blamed the government for 
not legalizing free trade: one farmer admitted having bought fertilizers from local black markets, where 
prices were half those asked by the cooperative. Two others denounced what they reported as being a 
common concern among farmers in Hitacha: land adaptability to fertilizers. The improved seeds sown 
on clusterized land require an intense application of processed fertilizers, which generates initial gains 
in terms of productivity, but in the mid-to-long-term causes soil depletion and forces farmers to apply 
increasing quantities of fertilizers in order to generate outputs, with a relevant economic burden. 
According to information gathered from the DAs, on average improved teff needs 50 kg/ha of DAP or 
80 kg/ha of urea to be cultivated in Hitacha. 
The DAs declared that, thanks to the application of improved inputs and to more efficient cultivation 
practices, teff production among cluster farmers has doubled compared to previous periods: from 13 
qt/ha to 25-30 qt/ha. These data are undoubtedly unreliable since the average national yield for the 
2015/16 year was 15, and South Wollo’s average was even lower. Interviews with farmers indeed 
confirmed that teff productivity increased significantly the year that cultivations were performed in 
clusters (130% on average), but the actual yields were much lower than those claimed by the experts, 
and ranged between 7 and 16 qt/ha. Interviews with the farmers, disclosed that around 68% of the total 
crop land owned by them (0.76 ha each, on average) was included into clusters. The main reason for 
participating which arose from the focus group discussion, was linked to the possibility to receive free 
inputs from the Wollo University and to have better results in terms of productivity. Only one farmer 
among those interviewed refused to be part of the cluster, due to the excessive manpower required by 
the cultivation practices implemented in the cluster: i.e. sowing on line, which requires farmer 
collaboration to be carried out. The DAs claimed that many farmers refused to be included in cluster 
cultivations, but were then convinced through training and demonstrations of their productive potential. 
8 out of the 10 interviewed farmers used to diversify their crop production more before clusterization - 
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mainly with wheat, maize, vegetables, khat and pulses – as a coping strategy in case any of the crops 
failed. With cluster cultivations, diversification has decreased, and one of the interviewed farmers 
admitted that if his teff crop should fail he will be forced to ask the kebele authorities for assistance. 
 
3.1.2. Wohilo 
The Wohilo kebele is located on a high altitude woine dega area, in the eastern part of Tahuladere. The 
area is connected to the main road (Dessie-Hayk) by dismal roadways, only accessible by bajaji or 
animal-drawn vehicles.192 Out of the total 1031 hectares of cultivated land, in 2015 405 ha were 
dedicated to cluster production: 65 ha and 231 households were involved in one wheat cluster, 340 ha 
and 843 households in two teff clusters. In 2016 the total number of households in the kebele was 1427, 
but since many households had plots in all three clusters, the sum of the abovementioned numbers is not 
a real estimate of the proportion of households’ involvement in clusters. 5 DAs are active in the kebele, 
each of them specializes in different agricultural-related issues and extension services: crop, animal 
sciences, natural resources and land management, irrigation and credit. The interviewed DA (specialized 
in crop cultivation) has taken part in the selection of areas to be included in the clusters, led by experts 
from the Regional Office of Agriculture. As for the commodity of choice, the same dynamics observed 
in Hitacha were replicated in Wohilo: the selection has been conducted mainly by regional experts based 
on local potential, and khat has not been included despite its high cultivation suitability. The potential 
for profit from khat production was even greater in Wohilo, where some of the interviewed farmers have 
recently gotten much richer thanks to the sale of this crop. Nevertheless, the DA declared that khat 
clusters are not feasible for two main reasons: farmers would not agree to shift their production to single 
and cash crops, because of the risks connected to food security; and regional experts were not keen on 
stimulating the consumption of an unhealthy crop, despite its income generation potential. 
The DA reported that many farmers refused to take part in cluster cultivations because sowing on line 
and weeding procedures required by these kinds of cultivations are highly labour intensive and require 
a remarkable amount of manpower which many households do not dispose of. One of the interviewed 
farmers confirmed that these problems were motivated his choice to refuse being clusterized, while 
another declared he was not included because his land is in an unsuitable area for wheat or teff 
production. The other interviewed farmers accepted because of the estimated productivity growth, and 
benefits associated to working together. Nevertheless, when questioned on the problems related to 
clustering, all of them answered with the same issues as raised by the DA. 
                                                     
192 - Information in the first paragraphs of this section was gathered from the interview with a DA working in 
Wohilo, 24 August 2016, Wohilo kebele. 
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In 4 out of 6 interviewed farmers with clusterized plots, land was 100% covered by cluster crops: 
diversification was remarkably lower and the proportion of purchased food items increased compared 
to previous years.193 In spite of the growth found in the amount of food items purchased from markets, 
compared to previous years, no particular concern was expressed by farmers regarding the risk 
associated to relying on one single crop. If the crop does fail, both the DA and the farmers agreed that 
the government (mengistu) will provide for the food requirements: in Wohilo, the PSNP covers the cases 
of chronic food insecurity. It is worth noticing here that the respondents’ lack of fear, is not due to an 
irrelevant risk in terms of food security associated to cluster development, but to the presence of an 
active safety net which intervenes in case of failure. Therefore the implementation of the cluster program 
depends heavily on complementary support, and concerns may be raised if clustering production should 
extend beyond the PSNP’s coverage capacity. 
In line with national and regional recommendations, cooperatives are expected to play a major role in 
input distribution and production aggregation. Before the establishment of clusters, improved seeds were 
purchased from both primary cooperatives and local markets; with clusters, all the interviewed farmers 
bought seeds from the cooperative, where quality was reported to be higher, despite the lower prices 
available at local markets. This was not seen by farmers as an obligation (gedeta), but as an acceptance 
of expert suggestions in order to achieve better results. As for fertilizers, no change in farmers’ purchase 
of fertilizers from the cooperative, nor in their utilization has been reported with clusterization. After 
harvest, farmers were not told where to sell, leaving to them the possibility to decide between local 
markets or the primary cooperative, as they prefer. As reported by many respondents, this situation was 
not expected to last much longer since, according to plans, primary cooperatives and cooperative unions 
will soon be able to aggregate farmer production. 
The three main clusters are divided in sub-clusters, forming a multilevel hierarchy, which ranges from 
the smallest groups of 8-10 farmers, to the largest composed by 200-400 households. Each sub-cluster 
is driven by a cluster leader whose role is to inform, motivate, support, coordinate and represent the 
farmers in meetings with DAs and kebele authorities. These leaders are not elected, but selected 
according to their education level, production capacity, economic status and public role in the kebele. 
12 leaders are at the top of the complex command system; on the bottom levels, there are 1 to 5 teams 
who are also active in cluster development, with the same purposes. 
 
3.1.3. Gobeya 
                                                     
193 - Information from the DA is completed with information gathered from individual interviews and 1 focus 
group discussion realized with 8 farmers, 24 August 2016, Wohilo kebele. 
190 
 
The Gobeya kebele covers a low-altitude woine dega area, south of the Lake Hayk, east of Hayk town. 
It is a food insecure area where teff clusters have been created since 2014. According to the interviewed 
DA, by 2016 8 teff clusterswere established, covering all of the kebele’s 117 hectares of land, and 
involving all of the 135 farming households.194 Field visits disproved these data because in at least two 
vast areas farmers refused to sow teff due to the excessive presence of wetland that would have 
threatened its cultivation. As gathered from the individual interviews and the focus group discussion 
with a selected number of farmers, many producers in the community opposed teff clustering also on 
land with more suitable agroecological conditions, for two main reasons: they could not afford the prices 
of the improved seeds and fertilizers, and they did not agree to sow and weed jointly and according to 
time schedules and practices indicated by the DAs. The interviewed DA claimed the oppositions were 
settled: farmers were convinced through training and thanks to the economic contribution from 
development assistance organizations who provided credit to purchase inputs. Field visits and talks with 
farmers once again reported a very different scenario. Most of the respondents did accept to participate 
both because of the expected benefits in terms of production, and the possibility to receive seeds for free 
offered by the whole extension service structure (Kebele Office of Agriculture and DAs). Instead, 2 
farmers declared they were forced to accept by experts and kebele authorities. 
Clustering was implemented overtly to increase production and to foster food security in the kebele: 
specialization, instead of diversification, was considered the main strategy to achieve these goals. 
Considering that, as claimed by respondents, production in the area rarely surpasses subsistence levels 
and therefore surplus volumes are almost irrelevant, the kebele has no structured aggregation systems 
or output channelling, and farmers usually sell (their production quota which is not destined to self-
consumption) to local markets, where prices are more favourable. The kebele level primary cooperative 
was therefore inactive for post-harvest activities at the time of the survey, nor was it particularly active 
for input distribution since farmers preferred purchasing seeds (the quota not delivered for free by the 
extension agents) from local markets, where prices were lower. Fertilizers, on the contrary (and 
according to the law), were purchased from the cooperative by credit at very high interest rates, thus 
causing farmers to be indebted.  
All the interviewed farmers complained about being in debt, which is caused indirectly by cluster 
production. Moreover, during the field visits, in two cases farmers expressed their deep concern after 
the teff seeds sown in the cluster failed to germinate, and demanded the DA’s help to guarantee their 
households’ food security. Therefore, similarly to what was seen in Hitacha, cluster development is 
obviously causing problems to farmers, making complementary services necessary to compensate. 
Initially, the DAs convinced the farmers to sow improved teff seeds– distributed for free or purchased 
                                                     
194 - Information, data and opinions in the section are gathered from: interview with a DA working in Gobeya, 
individual interviews and 1 focus group discussion with 10 farmers, 23 August 2016, Gobeya kebele. 
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from local markets – to achieve a high productive potential. Then, seeing that cultivating these seeds 
required a substantial use of chemical fertilizers, farmers became indebted with saving and credit 
cooperatives for their purchase. Consequently, in case of crop failure, farmers face a double problem: 
food insecurity and indebtedness.  
Crop diversification has accordingly been greatly reduced among Gobeya’s farmers, since 62% of 
interviewed farmers’ crop land was shifted exclusively to teff cultivation. Many of the interviewed 
farmers picked chickpea (shimbra) and grass pea (guaya) as alternative crops to be planted before the 
shorter rainy season in case of teff failure, and associated this possibility to a modest chance of recovery; 
but the focus group discussion disclosed that concerns about food insecurity risks were not completely 
alleviated by the presence of these alternative solutions. 
The DAs and other local authorities selected 8 leaders to play a central role in spreading information, 
they are the first farmers to have access to and apply new technologies, and they operate as 
intermediaries between cluster farmers and extension agents: none of them are involved in input 
distribution nor post-harvest output aggregation. They have been selected among the most proactive and 
educated model farmers,195 and farmers’ participation in the selection process was not considered. 
 
3.1.4. Jari 
The Jari kebele is the only area selected for visits, which have been dedicated to the creation of cash 
crop clusters, specifically mango. Mango cultivation was started in 4 clusters in 2015, following the 
instructions from experts of the Regional Office of Agriculture, and the DA’s selection of this specific 
commodity.196 The establishment of mango clusters comes with the promise to build the necessary 
infrastructures to connect the kebele to the main road and the markets. Currently, the largest cropping 
area of the kebele cannot be reached by any motor vehicle and is about a 1-hour walk away from the 
main road that connects Hayk with the northern zones and cities. Considering that the plants will produce 
the first mangos in 3-4 years, major infrastructural works are required in the area in order to allow 
farmers to fully benefit from the extensive cultivations they have started. 
According to plans, mango clusters in Jari kebele are expected to occupy around a third of the total crop 
land and the great majority of peasant households: 248 out of 612 hectares, and 916 out of 1181 
households. According to the interviewed DA, the planned coverage was almost completed, but as 
declared by the leader of the four clusters, their extension did not go beyond 4 hectares and 90 
                                                     
195 - The DA declared that in the kebele there were 25 model farmers, defined on the basis of production capacity, 
livestock asset and resistance to famine. 
196 - Interview with a DA working in Jari, 22 August 2016, Jari kebele. 
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households. As observed during field visits,197 mango cultivations are very limited (slightly above 1000 
square metres on average among the interviewed farmers), involved plots are not adjacent, and mango 
plants are intercropped with cereals or pulses. Due to the limited extension of mango cultivations, and 
the intercropping practice, farmers’ cropping diversification has not changed significantly. 
Among the respondents, farmers involved in mango clusters have generally accepted in order to benefit 
from more collaboration in defending the fields from depletion caused by animals and disease, and from 
increased market opportunities offered by the practice of selling collectively. According to the 
conversation with the DA, the DAs and experts from the Regional Office of Agriculture selected the 
land of the kebele to be part of the cluster, based on its geographical and agroecological conditions. 
According to regional indications, farmers purchased mango seeds from the AMELD, the local primary 
cooperative and the Kebele Office of Agriculture at a fixed price of 10 birr each, while the price in local 
markets was 5 times higher. Interviewed farmers have also been informed that, if they should plant the 
purchased seeds in a plot which has not been selected for clustering, or if one of the mango plants will 
not produce according to expectations because of their negligence, they will be charged 1,000 Birr fines. 
There is no written agreement on this rule, but every interviewed farmer was aware of this possibility. 
Each of the 4 clusters is ruled by a chairman, a cashier and a secretary,198 who are responsible for 
assessing any case of this kind that will occur. 
 
3.2. Qalu 
The Qalu woreda is located in the south-eastern part of the South Wollo Zone and, as seen in previous 
sections, it is characterized by generally more favourable agroecological conditions. In spite of that, the 
area is not exempt from food insecurity problems, and a considerable group of peasants is very 
vulnerable to droughts, soil erosion, erratic rainfalls and relative famines. Cluster development started 
in 2014, following training and recommendations from the Regional Office of Agriculture.199 By 2016, 
87 clusters and up to 400 sub-clusters occupying a total of 9000 hectares were created, focusing mainly 
on sorghum production, followed by wheat and teff. According to indications, clusters are usually made 
up by 200-300 farming households, which are then subdivided into smaller groups of 5-20 households 
to form a sub-cluster. 
As declared by two representatives of the Woreda Office of Agriculture, cluster development in Qalu 
follows the model created by the ATA and its main purpose is to: encourage the use of improved inputs 
                                                     
197 - Following findings are from individual interviews and one focus group discussion with 10 farmers, 22 August 
2016, Jari kebele. 
198 - According to interviews with farmers, in Jari these figures and the cluster leaders have been selected by the 
DAs or elected in one-candidate polls. 
199 - Findings in the paragraphs are from individual interviews with a former official and the Vice Head of the 
Woreda Office of Agriculture of Qalu, 23 July and 2 Semptember 2016, Kombolcha. 
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in farming activities, foster mechanization, prevent disasters, increase collaboration and sharing of best 
practices among farmers, and improve their linkages to the markets. Improved seeds were reportedly 
distributed with cash payments or loans, issued by the Amhara Credit Service. With the application of 
the same input and cultivation practices, in land with similar characteristics, cluster cultivations are 
expected to ease the work of extension agents, and to generate an increase in production and 
productivity. Along with the crucial role of extension workers, cluster leaders, development groups and 
1 to 5 teams are expected to contribute further to the creation of a collaborative environment, to organize 
production, to motivate farmers, to create awareness and spread best practices. Until summer 2016, 
agricultural clusters in Qalu were expected mainly to supply local consumption, and eventual surplus, 
if any, was not intended to supply any processing industry or agro-industrial system. In 2015, the surplus 
of sorghum seeds that was created through clusters was collected mainly by the Borkena Union, and the 
biggest state-owned seed producing enterprise of the Amhara Region, the Amhara Seeds Enterprise. The 
collection was done without any contract agreements, through offhand negotiations with local primary 
cooperatives and (kebele and woreda) agriculture offices. Because of rainfall and production 
unpredictability, according to the interviewed representatives it was going to be very difficult to assess 
whether the main 2016 cropping season was going to be able to guarantee a surplus production. If this 
did happen, surplus was expected to be absorbed by local markets because the Woreda Office had not 
established a structured collection system. 
According to the Vice Head of the Qalu Office of Agriculture, clusters were not associated with reduced 
crop diversification for two main reasons: household land is usually fragmented into various plots which 
are located in different areas and not all involved in the cluster together; secondly, sorghum production 
(which is the most common cluster crop) allows intercropping with other crops such as sesame. In 
addition, clusters were not directly linked to an increased food insecurity vulnerability for farmers also 
because of the presence of community development programs to provide off-farm job creation and safety 
nets. None of the interviewed farmers or DAs reported intercropping as a suitable strategy for sorghum 
cultivation, and in 2 of the 3 visited kebele, only God or mengistu’s assistance were considered a viable 
solution in the event of a cluster crop failure.  
Clustering has not been implemented without farmer opposition: in many cases this indeed caused 
tensions and clashes between farmers and extension workers. One of the interviewed officials declared 
that many farmers did not accept to be organized into clusters because they did not agree with cultivating 
schedules planned by the experts. When participating in clusters, farmers are indeed instructed to prepare 
the land, sow, weed and harvest at the same time, to enjoy the benefits of collaboration, and to allow 
extension workers to manage better the activities. The time schedule is fixed by the extension workers 
themselves and it usually follows a standard timetable based on rainfall and cropping seasons. 
Conversely, due to the recent intensification of rainfall unpredictability, in these past years farmers have 
scheduled their cultivation activities according to actual rains. As claimed by the official, expert 
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instructions proved disastrous in 2015, when farmers who followed them and sowed improved seeds in 
June had failed cultivations, while those who sowed local seeds in May when the rainy season had 
actually started, achieved better results. 
 
3.2.1. Wodajo 
The Wodajo kebele is located in eastern Qalu, on the border with the Oromia Zone, and it is crossed by 
the road that connects Kombolcha with the Afar Region. It is characterized by a low-altitude woine dega 
environment, between 2000 and 1500 metres above the sea level. Wodajo has 935 hectares of total 
cultivated land, 534 of which were declared clusterized by the DA met in the field.200 2016 was the first 
year of implementation of the clustering program, and 6 areas were selected for cluster sorghum and 
faba bean (masho) cultivations, involving 595 out of a total of 1230 farming households in the kebele; 
as claimed by the interviewed farmers, one leader for each cluster was elected by the members. The 
main reasons for accepting to be a part of the cluster program, according to the interviewed farmers, 
were linked to expectations of an increased protection from plant diseases, an increased productivity 
provided by improved seeds and the on line sowing practice to be performed in the cluster fields. Focus 
group discussions revealed that the farmers who refused or opposed to take part in the clusters had many 
reasons: they were scared of the monocropping system; they could not afford to purchase the large 
amount of fertilizers required by the improved seeds; they could not gather the sufficient manpower 
needed to sow on line; and they preferred to plant local instead of improved seeds, believed to have 
lower yields, despite faster growth.201 
Contrarily to what stated by the DA, many of the interviewed farmers affirmed that planting improved 
seeds was not a mandatory condition to take part in the cluster. Improved masho seeds were distributed 
for free by FAO and Concern Worldwide, or bought from primary cooperatives such as the Cheffatà 
cooperative; and sorghum seeds were delivered by the Srinka Agricultural Research Center, and local 
cooperatives. Fertilizer prices were a major issue for all the interviewed farmers since, as already 
observed in the case of teff, the improved sorghum seeds planted in Wodajo required the application of 
a large amount of fertilizer, and for many of them prices were not affordable. Extension workers had 
not issued any gedeta for fertilizer application in cluster fields, but farmers needed to purchase them, in 
order not to waste all the sown seeds.  
                                                     
200 - Findings in the section are from a collective interview with an official of the Kebele Office of Agriculture and 
a DA working in Wodajo, individual interviews and a focus group discussion with 10 farmers, 30 August 2016, 
Wodajo kebele. 
201 - Officials of the agricultural bureau confirmed that local seeds are better in terms of yields but need 7-8 months 
for production, whereas improved seeds have worse yields but grow in 3-4 months. 
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 As for market linkages, the focus group discussion revealed that the extension worker did not provide 
any indications on where and how to sell farmer outputs, and that farmers will most likely sell their 
surplus production (if any) to local markets; incidentally the DA proved to be very optimistic in 
forecasting that half of the total production will be marketed. Among the interviewed farmers, almost 
all the crop land at their disposal has been cultivated with the cluster crop. In case of failure, neither the 
1 to 5 leaders (very active in cluster development), nor the cluster leader, nor the DA will be held 
responsible; «but mengistu will certainly provide assistance». 
 
3.2.2.  Addis Mender 
The Addis Mender kebele is located in the southern part of Qalu woreda, it is crossed by the Dessie - 
Addis Ababa road, and it is characterized by kolla and low-altitude woine dega. Addis Mender is part 
of the Cheffa Valley Livelihood Zone, which has a supposedly high potential for agricultural production 
and favourable conditions in terms of food security. However, the unpredictable rains determine the 
performance of the agricultural sector and the vulnerable food security that comes with it. According to 
information provided by the DA deployed in Addis Mender, cluster establishment started in 2011.202 In 
2016, according to the Kebele Office of Agriculture’s estimate, three agricultural clusters covered 676 
hectares of crop land, out of a total of 1000 hectares, involving 1200 households out of 1550. Sorghum, 
maize and teff constituted the most diffused crops for cluster land, as selected by a joint effort between 
development agents, farmers and woreda experts. The declared goal of the cluster development is to 
increase the kebele’s agricultural capacity, and to aggregate production through the Harbu Cooperative, 
in order to ensure market linkages for farmers, and to promote the creation of post-harvest value addition 
activities. The interviewed farmers proved to be partially aware of these expected trends: only half of 
them affirmed they had gotten the suggestion to sell to the primary cooperative, collectively with other 
farmers of the kebele. Despite its intentions, the Harbu Cooperative was not sufficiently developed yet, 
and it lacked the economic and structural capacity to aggregate the surplus production of the surrounding 
areas, or to implement value addition: in 2015 only one of the interviewed farmers declared he had sold 
part of his output to the cooperative, while the others sold to local markets because of more competitive 
prices and the Harbu Cooperative’s unresponsiveness. 
As for input purchases, similar dynamics to those observed in Wodajo were revealed by the interviewed 
farmers in Addis Mender. Cluster farmers were expected to sow improved seeds purchased from the 
cooperative, and to apply the required (high) amount of fertilizers to increase productivity. Among the 
small sample surveyed, the farmers who used the improved seeds were those with larger plots (4 t’emad 
                                                     
202 - Findings in the section are from the interview with a DA working in Addis Mender, individual interviews and 
a focus group discussion with 6 farmers, 30 August 2016, Addis Mender. 
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on average), while those who preferred self-produced or local seeds purchased from local markets were 
reported to plough less land (an average 3 t’emad). 
The focus group discussion revealed that a cluster and sub-cluster leader system was established also in 
Addis Mender: farming households were grouped in structures made up by 15-30 components, 
coordinated by one elected leader. In turn these were aggregated into larger groups, at whose head 
another chief (or leader) was selected. These command positions were often associated with a parallel 
role in kebele authorities. In addition, 1 to 5 teams were included in this highly structured hierarchy, in 
charge of fostering and coordinating cluster development. 
Furthermore, during the focus group discussion, farmers disclosed a greater diversification, in the years 
before the establishment of clusters, but no particular concern was vented on food insecurity risks. 
Nevertheless, as opposed to other kebele presented in previous sections, the responsibility in case of 
failure was openly charged to mengistu (intended as both the kebele and woreda officials, and the DAs) 
for having pushed them to sow new varieties of seeds and chemical fertilizers: «before it was our 
responsibility, now it is theirs», one respondent stated. 
 
3.2.3. Takake 
The Takake is an area very close and similar to Addis Mender, which extends on the western edge of 
the Dessie – Addis Ababa road. The kebele is crossed by the Awash - Kombolcha railway under 
construction by the Turkish company Yapi Merkezi, and the Borkana river, which during the rainy 
season hampers peasants’ access to Harbu and Addis Mender, the nearest urban centres. 234 hectares 
out of a total crop land of 715, and 345 farming households out of 572, were involved in cluster 
production by 2016.203 5 crop clusters were created, one for each of the targeted commodities: sorghum, 
teff, faba beans, mango and banana. According to the DAs interviewed, the land selection was done by 
woreda and kebele extension workers, including farmers as well. Except for fruit cultivations, each year 
the clusters’ temporary crops may change, following farmers and experts’ joint decisions. 
All the interviewed farmers were involved in cluster cultivations: 6 with sorghum, 2 with sorghum and 
teff, 1 only with teff, and 1 banana. Most of them accepted to be part of the clusters because of the high 
expectations on the output of improved seeds and fertilizers and to enjoy better assistance as promised 
by the experts. Among the small sample, the farmer with the largest plot and the one participating in the 
banana cluster received free seeds from Srinka Agricultural Research Centre, through the Kebele Office 
of Agriculture, for having joined the cluster. All the others used improved seeds bought from the local 
                                                     
203 - Findings in the section are from the interview with a DA working in Takake, individual interviews and a focus 
group discussion with 10 farmers, 1 September 2016, Takake kebele. 
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cooperative; only a few of them admitted they had mixed local seeds saved from the previous year with 
purchased improved ones. 
Again, improved seeds require the use of large amounts of chemical fertilizers, and almost half of the 
surveyed farmers stated that the extension workers issued a gedeta to farmers for the purchase of 
fertilizers, whose sanction included arrest. The farmers reported the DAs and kebele authorities deemed 
fertilizers application mandatory since the creation of clusters, to be used for both local and improved 
varieties of seeds. «To use fertilizers» is also written on a big panel hung on the wall of the Kebele 
Office of Agriculture, which contains the rules that every farmer must follow, according to instructions 
from the woreda.204 Some farmers complained about the high costs of fertilizers, whose purchase forced 
many in the community to sell their cattle, given the lack of institutes providing credit. In addition, many 
also complained about the uselessness of the application of standard amounts of fertilizers in areas that 
are not suitable for it, and accused the government of compelling them for the sole purpose of earning 
revenue from the sales. For all these reasons, the DAs admitted that convincing the farmers to join cluster 
cultivations was particularly difficult, and that the 1 to 5 teams played a crucial role in informing and 
managing the transition to clusters. Differently from the rest of the surveyed areas, in this kebele the 
DAs have not promoted the election/selection of cluster leaders based on indications from the Woreda 
Office of Agriculture. 
Takake is an area of high surplus production, compared to the rest of South Wollo; however, floods and 
soil erosion constitute a major problem for local peasants, which is reportedly aggravated further by the 
railway construction work. According to the DA interviewed, there is no plan for the surplus production 
generated by the clusters, and farmers are free to sell their surplus where they can make the higher profit. 
The only exception is represented by some sub-clusters that are linked to Srinka for seed multiplication: 
as observed in one abovementioned case, some of them received free seeds and were expected to give 
back part of their production to Srinka, but none of these agreements are formally recognized by 
contracts and it all depends on extemporary negotiations. Finally, the interviewed farmers spoke of a 
greater crop diversification in the previous years, which has been considerably reduced by the creation 
of clusters. The farmers who had shifted 100% of their land to one crop (half of the ones interviewed), 
reported they had no recovery strategy except to request support from mengistu. 
 
3.3. Dessie Zuria 
The Dessie Zuria is a woreda in the center of the South Wollo Zone, consisting mainly of high mountains 
and with a high average population density. From the agroecological point of view, the area is mainly 
                                                     
204 - The panel recites: «1- to plough the land repeatedly; 2- to use improved seeds; 3- to use fertilizers; 4- to use 
compost; 5- to make the land have moisture; 6- to weed; 7- to use pesticides; 8- to harvest properly». 
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characterized by wurch, dega and woine dega, it has a low average potential for agricultural production 
compared to the rest of the zone (even though there are food surplus areas), and its cropping system is 
almost completely rainfed and structured on two rainy seasons: belg and kirmet. Out of a total area of 
around 96,000 hectares, only 25,000 ha are cultivated; the major crops grown in the area are wheat, teff, 
food and malt barley, and pulses.205 
In spite of a rather challenging environment, by August 2016 10 clusters had been created in 21 of the 
woreda’s kebele, to cover an estimated total of 11,000 hectares, as declared by the Woreda Office of 
Agriculture in Dessie. The short- to mid-term impact foreseen by the cluster implementation is to 
improve the population’s food security and livelihood, by increasing the total staple crop production 
volume; accordingly, clusters are focused mainly on wheat, teff, barley and potato crops. In the long-
term vision, clusters are also expected to supply raw materials to local processing factories such as a 
wheat bread factory located in Jama, and the breweries in Debre Birhan and Kombolcha. Malt barley is 
produced in exceptionally large volumes in the woreda, and it is already channelled through primary 
cooperatives and unions toward the Dashen Brewery in eastern South Wollo and the BGI Brewery in 
Kombolcha; based on this model, wheat and all the other crops cultivated in the woreda’s clusters are 
supposed to achieve better performance and supply value addition schemes. At the same time, clusters 
are also expected to increase the production of the necessary staple crops to achieve food security. 26 
agricultural primary cooperatives are active in Dessie Zuria, almost 1 for every 3 kebele. In addition to 
selling sugar, oil and agricultural inputs, they play a relevant role in aggregating production where 
agricultural conditions are most favourable. This marketed output is usually sold to the Woreda Offices 
of Agriculture and redistributed through the PSNP and other food security initiatives. In 2015 for 
instance, according to estimates by the Dessie Zuria Office of Agriculture, exceptionally favourable 
conditions have generated 42 qt of food barley surplus, which have been sold by the local cooperatives 
in Dessie Zuria to other food deficit woreda in the South Wollo Zone. 
 
3.3.1. Abaso Qotu 
The Dessie Zuria kebele selected for the field visits is located at a 30-minute drive from the town of 
Dessie, on the road to Guguftu, a rural village in the central South Wollo Zone mountains, which 
happens to be an important crossroads for the zone. The Abaso Qotu kebele extends at an altitude 
between 2000 and 3000 meters, it has a total crop land of 1391 hectares and, at the time of the visit in 
August 2016, it involved 1245 farming households.206 The area has been selected for the establishment 
                                                     
205 - Data in the section are gathered from the Woreda Office of Agriculture and a subsequent interview with the 
Head of the Dessie Zuria Office of Agriculture, 18 August 2016, Dessie. 
206 - Data and findings in the section are from the interview with a DA working in Abaso Qotu, individual 
interviews and a focus group discussion with 10 farmers, personal talks with other members of the community, 19 
August 2016, Abaso Qotu kebele. 
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of 51 clusters, covering a total of 629 ha: 29 areas have been defined suitable for wheat cultivation, and 
22 for teff. As already observed elsewhere, the selection has been made by the DAs and experts from 
the Woreda Office of Agriculture because of the presence of at least 10 hectares of adjacent plots which 
are suitable for the targeted commodity. Subsequently, the farmers involved were informed, and 
convinced of the profitability of clusters through training and meetings. As stated by the interviewed 
DA and personal talks with peasants not included in the sample of farmers gathered by the DA for 
interviews, many in the community were reluctant to accept clusters because they were afraid it would 
have entailed an increased work burden and capital investment (mainly for fertilizer purchases). 
Most of the reluctant farmers were convinced by the possibility to receive free improved seeds, which 
was granted to all the members involved. In Abaso Qotu, clusterized farmers did in fact receive 
improved seeds for free from the local extension workers, based on an agreement which in turn obliged 
them to give back the same amount of seeds received. This fact, announced by the DA, was confirmed 
by all the interviewed and consulted farmers. The agreement was officialized by a contract, according 
to which no sanctions will be issued if the producers are not able to pay back the seeds received, after 
harvest. This provision was confirmed by the majority of farmers interviewed, who were in their first 
year of participation in cluster cultivations, and probably responded according to a common belief. 
However, it is worth mentioning here that the only farmer who was in his second year of cluster 
production, declared that giving back to mengistu the received amount was a gedeta. In addition to the 
quota destined for reimbursement, farmers were instructed to sell the remaining surplus to the local 
cooperative. Again, only the farmer who had already experienced a post-harvest period in the clusters, 
stated that selling to the cooperative was an obligation, while the others claimed they had not received 
any binding recommendations. 
On the contrary no gedeta was reported regarding fertilizer use, which was defined very costly by all 
the sample farmers: all the interviewed farmers declared that fertilizer use depended on the producer’s 
will, yet at the same time they also claimed that following the establishment of clusters more peasants 
have started to apply for credit in order to purchase it. In order to help farmers apply all the necessary 
cultivation practices and inputs in the right way, every sub-cluster (from 10 to 20 households) was 
appointed a leader, and every cluster (agglomeration of different sub-clusters) was appointed a leader, 
a vice leader and a secretary. These people were elected among farmers from a limited list drawn up by 
the DAs based on their education, production capacity and attitude towards innovation. 
 
3.4. Were Ilu 
The Were Ilu woreda is located south of the zone’s high central mountains, it is characterized mainly 
by woine dega and dega agro-ecologies, and presents a medium suitability for agricultural production, 
compared to the rest of the zone. Total cultivated land covers around 27,110 hectares out of the woreda’s 
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total 782 kmsq. Of this total coverage, by 2016, 11,129 hectares were occupied by agricultural clusters, 
spread over all of the woreda’s 20 kebele.  
The area is compatible mainly with cereal and legume production, therefore the woreda’s 252 clusters 
were divided as follows: 8013 ha for wheat, 2338 ha for teff, 517 ha for barley, 261 ha for lentils. As 
already observed in Dessie Zuria, the barley production is divided between food barley, which in 2016 
covered 442 ha and 10 kebele, intended mainly for self-consumption or local markets, and malt barley, 
in 2 kebele for a total of 75 ha, channelled mainly to the Dashen Brewery in Debre Birhan. Cluster 
extension varied between 20 and 60 ha: wheat production was divided among 150 clusters, teff among 
82 clusters, barley among 517 and lentils among 4.207 
Were Ilu is one of the six woreda selected by the Wollo University for a seed multiplication project 
conducted jointly with the Bahir Dar University, the Integrated Seed Sector Development, and some 
other minor projects linked with seed multiplication or genetic improvement. Reports from field visits 
conducted by Wollo University researchers, proved that the creation of clusters has led to some harsh 
clashes between farmers and government representatives, mainly because of farmers’ unwillingness to 
accept to join the cluster, and thus be forced to abide by its regulations.208 As confirmed by a member 
of the US Peace Crops deployed in Were Ilu, in some cases, the disputes have turned violent and 
extension workers and governmental representatives resorted to police intervention to suppress dissent 
and oblige farmers to accept.209 
Despite the medium potential for agricultural production which characterizes the woreda, the only 
processing factory present in Were Ilu by 2016 focused on lentils and was located in kebele 07, Segno 
Gobeya. As stated by a representative of the Woreda Office of Agriculture, self-consumption and local 
markets absorbed the bulk of the agricultural production, and did not generate any value addition; 
accordingly, clusters were created to increase the production volumes, to ensure the woreda’s food self-
reliance, and foster the creation of opportunities for other agro-industrial schemes. In the initial phases 
of this process, however, the lack of viable outflows for the marketable surplus, generates an economic 
unbalance. Informants from the Wollo University indeed reported that the clusters’ production is not 
linked to the presence of a market demand, but based on a woreda level fixed quota. Hence, as observed 
by some researchers, in some villages clusters are organized as follows: each cluster’s surplus 
production is estimated by the DAs and the kebele administrator and these data are transmitted to the 
Woreda Office. Based on the data received, the latter is in charge of finding a destination for the 
production: usually processing companies or food deficit woreda. However, as reported and observed 
during field visits, due to the lack of a relevant agro-industrial subsector in the area, weak 
                                                     
207 - Data provided by an official of the Woreda Office of Agriculture, September 2016, Were Ilu. 
208 - Personal talks with researchers of the College of Agriculture of the Wollo University, July-September 2016, 
Dessie. 
209 - Personal talks with US Peace Corps in Were Ilu, July 2016, Dessie. 
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communication between woreda and financial limits, often woreda administrators are unable to find 
viable recipients and consequently the surplus production is dumped by the clusters’ farmers on the local 
markets. 
 
3.4.1. Adarash 
Adarash is one of the two kebele selected in Were Ilu for fieldwork in the summer of 2016. It is located 
on the unpaved road which connects Dessie and Were Ilu, through Guguftu, around 5 km south of Kabe. 
It includes a large area with medium potential for agricultural production, located on a plateau between 
2500 and 3000 metres above the sea level. The kebele extends over 1887 ha of cultivated land, 217 ha 
of which are served by irrigation, while the rest is totally rainfed, depending mainly on both the kirmet 
and belg rainy seasons.210 Adarash has been recently included in extension services provided by the 
Wollo University, therefore a higher level of collaboration from the DAs was appreciated. 
Cluster development in the area started in 2011. In 2015, 448 ha were used for aggregated wheat 
production, 43 ha for fenugreek (abish) and 12 for beans. In 2016, the clusters had expanded and 
changed their targets: 936 ha were destined to wheat cluster, 22 ha for barley and 13 for beans. In line 
with other analysed kebele, clusters are formed on adjacent plots with similar soil characteristics, which 
have been selected for the cultivation of the commodity with the highest potential. However, in Adarash 
each commodity is associated to a single cluster, even though it extends on land located in different 
areas of the kebele: consequently, the farmers and the DAs consider the 936 ha as part of the (single) 
wheat cluster, and so on. Every cluster is then divided in sub-clusters composed by an average of 25-30 
farming households. 1 to 5 teams, development groups and cluster leaders elected from a limited list 
drawn up by kebele authorities, are active in promoting the right application of cluster regulations; as 
revealed by the interview, the leaders are usually selected among people who also play other roles in 
kebele administration, and who consequently are also party members. 
The focus group discussions revealed that clusters have been well accepted by the community, but 
resistance and violent opposition were experienced in neighbouring kebele. Acceptance was motivated 
mainly by the DA’s expectations of increased productivity, better management of plant diseases, greater 
assistance from the experts, improved accessibility to high quality inputs, and ultimately higher incomes. 
A positive attitude was also seen regarding the risks of the shift toward a monocropping system: even 
though among the interviewed farmers 74% of the land has been dedicated (on average) to the targeted 
commodity, and all the respondents confirmed that they used to diversify their production more in the 
                                                     
210 - Findings in the section are from an individual interview with a DA working in Adarash, individual interviews 
and two focus group discussions with 14 farmers, 1 and 5 August 2016, Adarash kebele. 
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past, the confidence in expert indications and the possibility to manage diseases collectively represented 
major guarantees for security. 
Individual interviews with farmers revealed that producers in the Adarash clusters purchased seeds and 
fertilizers from the Kabe Cooperative. Despite the recurrent problems linked to the unaffordability of 
fertilizer prices, that was mentioned every so often during the individual interviews with farmers, on 
average producers in Adarash did not have to face any major obstacles to access the agricultural inputs 
in the kebele. This may be explained by the fact that farmers in Adarash enjoy a better economic status 
compared to other visited kebele - probably because of the area’s higher agricultural potential– which 
makes access to improved seeds and fertilizers a simpler procedure. Fertilizers are preferably purchased 
with cash to avoid the interest rate charged for credit delivery by the Amhara Credit and Saving 
Association; no changes were observed on this issue following cluster creation, except for the prices, 
which were increased considerably. On the contrary, surplus production sales have changed following 
the establishment of clusters. As claimed by some of the interviewed farmers, in 2015, the selling price 
of wheat on local markets had dropped from 18 to 8 birrs per kg and this could probably be attributed 
to the major increase in wheat supply produced by the large cluster. The interviews revealed that neither 
the local cooperatives (Kabe is the biggest in terms of number of members and financial capacity, but 
as the DA stated, «the system [was] not well developed»), nor any other governmental administration 
structures have been able to aggregate the increased production. As reported by the DA, the members 
and range of activities performed by the Kabe Cooperative were gradually increasing, in accordance 
with regional and national plans; however, at the time of the field visits, the process was still far from 
being completed and smallholder farmers were already experiencing some negative consequences. 
 
3.4.2. Segno Gobeya 
The last kebele presented is located about 10 km south of Adarash, with similar agroecological 
conditions. The field visit was made during fieldwork conducted by some researchers and lecturers of 
the Wollo University College of Agriculture. Cluster cultivation started in 2013, and by 2016 the 
agricultural experts organized the cultivations into 16 clusters: divided into 7 wheat clusters (972 ha), 5 
teff clusters (396 ha) and 4 lentils clusters (265 ha) for a total 2808 ha of cultivated land. In Segno 
Gobeya, each cluster is composed by around 90 ha and 180-200 farming households. Agricultural 
clusters were created to improve food security and supply raw materials to local processing companies: 
an already active firm involved in lentils transformation, and a wheat flour factory which is supposed to 
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be built in the woreda in the next years. With the clusters, farmers are expected to produce more and to 
sell collectively to the factories.211 
As told by the interviewed DA, instructions for clustering arrived from the Woreda Office of 
Agriculture, who in turn received them from the regional government. The Regional Board of 
Agriculture established targets for land and crop production to be achieved by each woreda with the 
clusters, and the woreda in turn distributed this share among the kebele. The upper administration level 
selected the commodities and the quantities for each lower level, and neither the DAs nor the farmers 
had the possibility to participate in the process. What the interviews disclosed was that this top-down 
approach led to the selection of crops with low production potential, and that this caused a general farmer 
opposition to the creation of clusters: wheat, teff and lentils indeed gave lower yields compared to guaya 
and abish. Furthermore, the selected crops require the use of large amounts of fertilizers, which 
constitute a heavy economic burden for many farming households, and whose purchase is mandatory 
according to the interviewed farmers. For these reasons, many farmers refused to join the clusters, but 
were forcefully convinced to do so. 
Another main problem that was discovered with the interviews regarded the revenue drop caused by the 
creation of clusters. In the last years, due to a better application of improved inputs and to the conversion 
of many plots to wheat and teff, the production volumes of these commodities have increased 
significantly. Since the primary cooperatives and unions were not sufficiently structured to aggregate 
the surplus production, this was poured on the local markets, causing a significant price decrease. All 
the farmers interviewed individually claimed this was causing them a relevant decrease in income, that 
nullified the potential earnings generated by the achieved productivity growth. The interviewed farmers 
confirmed that guaya and abish had greater potential in terms of yields and revenue: one farmer reported 
the sale prices for wheat and teff crops in post-harvest periods in the preceding year (when clusters were 
already established) were 7 and 12 birr/kg, whereas it was 40 for abish and 70 for lentils. In addition, 
interviewees showed scepticism about the construction of a wheat flour factory in the area. Even the 
presence of the lentils factory had a very limited influence on the economy of the kebele, according to 
the interviews. 
Furthermore, the targets set at regional and district levels were linked to a reward and promotion system. 
Findings from the field visit proved that this system placed the clusters’ main implementers under great 
pressure, from higher officials, which created discontent and had a negative impact on the results. At 
the same time, as already observed in other kebele, a hierarchical command structure was purposely 
created: each sub-cluster (around 20-30 households) had an imposed leader who controlled and fostered 
cultivations, and who was part of the cluster’s central committee (composed by a chairman, a cashier, a 
                                                     
211 - Findings in the sections are from the individual interview with a DA working in Segno Gobeya, individual 
interviews with 7 farmers, 2 September 2016, Segno Gobeya kebele. 
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secretary, a valuator and a vice-chairman); every 15 days the central committee gathered for political 
meetings with kebele authorities. 
 
3.5. Findings from an Aggregated Perspective 
The fieldwork conducted in South Wollo reveals that the creation of agricultural clusters may be 
considered one of the most remarkable processes of transformation in peasant production relations, 
access to land, marketing and food security. Its presence is not so evident in policy papers, but its 
incidence on the field is clearly visible. Evidence from South Wollo proves that the creation of 
agricultural clusters is typically aimed at improving the quantity and quality of farming patterns around 
selected commodities in targeted areas, with the intended purpose to reach food self-sufficiency, boost 
agricultural commercialization, promote value addition activities and market linkages. The current 
clustering project is de facto embedded in the large framework of the agenda for agrarian transformation 
inasmuch as it is aimed at increasing smallholder-based agricultural production, it is based on a large-
scale promotion of extension services, it is focused on both staple and high-value commodities for 
import substitution and export, it assigns a crucial role to cooperatives, and it works towards developing 
intersectoral linkages for the transition to an industrialized and middle-income country. In this section, 
the data presented above are gathered and interpreted from a comprehensive perspective in order to 
analyse the most relevant mechanisms of agrarian transformation entailed by the creation of agricultural 
clusters in South Wollo. Data from the 10 kebele are integrated with information gathered at Hawi 
kebele, in Wegdi woreda, where I had the opportunity to obtain information from the conversation with 
a representative of the Woreda Office of Agriculture and one of the local DAs. The field visit was made 
possible by the staff of the Wollo University, that I joined in one of their fieldworks in August 2016.212 
Since farmers were not surveyed due to logistical problems, the kebele was not included in the previous 
presentation, but the most relevant findings gathered are included in the following analysis. 
 
3.5.1. Agricultural Clusters: Sizes and Definitions 
Evidence from South Wollo presents a diverse application system of the cluster-based approach to 
agricultural development. From the interviews and the collected data, differences surfaced vis-à-vis the 
                                                     
212 - Hawi in Wegdi was among the kebele involved in one of the seed multiplication projects carried out by the 
Wollo University. The university donated improved seeds to the woreda administrators, who in turn selected some 
kebele with high multiplication potential; the kebele administrators have in turn chosen the most suitable areas for 
the commodity and distributed the seeds to some of the farmers involved. During the cropping season, the 
University staff monitored the performance of the cultivated areas, and provided integrated support to the farmers 
and the extension workers in carrying out these cultivations. After harvest, the farmers who received free seeds 
were expected to give back to the Kebele Office of Agriculture the amount of seeds they gathered, but no formal 
agreement was signed. 
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physical definition of clusters: some officials designed clusters according to actual adjacent plots and 
monocropping systems, while others planned them in more general terms as areas with growth potential 
for specific commodities. Among the interviewed informants, only officials from the Tahuladere board, 
Gobeya, Abaso Qotu and Adarash included land proximity among the defining characters for clusters, 
while the others focused more on farming issues for cluster definition. 
Inconsistencies loomed among different administrative levels: table 2 compares cluster numbers and 
sizes, as declared by the interviewed officials in the surveyed areas. Regardless of how valuable these 
statistics may be, the average cluster size seen in the surveyed kebele is 115.7 ha per cluster, and the 
standard discrepancy is very high, reaching 101.6. The most compelling incongruence regarding cluster 
average size can be seen very clearly in the comparison between data gathered from Dessie Zuria and 
Abaso Qotu. Likewise, differences were also noticeable between the 4 main clusters identified at the 
Zone Office of Agriculture and the dozens and hundreds claimed by each woreda board. 
 
Table 2 - Cluster size in surveyed woreda and kebele. Personal calculation, source: interviews with officials and extension 
workers, July-September 2016, South Wollo 
 Number of 
clusters 
Total size of 
clusters (in ha) 
Average size of 
clusters (in ha) 
Total crop land of 
the kebele (in ha) 
Share of total crop 
land covered by 
clusters (in %) 
Tahuladere 126 7,222 57.3 *  
   Hitacha 3 748 249.3 *  
   Wohilo 3 405 135.0 1,031 39.3 
   Gobeya 8 117 14.6 117 100 
   Jari 4 248 62.0 612 40.5 
Qalu 87 9,000 103.4 *  
   Wodajo 6 534 89.0 935 57.1 
   Addis 
Mender 
3 676 225.3 1,000 67.6 
   Takake 5 234 46.8 715 32.7 
Dessie Zuria 10 11,000 1,100.0 25,000 44 
   Abaso Qotu 51 629 12.3 1,391 45.2 
Were Ilu 252 11,129 44.2 271,100 41 
   Adarash 3 971 323.7 1,887 51.5 
   Segno 
Gobeya 
16 1,633 102.1 2,808 58.2 
Hawi (Wegdi) 29 356 12.3 *  
*: missing data. 
 
In addition, different definitions were also noticeable within the same administrative units. As presented 
earlier, extension workers in Adarash, Addis Mender and Takake outlined the clusters according to the 
selected commodity, without considering land boundaries as defining characters. Instead, in another 
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kebele group implementers designed clusters by taking into consideration both monocrop cultivation 
and spatial proximity: for instance, in Hitacha the DA stated that 3 teff clusters were developed in the 
kebele, occupying over 700 ha of cultivated land. Most of the surveyed kebele may be found among this 
group: Wohilo, Gobeya, Jari, Wodajo, Segno Gobeya and Hitacha. In Abaso Qotu and Hawi, the 
proximity of land was of greater importance to mark the clusters borders as opposed to the other 
surveyed locations, since the informants recorded a high number of clusters in smaller areas: in Hawi, 
16 teff clusters covered 212 ha, and 13 wheat clusters covered 144 ha; in Abaso Qotu 629 ha were 
divided into 51 clusters. 
Table 2 clearly shows the high variability in the average size of clusters in the surveyed kebele. Since 
differences were found also within the same woreda, it can be said that kebele level implementers 
followed individual cluster development pathways. Nevertheless, as mentioned above and proved by 
the case studies, clusters policy decentralization is highly influenced by the principle of upward 
accountability, which reduces considerably the lower tiers’ autonomy and therefore belies that idea.213 
This variability may therefore be more realistically defined as the result of overestimations, inefficient 
communication between different administration levels, fallacies in data collection and, probably, 
diverse cluster interpretations. Whichever interpretation is given, these differences are worth analysing 
in order to look at the data from an aggregated point of view, and keeping in mind the different 
organizational structures and implementation strategies that these may entail. 
Informant tendency to exaggerate estimates was noticed in many ways. The DAs in Gobeya and Jari 
overemphasized cluster extension, in Hitacha the agent inflated the cluster results in terms of 
productivity gains. In Wodajo the agent’s predictions on productivity growth and marketed share of total 
outputs from cluster production were significantly higher than the farmers’ ones. Farmers’ answers 
regarding effective or expected growth in productivity rates following cluster creation, revealed a 
widespread positive tendency in three out of every four cases, and no answers or decreasing trends from 
the remaining ones. 16 respondents from the first group provided unreliable data on the expected or 
effective cluster yields: these exceeded the rest of the community and the zone average by too much to 
be considered reliable.214 It may be said that this tendency is the result of a methodological limit in the 
semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions conducted with farmers who were often 
gathered by the DAs, and probably selected among the ones with the best performance and who accepted 
the experts’ suggestions. Having acknowledged this possibility, the data gathered and the bias itself may 
                                                     
213 - Following the party and the state’s administration structures, each board is accountable for the lower levels, 
and therefore exercises a strong control over their performances, keeping decentralized decisions within defined 
limits. 
214 - Among these, sorghum crop was expected to reach 35-40 qt/ha, teff 28-30 qt/ha and wheat 40 qt/ha; average 
yields in South Wollo reported by the Zone Office of Agriculture estimated 24, 15 and 20 qt/ha respectively. It is 
worth mentioning that 10 out of these 16 responses were surveyed in Abaso Qotu, the only place where the DA 
held a private meeting with the gathered farmers after having been informed about the research topics, before the 
interviews were held. 
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also be explained from a more valuable perspective. Cluster implementation may indeed be embedded 
in the pervasive commitment to development pursued in different ways by the developmental states, 
according to which civil servants and farmers are exposed to a control system exerted through local 
officials and cluster leaders. Hence, the overestimation of some of the surveyed responses may be 
interpreted as the result of the significant pressure exerted by higher government tiers on the 
implementers, thus increasing their tendency to present a positive and optimistic interpretation of their 
achievements. 
 
3.5.2. The Purposes and the Selection Process 
Agricultural cluster implementation in South Wollo is influenced heavily by its agroecological 
conditions. The analysed clusters were, accordingly, focused primarily on the food security aspects, and 
aimed mainly at the production-side of the agricultural chain. The implementation strategy was indeed 
tailored on the application of comprehensive packages of improved inputs, on the creation of a 
hierarchical coordination and control system among producers and, only marginally, on the promotion 
of market linkages. This could be seen clearly in Tahuladere, where clusters’ sole purpose was to solve 
the food poverty problem. In the other surveyed woreda as well, officials expected a significant 
improvement in food supply volumes available to local markets from the establishment of clusters, with 
positive consequences in terms of food security access, utilization and stability. In addition, many 
officials claimed that the aggregation of production patterns entailed benefits in terms of market linkages 
and value addition activities, but only very few successful cases were reported at the time of the survey. 
Despite similar narratives, implementation goals and strategies, this evidence clashes with the 
framework depicted by the ATA in the ACC: agricultural clusters are therefore part of the broad 
transformational agenda, which applies to both food surplus and food deficit areas. 
As shown in table 2, data gathered from the interviewed extension workers reveals that cluster average 
extension covered (after overestimated data adjustment) between 40 and 60 percent of the kebele total 
crop land. In the surveyed areas, clustering started in very recent years: between 2013 and 2016 in all 
but two kebele, Addis Mender and Adarash where the program started in 2011. All the interviewed 
officials reported that it was started upon recommendations coming from the Regional or Woreda 
Offices of Agriculture, but none admitted the participation of the zone government; this finding is 
consistent with less recent researches on decentralization in Ethiopia, which explored the greater role 
played by the district administrations, as a consequence of new legislations issued in the early 2000s 
(WB 2001; Kena 2016). Directions were spread mainly through training and meetings, without issuing 
any declaration or detailed guideline. With the only exception of Takake, in all the surveyed kebele the 
targeted land and commodities were selected by woreda experts and DAs, without any relevant public 
consultation. As seen in the cases of Hitacha and Wohilo, this has not led to the selection of the crops 
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with the highest growth and income generation potential for farmers, and has created some discontent. 
In Gobeya and Addis Mender, farmers reportedly refused because their land was not suitable for the 
commodity selected; in some cases, the farmers were able to resist, in others, the DAs forced them to 
comply. In Wodajo, Abaso Qotu and Segno Gobeya many complained about the mandatory application 
of inputs and labour-intense cultivation practices required by the clusters. Farmers’ negative attitude 
toward clusters was found also in Hawi: the conversation with the DA and a representative of the 
Woreda Office of Agriculture revealed that in 2015 the suitable area was identified only by GPS, while 
in 2016 the selection involved also local farmer participation. As a consequence of this change in the 
selection process, the 650 ha targeted for teff clusters in 2015 declined to 212 in 2016, and the 320 ha 
identified for wheat clusters were adjusted to 144 ha in 2016. Therefore, this finding suggests that, when 
given a chance to choose their farming patterns, many farmers did not accept to subordinate their land 
to the clusters’ rules. 
These cases disclose that the land and commodity selection process has been carried out mainly through 
a top-down approach which has rarely called for the participation of the farmers involved. Cluster 
creation requires targeted areas to have similar agroecological and topographical conditions, and to be 
adjacent or neighboring, in order to allow an easier large-scale application of the same inputs and 
technologies. Since South Wollo’s crop land is highly fragmented into small parcels and plots “owned” 
by different farmers, a vast and uniform acceptance of cluster regulations is required from all the farmers 
in the targeted areas, because even isolated discontinuities may hamper the performance of large scale 
cultivations. The rationale behind this form of collectivization was explained by the Head of the Zone 
Office of Agriculture,215 who claimed that in order to plough, sow, fertilize apply pesticides and for 
many other activities to be carried out in a modern and effective form, land cannot be fragmented into 
small and diversified plots. Accordingly, the field visits revealed that the farmers who owned plots on 
the targeted land were convinced about the benefits of clusters through training and meetings, or else 
forcefully included with threats and violence. However, it should be said that farmer inclusion in the 
selection process would have probably entailed a more favorable context for implementation: a more 
profitable commodity selection, an improved attitude toward collaboration between farmers, and 
(conceivably) greater benefits in terms of outputs and revenue. 
 
3.5.3. Agricultural Inputs and Cultivation Patterns 
The fieldwork reveals that a relevant part of the cluster creation process was driven by the extension 
system and its implementers. After having targeted land and crops, the woreda and kebele offices of 
agriculture and the DAs informed the farmers about the type of inputs required for cluster cultivation 
                                                     
215 - Interview with Mesfin Dagne. 
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and controlled their application. The recommended improved seeds were sold by the primary 
cooperatives, the kebele offices and the local markets, or in some cases distributed by associations and 
institutes for seed multiplication, or local NGOs: the Wollo University in Hitacha and Hawi, the 
AMELD in Jari, FAO and Concern Worldwide in Wodajo, Srinka in Takake and Wodajo. This proves 
that many governmental and non-governmental entities are involved in a synergetic effort aimed at the 
selected crop specialization of targeted farmers and areas. For some of the interviewed farmers in Jari, 
Gobeya, Hitacha and Takake, the possibility to receive free or under-priced seeds was an incentive to 
join the clusters. Despite the significant emphasis conveyed to farmers by the DAs, on the benefits linked 
to the use of improved seeds, only one of the interviewed farmers defined it as an obligation imposed 
on them; all the others declared that the quality of the seeds to be sown was their free choice. 
Clusters entailed an important change for farmers: out of a total of 31 surveyed farmers who used to 
sow non-hybrid seeds (collected from local markets or saved from their last production) before joining 
the clusters, 24 declared that they had since then purchased improved qualities, and mainly from 
cooperatives.216 This represents a crucial achievement for cluster establishment, and confirms also the 
enhanced role appointed to primary cooperatives to improve the quality of applied inputs, for the 
development of the agricultural sector; which is strengthened by data according to which the remaining 
64 interviewed farmers already purchased their seeds from the cooperatives. However, in some cases 
improved seeds and expert indications on cluster cultivating patterns have proven detrimental for 
farmers: as claimed by a Qalu official and some of the farmers interviewed, the seeds allocated by the 
experts were not always suitable for the targeted land. In addition, compared to local breeds, the quality 
of the seeds recommended by the agricultural experts required a greater application of complex 
fertilizers in order to be productive, and their purchase was considered a heavy burden in almost every 
surveyed kebele, with prices in the area ranging from 1200 birr/qt to 1400 birr/qt. The only legal way to 
purchase fertilizers is through governmental entities (primary cooperatives and kebele offices), but an 
active unofficial market has surfaced from the interviews in Hitacha, where fertilizers are sold at a 
considerably cheaper price than the cooperatives’: 800 birr/qt. 
With the only exception of Wohilo and Jari, in all the kebele farmers claimed that fertilizer prices had 
increased significantly in the last years. When savings made it possible, all the surveyed farmers 
preferred to buy fertilizers with cash, in order to avoid the high interest rates offered by local credit 
institutions. Some surveyed farmers in Takake and Segno Gobeya stated that the purchase of fertilizers 
was an obligation imposed by the experts and that came with coercive sanctions by local officials and 
officers. In addition, informants claimed that fertilizers were required by the new qualities of seeds sown 
within the clusters, without which no yield could be achieved. Therefore, because of gedeta or as a 
                                                     
216 - The only opposite trend was observed in Gobeya, a particular case as seen above, where the interviewed 
farmers shifted from collecting seeds from the cooperative, to purchasing them from local markets, because of 
cheaper prices. 
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consequence of combined changes in agricultural patterns, cluster creation has obviously increased 
farmer dependence on fertilizers. What surfaced from some focus group discussions was that some of 
the most vulnerable farmers were forced to sell their cattle prematurely in order to buy the imposed 
quantity of fertilizers. In addition, as already seen, these complex fertilizers were considered responsible 
for soil depletion. 
As observed earlier, in the targeted areas the experts recommended - more or less compulsorily - the 
application of equal agricultural inputs to foster and specialize their support services and shift toward 
monocropping. In view of productivity enhancement and to obtain scale economies, cluster creation also 
included a transformation of some of the cultivation methods, so as to: follow a common schedule, 
collaborate at the most demanding tasks, plough the land multiple times, sow on line, weed and defend 
the land from pests and invasive animals. According to findings from the field visits, cluster farmers 
benefited from the positive attitude towards cooperation, that was promoted by the extension workers. 
As discovered by several studies, peasants in South Wollo are traditionally used to many forms of 
collaboration, sharecropping and agreements as coping strategies against eventual scarce land, cattle or 
labour entitlements, or else in the case of remarkably high performing farming households (Ege, Aspen 
2003). 
However, as reported by the Qalu’s official, in some cases expert recommendations regarding the 
schedule have not proven effective. In addition, sowing on line turned out to be a very labour-intense 
task, for which almost 100% of the interviewed cluster farmers (92, out of the 95 interviewed) 
complained of manpower shortage, thus forcing many of the most vulnerable farming households in 
Addis Mender and Segno Gobeya to share their outputs with workers they had to hire for this purpose. 
Therefore, although more in depth research is needed on this issue, according to the field visits, cluster 
implementation has been particularly challenging for the most vulnerable farmers, the ones possessing 
less land, capital and labour force. In addition to the burden experienced to sow on line, evidence from 
Takake and Segno Gobeya confirmed that the poorest farmers faced major obstacles to obtain the 
required fertilizers. At the same time, less land-endowed farmers in Addis Mender did not purchase high 
quality seeds and were excluded from the distribution of free seeds by Srinka in Takake. Hence, the 
information gathered suggests that, in line with the studies by Lefort (2012) and Chinigò (2015), the 
current rural and agricultural development patterns are shaped by an ongoing differentiation process of 
the Ethiopian peasantry. As evidence may confirm, the implementation of agricultural clusters is 
seemingly promoting an economic differentiation mechanism, by which more endowed farmers are 
better able to fulfill cluster regulation requirements, and to make a profit from them. 
 
3.5.4. Leaders and Development Groups 
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Furthermore, the coordination and monitoring system promoted among clusters - to boost agrarian 
economy transformation and for the rapid achievement of the objectives set by the developmental project 
- is developing social differentiation mechanisms among the peasantries. In all but one surveyed kebele 
(Takake) the DAs and the woreda officials promoted the selection of one or more people in charge of 
coordinating, monitoring and fostering the execution of the cultivation practices designed by the 
extension workers. As reported in previous sections, the organization of the clusters’ leaders had 
differing degrees of complexity, the highest of which was observed in Segno Gobeya. Out of the 92 
surveyed cluster farmers, 23 were leaders of clusters or sub-clusters of varying extension, ranging from 
8 to 500 farming households. Cluster leaders were selected according to some common criteria: 
agricultural performance, education and role in the kebele administration. From an aggregated point of 
view, those leading the largest groups of households also had a role in kebele administration as local 
militia, tax collector and public works’ manager. In most cases they also happened to be connected to 
the ruling party: in Hitacha, Jari, Wodajo, Addis Mender, Abaso Qotu, Adarash and Segno Gobeya the 
leaders in charge of the highest number of households were also active party members or showed a 
general allegiance to mengistu.217 Data collected also showed that leaders owned larger plots of crop 
land: an average 0.89 ha, compared to the 0.71 ha of non-leaders (data includes non-clusterized farmers). 
According to the interviews, the agricultural experts and kebele authorities chose the candidates to be 
elected as leaders by the farmers, or appointed them directly: of the 69 non-leading farmers interviewed, 
only 15 confirmed that they had participated in the election process, while the majority proved to have 
been unaware of the selection process, or was not given the possibility to participate in the elections.  
At the same time, in all the surveyed kebele informants and farmers declared that 1 to 5 teams and 
development groups had an active role in promoting collaboration among farmers and the application 
of agricultural experts and kebele authority guidelines for rural and agricultural development initiatives. 
However, inquiries on the specific contribution required of these two forms of sub-kebele organization 
in the implementation of clusters yielded different answers depending on the kebele: a direct 
involvement of 1 to 5 teams in the development of clusters was explicitly stated by respondents in 
Wohilo, Abaso Qotu, Segno Gobeya and Takake, where their role was given great importance due to 
the absence of other leaders; in Adarash the number of development groups had reportedly increased 
after the establishment of clusters; in all the other cases, there was no change in the number or the 
                                                     
217 - A methodological remark is worth explaining here. One of the purposes of the survey was to study if and how 
the developmental narrative was replicated in rural politics with cluster creation. As pointed out by Prof. Ege – 
who has been conducting researches in the area for many years in the last two decades - during one of the very 
useful talks we had at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, in South Wollo peasants have often 
become party members without their consent or even awareness. Therefore, the questions and the focus group 
discussions were designed in order to make individual allegiance to mengistu’s politics appear by testing the 
respondents’ assessment of: land administration practices, cluster-related initiatives and rural development 
activities; only in the cases where allegiance was clearly stated by the answers, was the membership to the Amhara 
National Democratic Movement questioned directly to confirm these opinions. 
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functions of 1 to 5 teams or the development groups. Data gathered from the South Wollo Office of 
Agriculture confirmed that 1 to 5 teams and development groups were the most common sub-kebele 
organizations for rural and agricultural development affairs in the area. The interviewed informants at 
the Office pointed out a full list of tasks each group and team leader was supposed to perform: to identify 
the members, list and rank them according to their agricultural input and technology use, and report 
them to the Kebele Office of Agriculture; to evaluate the daily, weekly and monthly progress related to 
soil and water conservation activities and agricultural input application; to assemble its members for 
training and meetings; to mobilize them for any rural and agricultural development activities requested 
by the Kebele Office of Agriculture, and report any progress on a weekly basis; to spread messages and 
information sent down by woreda, zone or regional administrations; to participate to kebele development 
planning, monitoring and evaluation meetings; to pick out households for safety net transfers, identify 
the number of clients for public works, and assist in coordinating the PSNP activities with other 
development operations in the kebele. 
Insofar as this long list of duties is actually implemented, some of the activities requested can barely be 
separated from cluster creation. Further research is required to assess the issue with greater certainty. 
Several studies explored the recent diffusion of sub-kebele organizations as agricultural extension and 
political control instruments in view of the dissemination of developmental hegemony (Emmeneger et 
al. 2011; Dessalegn 2008b; Fana 2014; Chinigò, Fantini 2015; HRW 2010; Vaughan 2011). Based on 
this evidence, there is reason to believe that the more clusters will develop and scatter, the more the 
leader, sub-leader, and multilevel committee system will be boosted for monitoring purposes. Evidence 
therefore confirms that the cluster development process is transforming social relations among the 
peasantry, by fostering the differentiation between a small (but growing) group of better-off and 
politically aligned peasants, and a subordinated peasant majority. 
 
3.5.5. Monocropping and Food Security 
As learned from the interviews and field visits, the rationale for clustering in South Wollo is associated 
to the benefit obtained with extensive monocrop cultivations: changing farmers’ attitude toward 
monocropping was indeed declared by the Head of the Zone Office of Agriculture, as one of the foremost 
goals to be pursued by clusters. Through the extensive application of common agricultural inputs and 
similar cultivation methods on large targeted areas and groups of farmers, the cluster strategy is aimed 
at generating the benefits enjoyed by farming estates and large-scale collective productions. By pursuing 
specialization (instead of diversification) clusters are supposed to generate surplus production, to be 
channelled through government-led agro-industrial linkages for value addition, import substitution and 
export. However, pursuing the shift toward monocrop production in South Wollo is a very challenging 
goal since diversification is a proven coping strategy used by farmers in the area as a safety net against 
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failed cultivations caused by disease or scarce rains (Ege, Aspen 2003). Hence, shifting to monocrop 
production hampers the application of these coping strategies and leaves peasants vulnerable to food 
insecurity. As a consequence, unless smallholding farmers are able to develop new livelihood strategies, 
the avoidance of tragic consequences in the event of failed cultivations must rely once again on the 
government’s disaster prevention, preparedness and response capacity. 
The perception of these impacts on food security has been analysed during the fieldwork. About 56% 
of the interviewed farmers (without considering the three non-cluster farmers) declared they used to 
diversify their production more before cluster implementation: a lower diversification entailed less types 
of cereals, pulses and vegetables being planted, as well as less differentiated seed varieties for the same 
crop. 12% of the total interviewed farmers affirmed they could not cultivate anything other than the 
cluster crop. Farmer level data reveal that there is an inverse relationship between the share of land 
destined to clusters, and the change in crop diversification: for 51 peasants who declared a decline in 
diversification caused by clusters, the average land assigned to the cluster crop was 75% of the total, 
60% for those who hadn’t experienced that decrease. Moreover, of 33 farmers whose land was destined 
entirely to clusters, 21 declared a decrease in diversification. 
Peasants showed an overall positive attitude toward the possibility of a cluster crop failure, vis-à-vis a 
food insecurity risk. The trust on expert instructions, the possibility to recover from failures with 
supplementary crops during belg, the availability of land not included in the clusters and of additional 
land,218 and a widespread confidence in the government’s support in case of need were claimed to be 
the main instruments for recovery in case of failure. Assessing cluster performance from an agrarian 
perspective is beyond this study’s objective, however major issues arise from the transformation of 
peasant coping strategies caused by the current cluster implementation process, and are worth 
mentioning. First, the possibility of a food deficit rescue in case of cluster crop failure, with other crops 
cultivated during belg, does not reduce the economic loss, nor household vulnerability to food insecurity 
associated with monocropping. In addition, as already said, belg rainfalls are generally not suitable 
throughout the South Wollo territory and are becoming progressively more unreliable. Secondly, the 
presence of other non-clusterized land goes against the policy’s declared target- that calls for a full 
cluster coverage of the area - and it raises major concerns about the project’s planned expansion. Thirdly, 
the faith in mengistu’s responsiveness is emblematic of the patron-client relationships that shape 
peasant-state ties and demands a complementary support system from the government. Therefore, it can 
be said that evidence from the field reveal that shifting to monocropping cultivations in food deficit and 
                                                     
218 - In addition to the land destined exclusively to crop cultivation, peasants usually own a tiny amount of land 
around their houses, used for various household living activities, to keep poultry and other small farm animals, 
and occasionally a vegetable garden for self-consumption. The availability of this additional land may constitute 
a very extreme livelihood asset, and it may have contributed to appease farmers’ worries associated with decreased 
diversification. 
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drought-prone areas is a highly risky process, that requires investing major capacities and resources in 
an extensive and efficient disaster prevention, preparedness and responsiveness system. 
 
3.5.6. Commercialization through aggregation 
Findings from the interviews revealed that, in addition to food security, the shift to the monocropping 
system in South Wollo is expected to increase smallholding farmer productivity to enhance 
commercialization and promote value addition. In spite of these objectives, evidence from the field 
revealed that the possibilities for surplus production and relative post-harvest value addition in South 
Wollo were very limited. In 2015, only marginal shares of production from Dessie Zuria and Were Ilu 
supplied the breweries in Debre Birhan and Kombolcha, or were sold to other food deficit woreda, and 
very limited quantities were collected from the surveyed kebele in Qalu by government-owned seed 
multiplication associations: the Amhara Seeds Enterprise and Srinka. In none of these cases, were the 
farmers able to draw up formal agreements with the buyers, instead all transactions were negotiated in 
an improvised manner. Although the establishment of clusters did not entail a significant transformation 
in this sense by the time of the survey, the main strategy intended to promote agro-based value chains 
surfaced from the field visits. 
What was discovered with the fieldwork is that the surplus created by the clusters is supposed to be 
managed by the state apparatus through its local kebele and woreda level implementers. Kebele offices 
and primary cooperatives are in charge of aggregating the production and starting a primary 
transformation of the raw materials, or to channel it through value chains, or to send it to the woreda 
boards, that are then responsible for its redistribution to food deficit areas. In addition to their role in 
input distribution, primary cooperatives are thus assigned a significant task in implementing the 
aggregation, promoting market linkages or creating directly value addition, as planned by the federal 
cooperative development strategy that was analyzed earlier on. This plan surfaced from the interview 
with Dessie Zuria and Wegdi officials, personal communications with Wollo University researchers, 
and interviews with DAs in Wohilo, Addis Mender, Abaso Qotu, Adarash and Segno Gobeya. In the 
individual interviews, the DAs expressed their intention to instruct farmers to sell to cooperatives, as 
indicated by woreda and regional experts. In the same kebele, the indications also rose scattered from 
the focus group discussions conducted: some of the participants declared they had been instructed by 
kebele authorities and the DAs to sell their surplus production to the local cooperative, while others 
mentioned industries, seed multiplication associations and local markets as primary targets. In Hawi the 
woreda official interviewed stated there were two multipurpose cooperatives in the area that were 
purchasing part of the cluster farmers outputs, to sell to local markets or channel to transforming 
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companies in Addis Ababa.219 In all the other abovementioned cases, the marketing role appointed to 
the cooperatives was clearly outlined in the interviews, even though the system was declared not 
developed yet. Instead, in the remaining kebele the cooperatives were not assigned any specific functions 
in post-harvest activities, but the state’s intervention was nevertheless included in other ways in the 
cluster marketing strategy. In Hitacha for instance, the government-owned AMELD collected seeds 
from the cluster peasants; in Jari officials from the regional government promised to build roads to 
connect the mango cluster to the markets. 
Therefore, as the case studies reveal, the clustering project includes a structural and direct participation 
of the government to connect the production to the markets. However, at the time of the survey very 
little evidence of this system’s operation mode could be seen, because the lack of financial and 
organizational resources hampered its implementation. In Segno Gobeya and Adarash, where cluster 
surplus production was achieved, but government participation in channeling to the market was not 
effective (and the farmers could not direct their production to a local processing industry because of the 
low quality of their outputs) the increased production determined the inflow of significant quantities of 
outputs on the local markets, which led to market saturation and had a negative effect on selling prices. 
In this top-down governance and command economy system, proper attention needs to be focused on 
the urgency to provide a market outlet for the mono-varied production generated through clusters, 
without which negative economic impacts are to be expected. As the fieldwork demonstrates, clustering 
in South Wollo is currently being implemented without having invested sufficient efforts in the creation 
of efficient marketing connections and issuing clear regulations on contractual agreements, which are 
nevertheless fundamental for the proper functioning of the cluster system, and must not be ignored when 
implementing clusters. 
 
4. Agricultural Clusters and the Ethiopian Way 
 
The information from field visit surveys, interviews, focus group discussions and personal 
communications in South Wollo, reveals that in the last few years government officials and DAs have 
started the implementation of cluster-based initiatives for agricultural transformation. These initiatives 
are intended mainly for the smallholder farming community, which constitutes the bulk of the area’s 
agricultural producers, and their main purpose is to intensify crop production and foster 
commercialization. In the surveyed kebele and woreda, the implementation of the cluster-based 
initiatives follows similar patterns: commodity and area selection based on their growth potential and 
development impact, promotion of farmers’ adoption of improved agricultural inputs and farming 
                                                     
219 - Interview with Asafa, Woreda Office of Agriculture, 4 August 2016, Hawi kebele. 
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practices, and promotion of market linkages. The expected impacts on the community include: increased 
food security, poverty reduction and higher incomes from agriculture. 
In this study, clusters have been identified as major drivers for change in agrarian Ethiopia, and therefore 
considered as useful analysis tools for the broader agrarian transformation process. The study of 
agricultural clusters in contemporary Ethiopia focused initially on a large-scale analysis, aimed at 
exploring the rationale, determiners, stakeholders, objectives and strategies of the cluster-based 
initiatives currently adopted nationwide. Subsequently, by examining specific cases, the analysis has 
investigated the implementation process of agricultural clusters on a smaller scale, in selected kebele in 
South Wollo. Using the findings from both levels of analysis, and considering the relevancy of the 
historical trajectory outlined so far, this conclusive section is aimed at defining the model of agrarian 
transformation that is currently appearing, and discussing possible future scenarios. 
 
4.1. South Wollo’s Clusters in the National Framework 
In previous sections the study verified that cluster-based initiatives for agricultural development have 
been set up recently by the GoE, as a follow-up and scale-up of the agricultural transformation trajectory 
started in the early 2000s with the RDPS. The ACC and the AGP indeed show a current preference for 
geographically-focused and value-chain oriented interventions, which take inspiration from successful 
spatial development initiatives carried out in other continents and economic sectors. The Republic of 
Korea, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, India, Kenya and Nigeria are among the successful countries that the ATA 
explicitly refers to for the design of the ACC.220 Moreover, other SSA countries have already been 
mentioned in chapter 1 for the economic externalities and development contributions resulting from the 
concentration of production processes, companies, innovation hubs, infrastructural facilities and special 
trade policies in selected locations: Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa to name some 
(Gálvez-Nogales 2014; Zeng 2008). Many of these cases have definitely influenced the creation of this 
development policy for both the agricultural and industrial sectors in Ethiopia, that has been carried out 
in collaboration with international development partners: mainly the UNIDO, WB and FAO. 
Although the agricultural clusters discovered and analyzed in South Wollo are not part of the ACC,221 
they reveal a very similar theoretical approach, objectives and overall design. Clusters in South Wollo 
and in the ACC promote the concentration of extension system efforts, and agricultural cultivation inputs 
and patterns based on potential commodities and geographic areas. Moreover, following the mainstream 
cluster approach method, both promote the collaboration of actors throughout the farming value-chains 
                                                     
220 - ATA, National Framework for Agriculture Commercialization Clusters in Ethiopia. Concept, Vision, 
Strategic Interventions and Implementation Framework, Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency, 
unpublished draft 
221 - The Zone is not part of the woreda targeted by the AGP I and II neither (WB 2010, 2015). 
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as an instrument to strengthen horizontal linkages and take advantage of collective actions; both aim at 
fostering cooperation among producers, and scaling-up the use of innovative farming practices and 
inputs. Furthermore, both consider the smallholder farming community as the main target for their 
interventions, and envisage very ambitious expectations in terms of geographical extension, and in terms 
of impact on agricultural transformation and economic growth. 
Despite these planning similarities, the analysis of the implementation process conducted in South 
Wollo reveals many inconsistencies with the framework designed for the ACC. The ACC initiative 
constitutes the main instrument created by the GoE and the ATA to engender commercialization 
methods in the smallholder farmer subsector, and at the same time create opportunities to connect them 
with agro-industries and global agri-food value chains. In addition, the planned ACC interventions 
require a complex institutional setting to coordinate foreign capital, development partners and public 
sector participation.  
Instead, in South Wollo, clusters are focused mainly on increasing food availability and the marketed 
share of total outputs, and very limited actions are taken towards promoting value-adding activities, 
upgrading rural markets, or strengthening the connection with agro-industries and international markets. 
Hence, evidence reveals that the establishment of agricultural clusters in South Wollo has not been 
complemented with any rural transformation centres or other structured collection and primary crop 
transformation systems. Furthermore, there is very limited coordination with development partners, and 
there is evidence to the fact that local government representatives have not fostered contract 
formalization in the already existing (though limited) cases of out-grower schemes. Therefore, the 
findings from South Wollo suggest that the limited emphasis on the marketing-side of the agricultural 
chain – which characterizes the GoE’s approach to agricultural development so far -, has not changed 
with the introduction of the cluster approach. As confirmed by the case studies, agricultural cooperatives 
constitute the only organizational structure to which this mandate is entrusted, but evidence from the 
zone seem to suggest that their actual functions are extremely limited, and no relevant change has been 
noticed so far. 
The findings from South Wollo constitute a unique source to help to understand some of the major 
dynamics of agrarian transformation brought about by cluster-based initiatives in present day Ethiopia. 
Since South Wollo is not included among the ACC selected woreda, differences between the two cluster-
based initiatives are to be expected and are not worth assessing any further. However, because of the 
similarities characterizing the initiatives mentioned earlier, the agrarian transformation mechanisms 
found in South Wollo are most likely to be found also in the ACC context; and since so far no empirical 
research has been conducted on the ACC, this innovative study might constitute a milestone for further 
in-depth analysis. In addition, inasmuch as the cluster approach is coming to the fore of the 
transformational agenda even in areas and institutional realms unrelated to the ACC, similar dynamics 
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are most likely to be replicated elsewhere in the country and are therefore worth taking into consideration 
for policy implications and for the agrarian change debate. 
The coming sections will explore the direction of the transformation processes started by the cluster-
based initiatives in South Wollo and their significance in the Ethiopian model of agrarian transition. 
Before beginning this analysis, it is worth mentioning that evidence from South Wollo suggests that the 
current establishment of agricultural clusters in Ethiopia is lacking many of the determiners for success 
identified by relevant literature on the topic. A complete assessment of the policy’s impacts is beyond 
the objectives set for this work. However, comparing the essentials of the GoE’s pathway with the 
indications provided by recent studies - often conducted by the GoE’s development partners themselves 
–helps to define some of the fundamentals of the Ethiopian way to agrarian transformation. 
According to the mainstream cluster theory, these are intended primarily to promote competition and 
cooperation among neighbouring actors to spur innovation, take advantage of collective actions, and 
generate economic externalities (Porter 1990, 1998). Proximity and collaboration are essential elements 
in the strategy implemented in South Wollo: clusters are made of adjacent plots (kuta gettem), 
collaboration between farmers is necessary to carry out specific farming practices (for instance, sowing 
on line) and it is promoted through the creation of development groups and the alleged enhancement of 
agricultural cooperatives. Instead, competition does not appear to be an agricultural cluster distinctive 
target, given that the share of marketed outputs is generally low. Innovation is on the other hand a 
fundamental cluster element since extension workers promote the adoption of improved inputs and 
cultivation practices. Nevertheless, innovation does not arise from a stronger competition, nor from a 
close and bidirectional relation between actors spread out vertically along the value chain. Knowledge 
externalities are not created but imposed from the top. It is more the effect of a one-way technology 
transfer imposed through state-led structures and agents. As a result, knowledge externalities that could 
be achieved in a more flexible and competitive organizational structure (McCormick, Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka 2007), do not have the proper set up to develop. 
From the literature review seen briefly in chapter 1, it seems that most of the successful clusters 
implemented in the African continent - for instance in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and South 
Africa - came as a result of the spontaneous agglomeration of enterprises and other related actors, which 
subsequently benefited from government support (Zeng 2008). Instead, agricultural clusters in South 
Wollo have been created “from scratch” (Gálvez-Nogales 2010) by local administrators and extension 
workers, upon policy decisions taken at federal and regional levels. As a result, their performance is 
closely connected to the adjustment of government-led development initiatives to help overcome 
structural hurdles on infrastructures, rural finance constraints, market information system, and the 
creation of value addition through private and/or foreign investments. Nevertheless, in most of the 
surveyed cases the targeted areas lacked the basic marketing structures such as storage facilities, 
processing industries, collectors and traders with medium- to large-scale capacity, and rural finance 
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institutions. Therefore, the decision to create clusters in these areas requires strong public investment 
and commitment that will need to go beyond the promotion of an enabling environment.222 However, 
for the time being, clusters in South Wollo have benefited solely from a considerable boost from the 
extension system. 
In accordance with FAO indications, clusters in South Wollo have considered food security issues and 
have involved local government in the implementation process (Gálvez-Nogales 2010). Regarding the 
first element, the selection of a varied crop basket and mixed cropping have usually led to low rates of 
farmer vulnerability to price drops or crop diseases (Clark et al. 2015). Although clusters in South Wollo 
are explicitly intended to contribute to food insecurity relief, the alleged intention to shift farmer attitude 
toward monocropping collides with this principle, causes concern, and increases farmer dependence on 
government support. 
As for the second element, the fieldwork revealed that very often the top-down selection of areas and 
commodities has failed to identify the most proficient crops, and even the most suitable areas. Top-down 
and one-size-fits-all approaches have been repeatedly discredited by most of the relevant literature for 
not allowing adequate flexibility and participation from the private sector (Gálvez-Nogles 2010). The 
literature suggests that more transparent and open decision-making processes generally lead to more 
positive results. Nevertheless, as seen in South Wollo, the cluster implementation process is carried out 
mainly through government offices and personnel, following indications coming from top-ranking 
policy posts, thus becoming mandatory for the subordinates. At the same time, the private sector’s 
contribution is almost null in creating value addition or in farming chain phases other than production. 
To wrap up the section, there is another major divergence from mainstream cluster literature in South 
Wollo’s experience. Analysts found that in developing countries, clusters were more proficient at 
dealing with high-value and export-oriented agricultural products, when there were trade networks that 
connected them to sizeable distant markets (Gálvez-Nogales 2010; Schmitz, Nadvi 1999; Schmitz 
1999). In fact, in developing countries domestic markets are usually characterized by a low degree of 
integration and flexibility, which influences and slows down their capacity to adapt to supply changes. 
The commodities selected for South Wollo did not match these characteristics because in most cases 
they were staple crops for local markets or to be redistributed in the zone. As a consequence, in areas 
where cluster establishment had produced considerable surplus, local markets suffered the collapse of 
selling prices, with detrimental effects on farmer incomes. 
The similarities and divergences observed in this section between the cluster creation process found in 
South Wollo, the ACC, and the theoretical framework based on international best practices, suggest 
                                                     
222 - According to the WB (2012) and Zeng (2008), governments should foster the creation of an enabling 
environment for clusters’ development, linked to: macroeconomic stability, regulatory and institutional 
frameworks, creating trust among actors, boosting business associations and issuing incentive-based policies. 
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three conclusive remarks. First, the South Wollo clusters’ lack of crucial strategic and organizational 
elements definitely has a negative influence on their performance and, in some cases, is also responsible 
for the detrimental effects. These findings may not be applied to the ACC initiative, since a more 
complex set of policies and interventions is planned for that major program. Second, although there is 
no data on the extension and size of these nationwide agricultural clusters, the presence of agricultural 
clusters based on the ACC initiative in a food insecure area such as South Wollo, suggests that cluster-
based initiatives are becoming a priority in the agricultural transformation agenda. Therefore, it is very 
likely that cluster-based initiatives will spread in other zones and regions, and that similar 
implementation patterns will be replicated. Third, these divergences highlight certain aspects of the 
Ethiopian agricultural development and agrarian transition model, that were discovered early on during 
the analysis of the trajectory of the past twenty years, such as: the primary and active role of the 
government in agricultural development, the integration of development and political objectives, the 
production control strategy for the sake of equity, the focus on the smallholder farmer subsector for the 
sector’s upgrading, the neglect of market-related hurdles, the alleged role of cooperatives, the top-down 
approach toward development, the marginal role of the private sector. All these (and other) elements, 
that constitute the core of the Ethiopian trajectory for agrarian transformation, will be mentioned again 
and explored in greater depth in the following and conclusive sections. 
 
4.2. The Developmental State and the Agricultural Clusters 
The study of the agricultural cluster implementation processin South Wollo has showed a strong 
activism by the state’s administration and agricultural extension structures. The state’s protagonist role 
in agriculture had already been seen in earlier sections as an essential element of the developmental 
state. Exploring some of the fundamentals of the developmental state model performed in Ethiopia is a 
crucial step in the definition process of the Ethiopian way to agrarian transformation. 
In the previously mentioned unpublished draft written by Meles, the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia 
declared the developmental state as the most suitable model for African governments, to escape from 
the dead end trap of the predatory state and the Washington consensus.223 Exploring the theory and 
practice of developing economies in Africa and elsewhere, on one side Meles indeed rallied against the 
patronage and rent-seeking behaviours of interventionist states. On the other, he demolished the 
neoliberal political economy model by claiming that the rational choice theory conflicted with the self-
interest free attitude expected of the state apparatus, and that the market economy alone was not 
sufficient to achieve rapid growth and development. Instead, Meles attributed to the developmental state 
the capacity to create a proper combination of interventions and rules for a developing economy (Meles 
                                                     
223 - Meles Zenawi, African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, preliminary draft, 2006. 
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2012). State interventions were considered a necessary condition to bring about technological change, a 
process that was not deemed possible by relying only on market forces. At the same time, only the 
developmental state was believed capable of promoting values and norms that went beyond self-interest 
and of boosting social capital accumulation: an essential element for development and rapid economic 
growth. 
Taking the cue from the pioneer works of Johnson (1999), Evans (1995) and others, Meles (2012) stated 
that the developmental state has two components: ideology and structure. The former is based on the 
state’s mission, rapid development, which constitutes the source of the state’s actual legitimacy. The 
latter consists of the state’s effective bureaucratic capacity to implement political, institutional and 
technical reforms, independently from the private sector’s interests. As previous chapters have shown, 
these factors constituted the central elements of the state-building process the GoE has been following 
throughout the decades. Since the early 2000s, the development and poverty reduction imperatives 
became the sources of legitimation for the creation of a combination of market-led and state-driven 
reforms and policies. Rapid, social and equal development became the mainstream narratives of the 
government’s political strategy, which took on the shape of a hegemonic ideological project. The 
EPRDF called for a coalition with the Ethiopian people and a collective mobilization for the 
developmental purpose (Vaughan 2011). From the private sector to state bureaucracy, the whole society 
was divided between those who contributed to the nation’s development, the lematawi (developmental), 
and those who exploited the national resources for private interests, the kiray sebsabi (“rent seekers” or 
“rent collectors”) (Fana 2014). The pragmatism of Lenin’s democratic centralism was preferred to the 
factionalism of liberal democracies, and the EPRDF took on the role of a vanguard party aimed at 
boosting the peoples’ organizational capacity for the implementation of the “revolutionary 
democracy”.224 
The hegemonic project was linked to the state’s main role in promoting and implementing development. 
Once macroeconomic stability had been achieved, poverty reduction and development then became the 
main strategic objectives, which the “night watchmen state” envisaged by the neoliberal theory was not 
empowered to lead, according to the vanguard party. Meles (2012) claimed that a primary and 
autonomous role of the state in developing economies was justified by the risks connected to letting the 
private sector’s pressures influence governmental policies. While the private sector is driven by the 
dogma of self-interests, governments instead are expected to make policy decisions for the benefit of 
the community. Therefore, autonomy and guiding interventions of the former over the latter are 
necessary conditions to attain social equality and rapid growth. These interventions may come in various 
forms: incentives, regulations, taxes and fees, licensing and many others. Furthermore, the state is 
expected to intervene directly in sectors that the state itself considers strategic to achieve development; 
                                                     
224 - See Aalen (2011) and EPRDF, EPRDF Program, 2005. 
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or in sectors where the private sector’s contribution alone would not be sufficient, such as the 
technological capability accumulation one (Meles 2012). 
The state’s active role in the economy was analysed in previous sections: after the liberal reformism 
phase in the 1990s and following the tehadso phase, the EPRDF secured development politically and 
the government took the lead of the plan for the rapid transition toward “developmental capitalism”.225 
For instance, major regional parties kept the ownership of some leading companies, as was the case for 
the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, whose businesses were justified by their overall 
contribution to national development, and therefore supported with public funds (Plaut 2012). The GoE 
destined a considerable share of its overall public spending to building infrastructures, creating social 
development, engendering technological change and reducing poverty. The strategy obtained 
outstanding results, and was boosted further with the GTP I and II in view of the economy’s structural 
transformation toward industrialization. Nevertheless, this rush toward developmental capitalism had 
some detrimental consequences for civil rights and democratic pluralism, and in many ways hampered 
the private sector’s progress (Clapham 2017). 
In line with the ADLI, the developmental state’s activism was aimed primarily at the agricultural sector. 
The TGE inherited from the Derg a severely ailing agricultural sector, due mainly to persistent droughts, 
political instability and disastrous policies for agricultural socialisation and socialist transition. The TGE 
started a liberalisation period aimed at revamping private peasant holder production, restoring rural 
markets and obtaining the necessary international financial assistance. Nevertheless, at the turn of the 
millennium the reformist period was interrupted following a season of internal and external political 
instability that led to the start of the developmental state model. The endorsement of the model involved 
a reversal or interruption of some of the preceding reforms, in view of an enhanced state run rural and 
agricultural development trajectory. This could be clearly seen in the structures for import, production, 
distribution or export of agricultural inputs and products, that were in various ways brought under the 
almost exclusive control of public or semipublic entities: the AISE, ESE, ECX and EGTE. At the same 
time the GoE started to pursue the opportunities created by the global economy, and promote (and 
channel) foreign capital penetration in the growing domestic economy as an additional instrument to 
foster the strategy. 
The agricultural clusters studied in South Wollo constitute the most recent step in the Ethiopian 
developmental state trajectory, whose main elements have been briefly recalled or explored in this 
section. On one side, this implies that the trajectory has influenced cluster design and implementation; 
and indeed this is confirmed by the fact that some of the main elements of the developmental state can 
be found in the cluster policies. On the other, because of the clusters’ alleged transformational capacity, 
                                                     
225 - In mid 2000s “developmental capitalism” replaced the objective of socialist transition that still characterized 
the early ideological narrative of the EPRDF (Vaughan 2011). 
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these may need to be addressed as a step forward in the trajectory itself, and therefore considering the 
effect that their implementation may have on the Ethiopian developmental state. 
Regarding the first issue, many of the findings from South Wollo confirm that the governmental 
administration and extension system structures exert a widespread and prominent authority over the 
rural economy. This is performed in both the structural and ideological components of the model. 
Concerning the former, the agricultural clusters demonstrate the GoE has invested a considerable effort 
into transferring new farming technologies to the smallholder farming community, in line with the role 
demanded of the developmental state in promoting technological change (Johnson 1999; Meles 2012). 
This is performed with the delivery of different kinds of extension services offered by a remarkably 
large extension worker structure; and the provision of improved farming inputs, through a supply 
structure whose administration is almost exclusively run by the state. Furthermore, the most important 
role in collecting and distributing cluster outputs is appointed to the agricultural primary cooperatives 
that, according to recent studies, retain close connections with local administrators and are extremely 
dependent on governmental support (Delelegne et al. 2016). 
As for the ideological component, the fieldwork revealed that the agricultural clusters are designed and 
planned for large scale implementation. In order for scale economies to be generated, the farmers of the 
targeted areas are all required to comply with the new farming rules, because each interruption reduces 
the profits of the whole cluster. At the same time, the study of the agricultural cluster implementation 
methods in South Wollo has demonstrated further the importance of massive compliance to the 
development purpose of the projects. The findings showed that farmers were sometimes forced to join 
the clusters or were subjected to pressure from the extension workers or governmental representatives, 
to abide by cluster rules. Farmers were also aggregated into different coordination structures 
(developmental groups, 1 to 5 teams, cluster groups) where they received advice from, and were subject 
to the control of, leaders who usually had close connections with the local government apparatus. 
With all these factors the government retains a strong hold over the cluster creation and governance 
process, thus fulfilling the primary role accorded by the developmental state model. Therefore, it is 
worth inquiring about the impact of agricultural cluster creation on the trajectory of the Ethiopian 
developmental state. As conceived and carried out in South Wollo, and envisaged also by the ACC, in 
the event of success and expansion of the agricultural clusters in the country some major transformations 
are to be expected. These changes will most likely boost the structural transformation of the economy, 
and agriculture and its smallholder farmer backbone will most probably downgrade further their 
economic and political centrality. 
This process has already been studied by many observers, according to whom the target of the 
developmental state has already shifted towards new entrepreneurs (Lefort 2012; Lavers 2012). Whether 
or not new actors are coming to the fore of the economic trajectory, new social categories are definitely 
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arising due to the influence of structural processes such as: population growth, migrations, urbanisation, 
landlessness, climate change, and so on.226 Moreover, the nationwide implementation of agricultural 
clusters is expected to combine with all these processes and to accelerate their impacts. The formation 
of these new social categories entails, new social needs and demands for the developmental state to 
address and to include in its hegemonic project. Therefore, although so far the centrality of the 
smallholder farming community has not changed substantially in relation to the cropping sector, and it 
remains at the centre of the political narrative; it is not to be excluded that its position vis-à-vis the 
economic and political agenda for development will change in the near future. Therefore, if clusters will 
be implemented successfully nationwide, this will most probably push both the structural and hegemonic 
components of the developmental state to adapt to the new circumstances. 
 
4.3. Agrarian Transformations and State-Peasant Relation 
The findings from the fieldwork revealed that the agricultural clusters may be interpreted as a tool in the 
hands of the GoE to direct and exert control over the economic structural transition and agricultural 
transformation process. As discussed in the previous section, governmental involvement is part of the 
political economy strategy envisaged by the developmental state. Furthermore, this strong presence of 
the state in the economy, and agriculture in particular, is also a heritage of the historical and ideological 
roots of the ruling coalition. As observed in chapter 2, the TPLF arose from a branch of the socialist 
movement that led the Derg to seize power in the country in mid-1970s. During the rebellion period, the 
TPLF developed a close connection with the peasantry in the north of the country that was later passed 
on to the TGE and the EPRDF. As this study has shown, this ideological attachment to the peasantry 
has shaped the whole Ethiopian trajectory up to nowadays. At the same time, although the socialist 
transition was officially abandoned, its legacies continued to influence the «strong sense of “ownership” 
of economic policies» that the WB observed in the GoE in the mid-1990s (WB 1997: 2). This section’s 
purpose is to analyse the current agrarian transformation process that arises from the observation of 
clusters and the study of the trajectory performed during the two decades of the EPRDF’s rule, from the 
state-peasant relation perspective. 
 
4.3.1. Land, Agriculture and Peasantry Under the Derg 
In order to do so, some of the major legacies of the Derg approach to agrarian transition are worth 
analysing briefly here. The February 1974 revolution was the result of the process of erosion of the 
                                                     
226 - See M. Rizzo, Rural Wage Employment in Rwanda and Ethiopia: A Review of the Current Policy Neglect and 
a Framework to Begin Addressing It, Working Paper No. 103, Policy Integration Department, International Labour 
Office, Geneva, May 2011. 
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Emperor’s social base, caused by the accumulation of a wide range of factors including: complaints by 
a growing mass of educated students, resentment towards mandatory military service, trade unions’ 
claims, recurring famines, growing urban unemployment, economic growth rate deceleration, instability 
of the international monetary system and the oil price increase of 1973 (Clapham1988; Eshetu, 
Makonnen 1992). However, most of the political and economic instability could be attributed to the 
precarious conditions of the agrarian backbone. The pre-revolution period rural economy was composed 
mainly by tenant- and smallholding owner-cultivators, with relevant intra- and inter-regional 
distribution differences. Both suffered from an extreme condition of powerlessness and dependence on 
their landlords and high government officials, two conditions that were often found in the same person. 
Rent, taxes, tenure insecurity, extremely limited production capacities, constituted the main causes of 
peasant dependency (Dessalegn 1984). The military council that seized power in 1974 attempted 
immediately to put an end to these unbalanced power relations and unstable economic and political 
conditions. 
Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First), the catch-all motto aimed at highlighting the utmost importance of the 
common good over special interests, constituted the essence of the statehood (Hansson 1995). On one 
side, this meant national unity instead of ethnic divisions and discrimination; social justice and equality 
instead of inequalities, exploitation and labour division; socialism instead of capitalist power and 
production relations. On the other, this involved a united effort to generate the resources required to 
boost economic development and improve the living standards of Ethiopians, to be achieved possibly 
through a command economy only, linked to centralized planning and resource allocation (Eshetu, 
Makonnen 1992). The entire production system was brought under the state’s administration through 
the nationalization of former private companies and rural and urban land; the establishment of semi-
public entities for the implementation of centralized surplus extraction, resource allocation and 
redistribution; the «encadrement» of citizens in control structures (Clapham 1988: 2002). 
The agricultural sector, being the heart of the economy, was subject to a pervasive transformation 
project. State ownership of land was established in 1975 by the Provisional Military Administration 
Council, with the purpose to subvert the quasi-feudal land administration structure of the Imperial 
period, and allocate land on an equal basis. The Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation n. 
31/1975 stated in articles 3/1 and 3/2: «all rural land shall be collectively property of the Ethiopian 
people. (2) No person or business organization or any other organization shall hold rural land in private 
ownership» (PMAC 1975). The Proclamation established also the Peasant Associations (PAs): mass 
organisations constituted by every willing farmer - tenants, landless people, hired agricultural workers, 
owners with less than 10 ha – within an 800 ha area (art. 8, 9). PAs were appointed a wide range of 
functions and responsibilities: to distribute land, to administer public property, to establish judicial 
courts, to establish cooperatives, to contribute to social development, to undertake villagization (art. 10). 
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According to Dessalegn (1984), the land reform indeed abolished landlordism and tenancy in the 
country; and by transforming all rural producers into usufructuary land holders, it eliminated all 
differences related to the relationship between producers and the means of production. However, he 
claimed that, instead of effectively empowering the newly independent smallholders to become the 
major force in rural production, the reform set off some land fragmentation and peasant de-stratification 
processes that ultimately led to an “agrarian involution”: where peasants were concerned solely with 
self-subsistence (Dessalegn 1984). At the same time, the PAs soon became subjected to central control 
and management, exerted mainly through state and party hierarchy, through elections manipulation and 
regular involvement in daily activities (Clapham 1988). PAs became the bridge between peasants and 
the state since they were used to carry out various political functions: they were appointed the role of 
tax collectors, they were expected to eliminate resistance to change, they owned armed squads and run 
jails which ultimately turned them into «extensions of state power, rather than agencies for self-
administration» (Clapham 1988: 161). 
Overwhelmingly, the most important task appointed to the PAs was the distribution of land among their 
constituents. With the dismantlement of the quasi-feudal agrarian structure of the Imperial period, the 
land reform was expected to hand over to peasants the control of their means of production. 
Nevertheless, a few years after the revolution, the agricultural socialization project based on the Soviet 
model overcame the free smallholder production system that had arisen from the land reform. The 
transition to a socialist agriculture involved the imposition of collectivization, state farms, producer 
cooperatives, villagization and resettlements (Dessalegn 1993). Peasants were therefore subjected to 
policies that ultimately transformed public ownership of land into an instrument to clear areas and 
remove farmers from their land, and turned the PAs into the operative arm of the state. Estimates show 
that around 2 million rural dwellers were displaced for the establishment of state farms and cooperatives 
(Dessalegn 1993); and around 8 million living in scattered homesteads were arbitrarily relocated to 
centralized villages (Alemayehu 1990; Clapham 1988), without giving peasants the possibility to have 
their say in the decision-making process. 
The transition to socialism trajectory expected agriculture and the peasantry to provide the required 
resources. During the Derg period, peasants were subjected to a taxation system consisting of: land use 
fees, taxes on agricultural income, taxes on agricultural product exports, “voluntary contributions”, 
levies for famines, and other smaller levies added by local officials. While Dessalegn (1993) claimed 
that these amounted to a third to half of a peasant’s annual cash income, Eshetu (1990) affirmed that 
these did not weigh excessively on peasants. Instead, all the analysts agreed that the most burdening 
instrument for surplus extraction designed by the Derg was the AMC: a state agency to whom private 
merchants, state farms and peasants from alleged surplus regions were obliged to sell a certain quota of 
grain at government set prices, which were lower than the markets’ (Eshetu 1990; Dessalegn 1993). The 
AMC was aimed at supplying grains to urban kebele, state enterprises and armed forces; but due to an 
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ineffective implementation and to unproductive marketing and pricing policies, it led to a deterioration 
of the agricultural terms of trade and contributed to the increase of the state budget deficit (Befekadu, 
Tesfaye 1990). 
In the transition to agricultural socialism process, peasantry became the recipient of top-down directives 
coming from the central state. The socialist transition was influenced by the notion that collective and 
large-scale production was more efficient than private and small-scale. Therefore, major investments 
were destined to the establishment of state farms, villagization, resettlement and the producer 
cooperative promotion. Between 1980 and 1985 state farms absorbed around 64% of the annual state 
spending allocated to agriculture, but their contribution to the national food supply and total exports 
never went beyond 2 and 6 percent respectively (Dessalegn 1990). At the same time, cooperatives 
received exceptional political emphasis and hopes: agricultural cooperatives were established mainly in 
order to control agricultural marketing, avoid private wholesaling, improve production performance, up-
scale outputs aggregation and fulfill national food requirements through the AMC (Brüne 1990). 
Members benefited from preferential treatment: they were allocated larger plots per head, they 
monopolized the extension services, they had preferential access to agricultural inputs and credit, they 
benefited from lower taxes, and other similar advantages (Clapham 1988). By 1993, over 50% of the 
PAs were expected to join cooperatives, but in 1990 the actual figure was 6.5% (Alemayehu 1992). 
Cooperatives have never been able to supply the expected contribution to national food sufficiency, in 
fact it never went beyond 2% of the total demand (Brüne 1990). 
They have not been able to modify peasant attitude to cooperation and socialisation either, and by March 
1990, three months after the beginning of a more market-friendly phase in Ethiopian politics, 95.7 
percent of the total 3500 agricultural producer cooperatives were dissolved because of massive member 
withdrawal (Alemayehu 1992). Producer cooperatives were actually also political control structures: 
farmers were expected to participate voluntarily to cooperatives, but many peasants actually joined as a 
consequence of the pressure exerted by local authorities, or as a necessary condition to access basic 
goods like soap, salt and sugar, and services like schools, clinics, kindergartens and the water system 
(Alemayehu 1992). Indeed, a main element for cooperatives and collectivization was peasantry 
relocation to satisfy the transition process to socialism. This peasantry capturing process was conducted 
through the state-driven control of production means - carried out with land reform and collective forms 
of production – and through the massive presence of state and party officials in rural areas. This was 
pursued through the creation of a vast administration and governance system– PAs, zematcha 
participants,227 party cadres, armed forces and kebele officials – as well as by the creation of an 
embedded civil society: trade associations and trade unions run by the government (Clapham 1988). It 
was the result of «a project of encadrement, or incorporation into structures of control, which was 
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pursued with remarkable speed and ruthlessness. It sought to intensify the longstanding trajectory of 
centralized state formation by removing the perceived sources of peripheral discontent and espousing 
an ideal of nation-statehood in which citizens would equally be associated with, and subjected to, an 
omnipotent state» (Clapham 2002: 14). 
 
4.3.2. The EPRDF and the Peasantry, Lessons from South Wollo 
Recalling some of the main issues that have been highlighted, state-peasant relations during the Derg 
were influenced by an approach to development and agrarian change aimed at the achievement of a 
rapid modernization. Taking inspiration from the Soviet model of agrarian transition, smallholder 
farmers were considered inefficient development actors, and this made them suitable for their removal 
from the control of production means, through their inclusion into larger and more efficient production 
systems. Planners intended to pursue this objective by expanding governance and administration 
structures in rural areas, and by spreading mobilization and control through political, institutional and 
civil society means. 
With the establishment of the FDRE and the EPRDF-led government, many of the fundamentals of the 
command economy were dismantled, and the position of the peasantry within the social and economic 
development strategy changed radically. Having acknowledged that collectivization had failed, the GoE 
began a trajectory of agricultural development based on the smallholder farmer upgrading. The 
extractive rural policy was abolished, along with the AMC and the quota system, many state farms were 
dismantled, and farmers were given the freedom of choice to participate in cooperatives, villagization 
and resettlement programs. These decisions were taken within the ADLI strategy context, that envisaged 
for agriculture - and smallholder farmers in particular – a leading role in generating economic growth 
and national food security, and setting off the industrialization process. 
Although the agricultural and economic development pathway started by the ADLI and the GoE differed 
considerably from the Derg’s, as seen in chapter 2, some of that trajectory’s essentials reflected the state-
peasant relations discussed in the previous section.228 The study of the post-1991 Ethiopian way to 
agrarian transformation, and the analysis of the strategy and implementation of cluster practice, have 
indeed revealed major trends of continuity with the past - in terms of state-peasant relations - that are 
analyzed in this section. It must be said that this long-term perspective provides useful elements to 
understand some of the issues arising from the observations, to interpret approaches and strategies for 
change, to define the essentials of the Ethiopian way, and to foresee possible future scenarios. 
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The starting point for this analysis regards the issue of land ownership because it is the most evident 
sign of that continuity, and it constitutes a crucial element of agrarian transformation. At the time the 
TGE established its control over the country, the land issue debate came to the fore, fuelled by two 
diverging political theories. The first was embraced by those who endorsed the thesis of fairness and 
state protection against the negative effects of market forces, including the EPRDF; the opposite stance 
instead stood for land privatization, based on the efficiency principle and was backed by international 
donors, Ehiopian and international researchers and the Ethiopian Economic Association (Crewett, Korf 
2008; EEA/EAPRI 2002). In the lack of any real popular consultations, the EPRDF’s political will 
dominated the debate and public land ownership was ratified by article 40/3 of the 1995 Constitution: 
«The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested 
in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange» (FDRE 1995). 
Peasants and pastoralists were granted the right to obtain land without payment, and to be protected 
from evictions and displacements (art. 40/4 and 40/5); but the «government» was legally conferred the 
right to «expropriate private property for public purposes», upon compensation (art. 40/8). 
Subsequently, Proclamation n. 89/1997 introduced the right to exchange, lease and bequeath land, labour 
and capital; massive certification programs were started by the main regions to strengthen farmer tenure 
security; and Proclamations during the 2000s fostered foreign and domestic investor land acquisitions 
for development purposes. 
Therefore, betraying some historical legacies from the past, the GoE took upon itself and its regional 
counterparts, the authority to manage land on behalf of the people of Ethiopia, given their powerlessness 
and for their protection from the inequalities caused by market forces. Accordingly, at the beginning of 
the EPRDF’s rule, smallholding farming households were considered the cornerstone of national food 
self-sufficiency and economic growth, and were therefore granted preferential treatment regarding land 
utilization and access, secondary only to the common good. Subsequently, with the support and 
influence of major international donors, land use limitations were partially lifted in order to revitalize 
the rural economy and promote agricultural development. However, in spite of the appearance of new 
actors and targets in the GoE’s agenda, the state’s leading position in terms of land governance and the 
submissive position of smallholder farmers versus the state, have not changed at all. 
According to Dessalegn (2008b: 283), «[t]he control of the land and its products has been the source of 
class power and the basis of the hegemony of the state». As pointed out in previous sections, the federal 
and regional governments have extensive land control for the application of the developmental state’s 
objectives.229 Land control is exerted through evictions, redistribution and allocations of land that is 
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considered unused or underexploited, to preferred target groups; and through the imposition of specific 
forms of land utilization. The former phenomenon has been seen consistently from the perspective of 
the so-called land grabbing that is unfolding in the country’s lowlands and peripheral areas, and it proves 
a certain degree of continuity with the Derg since it copies its approach to development and 
accumulation by dispossession (Fana 2016). The latter has been seen in some state-led outgrowing 
schemes, which were basically forced on the farmers (Lavers 2012). 
The second trend is also evident in the study of clusters in South Wollo, where land, agricultural inputs 
and manpower are submitted – not always voluntarily – to the state-driven cluster development project. 
According to the developmental state’s essence, with the establishment of clusters the GoE is committed 
to find “the perfect combination of capital, labor and land”,230 that farmers are considered incapable of 
doing on their own. Indeed, findings revealed that farmers were expected - and therefore convinced or 
forced - to join the clusters and to follow precise instructions regarding: the cultivation of selected crops, 
the use of highly “recommended” agricultural inputs, the acceptance of cropping timelines, the 
participation in collaborative farming practices. Cluster farmers increased their dependency on 
government-supply chains regarding farming inputs and coping strategies, they were excluded from 
decision-making processes regarding farming patterns, and they were informed about the preferability 
of channelling their surplus towards organizations that kept close ties with the government (the 
cooperatives). Therefore, as long as the cluster project will continue to expand, smallholder farmer 
detachment from the control of production factors is expected to increase, in favour of “one-size-fits-
all” farming patterns selected for their allegedly improved performance. Furthermore, given the political 
linkages that affect the cooperative system, once that system will be developed enough to fulfil the 
expected functions regarding agricultural output aggregation, accumulation and management, the 
clusters will give the state the organizational capacity to further expand its domination over the 
peasantry, by acquiring control of the outputs through these cooperatives. 
Therefore, it can be said that clusters copy the top-down approach to agricultural development, and the 
state-peasant relations that featured the Derg period. These are not new elements in the EPRDF’s 
trajectory for agricultural development: previous sections have indeed proved that the top-down 
approach and the concept of smallholder farmers as rural inhabitants in need of innovation, have both 
shaped the EPRDF’s agenda since the 1990s. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that these 
longstanding elements are enhanced by the current intensified exclusion of farmers from their means of 
production and subsistence, which is caused by the recent evolution of agrarian policies, with clusters 
first and foremost. 
Speaking of the elements of continuity with the past, as this section has demonstrated, the established 
land governance system fosters the state’s increasing interposition between the peasantry and its factors 
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of production. A crucial contribution to this penetration comes also from the widespread political, social 
and economic command system, established by the EPRDF in the rural world. This point has already 
been highlighted in previous sections dealing with the developmental state and its consolidation 
methods; but some additional insights are hereby worth analysing since this control system defines the 
shape of state-peasant relations and determines the agrarian transformation process. 
A crucial element for the establishment of this control structure came from the longstanding Ethiopian 
problem related to ethnicity. Since its establishment, the modern Ethiopian state has been challenged by 
an ongoing tension between the central government and the country’s peripheries. During the Imperial 
period, this tension was unfolding along ethnic and cultural lines, where a number of different ethnic 
groups challenged the political and economic domination of the Amhara-speaking and Orthodox core, 
that was based in the central highlands. When the Derg seized the power, it sought to reduce the conflicts 
to a mere class matter by calling for the Ethiopia Tikdem (Aalen 2011). At the same time, it sought to 
connect the main issue with the principle of state power decentralisation - for instance through the PAs 
(Vaughan, Tronvoll 2003) - which ultimately led to the incorporation of the Ethiopian people in a 
widespread mobilization and command system; this structure was composed mainly by the PAs 
themselves, the zemetcha participants, party executives and the state government hierarchies (Clapham 
2002). After 1991, the TPLF presented itself as one of the many oppressed groups, and through the 
establishment of ethnic-federalism sought to give voice and to represent neglected ethnic minorities. By 
affirming the principle of self-determination for the nationalities and people of Ethiopia, the EPRDF 
started a pathway of power decentralization and service delivery to the rural peripheries. Since the early 
2000s, kebele and woreda administrations were thus vested with the management of resources and many 
other responsibilities, there was a massive recruitment of civil service personnel, the number of 
extension agents in the rural world increased constantly, and farmers were grouped into sub-kebele 
organizations for rural development purposes (Emmeneger et al. 2011). 
In keeping with the Derg dogma, this decentralization took place within a rural governance system 
characterized by a blurred distinction between party and state. The principles of democratic centralism 
and upward accountability that ruled party structures, were replicated in the state hierarchy and, as a 
consequence, the whole process was more of a deconcentration of responsibilities, rather than an actual 
delegation of powers (Chinigò 2014).231 At the same time, the connection between local administrators 
and party officials was strengthened thanks to a vast campaign of party recruitments. Thus, the party 
enhanced its presence and power in the rural world, and the devolution of activities to the local 
governments became a way for the central executives of the state-party to exert control over the peasants 
(Teferi 2004). Many studies reported the political linkages that unfolded locally among kebele officials, 
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party executives, development group and 1 to 5 team leaders, cooperative leaders, model farmers, and 
local militias.232 The latter have been repeatedly mobilized for political reasons, especially just before 
elections; and the unfolding and results of the last two national ballots suggest that the control of the 
rural world has reached a level of effectiveness and pervasiveness that is unprecedented in Ethiopian 
history. Accordingly, Aalen rightly said that «the launch of “self-determination for nationalities” did not 
only reflect ideological conviction or a desire to pacify ethnic wars, but served as an instrument by which 
the new power holders could secure their control of the state apparatus» (Aalen 2011: 36). 
Findings from South Wollo confirmed the presence of many of these features that are historically 
embedded in state-peasant relations, including: a very complex state bureaucracy, a widespread mixture 
between state and party hierarchies, and the influence of upward accountability and bureaucratic 
centralization on rural development activities. As pointed out regarding the cluster establishment 
process, it is here argued that these mechanisms have considerable influence on the broad processes of 
agrarian transformation. First of all, the findings from the cluster study revealed that the extension 
agents’ activities are influenced by a pressure and reward system from their superiors, exerted most 
probably by fixing targets of land and farmers to be included in the clusters, regardless of the impact 
and utility of these inclusions. Secondly, bureaucratic centralism involves a top-down approach that 
does not adapt to local conditions. Hence, in some cases the selection of land, commodities, agricultural 
inputs and cropping timelines have proved to be inefficient, or even detrimental for farmers. Thirdly, as 
demonstrated by the rise of some opposition to the planned clusters (among farmers and even some 
DAs), while the implementation of rural development initiatives (such as clusters) is delegated to the 
local administration and extension structures, neither theirs nor the peasants’ fundamental contribution 
in the decision-making process are requested. In some of the surveyed cases, this implied the application 
of strategies that are not tailored to local conditions, and therefore not conducive to good performances. 
Fourthly, in almost all the surveyed cases, cluster establishment entailed the creation of a fostering and 
monitoring structure constituted by groups and sub-groups of farmers and leaders. In most of the studied 
cases leaders were appointed by a top-down selection rather than by a farmer election. Evidence also 
showed that these structures and their leaders were interconnected with the already functioning 1 to 5 
teams and development groups, as well as with local administration structures and party hierarchy. The 
blurred boundaries between these structures that the fieldwork revealed, confirm the tendency of rural 
politics to put together development and political purposes (Kassahun, Poulton 2014). Further evidence 
of this tendency was given by the fact that the interviewed farmers tended to use the mengist term to 
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address the different development and political organizations and agents indiscriminately (cooperatives, 
DAs, state officials, and party executives).233 
To wrap up the section, it is worth noticing that, similarly to the Derg’s trajectory, what arose after 1991 
as a democratic solution to the periphery’s longstanding demand for power and representation, actually 
translated into a massive, widespread and efficient control system. Decentralization was indeed captured 
for political targets (Teferi 2004), and the creation of parallel administration, rural development and 
political mobilization structures, served the GoE to consolidate its hegemonic project. This section has 
proved that the state-peasant relation that surfaces from the cluster study, is influenced heavily by 
historical legacies. The analysis of the land and decentralization issues has revealed the relevance of the 
top-down approach to agricultural development and of the widespread presence of state and party control 
structures in the rural world, for the Ethiopian trajectory of agrarian transformation. Furthermore, it can 
be claimed, but further research is needed to apply this thesis nationwide, that the creation of agricultural 
clusters in Ethiopia gives the government additional structures and tools to enhance its presence even 
more in the rural world, and to exert even greater oppressive control on smallholder farmers. 
 
4.3.3. Peasantry and Clusters, What Future? 
As analyzed in the first sections of this study, peasantry worldwide is currently subjected to the influence 
of a wide range of global and local issues that challenge its existence and stimulate its reconfiguration. 
In the Ethiopian case, the main influences having a bearing are the structural deficiencies of a developing 
country’s rural economy, including: land shortage, hampered capital accumulation, low investment 
rates, small and unintegrated markets, inadequate infrastructures, dependence on rain for water, food 
insecurity. In addition, main challenges deal also with the expected penetration in the global markets, 
for which peasantry lacks the sufficient means to compete, and does not receive the required support 
against its negative impacts. In line with its developmental aim, the Ethiopian state has been leading a 
transformation process of the peasantry, to respond to the requirements of an equal and poverty-free 
society, and to boost the economy’s structural transformation process. The clusters indeed represent one 
of the means by which the state-led peasantry reconfiguration is taking place in Ethiopia. 
Agricultural clusters in South Wollo revealed that the Ethiopian peasantry still plays a central role in the 
agenda for economic growth and structural transformation. In the last two and half decades, the GoE 
has attempted in different ways to transform the smallholding farming community from its vulnerable 
and subsistence-led condition, to a self-subsistent and market-oriented productive class. In spite of its 
remarkable success in terms of agricultural development, the trajectory fell short of the expected targets 
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regarding the transformation of the agrarian sector into an efficient, equal, modern, value-adding and 
industrial-oriented sector. Starting from these deficiencies, the creation of agricultural clusters is 
expected to create the most favourable conditions for the smallholder farmers to overcome them. 
Although findings suggested that agricultural clusters failed to empower smallholder farmers, they 
definitely created a system that depends heavily on their commitment and participation. Hence, it can 
be said that the rate of extension that clusters will achieve nationwide might be considered as an indicator 
of the role the GoE is currently conceding - and will most probably appoint in the incoming years - to 
smallholder farmers, in boosting the country’s transition toward industrialization and middle-income 
status. That is to say that if, in the years to come, the ACC pilot initiative will be scaled-up, or if the less 
complex clusters seen in South Wollo will continue to expand (and new researches will find a similar 
commitment also in other zones), this will mean that smallholder farmers have not lost their central 
position in the GoE agenda. Conversely, if the agricultural clusters should fail to achieve the expected 
levels of expansion and development, Ethiopian smallholder farmers can be expected to have to face a 
more uncertain trajectory. At the moment, findings from South Wollo revealed that cluster 
implementation is channelling relevant resources as well as extension agent and local administrator 
commitment, and that smallholder farmers retain a crucial role in cluster performance. 
Evidence from the fieldwork also revealed that the creation of agricultural clusters may bring about deep 
transformations in the agricultural sector and in the agrarian world. In fact, regarding the agricultural 
sector, three main impacts are expected to take place if the cluster-based policy should proceed as 
planned. First, by pursuing a massive knowledge transfer and a systematic adoption of improved 
agricultural inputs, production volumes will most probably grow at an unprecedented rate. Second, 
regardless of local potential, production in food-deficit areas will be most likely focused exclusively on 
staple crops. Third, the government will retain a centralized control of the country’s entire agricultural 
production, and will have the possibility to plan, command and organize all village-level production and 
market channels. 
Cluster analysis has also shown that, through them, the GoE is seeking to bring about impressive changes 
in agrarian relations of production and trade, that go beyond the mere agricultural realm. In line with the 
relevant theory and other successful international experiences, the GoE adopted the ACC initiative to 
transform the country into a combined system of enhanced agri-food value chains within geographically 
targeted production areas, characterized by strengthened vertical and horizontal linkages, and better 
connections with the international trade. What the cluster study in South Wollo discovered was that, on 
one side the GoE is very determined to bring about that change, but on the other its ability to handle the 
challenges that come with it is limited. Implementing the cluster-project in areas with low production 
potential indeed leads to a wide range of complex and extra interventions to be added to the ones 
specifically needed for the shift to monocropping and to extend technology adoption. These 
interventions will involve, among others, the creation of alternative sources for income and food 
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security, the creation of stable marketing systems, the regulation of benefit sharing along the chain, 
protection from an increased exposure to more competitive markets. This case gives credit to the 
literature that sees a strong regulatory and intermediary role of the state, as a necessary condition to 
prevent detrimental impacts on peasants (Zeng 2008; Porter 1998; Gálvez Nogales 2010). However, at 
the current stage all these interventions are missing, and unless their introduction takes place soon, the 
project will fail to bring about the expected impacts. 
Furthermore the fieldwork showed that the clusters contained the seeds for peasantry differentiation. As 
stated earlier on, the agricultural transformation trajectory followed by the GoE has not brought about 
significant changes in its general structure: smallholder farmers have kept a major role in the sector and 
their vulnerability has not been significantly reduced; and the appearance of new entrepreneurs with 
greater capital availability and investment possibilities has proved to be unimpressive. However, some 
social and economic differentiation mechanisms were discovered with the fieldwork, and the 
contribution of clusters therein seemed to be relevant and linked to a social, rather than economic, 
performance. The findings from South Wollo are in line with previous studies that discovered that 
upward mobility in rural Ethiopia is more a matter of mastering political skills and loyalty to superiors, 
rather than the result of better yields and capital accumulation (Teferi 2012). The fieldwork indeed 
confirmed the presence of a rural elite composed by the leaders of the different cluster and rural 
development hierarchies; and evidence proved the existing linkages between the realms of politics and 
development, suggesting that upward mobility does indeed take place in this manner. Nevertheless, 
further research is required to assess whether, through clusters, the strengthening of this loyal leader 
elite may actually transform into an active entrepreneurial class – either through the appropriation of the 
control of inputs and credit distribution, or through a stronger role in output aggregation and marketing 
– or if the expansion and accumulation of these structures is for the sole purpose of controlling the rural 
world. 
As repeatedly stated, the Ethiopian agricultural cluster strategy intends for smallholder farmers to have 
a central role in agricultural development and agrarian transformation, in keeping with the ADLI 
strategy and the whole EPRDF trajectory. Nevertheless, findings from the fieldwork suggest that cluster 
implementation changes the functions that the EPRDF has traditionally attributed to that role. The 
agricultural development trajectory implemented by the EPRDF throughout the decades has indeed been 
influenced by a neo-populist approach to small-scale peasantry, according to which the peasantry kept 
the seeds and potential for its own upgrade. In keeping with this approach, with the creation of a massive 
extension system and the establishment of an interventionist state, the GoE has attempted to provide the 
peasantry with the necessary elements for an equal and rapid development. Lately, this position has 
evolved slightly towards a more “pluralist” vision, with the appearance of new large-scale and 
entrepreneurial investors in the GoE’s agenda; but this occurrence did not entail any significant shift 
from the mainstream approach. 
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Instead, cluster creation reveals that the peasantry has been apparently stripped of the control of its 
production and trade relations, and has been replaced by the state’s intermediary role. Hence, with 
clusters the peasantry takes on a different position within the process of agrarian transformation: from 
being the undisputed protagonist of change, to being an instrument for the state to use to bring about 
that change. In the clusters, the GoE offers services and support to small-scale producers for their being 
part of a planned and “encadred” of agrarian transformation process where it controls: the input supply 
system, the identification of production areas and the marketing process. Although these processes have 
been seen only in their embryonal phase, in the clusters, farmers actually lose their freedom regarding 
the commodity to be sowed, they lose control of their farming methods, and they are strongly influenced 
in their marketing relations. As a matter of fact, in the clusters small-scale farmers are included in 
collective production systems where the GoE holds impressive control and surplus extraction structures. 
As observed earlier on, through public ownership of land and with a strong interventionist policy, the 
state already possessed significant tools to direct the trajectory of agrarian transition. However, the level 
of influence and interposition in the rural economy, that it will be able to achieve with the widespread 
application of this specific approach to clusters, had never been so great. Clusters have gone from being 
conceived as instruments to strengthen market relations between companies engaged in similar and 
inter-related activities, as per the mainstream theory, to being apparently taken over by the GoE for its 
developmental targets, and therefore transformed into structures of control. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
My work has focused on the process of agrarian transformation that affects the peasantry of developing 
countries at present. The debate on which this work is centered, arises from the studies on peasants and 
agrarian change that since the decolonization period have blurred among the social sciences, and that 
dealt with the role that peasantry, the largest social and economic group in developing countries, could 
play in the industrialization and economic growth of developing countries. The original debate, briefly 
discussed in chapter 1, unfolded on the legacies of the agrarian question and aimed at defining the 
peasantry’s position in the economic growth and industrialization process. Initial studies and 
development policies focused on the transition process of agrarian-based economies shaped by informal 
and not-modern relations of production and trade, to more innovative, profitable and industrialized 
systems. Different theories have arisen over the decades regarding the contribution the agricultural 
sector and the peasantry were expected to give to this transition. The peasantry’s role in agricultural and 
economic development has evolved over the decades, along with the unfolding of historical events, 
technological change, the international transformation of production and trade relations, demographic 
change and many other concurring processes. The interaction between these factors has changed the 
political, social and economic context where the peasantry lived and maintained its relations of 
production, reproduction and exchange. 
At present, a new set of opportunities and challenges are faced by peasantry in developing countries, as 
a result of the internationalization of the production and trade processes, a conducive trade policy 
framework, improved migration and communication possibilities, and many other elements that shape 
the so-called global economy. A broad range of pro-poor strategies has been promoted and implemented 
to reduce poverty, improve peasant livelihoods, and limit the negative impacts of their exposure to 
highly competitive markets. At the same time, the mainstream approach to agricultural and economic 
development has sought primarily to take advantage of the opportunities created by the global economy, 
sustaining the integration of smallholder farmers in agri-food value chains with inter-sectoral linkages. 
This strategy’s purpose is to transform the subsistence-led peasantry into a market-oriented group 
included in domestic and international chains of value addition, with expected positive impacts on food 
security and poverty reduction. Clusters and spatial development initiatives have reappeared lately in 
developing countries as viable solutions to achieve these objectives. Clusters are aggregations of 
companies engaged in similar and inter-related activities, in spatially limited areas selected for their 
growth potential. The strategy of creating clusters in industry, as well as in agri-food, is intended mainly 
to benefit from enhanced horizontal and vertical linkages along the value chain – fostered by company 
proximity – and to bring about innovation, economic externalities and widespread development. 
Through multi-directional exchanges along the value chain, clusters are therefore conceived as a means 
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to channel smallholder farmers’ contribution to national development and at the same time boost their 
weak economic and productive performances. 
The debate on peasantry and agrarian change and transition methods, summarized in chapter 1, outlined 
major features and strategies analyzed by the relevant literature, and provided a useful theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the Ethiopian agrarian transformation trajectory. Since it seized the power 
in 1991, the TPLF-led coalition has started an economic development trajectory based on the support of 
the small-scale producing peasantry. The strategy intended to improve the social and economic 
conditions of the peasantry to source an agricultural-development-led industrialization process, by 
achieving household level food security, reducing poverty and generating economic growth. Following 
a transition period from the Marxist-Leninist regime, in the 2000s the EPRDF was able to reach 
macroeconomic stability, and to consolidate its developmental state model. Given the hegemonic 
ambition of the model, peasantry mobilization was given a fundamental role towards achieving the 
development goals. 
Galvanized by the economic successes of the first transition period, and backed by a substantial 
participation of the international financial institutions, starting from the period of the poverty-reduction 
strategy programs rural areas were targeted with increasing amounts of social and economic 
development initiatives. The GoE’s efforts were aimed at intensifying and improving production quality, 
to strengthen and integrate rural markets in the country, to expand high-value crop markets, to expand 
and diversify its agricultural-led exports, and to promote a wide range of initiatives aimed at improving 
infrastructural endowments and the most important social issues. Consistently with the mainstream 
approach to agricultural and rural development, the Ethiopian peasantry has benefited from an extensive 
system of service delivery and support from the GoE, which eventually led to a remarkable improvement 
in its performance. The strategy aimed at promoting the poor and subsistence-led small-scale producers 
to resilient and market-oriented actors, to stimulate the whole economic growth process. Lately, in 
keeping with new trade opportunities, the strategy has opened to the participation of large-scale investors 
in agriculture and has promoted their integration with the smallholding peasantry. 
In spite of remarkable results in terms of production growth, the study of agrarian transformations has 
revealed that so far the trajectory has performed poorly in many ways: the subsistence-led and rain-
dependent smallholder farmers still dominate the agrarian world; innovation and technology adoption 
has not expanded in the agricultural sector at the expected rates; large-scale investments have not 
produced the expected results in terms of economic externalities and job creation; rural market 
development fell short of the plans; a structural transition toward industry has not taken place. As a 
matter of fact, the longstanding approach to agrarian transformation has proved to be scarcely adaptable 
to changing production and trade relations determined by the inflow of international capital on the 
domestic economic scene, and vice versa. In spite of a very attractive policy for foreign investors, the 
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domestic private sector is still strongly restricted, and therefore most of the Ethiopian peasantry has 
remained tied to traditional and informal relations of production and trade. 
The introduction of the cluster approach in Ethiopian agriculture is recent and aimed at enhancing value 
chains for selected commodities in targeted areas with high growth potential. The approach is part of 
the comprehensive agenda for agricultural transformation designed by the MoARD and the ATA to 
boost the sector’s development and contribute to the overall objective of becoming an industrialized and 
middle-income country by 2025. The ACC initiative includes a broad and complex set of cluster-based 
initiatives linked to the creation of agro-industrial parks, and it currently represents the country’s pilot 
project, which is expected to lead the strategy. According to the ACC’s plan, the smallholding peasantry 
of a targeted farming area is expected to boost the production of a target commodity, to supply rural 
transformation centers and other aggregation and value addition structures, to eventually channel 
towards agro-industrial parks and international markets. Consistently with the mainstream cluster 
theory, these initiatives aim at benefiting from a greater international and domestic private sector 
participation, a strengthened collaboration and competition along the chain, innovation linkages and 
economic externalities. 
Based on the ACC and AGP model - which is similarly aimed at fostering and promoting small-scale 
producer participation in farming chains with value-addition activities - clusters of agricultural 
producers are currently being established also in areas that are not a part of the pilot project. This study 
gathers information from a fieldwork realized in South Wollo in 2016 and constitutes an innovative 
analysis of the implementation process of state-led agricultural clusters in Ethiopia. The analysis has 
provided some unique findings from the field, that have contributed to the overall objective of this study 
dealing with the definition of the major elements of the Ethiopian strategy for agrarian transformation 
that is being implemented lately. 
The cluster analysis has produced some remarkable results. First of all, this work provides empirical 
findings on the pattern of integration of smallholding peasantry in the agrarian transformation process, 
adopted by one of the most successful developing economies. As discovered in section 3 of the fourth 
chapter, following top-down instructions conveyed to peasants by a massive extension system, the South 
Wollo clusters envisaged the creation of aggregated forms of production, with the purpose to promote 
collaboration between participants and generate the benefits related to large-scale farming schemes. In 
these schemes, peasants do not lose formal ownership of their land and production assets, but these are 
considerably limited and bound to community development targets. The peasantry is indeed expected 
to adopt improved agricultural inputs and farming techniques on a large-scale, to increase production 
and productivity levels. At the same time, with the clusters peasants are expected to delegate completely 
their household’s food security to the attainment of national food self-sufficiency; and to change their 
farming approach from a diversified basket of high-value crops to specializing in a monocrop chosen 
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for its high yield potentials, regardless of local market opportunities. These farming schemes are 
expected to generate output surplus, to be channeled through value-adding chains. 
Secondly, this work provides important evidence for the study of the developmental state’s approach to 
agrarian change, and the influence of historical legacies on the application of a mainstream development 
model. As a matter of fact, as discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the fourth chapter, the creation of 
clusters in South Wollo reflects the protagonist role taken on by the Ethiopian developmental state in 
running the agrarian transformation and economic growth processes. This role is exerted through a top-
down and coercive approach that replicates historical legacies from the Derg regime; and in many ways 
clashes with the mainstream approach from which the cluster initiative descends. The main divergent 
points are related to their imposed nature, the absence of relevant market opportunities and linkages, the 
lack of participation by an adequate and flexible private sector, the failure to tailor interventions to local 
conditions, the focus on a very limited basket of staple crops. These collide with the objectives and 
practice of the most successful international cluster experiences to which the literature discussed in 
section 3 of the first chapter refers, according to which actors along the farming value chain are expected 
to participate voluntarily, to increase collaboration and competition, and to foster innovation.  
Thirdly, this study reveals the effects of current agricultural transformation policies and practices on 
smallholding peasantry and its role in development. In the most vulnerable areas, such as South Wollo, 
small-scale farmers are eventually expected to contribute to national development by supplying large 
volumes of high-quality raw materials to agri-food value chains. The study clearly reveals a potentially 
disruptive evolution of the role intended by the GoE for the peasantry in agrarian transformation. In the 
clusters small-scale producers are in fact still being substantially supported by an interventionist state, 
but this support is channeled through a centralized system of controlled participation in large-scale 
commodity-based chains. In these schemes, peasants’ choices and control of their means of production 
are considerably reduced, and evidence suggests that a similar trend is very likely to be expected also in 
their marketing relations. This process creates the set up for a radical transformation of the rural 
economy, along the line of the Derg’s exploitative and extractive model. At the same time, it moves 
away from the mainstream theory of agrarian transformation that relies on competition and markets, and 
it envisages a different (and allegedly more equitable) trajectory for change and integration in the global 
economy for the peasantry. However, as can be seen in this work, this trajectory is unlikely to secure 
food availability and accessibility, to avoid detrimental effects on local markets, to ensure a fair 
distribution of benefits along the chain, to create reliable and independent marketing linkages, to 
formalize contractual agreements, to avoid expropriations, and guarantee an appropriate farmer 
participation in decision-making processes.  
Therefore, the findings of the Ethiopian cluster analysis constitute a unique and empirical-based tool to 
understand the GoE’s trajectory of agrarian transformation, and provide innovative and useful insights 
for the international debate on the peasantry’s changing role in developing countries. In line with a 
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substantial part of the literature, the study finds that the opening to attractive opportunities created by 
the global economy, forces peasants to have to face highly competitive and distant markets. The creation 
of enhanced value chains and spatial development initiatives constitute some of the cornerstones of the 
mainstream strategy adopted by developing countries to integrate smallholding peasantries in 
international relations of production and trade. In keeping with that framework, the ACC initiative is 
indeed focused on creating the structures to include small-scale producers in value adding, integrated 
and outward-oriented chains. The clusters in South Wollo – shaped according to the ACC initiative - 
have not provided direct evidence of any such international linkages, but have revealed the major 
challenges that peasantry may be exposed to with these schemes. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 3 – Major crop production estimate (in ‘000 qt), and average annual growth rate (%) during meher seasons from 1994 to 2016. Personal elaboration, source: CSA234 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
GRO
WTH 
CEREALS 61,542 82,697 86,293 64,988 76,830 77,413 92,960 90,062 100,308 116,243 128,798 137,170 144,964 155,342 177,613 188,100 196,512 215,835 236,077 231,288 253,847 8% 
teff 12,984 17,524 20,019 13,073 16,423 17,176 17,369 16,773 20,255 21,756 24,377 29,929 30,280 31,794 34,835 34,977 37,652 44,186 47,507 44,714 50,204 8% 
barley 8,477 8,752 7,424 7,864 7,686 7,419 9,454 10,797 13,281 12,707 13,521 13,548 15,194 17,504 17,033 15,853 17,817 19,083 19,534 18,567 20,249 5% 
wheat 10,239 10,763 10,016 11,068 11,138 12,126 15,712 16,144 21,766 22,191 24,631 23,145 25,376 30,756 28,557 29,163 34,347 39,252 42,316 42,193 45,379 8% 
maize 16,732 25,393 25,320 19,259 24,166 25,255 31,385 25,430 23,942 33,368 37,764 37,497 39,325 38,972 49,861 60,694 61,583 64,915 72,350 71,508 78,472 9% 
sorghum 11,219 17,227 20,073 10,697 13,208 11,811 15,383 17,425 17,160 21,736 23,160 26,591 28,044 29,713 39,599 39,513 36,043 38,289 43,391 43,233 47,521 10% 
PULSES 7,723 8,141 8,026 6,802 7,320 9,594 10,736 10,373 13,496 12,712 15,786 17,827 19,646 18,980 19,531 23,162 27,510 28,589 26,718 27,693 28,146 7% 
horse/faba 
beans 
3,736 3,594 3,207 2,597 2,852 3,887 4,528 4,269 5,520 5,128 5,762 6,887 6,960 6,108 6,978 7,148 9,440 9,917 8,389 8,487 8,780 5% 
field peas 1,433 1,396 1,063 927 985 1,160 1,414 1,704 2,283 1,823 2,101 2,319 2,671 2,359 2,570 2,633 3,274 3,798 3,426 3,234 3,481 6% 
haricot 
beans 
339 784 948 548 1025 1,329 1,490 1,722 2,113 1,384 2,227 2,414 3,298 3,629 3,403 3,878 4,630 4,574 5,137 5,402 4,839 20% 
chick peas 1,225 1,232 1,265 1,371 1,388 1,646 1,757 1,359 1,616 2,106 2,539 2,868 3,121 2,846 3,228 4,002 4,097 4,238 4,587 4,726 4,441 7% 
lentils 368 332 345 311 284 498 553 353 546 576 810 941 948 1,238 809 1,280 1,515 1,591 1,374 1,339 1,663 11% 
grass 
peas/vetch 
633 804 1,199 1,047 786 1,075 994 790 1,250 1,459 1,838 1,855 2,021 2,040 2,009 3,056 3,256 3,173 2,514 2,877 2,971 11% 
OILSEEDS 1,153 1,953 2,133 1,837 1,689 1,903 2,463 3,129 5,264 4,866 4,971 6,169 6,557 6,436 6,340 7,309 7,267 7,113 7,601 7,848 8,392 12% 
neug 443 859 835 736 845 1,022 1,190 1,190 1,872 1,471 1,478 1,598 1,908 1,578 1,448 1,863 2,124 2,021 2,245 2,563 3,024 13% 
linseed 536 568 676 633 353 321 641 774 1,519 1,259 1,082 1,699 1,561 1,506 654 1,128 1,221 879 831 886 879 10% 
ground nuts  142 125 78 84 119 152 207 291 342 511 447 469 464 716 1,035 1,244 1,121 1,037 1,039 1,296 17% 
                                                     
234 - The last column in tables 3 and 4 show the crop distribution by average annual growth rate (% from 1994 to 2016), ranging from a dark green (higher growth) to a dark red 
(lower growth) colour scale. No aggregate data is available for vegetables, root crops, fruit crops, khat, coffee, hops and sugar cane for the years before 2003, therefore the 
annual growth rate is calculated from 2003 to 2016. 
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sunflower  24  13 25 37 65 50 70 60 112 81 66 55 51 89 133 83 63 67 80 19% 
sesame  33 73 98 177 156 189 615 1,155 1,489 1,494 1,868 2,167 2,605 3,277 2,448 1,814 2,202 2,888 2,742 2,679 30% 
rapeseed 112   87 84 139 147 293 358 244 292 477 387 226 193 747 731 625 537 550 434 24% 
VEGETABLES        3,879 4,320 4,502 3,451 4,720 5,989 5,574 6,756 7,557 8,523 7,229 5,954 7,444 8,126 7% 
ROOT 
CROPS 
       16,055 16,152 13,375 14,095 15,309 12,136 18,064 19,156 16,710 36,299 41,609 54,616 39,986 46,306 13% 
FRUIT 
CROPS 
       2,496 2,634 4,283 4,600 4,621 3,513 4,089 4,863 5,393 4,793 4,992 7,066 6,797 7,924 11% 
KHAT        933 975 1,197 1,517 1,368 1,149 1,162 2,031 1,807 1,831 2,451 2,758 2,027 2,202 9% 
COFFEE        1,262 1,562 1,716 2,415 2,734 2,602 2,655 3,706 3,768 3,739 3,920 4,200 4,146 4,691 11% 
HOPS        249 260 228 241 324 303 309 281 289 290 356 373 372 401 4% 
SUGAR 
CANE 
       998 1,274 16,050 11,163 7,817 5,594 6,724 11,878 10,336 10,399 14,034 15,612 13,770 14,103 94% 
 
Table 4 - Major crop surface estimate (in ‘000 ha), and average annual growth rate (%) during meher seasons from 1994 to 2016. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 GROWTH 
CEREALS 5,746 6,653 6,689 5,602 6,745 6,747 7,637 6,999 7,638 8,081 8,472 8,730 8,770 9,233 9,691 9,589 9,601 9,849 10,152 9,974 10,219 3% 
teff 1,844 2,097 2,168 1,747 2,091 2,123 2,183 1,989 2,136 2,246 2,405 2,565 2,481 2,589 2,761 2,731 2,730 3,017 3,016 2,866 3,018 3% 
barley 879 826 698 682 830 794 874 920 1,095 998 1,019 985 978 1,129 1,047 948 1,019 1,019 994 944 959 1% 
wheat 769 882 772 788 987 1,025 1,140 1,099 1,398 1,460 1,474 1,425 1,454 1,684 1,553 1,437 1,628 1,606 1,664 1,665 1,696 5% 
maize 1,105 1,281 1,317 1,101 1,303 1,407 1,720 1,367 1,393 1,526 1,695 1,767 1,768 1,772 1,963 2,055 2,013 1,995 2,115 2,112 2,136 4% 
sorghum 886 1,252 1,400 955 1,042 995 1,333 1,284 1,254 1,468 1,464 1,533 1,615 1,619 1,898 1,924 1,711 1,677 1,835 1,855 1,882 5% 
PULSES 878 904 905 838 875 1045 1,234 1,100 1,349 1,292 1,379 1,518 1,586 1,489 1,358 1,617 1,863 1,743 1,558 1,653 1,550 3% 
horse/faba beans 342 337 329 266 293 359 426 382 463 457 459 521 539 512 459 458 574 538 443 444 428 2% 
field peas 155 180 158 120 142 152 205 212 254 233 222 212 231 227 204 213 256 275 231 221 213 3% 
haricot beans 69 101 113 92 129 166 187 184 245 164 223 231 267 244 237 332 367 326 323 357 290 10% 
chick peas 175 145 148 170 168 185 212 154 168 201 200 227 233 213 208 231 240 230 240 258 226 2% 
lentils 58 65 53 47 48 72 90 52 77 85 97 107 95 106 77 110 124 126 99 101 114 6% 
grass peas/vetch 80 76 104 142 95 111 114 83 112 123 125 147 160 134 131 180 205 169 137 159 151 5% 
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OILSEEDS 336 392 478 410 396 424 575 571 824 797 742 707 855 781 775 881 818 813 856 859 805 5% 
neug 197 223 250 195 221 257 336 282 359 307 275 285 313 257 248 309 304 285 253 281 281 3% 
linseed 111 113 148 135 90 74 131 143 251 215 174 152 181 141 74 117 128 96 82 85 80 3% 
ground nuts  13 17 11 15 14 17 20 27 35 37 40 42 42 50 64 90 80 65 67 75 12% 
sunflower  5 5 3 6 5 11 8 10 9 13 9 8 5 5 8 11 12 5 7 7 11% 
sesame  9 18 24 32 38 42 92 136 205 211 186 278 316 385 338 240 300 420 388 338 26% 
rapeseed 15  21 16 10 20 25 26 42 25 31 35 33 21 13 45 46 44 30 30 24 13% 
VEGETABLES        82 94 94 95 119 162 138 127 161 193 161 140 201 240 10% 
ROOT CROPS        159 156 156 189 184 146 212 214 200 204 210 217 214 229 4% 
FRUIT CROPS        44 46 46 50 63 48 53 55 61 62 72 90 92 108 8% 
KHAT        112 120 136 148 163 138 139 205 180 174 222 249 251 255 8% 
COFFEE        232 260 261 295 407 391 395 499 516 529 538 562 654 700 9% 
HOPS        21 22 23 24 25 24 24 22 23 23 25 28 28 31 3% 
SUGAR CANE        14 19 19 17 21 16 19 23 22 22 29 30 30 31 8% 
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Table 5 - Land use and distribution, comparison between South Wollo, Amhara Region and Ethiopia, during 2015/16 meher 
season. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 2016b 
  South Wollo Amhara Region Ethiopia 
All land use (in ha) 568,920 5,369,028 18,104,024 
   average holding/HH 0.82 1.16 1.06 
All crop area (in ha and 
percent) 
463,194 81.42% 4,597,152 85.62% 14,521,001 80.21% 
   temporary crop area 452,643 97.72% 4,545,826 98.88% 13,007,323 89.58% 
   permanent crop area 10,552 2.28% 51,326 1.12% 1,513,678 10.42% 
   average area/household 0.69 1.04 0.88 
Fallow land 4,688 0.82% 154,067 2.87% 590,271 3.26% 
Grazing land 42,129 7.41% 353,282 6.58% 1,886,030 10.42% 
Wood land 11,513 2.02% 81,041 1.51% 285,344 1.58% 
Other land use 47,396 8.33% 183,487 3.42% 821,378 4.54% 
 
Table 6 - Cultivated surface per crop during 2015/16 meher season, in hectares and %. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 2016a 
  
South Wollo Amhara Region Ethiopia 
hectares percent hectares percent hectares percent 
Cereals 341,010.36 74.35% 3,418,732.34 74.75% 9,974,316.28 71.46% 
   teff 117,534.44 34.47% 1,093,135.22 31.97% 2,866,052.99 28.73% 
   barley 33,554.10 9.84% 323,130.12 9.45% 944,401.34 9.47% 
   wheat 108,664.85 31.87% 545,106.10 15.94% 1,664,564.62 16.69% 
   maize 10,685.97 3.13% 517,210.23 15.13% 2,111,518.23 21.17% 
   sorghum 67,592.55 19.82% 644,263.75 18.85% 1,854,710.93 18.59% 
   finger millet 1,705.64 0.50% 256,064.53 7.49% 465,508.27 4.67% 
   oats 1,272.28 0.37% 2,872.60 0.08% 22,105.72 0.22% 
   rice - - 36,949.80 1.08% 45,454.18 0.46% 
Pulses 98,219.75 21.41% 695,392.24 15.20% 1,652,844.19 11.84% 
Oilseeds 6,023.71 1.31% 310,350.12 6.79% 859,110.39 6.16% 
Vegetables 2,797.93 0.61% 59,494.96 1.30% 201,332.14 1.44% 
Root crops 1,940.36 0.42% 41,957.60 0.92% 213,766.65 1.53% 
Fruit crops 1,245.21 0.27% 4,839.14 0.11% 92,362.36 0.66% 
Chat 4,757.10 1.04% 9,960.75 0.22% 251,381.15 1.80% 
Coffee 2,065.40 0.45% 8,283.22 0.18% 653,909.76 4.69% 
Hops 602.96 0.13% 20,663.53 0.45% 28,332.67 0.20% 
Sugar cane - - 4,091.86 0.09% 29,679.34 0.21% 
Total 458,663 100% 4,573,766 100% 13,957,035 100% 
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Table 7 – Major crop production during 2015/16 meher season, in qt and %. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 2016a 
  
South Wollo Amhara Region Ethiopia 
quintals percent quintals percent quintals percent 
Cereals 6,180,396.82 78.21% 73,973,735.79  76.82% 231,287,970.83 67.75% 
   teff 1,774,814.73 28.72% 17,570,224.12  23.75% 44,713,186.91 19.33% 
   barley 522,945.00 8.46% 5,759,047.99  7.79% 18,567,042.76 8.03% 
   wheat 2,206,479.19 35.70% 12,219,043.09  16.52% 42,192,572.23 18.24% 
   maize 234,864.61 3.80% 18,143,268.40 24.53% 71,508,354.11 30.92% 
   sorghum 1,391,835.56 22.52% 13,669,612.33 18.48% 43,232,997.52 18.69% 
   finger millet 33,012.92 0.53% 5,492,752.20 7.43% 9,402,463.39 4.07% 
   oats 16,427.58 0.27% 37,802.34 0.05% 402,689.43 0.17% 
   rice - - 1,081,985.33 1.46% 1,268,064.47 0.55% 
Pulses 1,348,993.42 17.07% 10,841,499.53 11.26% 27,692,743.11 8.11% 
Oilseeds 42,476.06 0.54% 2,649,032.34 2.75% 7,848,093.10 2.30% 
Vegetables 89,493.21 1.13% 1,472,260.35 1.53% 7,444,468.39 2.18% 
Root crops 187,322.45 2.37% 5,427,750.86 5.64% 39,985,663.02 11.71% 
Fruit crops - - 238,033.14 0.25% 6,797,428.30 1.99% 
Chat 37,790.52 0.48% 68,058.69 0.07% 2,026,966.39 0.59% 
Coffee 10,032.12 0.13% 29,683.34 0.03% 4,145,964.55 1.21% 
Hops 5,937.11 0.08% 217,613.00 0.23% 371,622.33 0.11% 
Sugar cane - - 1,376,965.00 1.43% 13,769,813.48 4.03% 
Total 7,902,441.71 100% 96,294,632.04 100% 341,370,733.50 100% 
 
Table 8 – Major cereal yields for the 2010/11 and 2015/16 meher seasons. Personal elaboration, source: CSA 2011, 2016a 
 
South Wollo Amhara Region Ethiopia 
2010/11 2015/16 2010/11 2015/16 2010/11 2015/16 
Teff 12.51 15.10 12.61 16.07 12.62 15.60 
Barley 13.07 15.59 13.12 17.82 16.28 19.66 
Wheat 14.14 20.31 16.54 22.42 18.39 25.35 
Maize 22.38 21.98 25.72 35.08 25.40 33.87 
Sorghum 23.13 20.59 21.58 21.22 20.87 23.31 
Finger millet - 19.36 15.49 21.45 15.56 20.20 
Oats 10.97 12.91 12.72 13.16 15.41 18.22 
 
 
